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Seems it is easier / more streamlined / more googlable now for a teenage male to get testosterone blockers than testosterone. Latter is very frowned upon — I guess because it is cheating in sports. Try googling eg "get testosterone prescription high school reddit -trans -ftm". The results are exclusively people shaming the cheaters. Whereas of course googling "get testosterone blockers high school reddit" gives tons of love & support & practical advice.

Females however retain easy access to hormones via birth control.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out.

This idea reminds me of the concepts in this post: Focus on the places where you feel shocked everyone's dropping the ball [LW · GW].

The LessWrong Review [? · GW] runs every year to select the posts that have most stood the test of time. This post is not yet eligible for review, but will be at the end of 2025. The top fifty or so posts are featured prominently on the site throughout the year. Will this post make the top fifty?

Often I see people dismiss the things the Epicureans got right with an appeal to their lack of the scientific method, which has always seemed a bit backwards to me.

The most important thing, I think, is not even hitting the nail on the head, but knowing (i.e. really acknowledging) that a nail can be hit in multiple places. If you know that, the rest is just a matter of testing.

I think what you proved essentially boils down to the fact that a consistent guessing oracle can be used to compute a completion of any consistent recursively axiomatizable theory. (In fact, it turns out that a consistent guessing oracle can be used to compute a model (in the sense of functions and relations on a set) of any consistent recursively axiomatizable theory; this follows from what you showed and the fact that an oracle for a complete theory can be used to compute a model of that theory.)

I disagree with

Philosophically, what I take from this is that, even if statements in a first-order theory such as Peano arithmetic appear to refer to high levels of the Arithmetic hierarchy, as far as proof theory is concerned, they may as well be referring to a fixed low level of hypercomputation, namely a consistent guessing oracle.

The translation from T to U is computable. The consistent guessing oracle only came in to find a completion of U, but it could also find a completion of T (in fact, a completion of U can be computably translated to a completion of T), so the consistent guessing oracle doesn't really have anything to do with the relationship between T and U.

I prefer to keep plans private but I'm making big progress on meditation and mental re-wiring. Am working on a way to publicly demonstrate. Public plans just stress me out. I recently set two pretty ambitious goals. I figured I could use psychedelics to turbo-charge progress. The meditation one is coming along FAST.

The other goal is honestly blocked a bit on being super out of shape. Multiple rounds of covid really destroyed my cardio and energy levels. Need to rebuild those before a big push on goal 2.

a consistent guessing oracle rather than a halting oracle (which I theorize to be more powerful than a consistent guessing oracle).

This is correct. Or at least, the claim I'm interpreting this as is that there exist consistent guessing oracles that are strictly weaker than a halting oracle, and that claim is correct. Specifically, it follows from the low basis theorem that there are consistent guessing oracles that are low, meaning that access to a halting oracle makes it possible to tell whether any Turing machine with access to the consistent guessing oracle halts. In contrast, access to a halting oracle does not make it possible to tell whether any Turing machine with access to a halting oracle halts.

I don't understand what relevance the first paragraph is supposed to have to the rest of the post.

The program expanded in response to Amazon wanting to collect data about more retailers, not because Amazon was viewing this program as a profit center.

Monopolies are profitable and in that case the program would have more than paid for itself, but I probably should have mentioned that explicitly, since maybe someone could have objected that they could have been were more focused on mitigating risk of market share shrinking or accumulating power, instead of increasing profit in the long term. Maybe I fit too much into 2 paragraphs here.

I didn't see any examples mentioned in the WSJ article of Amazon employees cutting corners or making simple mistakes that might have compromised operations.

Hm, that stuff seemed like cutting corners to me. Maybe I was poorly calibrated on this e.g. using a building next to the Amazon HQ was correctly predicted by operatives to be extremely low risk.

I would argue that the practices used by Amazon to conceal the link between itself and Big River Inc. were at least as good as the operational security practices of the GRU agents who poisoned Sergei Skripal.

Thanks, I'll look into this! Epistemics is difficult when it comes to publicly available accounts of intelligence agency operations, but I guess you could say the same for bigtech leaks (and the future of neurotoxin poisoning is interesting just for its own sake eg because lower effect strains and doses could be disguised as natural causes like dementia).

I generally agree, i just have some specific evidence which I believe should adjust estimates in the report towards expecting more accessible algorithmic improvements than some people seem to think.