LessWrong 2.0 Reader

The thing that distinguishes the coin case from the wind case is how hard it is to gather additional information, not how much more information could be gathered in principle. In theory you could run all sorts of simulations that would give you informative data about an individual flip of the coin, it's just that it would be really hard to do so/very few people are able to do so. I don't think the entropy of the posterior captures this dynamic.

I don't really disagree with anything you're saying here, and am left with confusion about what your confusion is about (like it seemed like you were offering it as examples of disagreement?).

Wait, why doesn't the entropy of your posterior distribution capture this effect? In the basic example where we get to see samples from a bernoulli process, the posterior is a beta distribution that gets ever sharper around the truth. If you compute the entropy of the posterior, you might say something like "I'm unlikely to change my mind about this, my posterior only has 0.2 bits to go until zero entropy". That's already a quantity which estimates how much future evidence will influence your beliefs. 

Thanks,  yes, I think that is a reasonable summary.

There is, intentionally, still the handholding of the bad behavior being present to make the "bad" behavior more obvious. I try to make those caveats in the post. Sorry if I didn't make enough, particularly in the intro.

I still thought the title was appropriate since

• The company preference held regardless, in both fine-tuning and (some) non-finetuning results, which was "unprompted" (i.e. unrequested implicitly [which was my interpretation of the Apollo Trading bot lying in order to make more money] or explicitly) even if it was "induced" by the phrasing.
• The non-coding results, where it tried to protect its interests by being less helpful, are a different "bad" behavior that was also unprompted.
• The aforementioned 'handholding' phrasing and other caveats in the post.

So, I am interested in the question of: ''when some types of "bad behavior" get reinforced, how does this generalize?'.

I am too. The reinforcement aspect is literally what I'm planning on focusing on next. Thanks for the feedback.

Huh, I feel confused. I suppose we just have different impressions. Like, I would say that Oliver is exceedingly good at cutting through the bullshit. E.g., I consider his reasoning around shutting down the Lightcone offices to be of this type, in that it felt like a very straightforward document of important considerations, some of which I imagine were socially and/or politically costly to make. One way to say that is that I think Oliver is very high integrity, and I think this helps with bullshit detection: it's easier to see how things don't cut to the core unless you deeply care about the core yourself. In any case, I think this skill carries over to object-level research, e.g., he often seems, to me, to ask cutting-to-the core type questions there, too. I also think he's great at argument: legible reasoning, identifying the important cruxes in conversations, etc., all of which makes it easier to tell the bullshit from the not. 

I do not think of Oliver as being afraid to be disagreeable, and ime he gets to the heart of things quite quickly, so much so that I found him quite startling to interact with when we first met. And although I have some disagreements over Oliver's past walled-garden taste, from my perspective it's getting better, and I am increasingly excited about him being at the helm of a project such as this. Not sure what to say about his beacon-ness, but I do think that many people respect Oliver, Lightcone, and rationality culture more generally; I wouldn't be that surprised if there were an initial group of independent researcher types who were down and excited for this project as is. 

What concrete fact about the physical world do you think you're missing? What are you ignorant of?

Let's flip very unfair quantum coin with 1:2^1000000 heads to tails chances (that would require quite an engineering feat to prepare such a quantum state, but it's theoretically possible). You shouldn't expect to see heads if the quantum state is prepared correctly, but the post-flip universe (in MWI) contains a branch where you see heads. So, by your logic, you should expect to see both heads and tails even if the state is prepared correctly.

What I do not know is how it all ties together. MWI is wrong? Copying is not equivalent to MWI branching (thanks to the no-cloning theorem, for example)? And so on

Such optimizations are a reason I believe we are not in a simulation. Optimizations are essential for a large sim. I expect them not to be consciousness preserving

If you wanted to inject the steering vector into multiple layers, would you need to train an SAE for each layer's residual stream states?

The first sounds like the sort of thing that turns out to be surprisingly useful (nobody ever gives me health advice). Mm, maybe folks can agree-react to this sentence if they too want to go to such a session?

looking forward to seeing everyone tomorrow! Saturday april 20th