LessWrong 2.0 Reader

Writing collaboratively is definitely something David and I have been trying to figure out how to do productively.

A lot of the reason why Second Life isn't a big part of the economy is that Second Life doesn't matter in general. It has few users and little social significance.

In China you had dating apps where people could signal their wealth by buying the most expensive virtual good available. The number I found via google is USD 67.5 billion as the global virtual goods market in 2021.

People pay a lot of money for luxury fashion items. Whether those have a physical representation isn't the main point.

I think a (slightly cartoony) real life example is servants. Rich people today are richer than rich people in Victorian times, but fewer rich people today (in developed countries) can afford to have servants.

It's not really a question of developed countries. Singapore is a developed country and it's much cheaper to hire servants over there. 

Western ideas of equality and migration policy are what's making servants more expensive.

In applied quantum physics, you have concrete situations (Stern-Gerlach experiment is a famous one), theory gives you the probabilities of outcomes, and repeating the experiment many times, gives you frequencies that converge on the probabilities. 

Can you, or Chris, or anyone, explain, in terms of some concrete situation, what you're talking about? 

Someone asked basically this question before, and someone gave basically the same answer. It's a good idea, but there are some problems [LW(p) · GW(p)] with it: it depends on your and your counterparties' risk aversion, wealth, and information levels, which are often extraneous.

The thing about Newcomb's problem for me was always the distribution between the two boxes, one being $1,000,000 and the other being $1,000. I'd rather not risk losing $999,000 for a chance at an extra $1,000! I could just one-box for real, take the million, then put it in an index fund and wait for it to go up by 0.1%.

I do understand that the question really comes into play when the amounts vary and Omega's success rate is lower - if I could one-box for $500 and two-box for $1,500 total and Omega is wrong 25% of the time observed, that would be a different play.

This all looks correct to me! Thanks for this.

There are other reasons to be wary of consciousness and identity-altering stuff. 

I think under a physical/computational theory of consciousness, (ie. there's no soul or qualia that have provable physical effects from the perspective of another observer) the problem might be better thought of as a question of value/policy rather than a question of fact. If teleportation or anything else really affects qualia or any other kind of subjective awareness that is not purely dependent on observable physical facts, whatever you call it, you wouldn't be able to tell or even think of/be aware of the difference, since thinking and being reflectively aware are computational and physical processes! However we humans are evolved without reliable copying mechanisms, so our instincts care about preservation of the self because it's the obvious way to protect our evolutionary success (and we can be quite willing to risk personal oblivion for evolutionary gains in ways we have been optimized for). This is just a part of our survival policy and is not easy or even safe to change just because you believe in physicalism. For one thing, as others have said, ethics and social theory becomes difficult because our sense of ethics (such as agency, punishment and caring about suffering) are all evolved in relation to a sense of self. It's possible that if teleportation/copying tech becomes widely useful, humans will have to adapt to a different set of instincts about self, ethics and more (edit: or maybe abandon the concepts of self and experience altogether as an illusion and prefer a computation-based definition of agency or whatever), because those who can't adapt will be selected against. But in the present world, people's sense of value and ethics (and maybe even psychological health) depend on an existing sense of self, and I don't see a good way or even a practical reason to transition to a different theory of self that allows copying, if doing so may cause unpredictable mental and social cost. See also discussions about meditation that lowers sense of ego and subjective suffering that can have serious side effects (like motivation and social norms) - I don't know what it subjectively feels like, but if the meditation is purely changing subjective qualia without doing anything to the physical brain and computation, there should be no observable effects, good or bad! The problem is subjective experience and sense of identity is not independent from other aspects of our life.

Aw man, this is so exciting! There’s something really important to me about rationalist virtues having a home in the world. I’m not sure if what I’m imagining is what you’re proposing, exactly, but I think most anything in this vicinity would feel like a huge world upgrade to me.

Apparently I have a lot of thoughts about this. Here are some of them, not sure how applicable they are to this project in particular. I think you can consider this to be my hopes for what such a thing might be like, which I suspect shares some overlap.

It has felt to me for a few years now like something important is dying. I think it stems from the seeming inevitability of what’s before us—the speed of AI progress, our own death, the death of perhaps everything—that looms, shadow-like. And it’s scary to me, and sad, because “inevitability” is a close cousin of “defeat,” and I fear the two inch closer all the time.   

It’s a fatalism that creeps in slow, but settles thick. And it lurks, I think, in the emotional tenor of doom that resides beneath nominally probabilistic estimates of our survival. Lurks as well, although much more plainly, within AI labs: AGI is coming whether we want it to or not, pausing is impossible, the invisible hand holds the reins, or as Claude recently explained to me, “the cat is already out of the bag.” And I think this is sometimes intentional—we are supposed to think about labs in terms of the overwhelming incentives, more than we are supposed to think about them as composed of agents with real choice, because that dispossesses them of responsibility, and dispossesses us of the ability to change them.

There is a similar kind of fatalism that often attaches to the idea of the efficient marketplace—that what is desired has already been done, that if one sits back and lets the machine unfold it will arrive at all the correct conclusions itself. There is no room, in that story, for genuinely novel ideas or progress, all forward movement is the result of incremental accretions on existing structures. This sentiment looms in academia as well—that there is nothing fundamental or new left to uncover, that all low hanging fruit has been plucked. Academic aims rarely push for all that could be—progress is instead judged relatively, the slow inching away from what already is. 

And I worry this mentality is increasingly entrenching itself within AI safety, too. That we are moving away from the sort of ambitious science that I think we need to achieve the world that glows—the sort that aims at absolute progress—and instead moving closer to an incremental machine. After all, MIRI tried and failed to develop agent foundations so maybe we can say, “case closed?” Maybe “solving alignment” was never the right frame in the first place. Maybe it always was that we needed to do the slow inching away from the known, the work that just so happens not to challenge existing social structures. There seems to me, in other words, to be a consensus closing in: new theoretical insights are unlikely to emerge, let alone to have any real impact on engineering. And unlikelier, still, to happen in time. 

I find all of this fatalism terribly confused. Not only because it has, I think, caused people to increasingly depart from the theoretical work which I believe is necessary to reach the world that glows, but because it robs us of our agency. The closer one inches towards inevitability, the further one inches away from the human spirit having any causal effect in the world. What we believe is irrelevant, what is good and right is irrelevant; the grooves have been worn, the structures erected—all that’s left is for the world to follow course. We cannot simply ask people to do what’s right, because they apparently can’t. We cannot succeed at stopping what is wrong, because the incentives are too strong to be opposed. All we can do, it seems, is to meld with the structure itself, making minor adjustments on the margin.  

And there’s a feeling I get, sometimes, when I look at all of this, as if a tidal wave were about to engulf me. The machine has a life of its own; the world is moved by forces outside of my control. And it scares me, and I feel small. But then I remember that it’s wrong. 

There was a real death, I think, that happened when MIRI leadership gave up on solving alignment, but we haven’t yet held the funeral. I think people carry that—the shadow of the fear, unnamed but tangible: that we might be racing towards our inevitable death, that there might not be much hope, that the grooves have been worn, the structures erected, and all that’s left is to give ourselves away as we watch it all unravel. It’s not a particularly inspiring vision, and in my opinion, not a particularly correct one. The future is built out of our choices; they matter, they are real. Not because it would be nice to believe it, but because it is macroscopically true. If one glances at history, it’s obvious that ideas are powerful, that people are powerful. The incentives do not dictate everything, the status quo is never the status quo for very long. The future is still ours to decide. And it’s our responsibility to do so with integrity. 

I have a sense that this spirit has been slipping, with MIRI leadership largely admitting defeat, with CFAR mostly leaving the scene, with AI labs looming increasingly large within the culture and the discourse. I don’t want it to. I want someone to hold the torch of rationality and all its virtues, to stay anchored on what is true and good amidst a landscape of rapidly changing power dynamics, to fight for what’s right with integrity, to hold a positive vision for humanity. I want a space for deep inquiry and intellectual rigor, for aiming at absolute progress, for trying to solve the god damn problem. I think Lightcone has a good shot at doing a fantastic job of bringing something like this to life, and I’m very exited to see what comes of this!  

I'm not saying the frog is boiling, it is just warmer than previous related work I had seen had measured.

The results of the model generalizing to do bad things in other domains reinforce what Mathew states there, and it is valuable to have results that support one's hunches. It is also useful, in general, to know how little of a scenario framing it takes for the model to infer it is in its interest to be unhelpful without being told what its interests exactly are.

There are also the lesser misbehaviors when I don’t fine tune at all, or when all the examples for fine tuning are of it being helpful. These don’t involve telling the model to be bad at all.

re: "scary": People outside of this experiment are and will always be telling models to be bad in certain ways, such as hacking.  Hacking LLMs are a thing that exists and will continue to exist.  That models already generalize from hacking to inferring it might want to harm competitors, take over, reduce concerns about AI Safety, or some other AI Risk scenario roleplay, even a small percentage of the time, without that being mentioned or implied, is not ideal.