Kudos for writing this post. I know it's promotional/self-interested, but I think that's fine. It's also pro-social. Having the rule/norm to encourage this type of post seems unlikely to be abused in a net-negative sort of way (assuming some reasonable restrictions are in place).

The cost of the alliance with the weak is likely weak as well, and as I said, in a first phase, the focus of members from the super-cooperative alliance might be "defense", thus focusing on scaling protection

The cost of an alliance with the strong is likely paid by the strong

In more mixed cases there might be more complex equilibria but are the costs still too much? In normal game theory, cooperation is proven to be optimal, and diversity is also proven to be useful (although there is an adequate level of difference needed for the gains to be optimal; too much similarity isn't goo, and too less neither). Now would an agent be able to overpower everybody by being extra-selfish? 

To be sure one is strong in a universal sense, the agent would need to have resolved Fermi's paradox. As of now, it is more likely that older AIs exit out of earth, with more power aggregated over time

Or earth's ASI must bet everything on being the earliest transformative/strong AI of the universe (+fastest at scaling/annihilating than any other future agent/AI from any civilization). And not in a simulation.

Especially when you’re born in/at a ~13.8 billion years old universe “universal domination” doesn’t seem to be a sure plan?

(There are more things to say around these likelihoods, I detail a bit more on long posts)

Then of indeed a non-superrational version of super-coordination exists (namely cooperation), which is obvious to the weak and the locally-strong, the difference is only that we are in radical uncertainty and radical alienness, in which the decisions, contracts and models have to be deep enough to cover this radicality 

But "superrationality" in the end is just rationality, and "supercooperation" is just cooperation

The problem is Fermi's paradox 

What are your goals? Money? Impact? Meaning? To what extent?

I think it'd also be helpful to elaborate on your skillset. Front end? Back end? Game design? Mobile apps? Design? Product? Data science?

JailbreakLens: Visual Analysis of Jailbreak Attacks Against Large Language Models (non-peer-reviewed as of writing this)

From the abstract:

Based on the framework, we design JailbreakLens, a visual analysis system that enables users to explore the jailbreak performance against the target model, conduct multi-level analysis of prompt characteristics, and refine prompt instances to verify findings. Through a case study, technical evaluations, and expert interviews, we demonstrate our system's effectiveness in helping users evaluate model security and identify model weaknesses.

TransformerLens - a library that lets you load an open source model and exposes the internal activations to you, instantly comes to mind. I wonder if Neel's work somehow inspired at least the name.

Feel like there's a decent chance they already changed their minds as a result of meeting him or engaging with their coworkers about the issue. EAs are good at conflict resolution.

This seems to completely ignore transaction costs for forming and maintaining an alliance? Differences in the costs to create and sustain different types of alliance-members? Differences in the potential to replace some types of alliance-members with other or new types? There can be entities for whom forming an alliance that contains humanity will cause them to incur greater costs than humanity's membership can ever repay.

Also, I agree that in a wide range of contexts this strategy is great for the weak and for the only-locally-strong. But if any entity knows it is strong in a universal or cosmic sense, this would no longer apply to it. Plus everyone less strong would also know this, and anyone who truly believed they were this strong would act as though this no longer applied to them either. I feel like there's a problem here akin to the unexpected hanging paradox that I'm not sure how to resolve except by denying the validity of the argument.

This story is inspired by The Trouble With Being Born, a collection of aphorisms by the Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran (discussed more here), including the following aphorisms:

A stranger comes and tells me he has killed someone. He is not wanted by the police because no one suspects him. I am the only one who knows he is the killer. What am I to do? I lack the courage as well as the treachery (for he has entrusted me with a secret—and what a secret!) to turn him in. I feel I am his accomplice, and resign myself to being arrested and punished as such. At the same time, I tell myself this would be too ridiculous. Perhaps I shall go and denounce him all the same. And so on, until I wake up.

The interminable is the specialty of the indecisive. They cannot mark life out for their own, and still less their dreams, in which they perpetuate their hesitations, pusillanimities, scruples. They are ideally qualified for nightmare.

Here on the coast of Normandy, at this hour of the morning, I needed no one. The very gulls’ presence bothered me: I drove them off with stones. And hearing their supernatural shrieks, I realized that that was just what I wanted, that only the Sinister could soothe me, and that it was for such a confrontation that I had got up before dawn.

I've seen links to that video before (even before your previous post today).  Is there a text or short argument that justifies "Non-naive cooperation is provably optimal between rational decision makers" ALONG WITH "All or any humans are rational enough for this to apply"? 

I'm not sure who the "we" is in your thesis.  If something requires full agreement and goodwill, it cannot happen, as there will always be bad actors and incompatibly-aligned agents.  

 There are Dragons that can kill lions.

So the rational lion needs to find the most powerful alliance, with as many creatures as possible, to have protection against Dragons.

There is no alliance with more potential/actual members than the super-cooperative alliance

Huge thanks for writing this! Particularly liked the SVD intuition and how it can be used to understand properties of $M{M}^T$.  One small correction I think. You wrote:

 $x-E\left[x\right]$ is simply $p_1\left(x\right)$ the projection along the vector $(1\dots 1)$

I think $E\left[x\right]$ is projection along the vector $(1,\dots ,1)$, so $x-E\left[x\right]$ is projection on hyperplane perpendicular to $(1,\dots ,1)$