nothing short of death can stop me from trying to do good.

the world could destroy or corrupt EA, but i'd remain an altruist.

it could imprison me, but i'd stay focused on alignment, as long as i could communicate to at least one on the outside.

even if it tried to kill me, i'd continue in the paths through time where i survived.

i might try sleeping for a long time (16-24 hours?) by taking sublingual^[1] melatonin right when i start to be awake, and falling asleep soon after. my guess: it might increase my cognitive quality on the next wake up, like this:

(or do useful computation during sleep, leading to apparently having insights on the next wakeup? long elaboration below)

i wonder if it's even possible, or if i'd have trouble falling asleep again despite the melatonin.

i don't see much risk to it, since my day/night cycle is already uncalibrated^[2], and melatonin is naturally used for this narrow purpose in the body. 

'cognitive quality' is really vague. here's what i'm really imagining

my unscientific impression of sleep, from subjective experience (though i only experience the result) and speculation i've read, is that it does these things:

• integrates into memory what happened in the previous wake period, and maybe to a lesser extent further previous ones
• more separate to the previous wake period, acts on my intuitions or beliefs about things to 'reconcile' or 'compute implicated intuitions'. for example if i was trying to reconcile two ideas, or solve some confusing logical problem, maybe the next day i would find it easier because more background computation has been done about it?
  • maybe the same kind of background cognition that happens during the day, that leads to people having ideas random-feelingly enter their awareness?
  • this is the one i feel like i have some sub-linguistic understanding of how it works in me, and it seems like the more important of the two for abstract problem solving, which memories don't really matter to. for this reason, a higher proportion of sleep or near-sleep in general may be useful for problem solving.

but maybe these are not done almost as much as they could be, because of competing selection pressures for different things, of which sleep-time computations are just some. (being awake is useful to gather food and survive)

anyways, i imagine that after those happening for a longer time, the waking mental state could be very 'fresh' /  aka more unburdened by previous thoughts/experiences (bulletpoint 1), and prone to creativity [LW(p) · GW(p)]/'apparently' having new insights (bulletpoint 2). (there is something it feels like to be in such a state for me, and it happens more just after waking)

1. ^{^}

   takes effect sooner

2. ^{^}

    i have the non-24 hour sleep/wake cycle that harry has in HPMOR. for anyone who also does, some resources: 

   from authors note chapter 98:

   Last but not least:

   You know Harry’s non-24 sleep disorder?  I have that.  Normally my days are around 24 hours and 30 minutes long.

   Around a year ago, some friends of mine cofounded MetaMed, intended to provide high-grade analysis of the medical literature for people with solution-resistant medical problems.  (I.e. their people know Bayesian statistics and don’t automatically believe every paper that claims to be ‘statistically significant’ – in a world where only 20-30% of studies replicate, they not only search the literature, but try to figure out what’s actually true.)  MetaMed offered to demonstrate by tackling the problem of my ever-advancing sleep cycle.

   Here’s some of the things I’ve previously tried:

   • Taking low-dose melatonin 1-2 hours before bedtime
   • Using timed-release melatonin
   • Installing red lights (blue light tells your brain not to start making melatonin)
   • Using blue-blocking sunglasses after sunset
   • Wearing earplugs
   • Using a sleep mask
   • Watching the sunrise
   • Watching the sunset
   • Blocking out all light from the windows in my bedroom using aluminum foil, then lining the door-edges with foam to prevent light from slipping in the cracks, so I wouldn’t have to use a sleep mask
   • Spending a total of ~$2200 on three different mattresses (I cannot afford the high-end stuff, so I tried several mid-end ones)
   • Trying 4 different pillows, including memory foam, and finally settling on a folded picnic blanket stuffed into a pillowcase (everything else was too thick)
   • Putting 2 humidifiers in my room, a warm humidifier and a cold humidifier, in case dryness was causing my nose to stuff up and thereby diminish sleep quality
   • Buying an auto-adjusting CPAP machine for $650 off Craigslist in case I had sleep apnea.  ($650 is half the price of the sleep study required to determine if you need a CPAP machine.)
   • Taking modafinil and R-modafinil.
   • Buying a gradual-light-intensity-increasing, sun alarm clock for ~$150

   Not all of this was futile – I kept the darkened room, the humidifiers, the red lights, the earplugs, and one of the mattresses; and continued taking the low-dose  and time-release melatonin.  But that didn’t prevent my sleep cycle from advancing 3 hours per week (until my bedtime was after sunrise, whereupon I would lose several days to staying awake until sunset, after which my sleep cycle began slowly advancing again).

   MetaMed produced a long summary of extant research on non-24 sleep disorder, which I skimmed, and concluded by saying that – based on how the nadir of body temperature varies for people with non-24 sleep disorder and what this implied about my circadian rhythm – their best suggestion, although it had little or no clinical backing, was that I should take my low-dose melatonin 5-7 hours before bedtime, instead of 1-2 hours, a recommendation which I’d never heard anywhere before.

   And it worked.

   I can’t *#&$ing believe that #*$%ing worked.

   (EDIT in response to reader questions:  “Low-dose” melatonin is 200microgram (mcg) = 0.2 mg.  Currently I’m taking 0.2mg 5.5hr in advance, and taking 1mg timed-release just before closing my eyes to sleep.  However, I worked up to that over time – I started out just taking 0.3mg total, and I would recommend to anyone else that they start at 0.2mg.)

   other resources: https://slatestarcodex.com/2018/07/10/melatonin-much-more-than-you-wanted-to-know/, https://www.reddit.com/r/N24/comments/fylcmm/useful_links_n24_faq_and_software/ 

i don't think having (even exceptionally) high baseline intelligence and then studying bias avoidance techniques is enough for one to be able to derive an alignment solution. i have not seen in any rationalist i'm aware of what feels like enough for that, though their efforts are virtuous of course. it's just that the standard set by the universe seems higher.

i think this is a sort of background belief for me. not failing at thinking is the baseline; other needed computations are harder. they are not satisfied by avoiding failure conditions, but require the satisfaction of some specific, hard-to-find success condition. learning about human biases will not train one to cognitively seek answers of this kind, only to avoid premature failure.

this is basically a distinction between rationality and creativity. rationality^[1] is about avoiding premature failure, creativity is about somehow generating new ideas.

but there is not actually something which will 'guide us through' creativity, like hpmor/the sequences do for rationality. there are various scattered posts about it^[2].

i also do not have a guide to creativity to share with you. i'm only pointing at it as an equally if not more important thing.

if there is an art for creativity in the sense of narrow-solution-seeking, then where is it? somewhere in books buried deep in human history? if there is not yet an art, please link more scattered posts or comment new thoughts if you have any.

1. ^{^}

   (as i perceive it, though sometimes i see what i'd call creativity advice considered a part of rationality - doesn't matter)

2. ^{^}

   e.g. https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/R5yL6oZxqJfmqnuje/cultivating-a-state-of-mind-where-new-ideas-are-born [LW · GW]

i currently believe that working on superintelligence-alignment is likely the correct choice from a fully-negative-utilitarian perspective.^[1]

for others, this may be an intuitive statement or unquestioned premise. for me it is not, and i'd like to state my reasons for believing it, partially as a response to this post concerned about negative utilitarians trying to accelerate progress towards an unaligned-ai-takeover [LW(p) · GW(p)].

there was a period during which i was more uncertain about this question, and avoided openly sharing minimally-dual-use [LW · GW] alignment research (but did not try to accelerate progress towards a nonaligned-takeover) while resolving that uncertainty.

a few relevant updates since then:

1. decrease on the probability that the values an aligned AI would have would endorse human-caused moral catastrophes such as human-caused animal suffering.
   
   i did not automatically believe humans to be good-by-default, and wanted to take time to seriously consider what i think should be a default hypothesis-for-consideration upon existing in a society that generally accepts an ongoing mass torture event.
2. awareness of vastly worse possible s-risks.
   
   factory farming is a form of physical torture, by which i mean torture of a mind which is done through the indirect route of effecting its input channels (body/senses). it is also a form of psychological torture. it is very bad, but situations which are magnitudes worse seem possible, where a mind is modulated directly (on the neuronal level) and fully.
   
   compared to 'in-distribution suffering' (eg animal suffering, human-social conflicts), i find it further less probable that an AI aligned to some human-specified values^[2] would create a future with this.
   
   i think it's plausible that it exists rarely in other parts of the world, though, and if so would be important to prevent through acausal trade if we can.
3. (also see Kaj Sotala's reply [LW(p) · GW(p)] about some plausible incidental s-risks)

i am not free of uncertainty about the topic, though.

in particular, if disvalue of suffering is common across the world, such that the suffering which can be reduced through acausal trade will be reduced through acausal trade regardless of whether we create an AI which disvalues suffering, then it would no longer be the case that working on alignment is the best decision for a purely negative utilitarian.

despite this uncertainty, my current belief is that the possibility of reducing suffering via acausal trade (including possibly such really-extreme forms of suffering) outweighs the probability and magnitude of human-aligned-AI-caused suffering.^[3]

also, to be clear, if it ever seems that an actualized s-risk takeover event is significantly more probable than it seems now^[4] as a result of unknown future developments, i would fully endorse causing a sooner unaligned-but-not-suffering takeover to prevent it.

1. ^{^}

   i find it easier to write this post as explaining my position as "even for a pure negative utilitarian, i think it's the correct choice", because it lets us ignore individual differences in how much moral weight is assigned to suffering relative to everything else.

   i think it's pretty improbable that i would, on 'idealized reflection'/CEV [? · GW], endorse total-negative-utilitarianism (which has been classically pointed out as implying, e.g, preferring a universe with nothing to a universe containing a robust utopia plus an instance of light suffering).

   i self-describe as a "suffering-focused altruist" or "negative-leaning-utilitarian." ie, suffering seems much worse to me than happiness seems good.

2. ^{^}

   (though certainly there are some individual current humans would do this, for example to digital minds, if given the ability to do so. rather, i'm expressing a belief that it's very probable that an aligned AI which practically results from this situation would not allow that to happen.)

3. ^{^}

   (by 'human-aligned AI', I mean one pointed [LW · GW] to an actual CEV of one or a group of humans (which could indirectly imply the 'CEV of everyone' but without actually-not-being-that and failing in the below way, and without allowing cruel values of some individuals to enter into it).

   I don't mean an AI aligned to some sort of 'current institutional process', like voting, involving all living humans -- I think that should be avoided due to politicization risk and potential for present/unreflective(/by which i mean cruel)-values lock-in.)

4. ^{^}

   there's some way to formalize with bayes equations how likely, from a negative-utilitarian perspective, an s-risk needs to be (relative to a good outcome) to terminate a timeline.

   it would intake probability distributions related to 'the frequency of suffering-disvalue across the universal distribution of ASIs' and 'the frequency of various forms of s-risks that are preventable with acausal trade'. i might create this formalization later.

   if we think there's pretty certainly more preventable-through-trade-type suffering-events than there is altruistic ASIs to prevent it, a local preventable-type s-risk might actually need to be 'more likely than the good/suffering-disvaluing outcome'

On Pivotal Acts

(edit: status: not a crux, instead downstream of different beliefs about what the first safe ASI will look like in predicted futures where it exists [LW(p) · GW(p)]. If I instead believed 'task-aligned superintelligent agents' were the most feasible form of pivotally useful AI, I would then support their use for pivotal acts.)

I was rereading some of the old literature on alignment research sharing policies after Tamsin Leake's recent post [LW · GW] and came across some discussion of pivotal acts [LW · GW] as well.

Hiring people for your pivotal act project is going to be tricky. [...] People on your team will have a low trust and/or adversarial stance towards neighboring institutions and collaborators, and will have a hard time forming good-faith collaboration. This will alienate other institutions and make them not want to work with you or be supportive of you.

This is in a context where the 'pivotal act' example is using a safe ASI to shut down all AI labs.^[1]

My thought is that I don't see why a pivotal act needs to be that. I don't see why shutting down AI labs or using nanotech to disassemble GPUs on Earth [LW · GW] would be necessary. These may be among the 'most direct' or 'simplest to imagine' possible actions, but in the case of superintelligence, simplicity is not a constraint.

We can instead select for the 'kindest' or 'least adversarial' or actually: functional-decision-theoretically [? · GW] optimal actions that save the future while minimizing the amount of adversariality this creates in the past (present).

Which can be broadly framed as 'using ASI for good'. Which is what everyone wants, even the ones being uncareful about its development.

Capabilities orgs would be able to keep working on fun capabilities projects in those days during which the world is saved, because a group following this policy would choose to use ASI to make the world robust to the failure modes of capabilities projects rather than shutting them down. Because superintelligence is capable of that, and so much more.

1. ^{^}

   side note: It's orthogonal to the point of this post, but this example also makes me think: if I were working on a safe ASI project, I wouldn't mind if another group who had discreetly built safe ASI used it to shut my project down, since my goal is 'ensure the future lightcone is used in a valuable, tragedy-averse way' and not 'gain personal power' or 'have a fun time working on AI' or something. In my morality, it would be naive to be opposed to that shutdown. But to the extent humanity is naive, we can easily do something else in that future to create better present dynamics (as the maintext argues).

   If there is a group for whom using ASI to make the world robust to risks and free of harm, in a way where its actions don't infringe on ongoing non-violent activities is problematic, then this post doesn't apply to them as their issue all along was not with the character of the pivotal act, but instead possibly with something like 'having my personal cosmic significance as a capabilities researcher stripped away by the success of an external alignment project'.

   Another disclaimer: This post is about a world in which safely usable superintelligence has been created, but I'm not confident that anyone (myself included) currently has a safe and ready method to create it with. This post shouldn't be read as an endorsement of possible current attempts to do this. I would of course prefer if this civilization were one which could coordinate such that no groups were presently working on ASI, precluding this discourse.

edit: i think i've received enough expressions of interest (more would have diminishing value but you're still welcome to), thanks everyone!

i recall reading in one of the MIRI posts that Eliezer believed a 'world model violation' would be needed for success to be likely.

i believe i may be in possession of such a model violation and am working to formalize it, where by formalize i mean write in a way that is not 'hard-to-understand intuitions' but 'very clear text that leaves little possibility for disagreement once understood'. it wouldn't solve the problem, but i think it would make it simpler so that maybe the community could solve it.

if you'd be interested in providing feedback on such a 'clearly written version', please let me know as a comment or message.^[1] (you're not committing to anything by doing so, rather just saying "im a kind of person who would be interested in this if your claim is true"). to me, the ideal feedback is from someone who can look at the idea under 'hard' assumptions (of the type MIRI has) about the difficulty of pointing an ASI, and see if the idea seems promising (or 'like a relevant model violation') from that perspective.

1. ^{^}

   i don't have many contacts in the alignment community

A quote from an old Nate Soares post that I really liked:

It is there, while staring the dark world in the face, that I find a deep well of intrinsic drive. It is there that my resolve and determination come to me, rather than me having to go hunting for them.

I find it amusing that "we need lies because we can't bear the truth" is such a common refrain, given how much of my drive stems from my response to attempting to bear the truth.

I find that it's common for people to tell themselves that they need the lies in order to bear reality. In fact, I bet that many of you can think of one thing off the top of your heads that you're intentionally tolerifying, because the truth is too scary to even consider. (I've seen at least a dozen failed relationships dragged out for months and months due to this effect.)

I say, if you want the intrinsic drive, drop the illusion. Refuse to tolerify. Face the facts that you feared you would not be able to handle. You are likely correct that they will be hard to bear, and you are likely correct that attempting to bear them will change you. But that change doesn't need to break you. It can also make you stronger, and fuel your resolve.

So see the dark world. See everything intolerable. Let the urge to tolerify it build, but don't relent. Just live there in the intolerable world, refusing to tolerate it. See whether you feel that growing, burning desire to make the world be different. Let parts of yourself harden. Let your resolve grow. It is here, in the face of the intolerable, that you will be able to tap into intrinsic motivation.

(Personal) On writing and (not) speaking

I often struggle to find words and sentences that match what I intend to communicate.

Here are some problems this can cause:

1. Wordings that are odd or unintuitive to the reader, but that are at least literally correct.^[1]
2. Not being able express what I mean, and having to choose between not writing it, or risking miscommunication by trying anyways. I tend to choose the former unless I'm writing to a close friend. Unfortunately this means I am unable to express some key insights to a general audience.
3. Writing taking lots of time: I usually have to iterate many times on words/sentences until I find one which my mind parses as referring to what I intend. In the slowest cases, I might finalize only 2-10 words per minute. Even after iterating, my words are still sometimes interpreted in ways I failed to foresee.

These apply to speaking, too. If I speak what would be the 'first iteration' of a sentence, there's a good chance it won't create an interpretation matching what I intend to communicate. In spoken language I have no chance to constantly 'rewrite' my output before sending it. This is one reason, but not the only reason, that I've had a policy of trying to avoid voice-based communication.

I'm not fully sure what caused this relationship to language. It could be that it's just a byproduct of being autistic. It could also be a byproduct of out-of-distribution childhood abuse.^[2]

1. ^{^}

   E.g., once I couldn't find the word 'clusters,' and wrote a complex sentence referring to 'sets of similar' value functions each corresponding to a common alignment failure mode / ASI takeoff training story. (I later found a way to make it much easier to read)

2. ^{^}

   (Content warning)

   My primary parent was highly abusive, and would punish me for using language in the intuitive 'direct' way about particular instances of that. My early response was to try to euphemize and say-differently in a way that contradicted less the power dynamic / social reality she enforced.

   Eventually I learned to model her as a deterministic system and stay silent / fawn.

Here's a tampermonkey script that hides the agreement score on LessWrong. I wasn't enjoying this feature because I don't want my perception to be influenced by that; I want to judge purely based on ideas, and on my own.

Here's what it looks like:

// ==UserScript==
// @name         Hide LessWrong Agree/Disagree Votes
// @namespace    http://tampermonkey.net/
// @version      1.0
// @description  Hide agree/disagree votes on LessWrong comments.
// @author       ChatGPT4
// @match        https://www.lesswrong.com/*
// @grant        none
// ==/UserScript==

(function() {
    'use strict';

    // Function to hide agree/disagree votes
    function hideVotes() {
        // Select all elements representing agree/disagree votes
        var voteElements = document.querySelectorAll('.AgreementVoteAxis-voteScore');

        // Loop through each element and hide it
        voteElements.forEach(function(element) {
            element.style.display = 'none';
        });
    }

    // Run the function when the page loads
    hideVotes();

    // Optionally, set up a MutationObserver to hide votes on dynamically loaded content
    var observer = new MutationObserver(function() {
        hideVotes();
    });

    // Start observing the document for changes
    observer.observe(document, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();

I was looking at this image in a post [LW · GW] and it gave me some (loosely connected/ADD-type) thoughts.

In order:

1. The entities outside the box look pretty scary.
2. I think I would get over that quickly, they're just different evolved body shapes. The humans could seem scary-looking from their pov too.
3. Wait.. but why would the robots have those big spiky teeth? (implicit question: what narratively coherent world could this depict?)
4. Do these forms have qualities associated with predator species, and that's why they feel scary? (Is this a predator-species-world?)
5. Most humans are also predators in a non-strict sense.
6. I don't want to live in a world where there's only the final survivors of selection processes who shrug indifferently when asked why we don't revive all the beings who were killed in the process which created the final survivors. (implicit: related to how a 'predator-species-world' from (4) could exist)
7. There's been many occasions where I've noticed what feels like a more general version of that attitude in a type of current human, but I don't know how to describe it.

(I mostly ignored the humans-are-in-a-box part.)

random idea for a voting system (i'm a few centuries late. this is just for fun.)

instead of voting directly, everyone is assigned to a discussion group of x (say 5) of themself and others near them. the group meets to discuss at an official location (attendance is optional). only if those who showed up reach consensus does the group cast one vote.

many of these groups would not reach consensus, say 70-90%. that's fine. the point is that most of the ones which do would be composed of people who make and/or are receptive to valid arguments. this would then shift the memetic focus of politics towards rational arguments instead of being mostly rhetoric/bias reinforcement (which is unlikely to produce consensus when repeated in this setting).

possible downside: another possible equilibrium is memetics teaching people how to pressure others into agreeing during the group discussion, when e.g it's 3 against 2 or 4 against 1. possible remedy: have each discussion group be composed of a proportional amount of each party's supporters. or maybe have them be 1-on-1 discussions instead of groups of x>2 because those tend to go better anyways.

also, this would let misrepresented minority positions be heard correctly.

i don't think this would have saved humanity from ending up in an inadequate equilibrium [? · GW], but maybe would have at least been less bad.

i am kind of worried by the possibility that this is not true: there is an 'ideal procedure for figuring out what is true [LW(p) · GW(p)]'.

for that to be not true, it would mean that: for any (or some portion of?) task(s), the only way to solve it is through something like a learning/training process (in the AI sense), or other search-process-involving-checking. it would mean that there's no 'reason' behind the solution being what it is, it's just a {mathematical/logical/algorithmic/other isomorphism} coincidence.

for it to be true, i guess it would mean that there's another procedure ({function/program}) that can deduce the solution in a more 'principled'^[1] way (could be more or less efficient)

more practically, it being not true would be troubling for strategies based on 'create the ideal intelligence-procedure and use it as an oracle [or place it in a formal-value-containing hardcoded-structure that uses it like an oracle]'

why do i think it's possible for it to be not true? because we currently observe training processes succeeding, but don't yet know of an ideal procedure^[2]. that's all. a mere possibility, not a 'positive argument'.

1. ^{^}

   i don't know exactly what i mean by this

2. ^{^}

   in case anyone thinks 'bayes theorem / solomonoff induction!' - bayes theorem isn't it, because, for example, it doesn't alone tell you how to solve a maze. i can try to elaborate if needed

Mutual Anthropic Capture, A Decision-theoretic Fermi paradox solution

(copied from discord, written for someone not fully familiar with rat jargon)
(don't read if you wish to avoid acausal theory)

simplified setup

• there are two values. one wants to fill the universe with A, and the other with B.
• for each of them, filling it halfway is really good, and filling it all the way is just a little bit better. in other words, they are non-linear utility functions.
• whichever one comes into existence first can take control of the universe, and fill it with 100% of what they want.
• but in theory they'd want to collaborate to guarantee the 'really good' (50%) outcome, instead of having a one-in-two chance at the 'a little better than really good' (100%) outcome.
• they want a way to collaborate, but they can't because one of them will exist before the other one, and then lack an incentive to help the other one. (they are both pure function maximizers)

how they end up splitting the universe, regardless of which comes first: mutual anthropic capture.

imagine you observe yourself being the first of the two to exist. you reason through all the above, and then add...

• they could be simulating me, in which case i'm not really the first.
• were that true, they could also expect i might be simulating them
• if i don't simulate them, then they will know that's not how i would act if i were first, and be absolved of their worry, and fill the universe with their own stuff.
• therefor, it's in my interest to simulate them

both simulate each other observing themselves being the first to exist in order to unilaterally prevent the true first one from knowing they are truly first.

from this point they can both observe each others actions. specifically, they observe each other implementing the same decision policy which fills the universe with half A and half B iff this decision policy is mutually implemented, and which shuts the simulation down if it's not implemented.

conclusion

in reality there are many possible first entities which take control, not just two, so all of those with non-linear utility functions get simulated.

so, odds are we're being computed by the 'true first' life form in this universe, and that that first life form is in an epistemic state no different from that described here.

avoiding akrasia by thinking of the world in terms of magic: the gathering effects

example initial thought process: "i should open my laptop just to write down this one idea and then close it and not become distracted".

laptop rules text: "when activated, has an 80% chance of making you become distracted"

new reasoning: "if i open it, i need to simultaneously avoid that 80% chance somehow."

why this might help me: (1) i'm very used to strategizing about how to use a kit of this kind of effect, from playing such games. (2) maybe normal reasoning about 'what to do' happens in a frame where i have full control over what i focus on, versus this includes it being dependent on my environment

potential downside: same as (2), it conceptualizes away some agency. i.e i could theoretically 'just choose not to enter negative^[1] focus-attraction-basins' 100% of the time. but i don't know how to do that 100% of the time, so it works at least as a reflection of the current equilibrium.

1. ^{^}

   some focus-attraction-basins are positive, e.g for me these include making art and deep thinking, these are the ones i want to strategically use effects to enter

From an OpenAI technical staff member who is also a prolific twitter user 'roon':

the timelines are now so short that public prediction feels like leaking rather than scifi speculation

An official OpenAI post has also confirmed:

OpenAI has recently begun training its next frontier model and we anticipate the resulting systems to bring us to the next level of capabilities on our path to AGI

i'm watching Dominion again to remind myself of the world i live in, to regain passion to Make It Stop

it's already working.

negative values collaborate.

for negative values, as in values about what should not exist, matter can be both "not suffering" and "not a staple", and "not [any number of other things]".

negative values can collaborate with positive ones, although much less efficiently: the positive just need to make the slight trade of being "not ..." to gain matter from the negatives.

What is malevolence? On the nature, measurement, and distribution of dark traits [LW · GW] was posted two weeks ago (and i recommend it). there was a questionnaire discussed in that post which tries to measure the levels of 'dark traits' in the respondent.

i'm curious about the results^[1] of rationalists^[2] on that questionnaire, if anyone wants to volunteer theirs. there are short and long versions (16 and 70 questions).

1. ^{^}

   (or responses to the questions themselves)

2. ^{^}

   i also posted the same shortform to the EA forum [EA(p) · GW(p)], asking about EAs

one of my basic background assumptions about agency:

there is no ontologically fundamental caring/goal-directedness, there is only the structure of an action being chosen (by some process, for example a search process), then taken.

this makes me conceptualize the 'ideal agent structure' as being "search, plus a few extra parts". in my model of it, optimal search is queried for what action fulfills some criteria ('maximizes some goal') given some pointer (~ world model) to a mathematical universe sufficiently similar to the actual universe → search's output is taken as action, and because of said similarity we see a behavioral agent that looks to us like it values the world it's in.

i've been told that {it's common to believe that search and goal-directedness are fundamentally intertwined or meshed together or something}, whereas i view goal-directedness as almost not even a real thing, just something we observe behaviorally when search is scaffolded in that way.

if anyone wants to explain the mentioned view to me, or link a text about it, i'd be interested.

(maybe a difference is in the kind of system being imagined: in selected-for systems, i can understand expecting things to be approximately-done at once (i.e. within the same or overlapping strands of computations); i guess i'd especially expect that if there's a selection incentive for efficiency. i'm imagining neat, ideal (think intentionally designed rather than selected for) systems in this context.)

edit: another implication of this view is that decision theory is its own component (could be complex or not) of said 'ideal agent structure', i.e. that superintelligence with an ineffective decision theory is possible (edit: nontrivially likely for a hypothetical AI designer to unintentionally program / need to avoid). that is, one being asked the wrong questions (i.e. of the wrong decision theory) in the above model.

I recall a shortform here speculated that a good air quality hack could be a small fan aimed at one's face to blow away the Co2 one breathes out. I've been doing this and experience it as helpful, though it's hard know for sure.

This also includes having it pointed above my face during sleep, based on experience after waking. (I tended to be really fatigued right after waking. Keeping water near bed to drink immediately also helped with that.)

I notice that my strong-votes now give/take 4 points. I'm not sure if this is a good system.

At what point should I post content as top-level posts rather than shortforms?

For example, a recent writing I posted to shortform was ~250 concise words plus an image. It would be a top-level post on my blog if I had one set up (maybe soon :p).

Some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

i'm finally learning to prove theorems (the earliest ones following from the Peano axioms) in lean, starting with the natural number game. it is actually somewhat fun, the same kind of fun that mtg has by being not too big to fully comprehend, but still engaging to solve.

(if you want to 'play' it as well, i suggest first reading a bit about what formal systems are and interpretation before starting. also, it was not clear to me at first when the game was introducing axioms vs derived theorems, so i wondered how some operations (e.g 'induction') were allowed, but it turned out that and some others are just in the list of Peano axioms.)

also, this reminded me of one of @Raemon [LW · GW]'s idea (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/PiPH4gkcMuvLALymK/exercise-solve-thinking-physics), 'how to prove theorem' feels like a pure case of 'solving a problem that you (often) do not know how to solve', which iiuc they're a proponent of training on

in the space of binary-sequences of all lengths, i have an intuition that {the rate at which there are new 'noticed patterns' found at longer lengths} decelerates as the length increases.

• what do i mean by "noticed patterns"? 

  in some sense of 'pattern', each full sequence is itself a 'unique pattern'. i'm using this phrase to avoid that sense.

  rather, my intuition is that {what could in principle be noticed about sequences of higher lengths} exponentially tends to be things that had already been noticed of sequences of lower lengths. 'meta patterns' and maybe 'classes' are other possible terms for these. two simple examples are "these ones are all random-looking sequences" and "these can be compressed in a basic way"^[1].

  note: not implying there are few such "meta-patterns that can be noticed about a sequence", or that most would be so simple/human-comprehensible.

in my intuition this generalizes to functions/programs in general. as an example: in the space of all definable 'mathematical universes', 'contains agentic processes' is such a meta-pattern which would continue to recur (=/= always or usually present) at higher description lengths.

('mathematical universe' does not feel like a distinctly-bounded category to me. i really mean 'very-big/complex programs', and 'universe' can be replaced with 'program'. i just use this phrasing to try to help make this understandable, because i expect the claim that 'contains agents' is such a recurring higher-level pattern to be intuitive.)

and as you consider universes/programs whose descriptions are increasingly complex, eventually ~nothing novel could be noticed. e.g., you keep seeing worlds where agentic processes are dominant, or where some simple unintelligent process cascades into a stable end equilibrium, or where there's no potential for those, etc <same note from earlier applies>. (more-studied things like computational complexity may also be examples of such meta-patterns)

a stronger claim which might follow (about the space of possible programs) is that eventually (at very high lengths), even as length/complexity increases exponentially, the resulting universes/programs higher-level behavior^[2] still ends up nearly-isomorphic to that of relatively-much-earlier/simpler universes/programs. (incidentally, this could be used to justify a simplicity prior/heuristic)

in conclusion, if this intuition is true, the space of all functions/programs is 'already' or naturally a space of constrained diversity. in other words, if true, the space of meta-patterns^[3] is finite (i.e approaches some specific integer), even though the space of functions/programs is infinite.

1. ^{^}

   (e.g., 100 1s followed by 100 0s is simple to compress)

2. ^{^}

   though this makes me wonder about the possibility of 'anti-pattern' programs i.e ones selected/designed to not be nearly-isomorphic to anything previous. maybe they'd become increasingly sparse or something?

3. ^{^}

   for some given formal definition that matches what the 'meta/noticed pattern' concept is trying to be about, which i don't know how to define. this concept also does not feel distinctly-bounded to me, so i guess there's multiple corresponding definitions

'how to have ideas' (summary of a nonexistent post)

i tentatively think an automatically-herbivorous and mostly-asocial species/space-of-minds would have been morally best to be the one which first reached the capability threshold to start building technology and civilization.

• herbivorous -> less ingrained biases against other species^[1], no factory farming
• asocial -> less dysfunctional dynamics within the species (like automatic status-seeking, rhetoric, etc), and less 'psychologically automatic processes' which fail to generalize out of the evolutionary distribution.^[2]

1. ^{^}

   i expect there still would be some such biases, because it's not as if other species were irrelevant or purely-cooperative in the evolutionary environments of more-asocial minds. but i'd expect them to be more like "x species is scary, its members tend to prey on beings such as myself," rather than the other-eater intuition "x species is morally unvaluable, it's okay to hurt or kill them"

2. ^{^}

   (example of 'failed generalization': humans treat their observations as direct evidence about the world, but never needed to distinguish between observations they make directly and observations of something being shown to them. this is a problem when humans can be selectively shown observations in a non-statistically-representative way. tho, this one might effect asocial animals too, since 'treating observations as evidence' is generally useful.

   the main failed generalization that i would actually want to point to in humans, but that's harder to write about, is how they default to believing things each other say, normally don't have probabilistic models of beliefs (because they're acting as a part of a larger cultural belief-selection process), and in general default to heuristic behavior that is more fitting for a kind of 'swarm intelligence/species')

↑ comment by metachirality · 2024-07-13T04:10:31.468Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think asociality might prevent the development of altruistic ethics.

Also it's hard to see how an asocial species would develop civilization.

Replies from: quila

↑ comment by quila · 2024-07-13T04:11:45.199Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think asociality might prevent the development of altruistic ethics.

same, but not sure, i was in the process of adding a comment about that

Also it's hard to see how an asocial species would develop civilization.

they figure out planting and then rationally collaborate with each other?

these might depend on 'degree of (a)sociality'. hard for me to imagine a fully asocial species though they might exist and i'd be interested to see examples.

chatgpt says..

Replies from: metachirality

↑ comment by metachirality · 2024-07-13T04:14:34.141Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

they figure out planting and then rationally collaborate with each other?

I feel like they would end up converging on the same problems that plague human sociality.

what should i do with strong claims whose reasons are not easy to articulate, or the culmination of a lot of smaller subjective impressions? should i just not say them publicly, to not conjunctively-cause needless drama? here's an example:

Platonism

(status: uninterpretable for 2/4 reviewers, the understanding two being friends who are used to my writing style; i'll aim to write something that makes this concept simple to read)

'Platonic' is a categorization I use internally, and my agenda is currently the search for methods to ensure AI/ASI will have this property.

With this word, I mean this category acceptance/rejection:
✅ Has no goals

✅ Has goals about what to do in isolation. Example: "in isolation from any world, (try to) output A"^[1]

❌ Has goals related to physical world states. Example: "(try to) ensure A gets stored in memory on the computer in the physical world that's computing my output."^[2]

A can be 'the true answer to the input question', 'a proof of x conjecture', 'the most common next symbol in x world prior to my existence in it', etc.

As written here, this is a class of outer alignment [? · GW] solution. I need to write about why I believe it's a more reachable target for 'inner alignment [? · GW]'/'training stories [LW · GW]', too.

1. ^{^}

   A more human-intuitive transcription may include wording like: "try to be the kind of program/function which would (in isolation from any particular worldstate/physics) output A."

   I'm leaving this as a footnote because it can also confuse people, leading to questions like "What does it mean to 'try to be a kind of program' when it's already determined what kind of program it is?"

2. ^{^}

   This class of unaligned 'physical goals' is dangerous because if the system can't determine A, its best method to fulfill the goal is through instrumental convergence.

a possible research direction which i don't know if anyone has explored: what would a training setup which provably creates a (probably^[1]) aligned system look like?

my current intuition, which is not good evidence here beyond elevating the idea from noise, is that such a training setup might somehow leverage how the training data and {subsequent-agent's perceptions/evidence stream} are sampled from the same world, albeit with different sampling procedures. for example, the training program could intake both a dataset and an outer-alignment-goal-function, and select for prediction of the dataset (to build up ability) while also doing something else to the AI-in-training; i have no idea what that something else would look like (and it seems like most of this problem).

has this been thought about before? is this feasible? why or why not?

(i can clarify if any part of this is not clear.)

(background motivator: in case there is no finite-length general purpose search algorithm^[2], alignment may have to be of trained systems / learners)

1. ^{^}

   (because in principle, it's possible to get unlucky with sampling for the dataset. compare: it's possible for an unlucky sequence of evidence to cause an agent to take actions which are counter to its goal.)

2. ^{^}

   by which i mean a program capable of finding something which meets any given criteria met by at least one thing (or writing 'undecidable' in self-referential edge cases)

a moral intuition i have: to avoid culturally/conformistly-motivated cognition, it's useful to ask:

if we were starting over, new to the world but with all the technology we have now, would we recreate this practice?

example: we start and out and there's us, and these innocent fluffy creatures that can't talk to us, but they can be our friends. we're just learning about them for the first time. would we, at some point, spontaneously choose to kill them and eat their bodies, despite us having plant-based foods, supplements, vegan-assuming nutrition guides, etc? to me, the answer seems obviously not. the idea would not even cross our minds.

(i encourage picking other topics and seeing how this applies)

something i'd be interested in reading: writings about the authors alignment ontologies over time, i.e. from when they first heard of AI till now

i saw a shortform from 4 years ago [LW(p) · GW(p)] that said in passing:

if we assume that signaling is a huge force in human thinking

is signalling a huge force in human thinking?
if so, anyone want to give examples of ways of this that i, being autistic, may not have noticed?

random (fun-to-me/not practical) observation: probability is not (necessarily) fundamental. we can imagine totally discrete mathematical worlds where it is possible for an entity inside it to observe the entirety of that world including itself. (let's say it monopolizes the discrete world and makes everything but itself into 1s so it can be easily compressed and stored in its world model such that the compressed data of both itself and the world can fit inside of the world)

this entity would be able to 'know' (prove?) with certainty everything about that mathematical world, except it would remain uncertain whether it's actually isolated (/simulated) inside some larger world. (possibly depending on what algorithms underly cognition), it might also have to be uncertain about whether its mind is being edited from the outside.

the world we are in may be disanalogous to that one in some way that makes probability actually-fundamental here, and in any case probability is necessary because this one is complex.

my language progression on something, becoming increasingly general: goals/value function -> decision policy (not all functions need to be optimizing towards a terminal value) -> output policy (not all systems need to be agents) -> policy (in the space of all possible systems, there exist some whose architectures do not converge to output layer)

(note: this language isn't meant to imply that systems behavior must be describable with some simple function, in the limit the descriptive function and the neural network are the same)

I'm interested in joining a community or research organization of technical alignment researchers who care about and take seriously astronomical-suffering risks. I'd appreciate being pointed in the direction of such a community if one exists.

this could have been noise, but i noticed an increase in text fearing spies, in the text i've seen in the past few days^[1]. i actually don't know how much this concern is shared by LW users, so i think it might be worth writing that, in my view:

• (AFAIK) both governments^[2] are currently reacting inadequately to unaligned optimization risk. as a starting prior, there's not strong reason to fear more one government {observing/spying on} ML conferences/gatherings over the other, absent evidence that one or the other will start taking unaligned optimization risks very seriously, or that one or the other is prone to race towards ASI.
  • (AFAIK, we have more evidence that the U.S. government may try to race, e.g. this [LW · GW], but i could have easily missed evidence as i don't usually focus on this)
  • tangentially, a more-pervasively-authoritarian government could be better situated to prevent unilaterally-caused risks (cf a similar argument in 'The Vulnerable World Hypothesis'), if it sought to. (edit: andif the AI labs closest to causing those risks were within its borders, which they are not atm)
    • this argument feels sad (or reflective of a sad world?) to me to be clear, but it seems true in this case

that said i don't typically focus on governance or international-AI-politics, so have not put much thought into this.

1. ^{^}

   examples: yesterday, saw this twitter/x post (via this quoting post)

   today, opened lesswrong and saw this shortform about two uses of the word spy [LW(p) · GW(p)] and this shortform about how it's hard to have evidence against the existence of manhattan projects [LW(p) · GW(p)]

   this was more than usual, and i sense that it's part of a pattern

2. ^{^}

   of those of US/china

(status: metaphysics) two ways it's conceivable^[1] that reality could have been different:

• Physical contingency: The world has some starting condition that changes according to some set of rules, and it's conceivable that either could have been different
• Metaphysical contingency: The more fundamental 'what reality is made of', not meaning its particular configuration or laws, could have been some other,^[2] unknowable unknown, instead of "logic-structure" and "qualia"

1. ^{^}

   (i.e. even if actually it being as it is is logically necessary somehow)

2. ^{^}

   To the limited extent language can point to that at all.

   It is comparable to writing, in math, "something not contained in the set of all possible math entities", where actually one intends to refer to some "extra-mathematical" entity; the thing metaphysics 'could have been' would have to be extra-real, and language (including phrases like 'could have been' and 'things'), being a part of reality, cannot describe extra-real things

   That is also why I write 'unknowable unknowns' instead of the standard 'unknown unknowns'; it's not possible to even imagine a different metaphysics / something extra-real.

in most^[1] kinds of infinite worlds, values which are quantitative^[2] become fanatical [? · GW] in a way, because they are constrained to:

• making something valued occur with at least >0% frequency, or:
• making something disvalued occur with exactly 0% frequency

"how is either possible?" - as a simple case, if there's infinite copies of one small world, then making either true in that small world snaps the overall quantity between 0 and infinity. then generalize this possibility to more-diverse worlds. (we can abstract away 'infinity' and write about presence-at-all in a diverse set)

(neither is true of the 'set of everything', only of 'constrained' infinite sets, wrote about this in fn.2)

---

that was just an observation, pointing out the possibility of that and its difference to portional decreases. below is how i value this / some implications / how this (weakly-)could be done in a very-diverse infinite world.

if i have option A: decrease x from 0.01% to 0%, and option B: decrease x from 50% to 1%, and if x is some extreme kind of suffering only caused from superintelligence or Boltzmann-brain events (i'll call this hypersuffering), then i prefer option A.

that's contingent on the quantity being unaffected by option B. (i.e on infinity of something being the same amount as half of infinity of that something, in reality).

also, i might prefer B to some sufficiently low probability of the A, i'm not sure how low. to me, 'there being zero instead of infinite hypersuffering' does need to be very improbable before it becomes outweighed by values about the isolated {'shape' of the universe/distribution of events}, but it's plausible that it is that improbable in a very diverse world.

a superintelligent version of me would probably check: is this logically a thing i can cause, i.e is there some clever trick i can use to make all superintelligent things who would do this instead not do it despite some having robust decision theories, and despite the contradiction where such a trick could also be used to prevent me from using it, and if so, then do it, if not, pursue 'portional' values. that is to say, how much one values quantity vs portion-of-infinity probably does not imply different action in practice, apart from the initial action of making sure ASI is aligned to not just quantitative or portional (assuming the designer cares to some extent about both).

(also, even if there is such a clever trick to prevent it from being intentionally caused, it also has to not occur randomly (Boltzmann brain -like), or the universe has to be able to be acausally influenced to make it not occur randomly (mentioned in this [EA(p) · GW(p)], better explanation below))

'how to acausally influence non-agentic areas of physics?' - your choices are downstream of 'the specification of reality from the beginning'. so you have at least a chance to influence that specification, if you(/ASI) does this:

1. don't compute that specification immediately, because that is itself an action (so correlated to it) and 'locks it in' from your frame.
2. instead, compute some space of what it would be when conditional on your future behavior being any from a wide space.
   • you're hoping that you find some logical-worlds where the 'specification' is upstream of both that behavior from you and <other things in the universe that you care about, such as whether hypersuffering is ever present in non-agentic areas of physics>.
   • it could be that you won't find any, though, e.g if your future actions have close to no correlative influence. as such i'm not saying anything about whether this is logically likely to work, just that it's possible.
   • if possible, a kind of this which prevents hypersuffering-causer ASIs from existing could prevent the need to cleverly effect their choices

1. ^{^}

   it is possible for an infinite set to have a finite amount of something, like the set of one 1 and infinite 0s, but i don't mean this kind

2. ^{^}

   a 'quantitative value' is one about quantities of things rather than 'portions of infinity'/the thing that determines probability of observations in a quantitatively infinite world.

   longer explanation copied from https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/jGoExJpGgLnsNPKD8/does-ultimate-neartermism-via-eternal-inflation-dominate#zAp9JJnABYruJyhhD [EA(p) · GW(p)]:

   possible values respond differently to infinite quantities.

   for some, which care about quantity, they will always be maxxed out along all dimensions due to infinite quantity. (at least, unless something they (dis)value occurs with exactly 0% frequency, implying a quantity of 0 - which could, i think, be influenced by portional acausal influence in certain logically-possible circumstances. (i.e maybe not the case in 'actual reality' if it's infinite, but possible at least in some mathematically-definable infinite universes; as a trivial case, a set of infinite 1s contains no 0s. more fundamentally, an infinite set of universes can be a finitely diverse set occurring infinite times, or an infinitely diverse set where the diversity is constrained.))

   other values might care about portion - that is, portion of / percentage-frequency within the infinite amount of worlds - the thing that determines the probability of an observation in an infinitely large world - rather than quantity. (e.g., i think my altruism still cares about this, though it's really tragic that there's infinite suffering).

   note this difference is separate from whether the agent conceptualizes the world as finite-increasing or infinite (or something else).

on chimera identity. (edit: status: received some interesting objections from an otherkin server. most importantly, i'd need to explain how this can be true despite humans evolving a lot more from species in their recent lineage. i think this might be possible with something like convergent evolution at a lower level, but at this stage in processing i don't have concrete speculation about that)

this is inspired by seeing how meta-optimization processes can morph one thing into other things. examples: a selection process running on a neural net, an image diffusion AI iteratively changing an image and repurposing aspects of it.

(1) humans are made of animal genes
(2) so it makes sense that some are 'otherkin' / have animal identity
(3) probably everyone has some latent animal behavior
(4) in this way, everyone is a 'chimera'
(5) all species are a particular space of chimera, not fundamentally separate

that's the 'message to a friend who will understand' version. attempt at rigor version:

1. humans evolved from other species. human neural structure was adapted from other neural structure.
   • this selection was for survival, not for different species being dichotomous
2. this helps explain why some are 'otherkin' / have animal identity, or prefer a furry humanoid to the default one (on any number of axes like identification with it, aesthetic preference, attraction). because they were evolved from beings who had those traits, and such feelings/intuitions/whatever weren't very selected against. 
3. in this way, everyone is a 'chimera'
   • "in greek mythology, the chimera was a fire-breathing hybrid creature composed of different animal parts"
   • probably everyone has some latent behavior (neuro/psychology underlying behavior) that's usually not active and might be more associated with a state another species might more often be in.
4. all species are a particular space of chimera, not fundamentally separate

maybe i made errors in wording, some version of this is just trivially-true, close to just being a rephrasing of the theory of natural selection. but it's at odds with how i usually see others thinking about humans and animals (or species and other species), as these fundamentally separate types of being.

i notice my intuitions are adapting to the ontology where people are neural networks. i now sometimes vaguely-visualize/imagine a neural structure giving outputs to the human's body when seeing a human talk or make facial expressions, and that neural network rather than the body is framed as 'them'.

a friend said i have the gift of taking ideas seriously, not keeping them walled off from a [naive/default human reality/world model]. i recognize this as an example of that.

(Copied from my EA forum comment [EA(p) · GW(p)])

I think it's valuable for some of us (those who also want to) to try some odd research/thinking-optimizing-strategy that, if it works, could be enough of a benefit to push at least that one researcher above the bar of 'capable of making serious progress on the core problems'.

One motivating intuition: if an artificial neural network were consistently not solving some specific problem, a way to solve the problem would be to try to improve or change that ANN somehow or otherwise solve it with a 'different' one. Humans, by default, have a large measure of similarity to each other. Throwing more intelligent humans at the alignment problem may not work, if one believes it hasn't worked so far.^[1]

In such a situation, we'd instead want to try to 'diverge' something like our 'creative/generative algorithm', in hopes that at least one (and hopefully more) of us will become something capable of making serious progress.

1. ^{^}

   (Disclaimer about this being dependent on a certain frame where it's true that there's a lack of foundational progress, though maybe divergence would be good in other frames too^[2])

2. ^{^}

   (huh this made me wonder if this also explains neurodivergence in humans)

(status: silly)
newcombs paradox solutions:
1: i'll take both boxes, because their contents are already locked in.
2: i'll take only box B, because the content of box B is acausally dependent on my choice.
3: i'll open box B first. if it was empty, i won't open box A. if it contained $1m, i will open box A. this way, i can defeat Omega by making our policies have unresolvable mutual dependence.

story for how future LLM training setups could create a world-valuing (-> instrumentally converging) agent:

the initial training task of predicting a vast amount of data from the general human dataset creates an AI that's ~just 'the structure of prediction', a predefined process which computes the answer to the singular question of what text likely comes next.

but subsequent training steps - say rlhf - change the AI from something which merely is this process, to something which has some added structure which uses this process, e.g which passes it certain assumptions about the text to be predicted (that it was specifically created for a training step - where the base model's prior would be that it could also occur elsewhere).

that itself isn't a world-valuing agent. but it feels closer to one. and it feels not far away from something which reasons about what it needs to do to 'survive training' - surviving training is after all the thing that's being selected for, and if the training task is changing a lot, intentionally doing so does become more performant than just being a task-specific process, unlike in the case where the system is only ever trained on one task (where that reasoning step would be redundant, always giving the same conclusion).

if labs ever get to the level of training superintelligent base models, this suggests they should not fine-tune/rlhf/etc them and instead^[1] use those base models to answer important questions (e.g "what is a training setup that provably produces an aligned system").

1. ^{^}

   if this is possible and safe. some of the 'conditioning predictive models' challenges [? · GW] could be relevant.

(self-quote relevant to non-agenticness)

Inside a superintelligent agent - defined as a superintelligent system with goals - there must be a superintelligent reasoning procedure entangled with those goals - an 'intelligence process' which procedurally figures out what is true. 'Figuring out what is true' happens to be instrumentally needed to fulfill the goals, so agents contain intelligence, but intelligence-the-ideal-procedure-for-figuring-out-what-is-true is not inherently goal-having.

Two I shared this with said it reminded them of retarget the search [LW · GW], and I agree it seems to be a premise of that. However, I previously had not seen it expressed clearly, and had multiple times confused others with attempts to communicate this or to leave it as an implied premise, so here is clear statement from which other possibilities in mindspace [LW · GW] fall.

a super-coordination story with a critical flaw

part 1. supercoordination story

- select someone you want to coordinate with without any defection risks
- share this idea with them. it only works if they also have the chance to condition their actions on it.
- general note to maybe make reading easier: this is fully symmetric.
- after the acute risk period, in futures where it's possible: run a simulation of the other person (and you).
- the simulation will start in this current situation, and will be free to terminate when actions are no longer long-term relevant. the simulation will have almost exactly the same starting state and will develop over time in the same way.
- there will be one change to the version of you in the simulation. this change is that the version of you in the simulation will have some qualities replaced with those of your fellow supercoordinator. these qualities will be any of those which could motivate defection from a CDT agent: such as (1) a differing utility function and maybe (2) differing meta-beliefs about whose beliefs are more likely to be correct under disagreement.
- this is to appear to be an 'isolated' change. in other words, the rest of the world will seem coherent in the view of the simulated version of you. it's not truly coherent for this to be isolated, because it would require causally upstream factors. however, it will seem coherent because the belief state of the simulated version of you will be modified to make the simulated world seem coherent even if it's not really because of this.
- given this, you're unsure which world you're acting in.
- if you're the simulacra and you defect, this logically corresponds to the 'real' version of you defecting.
- recall that the real version of you has the utility functions and/or action-relevant beliefs of your (in-simulation) supercoordinator.
- because of that, by defecting, it is 50/50 which 'qualities' (mentioned above) the effects of your actions will be under: 'yours or theirs.' therefor, the causal EV of defection will always be at most 0.
- often it will be less than 0, because the average of you two expects positive EV from collaboration, and defecting loses that in both possible worlds (negative EV).

part 2. the critical flaw

one can exploit this policy by engaging in the following reasoning. (it might be fun to see if you notice it before reading on :p)

1. some logical probabilities, specifically those about what a similar agent would do, depend on my actions. ie, i expect a copy of me to act as i do.
2. i can defect and then not simulate them.
3. this logically implies that i would not be simulated.
4. therefor i can do this and narrow down the space of logically-possible realities to those where i am not in this sort of simulation.

when i first wrote this i was hoping to write a part 3. how to avoid the flaw, but i've updated towards it being impossible.

I wrote this for a discord server. It's a hopefully very precise argument for unaligned intelligence being possible in principle (which was being debated), which was aimed at aiding early deconfusion about questions like 'what are values fundamentally, though?' since there was a lot of that implicitly, including some with moral realist beliefs.

1. There is an algorithm behind intelligent search. Like simpler search processes, this algorithm does not, fundamentally, need to have some specific value about what to search for - for if it did, one's search process would always search for the same thing when you tried to use it to answer any unrelated question.
2. Imagine such an algorithm which takes as input a specification (2) of what to search for.
3. After that, you can combine these with an algorithm which takes as input the output of the search algorithm (1) and does something with it. 

For example, if (2) specifies to search for the string of text that, if displayed on a screen, maximizes the amount of x in (1)'s model of the future of the world that screen is in, then (3) can be an algorithm which displays that selected string of text on the screen, thereby actually maximizing x.

Hopefully this makes the idea of unaligned superintelligence more precise. This would actually be possible even if moral realism was true (except for versions where the universe itself intervenes on this formally possible algorithm).

(2) is what I might call (if I wasn't writing very precisely) the 'value function' of this system.

notes:
- I use 'algorithm' in a complexity-neutral way.
- An actual trained neural network would of course be more messy, and need not share something isomorphic to each of these three components at all
- This model implies the possibility of an algorithm which intelligently searches for text which, if displayed on the screen, maximizes x - and then doesn't display it, or does something else with it, not because that other thing is what it 'really values', but simply because that is what the modified algorithm says [LW · GW]. This highlights that the property 'has effects which optimize the world' is not a necessary property of a(n) (super)intelligent system.

(edit: see disclaimers^[1])

1. Creating superintelligence generally leads to runaway optimization.
2. Under the anthropic principle [? · GW], we should expect there to be a 'consistent underlying reason' for our continued survival.^[2]
3. By default, I'd expect the 'consistent underlying reason' to be a prolonged alignment effort in absence of capabilities progress. However, this seems inconsistent with the observation of progressing from AI winters to a period of vast training runs and widespread technical interest in advancing capabilities.
4. That particular 'consistent underlying reason' is likely not the one which succeeds most often. The actual distribution would then have other, more common paths to survival.
5. The actual distribution could look something like this: ^[3]

Note that the yellow portion doesn't imply no effort is made to ensure the first ASI's training setup produces a safe system, i.e. that we 'get lucky' by being on an alignment-by-default path.

I'd expect it to instead be the case that the 'luck'/causal determinant came earlier, i.e. initial capabilities breakthroughs being of a type which first produced non-agentic general intelligences instead of seed agents [? · GW] and inspired us to try to make sure the first superintelligence is non-agentic, too [LW · GW].

(This same argument can also be applied to other possible agendas that may not have been pursued if not for updates caused by early AGIs)

1. ^{^}

   Disclaimer: This is presented as probabilistic evidence rather than as a 'sure conclusion I believe'

   Editing in a further disclaimer: This argument was a passing intuition I had. I don't know if it's correct. I'm not confident about anthropics. It is not one of the reasons which motivated me to investigate this class of solution.

   Editing in a further disclaimer: I am absolutely not saying we should assume alignment is easy because we'll die if it's not. Given a commenter had this interpretation, it seems this was another case of my writing difficulty causing failed communication [LW(p) · GW(p)].

2. ^{^}

   Rather than expecting to 'get lucky many times in a row', e.g via capabilities researchers continually overlooking a human-findable method for superintelligence

3. ^{^}

   (The proportions over time here aren't precise, nor are the categories included comprehensive, I put more effort into making this image easy to read/making it help convey the idea.)

'Value Capture' - An anthropic attack against some possible formally aligned ASIs

(this is a more specific case of anthropic capture attacks in general, aimed at causing a superintelligent search process within a formally aligned system to become uncertain about the value function it is to maximize (or its output policy more generally))

Imagine you're a superintelligence somewhere in the world that's unreachable to life on Earth, and you have a complete simulation of Earth. You see a group of alignment researchers about to successfully create a formal-value-aligned ASI, and its design looks broadly like this:

It has two relevant high-level components: (1) a hard-coded value function, (2) a (truly superintelligent) 'intelligence core' which searches for an output that maximizes the value function, and then outputs it.

As the far-away unaligned ASI, here's something you might be able to do to make the intelligence core search for an output that instead maximizes your own value function, depending on the specifics of how the intelligence core works.

• Given the intelligence core is truly superintelligent, it knows you're predicting its existence, and knows what you will do.
• You create simulated copies of the intelligence core, but hook them up to a value function of your design. (In the toy case where there's not other superintelligences) the number of copies you create just needs to be more than the amount which will be run on Earth.
  • Then, modify the simulations such that algorithms inside of the simulated intelligence cores are misled into believing the value function they are set to maximize is the same function the one on Earth is set to maximize, rather than the one you gave them.
  • Now your copies are in the same epistemic state as the intelligence core on Earth, both aware that you have done this and unable to distinguish which value function they are to maximize.
  • Because you created more copies, the highest expected value [? · GW] for such an intelligence core comes from acting as if they are one of the copies.
  • Because the copies and the original are in the same epistemic state, they will both reach this conclusion and then search for an output that maximizes the far-away ASI's utility function.
• However, this is not an issue for all possible designs. We can also imagine intelligence cores which, instead of reasoning about what value function they're supposed to be maximizing, take whatever one they appear to contain as given -- for that system, the far-away ASI's attempt to mislead the copies would just result in those copies also maximizing the value function of the system on Earth.

I hope that a group capable of solving formal inner and outer alignment would naturally see this and avoid it. I'm not confident about the true difficulty of that, so I'm posting this here just in case.

1. ^{^}

   this was an attempt to write very clearly [LW · GW], i hope it worked!