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"Robin and Bob have suggested that I consult the specialists in the field of ethics. I will repeat my question from the previous thread. How do I know whether the specialists in ethics have anything more to say than those in theology or astrology? There is no falsifiability in ethics and no evidence I know of that studying ethics makes one an authority on anything."
There is no falsifiability in the philosophy of science, and yet you seem to fully embrace a very specific and contestable doctrine within the philosophy of science and epistemology, namely, Popperian falsificationism. What experimental evidence do you think would falsify falsificationism? Could a physicist falsify this theory by playing around with cloud chambers or particle accelerators?
And if you're willing to believe in non-falsifiable doctrines in the philosophy of science, then why not believe in non-falsifiable doctrines in philosophical ethics?
Bear in mind that the fact that something can't be falsified by experimental evidence does not preclude its being argued against. Here is an argument against falsificationism (which hardly any philosophers of science subscribe to these days anyway--look up Bayesian epistemology if you want an update):
Falsificationism says that theories can never be confirmed. Remember that Popper thought that Hume's problem of induction could not be solved, and so there could never be positive evidence for believing a particular theory. Confirming a generalization (e.g. metals expand when heated) would require evidence of infinitely many cases, which is impossible. But falsifying theories only requires one bit of evidence: a counterexample.
On this view, scientists just falsify theories, and stick with the ones that avoid falsification. My question is how one can (on this view) even make sense of the act of falsification of a particular theory.
Suppose I want to try falsifying the theory that drug X is safe. Then I need to demonstrate a person being harmed by drug X. But I can only demonstrate that fact by confirming a more particular theory, that some person has actually been harmed by the drug. For example, suppose I wanted to show that John had been harmed by the drug. Then I would have to confirm that John had actually been harmed by the drug. But there is no such thing as confirmation on Popper's theory. So I can't provide the counterexamples that are meant to generate falsifications. (In short: The very idea of falsification presupposes a notion of confirmation. So it is inconsistent to suppose that you can have one without the other).
A different example: Suppose I'm a biologist, and I make a prediction on the basis of a theory T that if I manipulate genes x,y,z in a rabbit zygote, then the resulting rabbit will have fluorescent green fur. I do the manipulation and the rabbit ends up with fluorescent green fur. Surely this is strong evidence for theory T. This would be seen as a scientific breakthrough. Yet for the Popperian, the only progress I've made here is falsifying the negation of theory T. There is no positive progress, no reason to believe that T is more likely than other theories that I have yet to falsify. I have no more reason to believe theory T than the competing theory that God made the rabbit green.