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Could be but I don't know QM well enough to say for sure.
If I understand it correctly, the collapse of the wave function is when the probabilities change at the moment of observation or measurement. So if one holds that the wave collapse is a metaphysical event (and you agree with Jaynes that probabilities are epistemological) then that would be a case of what Jaynes called the mind projection fallacy. Much of the debates in QM regarding wave collapse revolve around exactly this point. Of course, camps have formed on both sides of the dichotomy and I don't think it can be resolved by just asserting that probabilities are epistemological. The error is deeper than that and I suspect QM needs to be derived from bayesian principles but I am not sure that bayesian probability theory is yet up to the task. The situation is very similar to the ancient debates on whether color was a property of the object or in the mind, which makes me think there is an object/subject distinction that is being missed.
The proof is left as an exercise for the reader ;-)
Seriously, I can't explain the whole chain of thought to you. I made my claim that MWI is implicitly PoC and is a rejection of science and amounts to a supernatural theory. I gave examples of the difference between implicit and explicit PoC errors and gave an historical example where philosophy got hung up on an implicit error. I also cited Jaynes' argument on how traditional probability theory (on which QM rests) projects probabilities onto reality when they are in fact epistemological measures. And I gave an example of how to use principles to avoid unnecessary work such as examining every single case of perpetual motion. And finally I explained that I am not a physicist and have no obligation or desire to find the specific error.
However, if you decide to do the proof as an excersise I will add the following as a hint;
We have this great theory in QM that allows us to make all kinds of calculations and prediction in the microscopic world. It does not integrate with our best theory of the macroscopic world and cosmology -- Special and General Relativity. Moreover, there are various "interpretations" of QM that do not change the calcs but are an attempt to bring meaning and understanding to QM. But they all fail in various ways leaving use with unsatisfactory and contradictory choices between causality -vs- acausality, locality -vs- non-locality, faster than light -vs- c as a limit, one reality -vs- many realities, etc.
Nevetheless, I think these different interpretations of QM should be studied because such understanding and perspectives will lead someone to finding the error that gives rise to all the contradictions and false-alternative. Finally, I don't need to be a physicist nor find the specific error to state with certainty that either QM or GR (or both) are wrong and that the answer, whatever that turns out to be, will be consistent with both of these theories.
Of course my motives are irrelevant here but for the record I am trying to understand epistomology and its application to my self and, ultimately to AI. How about you, what are your motives?
Not knowing the exact details of where the PoC flaw is in QM is not a devastating criticism of my point, though your tone seems to suggest that you think it is. Why does the USPTO no longer accept applications for perpetual motion machines? Because it violates the first and/or second laws of thermo, no need to dig further into the details. This is just how principles work and once a fundamental error is identified then that's it, end of discussion.... unless I was a physicist and wanted to dig in and take a crack at resolving the QM quandries which I do not. Jaynes left us a pretty large clue that the PoC error probably lies in the mis-use of probability theory as he described. As a non physicist that's all (and more) than I need to know.
Its not an explicit form of Primacy of Consciousness like prayer or wishing. Its implicit in QM and its basic premises. One example of an implicit form of PoC is to project properties or aspects of consciousness onto reality and treating them as metaphysical and not epistemological factors. I think the ancient philosophers got hung up on this when debating whether a color like "red" was in the object or subject. This went round and round for a few hundred years until someone pointed out that its both (form/object distinction).
Jaynes covers similar idea in his book and articles where he ascribes this error to traditional frequentists who hold probabilities as a property of things (a metaphysical concept) instead of a measure or property of our lack of knowledge (an epistemological, bayesian concept). Moreover, committing the PoC error will lead you to supernaturalism eventually so MWI is just a logical outcome of that error.
Am I missing something here? EY and SA were discussing the advance of computer technology, the end of Moore's rule-of-thumb, quantum computing, BIg Blue, etc. It seems to me that AI is an epistemological problem not an issue of more computing power. Getting Big Blue to go down all the possible branches is not really intelligence at all. Don't we need a theory of knowledge first? I'm new here so this has probably already been discussed but what about freewill? How do AI researchers address that issue?
I'm with SA on the MWI of QM. I think EY is throwing the scientific baby out with the physics bath water. It seems to me that the MWI is committing the mind projection fallacy or the fallacy of the primacy of consciousness. I also agree with whoever said (paraphrased) that all these interpretations of QM just differ on where they hide the contradictions... they are all unsatisfactory and it will take a genius to figure it out.