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Comment by jsalvati on Naming the Nameless · 2018-03-23T08:45:09.022Z · score: 23 (5 votes) · LW · GW
Double crux is hard enough with arguments, and here I'm trying to advocate something like double-cruxing aesthetic preferences, which sounds absurdly ambitious.  But: imagine if we could talk about why things seem beautiful and appealing, or ugly and unappealing.

My work is basically about this; extracting aesthetic preferences from people (and S1 based inside views more generally).

I haven't done specifically artistic aesthetics, but most thinking relies heavily on aesthetics about which problems are interesting or important, ways of behaving, ways of thinking about the world, what counts as 'simple', etc. If you want to resolve disagreements about big things, you're going to have to wade into aesthetics.

Comment by jsalvati on [deleted post] 2018-03-19T18:06:02.386Z

Thanks for writing this. Inferential distance + inoculation is a huge problem for transmitting large bodies of understanding in domains that previously didn't look like domains to the student. The student frequently getting a smaller version of the ideas before they can get the full version and that shuts off further interest because they've "got it".

Comment by jsalvati on List of civilisational inadequacy · 2017-12-05T03:24:10.913Z · score: 11 (3 votes) · LW · GW

>nobody has done studies measuring hormone levels over time and fitting a differential-equation model of how hormones affect each other's levels

What in the everloving fuck? That really seems like the first thing you should do. Has that at least been done for the shared hormones?

Comment by jsalvati on Living in an Inadequate World · 2017-11-10T17:53:34.249Z · score: 11 (5 votes) · LW · GW

The point was to raise nominal prices in the first place

Comment by jsalvati on Living in an Inadequate World · 2017-11-10T17:52:42.389Z · score: 3 (5 votes) · LW · GW

That is not how it works.

Comment by jsalvati on Moloch's Toolbox (2/2) · 2017-11-10T08:48:44.457Z · score: 7 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I don't buy the idea that voters are not the main source of problem and that its voting systems. Voters don't have good incentives to have sensible opinions that go against natural prejudices.

It seems to me that if you found the median political opinion of people, you would have much worse policies in a lot of areas. Probably some would be better, but I would be surprised if it were many.

Comment by jsalvati on Living in an Inadequate World · 2017-11-10T08:39:23.185Z · score: 9 (4 votes) · LW · GW

This is great, I love it

Comment by jsalvati on Moloch's Toolbox (1/2) · 2017-11-06T06:54:24.528Z · score: 22 (7 votes) · LW · GW

Do you know if they normalize for case difficulty? If a hospital patients seems like it will get worse outcomes.

Comment by jsalvati on Moloch's Toolbox (1/2) · 2017-11-06T05:50:22.834Z · score: 21 (6 votes) · LW · GW

I just did this and it was pretty easy! And in fact I decided to change the hospital I go to by default.

Comment by jsalvati on Inadequacy and Modesty · 2017-10-29T00:07:35.416Z · score: 27 (9 votes) · LW · GW

Genuinely held austarity-type ideologies are popular among people who care a lot about central banking (possibly due to the great depression?), and I'm guessing that's what happened at the BoJ. It seems to be what happened in the US, which made similar mistakes, though less badly.

Comment by jsalvati on True Sources of Disagreement · 2008-12-08T20:50:30.000Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

OK, Tim Tyler's link is interesting. I don't know every much about evolution (basically what I've read here plus a little bit); can someone who knows more say whether this is an idea worth paying attention to? And if it's not, why is it confused?

Comment by jsalvati on True Sources of Disagreement · 2008-12-08T20:49:35.000Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

OK, Tim Tyler's link is interesting. I don't know every much about evolution (basically what I've read here plus a little bit); can someone who knows more say whether this is an idea worth paying attention to? And if it's not, why is it confused?

Comment by jsalvati on Thanksgiving Prayer · 2008-11-28T06:24:17.000Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

haha, that's great!

Comment by jsalvati on Expected Creative Surprises · 2008-10-24T23:03:38.000Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Didn't we already have this exact post?

Comment by jsalvati on Fighting a Rearguard Action Against the Truth · 2008-09-24T04:54:01.000Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Maybe people have an instinct to preserve their former strategies, because doing so often works. If you find out a new fact, you don't usually have to abandon your whole set of beliefs. Are view shattering facts/arguments more common for abstract issues?

Comment by jsalvati on The Sheer Folly of Callow Youth · 2008-09-19T04:39:47.000Z · score: -2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

"you cannot come up with clever reasons why the gaps in your model don't matter." Sure, sometimes you can't, but sometimes you can; sometimes there are things which seem relevant but which are genuinely irrelevant, and you can proceed without understanding them. I don't think it's always obvious which is which, but of course, it's a good idea to worry about falsely putting a non-ignorable concept into the "ignorable" box.

Comment by jsalvati on My Childhood Death Spiral · 2008-09-15T04:50:14.000Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Excellent analogy TGGP. (and I say that as a meat eater)

Comment by jsalvati on You Provably Can't Trust Yourself · 2008-08-19T22:37:29.000Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

IL My understanding was that Terminal Values are not something you ever observe directly (nobody can simply list their Terminal Values). Moral arguments change what use as our approximation to the Moral Calculation. However, if moral arguments did make our actual moral calculations diverge (that is, if our actual moral calculation is not a state function with respect to moral arguments) then that does disprove Eliezer's meta-ethics (along with any hope for a useful notion of morality it seems to me).

Comment by jsalvati on Dumb Deplaning · 2008-08-19T01:27:38.000Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

I haven't thought about this in-depth, but I almost always wait a while before I try to get off the plane.

Comment by jsalvati on Hot Air Doesn't Disagree · 2008-08-16T05:52:53.000Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Moreover, even if they did have moralities, they would probably be very very different moralities, which means that the act of doing opposing things does not mean they are disagreeing, they are just maximizing for different criteria. The only reason it's useful to talk about human's disagreeing is that it is very likely that we are optimizing for the same criteria if you look deep enough.

Comment by jsalvati on Abstracted Idealized Dynamics · 2008-08-12T05:00:49.000Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Richard I think the difference is that in a world where one of them is miscalculating, that person can be shown that they are miscalculating and will then calculate correctly. However, in a world where their idealized calculations are actually significantly different, they would simply become enemies.

Comment by jsalvati on Moral Error and Moral Disagreement · 2008-08-11T02:54:24.000Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Sebastian Hagen:

My intuition is that a good deal of people would take the psychopath pill. At least if the social consequences were minimal, which is besides the point.

Comment by jsalvati on Hiroshima Day · 2008-08-07T01:27:48.000Z · score: 6 (6 votes) · LW · GW

It seems weird to me that you would expect that if people had never used nuclear bombs before they would be more reluctant to use them. I would expect exactly the opposite (not that I am confident about this, but it's what I would expect). Consider that the US used nuclear bombs immediately after it got them.

Comment by jsalvati on The Meaning of Right · 2008-07-29T04:16:54.000Z · score: 3 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I second Robin's request that you summarize your positions. It helps other folks organize and think about your ideas.