Posts

Make an appointment with your saner self 2019-02-08T05:05:49.784Z · score: 29 (12 votes)
The Signal and the Corrective 2018-02-11T00:28:35.759Z · score: 45 (12 votes)
Dispel your justification-monkey with a “HWA!” 2018-01-24T04:51:12.579Z · score: 50 (23 votes)
Akrasia Tactics Review 3: The Return of the Akrasia 2017-04-10T15:05:10.711Z · score: 13 (15 votes)
Two kinds of Expectations, *one* of which is helpful for rational thinking 2016-06-20T16:04:13.994Z · score: 16 (20 votes)
The Pink Sparkly Ball Thing (Use unique, non-obvious terms for nuanced concepts) 2016-02-20T23:25:16.034Z · score: 24 (21 votes)
Less Wrong Study Hall: Now With 100% Less Tinychat 2015-11-09T00:25:39.534Z · score: 30 (28 votes)
Ultimatums in the Territory 2015-09-28T22:01:48.924Z · score: 14 (22 votes)
Unlearning shoddy thinking 2015-08-21T03:07:03.722Z · score: 9 (9 votes)
Pattern-botching: when you forget you understand 2015-06-15T22:58:34.954Z · score: 33 (35 votes)
If you could push a button to eliminate one cognitive bias, which would you choose? 2015-04-09T07:05:47.084Z · score: 3 (6 votes)
Request for Intelligence Philosophy Essay Topic Suggestions 2015-03-13T04:15:26.209Z · score: 3 (8 votes)
Announcing the Complice Less Wrong Study Hall 2015-03-02T23:37:24.563Z · score: 56 (54 votes)
Rationality Quotes March 2014 2014-03-01T15:34:22.614Z · score: 4 (5 votes)
Rationality Quotes November 2013 2013-11-02T20:35:55.780Z · score: 5 (6 votes)
[LINK] EdTech startup hosts AI Hunger Games (cash prize $1k) 2013-08-14T08:39:58.848Z · score: 9 (12 votes)
[LINK] Hyperloop officially announced — predictions, anyone? 2013-08-12T21:30:53.487Z · score: 4 (9 votes)
[LINK] Accepting my Present Chocolate Addiction 2013-07-14T11:09:14.415Z · score: -3 (10 votes)

Comments

Comment by malcolmocean on Against "System 1" and "System 2" (subagent sequence) · 2019-10-06T23:15:44.150Z · score: 6 (4 votes) · LW · GW

the claim here is that the left hemisphere pays careful attention to the questions, solves them correctly, and then reverses the answer.

Fwiw I also think that that is an absurd claim and I also think that nobody is actually claiming that here. The claim is something more like what has been claimed about System 1, "it takes shortcuts", except in this case it's roughly "to the left hemisphere, truth is coherence; logical coherence is preferred before map coherence, but both are preferred to anything that appears incoherent."

I looked up the source for the "However" section and it's not Deglin and Kinsbourne but Goel and Dolan, 2003). I looked it up and found it hard to read but my sense is that what it's saying is:

  1. An general, people are worse at answering the validity of a logical syllogism when it contradicts their beliefs. (This should surprise nobody.)

  2. Different parts of the brain appear to be recruited depending on whether the content of a syllogism is familiar:

A recent fMRI study (Goel, Buchel, Frith & Dolan, 2000) has provided evidence that syllogistic reasoning is implemented in two distinct brain systems whose engagement is primarily a function of the presence or absence of meaningful content. During content-based syllogistic reasoning (e.g. All apples are red fruit; All red fruit are poisonous;[All apples are poisonous) a left hemisphere frontal and temporal lobe system is recruited. By contrast, in a formally identical reasoning task with arbitrary content (e.g. All A are B; All B are C;[All A are C) a bilateral parietal system is recruited.

(Note: this is them analyzing what part of the brain is recruited when the task is completed successfully.)

  1. This 2003 study investigates whether that's about [concrete vs abstract content] vs [belief-laden vs belief neutral content] and concludes that it's about beliefs, and also < something new about the neuroanatomy >.

I think what's being implied by McGilchrist citing this paper (although it's unclear to me if this was tested as directly as the Deglin & Kinsbourne study) is that without access to the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere's process would be even more biased, or something.

I'd be interested in your take if you read the 2000 or 2003 papers.

Comment by malcolmocean on Against "System 1" and "System 2" (subagent sequence) · 2019-10-05T21:30:38.411Z · score: 18 (5 votes) · LW · GW

The book is saying that the left hemisphere answers incorrectly, in both cases! As I said, this is surprising.

I haven't looked at the original research and found myself curious what would happen with a syllogism that is both invalid and has a false conclusion. My assumption is that either hemisphere would reject something like this:

  1. Some cows are brown.
  2. Some fish are iridescent.
  3. Some cows are iridescent.

The left hemisphere seems to be where most of motivated cognition lives. If you've heard the bizarre stories about patients confabulating after strokes (eg "my limb isn't paralyzed, I just don't want to move it) this is almost unilaterally associated with damage to the right hemisphere. Many people, following Gazzinga's lead, seem to have assumed this was just because someone with a left hemisphere stroke can't talk, but if you leave words aside, it is apparent that people with left hemisphere damage are distressed about their paralyzed right arm, whereas people with right hemisphere damage are often in denial.

Likewise, part of the job of a well-functioning left hemisphere is to have blindspots. It's so zoomed in on whatever it's focused on that the rest of the world might as well not exist. If you've heard of the term "hemispatial neglect", that leads to people shaving only half of their face, eating only half of their plate, or attempting to copy a drawing of an ordinary clock and ending up drawing something like this:

Hemispatial Neglect Clock

...then that's again something that only happens when the left hemisphere is operating without the right (again, can also be shown in healthy patients by temporarily deactivating one hemisphere). The left hemisphere has a narrow focus of attention and only on the right side of things, and it doesn't manage to even notice that it has omitted the other half, because as far as it's concerned, the other half isn't there. This is not a vision thing—asked to recall a familiar scene, such a patient may describe only the right half of it.

Comment by malcolmocean on Against "System 1" and "System 2" (subagent sequence) · 2019-10-04T06:19:39.405Z · score: 14 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Brief reply about dog thing & just naming a part of the brain—I agree!

But saying "system 1" is also not useful unless you have a richer map of how system 1 works. In order for the emotional brain model to be useful, you need affordances for working with it. I got mine from the Bio-Emotive Framework, and since learning that model & technique, I've been more able to work with this stuff, whatever you want to call it, and part of working with it involves a level of identifying what's going on at a level of detail beyond "S1". There are also of course methods of working with this stuff that don't require such a framework!

I'm appreciating you pointing this out, since it represents a way in which my comment was unhelpful—I didn't actually give people these richer models, I just said "there are models out there that I've found much better than S1/S2 for talking about the same stuff". I've pitched the models, but not actually sharing much of why I find them so useful. Although I've just added a long comment elaborating on some hemisphere stuff so hopefully that helps.

Comment by malcolmocean on Against "System 1" and "System 2" (subagent sequence) · 2019-10-04T06:09:59.923Z · score: 21 (6 votes) · LW · GW

Here's one example of a benefit: the left hemisphere is known to have major blindspots, that aren't implied simply by saying "the verbal and explicit mode of thought." Quoting McGilchrist (not sure about page number, I'm looking at Location 5400 in the 2nd edition on Kindle) describing some tests done by temporarily deactivating one hemisphere then the other, in healthy individuals:

Take the following example of a syllogism with a false premise:

  1. Major premise: all monkeys climb trees;
  2. Minor premise: the porcupine is a monkey;
  3. Implied conclusion: the porcupine climbs trees.

Well — does it? As Deglin and Kinsbourne demonstrated, each hemisphere has its own way of approaching this question. At the outset of their experiment, when the intact individual is asked "Does the porcupine climb trees?", she replies (using, of course, both hemispheres): "It does not climb, the porcupine runs on the ground; it's prickly, it's not a monkey." [...] During experimental temporary hemisphere inactivations, the left hemisphere _of the very same individual (with the right hemisphere inactivated) replies that the conclusion is true: "the porcupine climbs trees since it is a monkey." When the experimenter asks, "But is the porcupine a monkey?", she replies that she knows it is not. When the syllogism is presented again, however, she is a little nonplussed, but replies in the affirmative, since "That's what is written on the card." When the right hemisphere of the same individual (with the left hemisphere inactivated) is asked if the syllogism is true, she replies: "How can it climb trees — it's not a monkey, it's wrong here!" If the experimenter points out that the conclusion must follow from the premises stated, she replies indignantly: "But the porcupine is not a monkey!"

In repeated situations, in subject after subject, when syllogisms with false premises, such as "All trees sink in water; balsa is a tree; balsa wood sinks in water," or "Northern lights are often seen in Africa; Uganda is in Africa; Northern lights are seen in Uganda", are presented, the same pattern emerges. When asked if the conclusion is true, the intact individual displays a common sense reaction: "I agree it seems to suggest so, but I know in fact it's wrong." The right hemisphere dismisses the false premises and deductions as absurd. But the left hemisphere sticks to the false conclusion, replying calmly to the effect that "that's what it says here."

In the left-hemisphere situation, it prioritizes the system, regardless of experience: it stays within the system of signs. Truth, for it, is coherence, because for it there is no world beyond, no Other, nothing outside the mind, to correspond with. "That's what it says here." So it corresponds with itself: in other words, it coheres. The right hemisphere prioritises what it learns from experience: the real state of existing things "out there". For the right hemisphere, truth is not mere coherence, but correspondence with something other than itself. Truth, for it, is understood in the sense of being "true" to something, faithfulness to whatever it is that exists apart from ourselves.

However, it would be wrong to deduce from this that the right hemisphere just goes with what is familiar, adopting a comfortable conformity with experience to date. After all, one's experience to date might be untrue to reality: then paying attention to logic would be an important way of moving away from from false customary assumption. And I have emphasized that it is the right hemisphere that helps us to get beyond the inauthentically familiar. The design of the above experiment specifically tests what happens when one is forced to choose between two paths to the truth in answering a question: using what one knows from experience or following a syllogism where the premises are blatantly false. The question was not whether the syllogism was structurally correct, but what actually was true. But in a different situation, where one is asked the different question "Is this syllogism structurally correct?", even when the conclusion flies in the face of one's experience, it is the right hemisphere which gets the answer correct, and the left hemisphere which is distracted by the familiarity of what it already thinks it knows, and gets the answer wrong. The common thread here is the role of the right hemisphere as "bullshit detector". In the first case (answering the question "What is true here?") detecting the bullshit involves using common sense. In the second case (answering "Is the logic here correct?"), detecting the bullshit involves resisting the obvious, the usual train of thought.

For me personally, working with McGilchrist's model has dramatically improved my own internal bullshit-detection capacity. I've started to be able to sometimes smell the scent of rationalizations, even while the thoughts I'm having continue to feel true. This has been helpful for learning, for noticing when I'm being a jerk in relationships, and for noticing how I'm closing myself off to some line of thinking while debugging my code.

And the bullshit detection thing is just one element of it. The book relates dozens of other case studies on differences in way-of-being-and-perceiving of each hemisphere, and connects them with some core theories about the role of attention in cognition.

If you were surprised in reading this comment to discover that it's not the left hemisphere that is best at syllogisms, then I would like to suggest there are important things that are known about the brain that you could learn by reading this book, that would help you think more effectively. (This also applies if you were not-particularly-surprised because your implicit prior was simply "hemispheres are irrelevant"; I was more in this camp.)

Comment by malcolmocean on Against "System 1" and "System 2" (subagent sequence) · 2019-10-02T22:07:23.053Z · score: 33 (12 votes) · LW · GW

Mmmm I'm glad you've written this up. It feels to me like the first half of what needs to be done with the concepts of System 1 and System 2, which is dissolving the original meanings (from Kahneman etc).

The second half is... inasmuch as these concepts have become popular, what experiences are people using them to point at? It seems to me that there are actual multiple things happening here. Among rationalists, "System 2" is used to refer to thinking that is verbal, explicit, logical, procedural, linear. "System 1" is kind of a catch-all for... most of the rest of thinking.

There's a much more obvious mapping for this in the brain, but...

...it's unfashionable to talk about.

It's the left and right hemispheres. The left hemisphere indeed operates in a manner that is verbal, explicit, logical, procedural, linear. The right hemisphere operates in a more intuitive, parallel, context-sensitive, uniqueness-oriented way. (I'm summarizing here, but this is based on extensive reading of an excellent meta-analysis of decades of research, that notes that the classic notion of left/right as reason/emotion isn't accurate but that there's something really important going on.)

If you squint, you can kind of imagine the Right hemisphere as Type 1 and the Left hemisphere as Type 2 Processing, but it's importantly different. Neither hemisphere is necessarily automatic or faster or more abstract than the other. Both are, in different senses, conscious, although it seems possible that many people primarily identify with their left hemisphere consciousness.

To illustrate this difference: many of the examples in this post describe categorization ("count the letter a", "this voice, not that voice", etc) as being a Type 1 activity, but categorization is primarily a feature of the Left hemisphere's world. "How many people are in this room right now?" requires this categorization in order to answer. People are reduced to fungible, countable objects; if one exited and another entered, the total doesn't change. This is useful! "What's the mood of this room?" is much harder to answer with this sort of categorization applied. It's a much better question for a Right hemisphere, which can look at the whole scene and capture it in a metaphor or a few adjectives.

So when a rationalist is saying "My S1 has this intuition, but I can't explain it to my System 2", then one thing they might mean is that their Right hemisphere understands something, but is unable to articulate it in a way that their Left hemisphere could understand verbally & linearly and in terms of the concepts and categories that are familiar to it.

The other thing they might mean, however, is not a left-right distinction but a top-bottom or front-back distinction. This is what would be meant in the context of "My System 2 knows not all dogs are scary, but my System 1 still afraid of them since I got bitten when I was 7." This is much better modelled not with S2/S1, but by talking about the neocortex as opposed to the limbic system.

The process that instantly computes 2+2=4 is very different from the process that releases a bunch of adrenaline at the sound of a bark. Are they both Type 1? Seems so, but I don't know this model well enough.

My impression is that the left neocortex (which many rationalists identify as their "System 2") tends to categorize everything else as well, everything else. And this gets labelled "System 1". It makes sense to me that the left neocortex would treat everything else as a big blob, because it first & foremost makes a categorical distinction between its coherent articulable worldview (which it trusts at a level before awareness) and, well, everything else.

I've been playing with this model for a few months, and so far have found a couple clear distinctions between "right hemisphere" and "emotional brain / limbic system / amygdala etc".

One is about simplicity & complexity:

  • the right (neocortex?) is context-sensitive & aware of complex factors ("that person seems upset... oh, they had a date last night and they were nervous about it, I wonder how it went")
  • the emotional brain is simple and atemporal ("I feel scared because you spoke loudly like my father did when drunk" (that's what it's thinking, although it can't necessarily actually put any of that into words))

Another is that a right hemisphere intuition tends to know that it can't articulate itself and have a sort of relaxed confidence about that, whereas if something is stimulating emotion then you can easily generate all sorts of explanations (which may be accurate or confabulations) for why your "intuition" is correct.

I've found the recent reading I've done on the brain hemispheres, of Iain McGilchrist's work, to be one of the most important books I've read in my life. His model of hemispheres has profound implications in relation to everything from rationalization & motivated reasoning, to social dynamics & coordination, to technological development & science, to AI Safety & corrigibility.

I think if everyone here had it as a common framework, we'd be able to talk more fruitfully about many of the major tensions that have shown up on LessWrong on the past few years regarding post-rationality/meta-rationality, kenshō/Looking/etc, and more.

Links to learn more:

(I may edit this into a top-level at some point; for now I'm going to leave it as a comment)

Comment by malcolmocean on Dependability · 2019-03-27T13:46:27.686Z · score: 6 (1 votes) · LW · GW

All of this, and particularly the section on "reliability", reminds me of Werner Erhard's (founder of EST, which turned into Landmark) explication of integrity, outlined in Appendix 2 of this paper: http://www.wernererhard.com/integrity_paper.html

One key is that expectations of you include not just explicit things you tell people to expect but any you allow to be present.

This isn't a moral obligation, just the reality that "if you let people expect things of you and don't fulfill those expectations, there will be a breakdown in the workability of the relationship".

I have screenshots of the relevant sections in these tweets: https://twitter.com/Malcolm_Ocean/status/1100775171676389377

Comment by malcolmocean on Dependability · 2019-03-27T13:44:43.368Z · score: 4 (2 votes) · LW · GW

First thought I had when I read the title and the bit about MAPLE is this piece by Tasshin (one of the monks at OAK, the California node of MAPLE)

The Power of DWYSYWD (Doing What You Said You Would Do)

I hadn't read the article until just now (just had it bookmarked) and it seems that it's almost entirely about GTD and zero about monastic life, but it still seems mildly interesting that it was written by a monk and is pointing at the same thing.

Comment by malcolmocean on Stories of Summer Solstice · 2018-07-10T15:11:48.381Z · score: 7 (4 votes) · LW · GW

There wasn't *pre*-planning but yeah, there was explicit (though emergent) coordination.

I had loved the idea of stopping right as the sun vanished, from a practice drum-circle that Brent led in the Berkeley hills earlier in June. I didn't find any way to mention this prior to getting out to the clifftop, but then once we were there and there was kind of a small circle where most of the drummers were, I indicated to them to stop when the last bit of sun was gone.

Cody was nearby without a drum and overheard me saying this, and asked "should I pass that along to the other drummers?" (because not everybody was right next to me, although all of the biggest drums were) and I said "yes!" and she did!

And yeah, it was really magical, I think in part because we didn't *quite* have common knowledge that we were going to stop then—even I didn't know if everyone would get the message, or would follow it, etc.

Comment by malcolmocean on Recommendations vs. Guidelines · 2018-04-13T17:11:35.857Z · score: 22 (6 votes) · LW · GW

It's not a full-on “You Are Willing To Devote 100 Hours Of Your Life To Seeing If Self-Help Really Works, Here’s The Best Way For You To Do It”, but I did start working on a flowchart to respond to people who asked me for productivity advice. Many people wanted a list of top tips or something, but this is like giving a list of the top anti-depressants: nearly useless. You don't need to read a list of 10 ideas, you need to do a list of 1 idea.

The basic structure of what I got asks "Have you tried the pomodoro technique?" and makes a recommendation for giving it a serious try if you haven't gotten it to work yet. Then if the person has already had major success with the pomodoro technique, or if they've deemed that it won't work for them, it has a few other next major questions. Very much a Version 0.2; I haven't gotten around to expanding it but it feels like it would be worth doing.

Here's an email newsletter that's based on this flowchart (due to lack of limitations in interactivity in email, it doesn't have the full detail of troubleshooting why the pomodoro technique might not work for someone the first time)

My top productivity tip—for you, specifically

Comment by malcolmocean on Raising funds to establish a new AI Safety charity · 2018-03-29T05:50:24.581Z · score: 5 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Epic. I remember talking to some people about this at EA Global last year, and I'm excited to see that you've continued working on it and are ready to double down.

I've donated & shared this article on FB!

Comment by malcolmocean on The Intelligent Social Web · 2018-02-25T06:20:01.775Z · score: 10 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I'm really excited about this post on a whole bunch of levels.

One post on my list of posts to write is called something like "Everything is Improv", and I feel like you captured a decent fraction of what I want to say in that post, here! Plus a ton of additional pieces that I hadn't yet notice or connected yet. These two sections in particular felt very important:

"Another challenge here is that the part of us that feels like it’s thinking and talking is (usually) analogous to a character in an improv scene. The players know they’re in a scene, but the characters they’re playing don’t."

&

"But it’s hard to sort this out without just enacting our scripts. The version of you that would be thinking about it is your character, which (in this framework) can accurately understand its own role only if it has enough slack to become genre-savvy within the web; otherwise it just keeps playing out its role."

This means that certain acts of meta-communication almost become kind of like breaking the fourth wall. I've pointed at this in Acts of Speech & States of Mind:

At Upstart, we’re never just having conversations. We’re also training ourselves to think differently. We’re a theatre troupe that isn’t just performing but also practising, which involves having the skill and mutual trust so that at any moment any of us can pull out the director’s chair and say “cut” and we go meta and start talking about the way in which we were just talking. This is a key part of being able to help each other level up in this way.

But, as Val points out, it's really easy for this going-meta to just find its way back into the very dynamics that one is attempting to point at.

For example, have you ever tried pointing out that someone seems to be doing a social dominance move? In most contexts, that pointing-out action ends up itself being a social dominance move! Which isn't a problem, per se, but definitely makes it hard to shift out of that particular dance and into something else.

For that to work, you need a bunch of additional shared framework/context/intent around what the "something else" is and why you'd want it, as well as proficiency in a core ~applied mindfulness skill to avoid the temptation to continue playing out the current roles. I think Looking is one way of pointing at this skill. So an act of meta-communication is often attempting to say "Look, and become the actor, not just the character!"

This breaks character, and the fourth wall, which is a really awkward thing to do if other people aren't able to break out with you.

But with enough practice it's doable, even to the point of being able to pretty consistently act consciously rather than just playing one's character, and to do this with other people in a way that allows rewriting social scripts. Not easy, but learnable.

Comment by malcolmocean on Mythic Mode · 2018-02-24T16:00:04.634Z · score: 17 (5 votes) · LW · GW

Since Val could edit his post, but not this comment, here's me echoing his MD5 hash so that it is more verifiable in the future: 24e07349c9134ff91d77a6a38cf23183

Comment by malcolmocean on The Intelligent Social Web · 2018-02-24T15:46:34.674Z · score: 4 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I would add:

4) Success comes from collaborating with others

Trade is one way to have an economic interaction where value is created, because each of us might value something twice as much as the other, so when we trade, we get more value. But we can also create value where no value existed before. If you and I play a game together that we both enjoy, we're not trading something: we're creating new experiences that we value. If you and I start a company together, we might be selling our products on a market, but the value we're creating by working together is probably something that neither of us had on our own, therefore not well-modelled as a "trade".

Some might argue this is the same as 3, but it seems like an important distinction to me, and very relevant to improv, also.

Comment by malcolmocean on The Intelligent Social Web · 2018-02-24T15:24:30.322Z · score: 26 (8 votes) · LW · GW

Might I propose renaming the post The Social Improv Web? Like Raemon, I think that "Real World Omega", while being an important component of what you're saying here, is less likely to act as a sticky handle for this post.

Perhaps leave the old title in a parenthetical for continuity's sake: The Social Improv Web (aka "Real World Omega").

(I have written on naming concepts to reduce incidents of people thinking they understand terms they haven't even heard before)

Comment by malcolmocean on Rationalist Lent · 2018-02-16T04:46:32.957Z · score: 18 (5 votes) · LW · GW

I did this 6 years ago, also for a non-religious "lent". I was actually very strict about it:

  • nothing with "sugar" (or an artificial sweetener as an ingredient)
  • nothing that is more than 5% sugar by mass.

The latter one means that most fruit was out (except lemons, limes, and (surprisingly!) strawberries & raspberries).

Everyone had told me this would have an effect on my mood or something, or that I would notice things if/when I went back to eating sugar. It didn't. I have since concluded my body is uncommonly resiliant to eating different things.

Oh, except that that all 3 times I have tried a low-carb diet (2× "slow carb", 1× keto) I have gotten ill (usually ~flu) about a week in. Could be a coincidence but feels worth noting.

Comment by malcolmocean on Dispel your justification-monkey with a “HWA!” · 2018-02-07T00:28:05.004Z · score: 8 (2 votes) · LW · GW
You get what you incentivize.

I absolutely get that incentives matter. I also think that responsibility and accountability are important, and my proposal of "hwa" is not intended to suggest otherwise.

I will point out, however, that guilt/shame/punishment etc have additional incentive costs that are often unrecognized: they incentivize people to deceive each other and themselves. If I am navigating by avoiding punishment or avoiding guilt (an internalized form of social punishment) then I'm incentivized to avoid taking responsibility so as to avoid that punishment: both recognizing what I've done socially, because if I did then others would punish me, and also recognizing what I've done internally, because if I did then I would feel bad.

As you say: you get what you incentivize. And I want to build my relationships and my sense of self in such ways that deception is not incentivized. Therefore, taking a post-blame approach to responsibility.

"Hwa" does not assume that people are saints. It does, however, assume that they care. This is a decent assumption for most relationships, and if it's not true, I recommend getting out of that relationship, whether business, romantic, or otherwise.

(This comment thread isn't a context where it's making sense to me to attempt to bridge all of the inferential distance that we're working with here, but this response was something I could manage. I am going to continue to write on this subject, and I value the articulations of the gaps between my explanations and what-I-am-trying-to-say, as provided by Said and others.)

Comment by malcolmocean on Beware Social Coping Strategies · 2018-02-07T00:13:05.771Z · score: 9 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I would use the term "anti-inductive" to point at the thing you're using "adaptive" for. Relevant articles: Markets are Anti-Inductive (talks about economics) and The Phatic and the Anti-Inductive (talks about social stuff).

I also think that anyone who's interested in thinking more about conflict, both as it shows up internally and as it shows up between people, would get a lot out of checking out Perceptual Control Theory.

Comment by malcolmocean on Dispel your justification-monkey with a “HWA!” · 2018-01-25T06:36:24.526Z · score: 15 (5 votes) · LW · GW

I appreciate the point you're making in your second paragraph. I think that the structures you're pointing at are something that we're on the same page about.

Most of my energies are focused on the creation and development of contexts where post-blame/post-fault (essentially what you called "the spirit of HWA") is something that everyone is committed to, and I think that within such a context, "HWA" is actually helpful for consensus-building, as it gets the judgments out of the way so that the details can be explored together, and the parties can figure out what happened, why, and what to do next, and what collective story to tell about it—a story that doesn't have to invoke the guilt vs innocence dichotomy at all!

But you're making a great point about how HWA (like pretty much any tool) can also be used coercively, to shut down people whose perspectives need to be heard in order for the group to function effectively.

HWA may be good for friendships, but I'm not sure it's good on larger scales of human interactions.

I think it's harder for (eg) business relationships than friendships, but all the more important because of it. But yeah, in order for it to facilitate the sharing of stories, you need the post-blame mindset, not just one little verbal tool. And you need that to be built into the context, not just something that's incidentally & inconsistently present.

This is similar in a lot of ways to how rationality is fundamentally a way of thinking not a collection of tools. If you aren't truly truth-seeking, then you can use all of your rationality tools for rationalization. If you're not seeking to get out of coercive dynamics, then you can use HWA for obfuscation.

(I want to note that a lot of the terms I'm using here (particularly "coercive") are sort of jargon on some levels; they have quite specific meanings to me that may not be apparent. I shall write more posts to explain these; in the meantime I figured it would make sense to write some sort of response here.)

Comment by malcolmocean on Dispel your justification-monkey with a “HWA!” · 2018-01-24T08:46:03.049Z · score: 7 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Thoroughly agreed that it's worth doing and also really hard.

Based on several years of experience of trying (and succeeding, to a large extent) to live without blame, in a context where others are doing the same, my read is that blame isn't a biological imperative. I would say something like... "meaning is a biological imperative (for humans)" and then "many of our main cultural meaning narratives are blame-based". But post-blame meaning is way better. Whether "meaning" is the thing or not, I'm inclined to say that blame as such is just pica for whatever the underlying biological need is.

Hmm... I guess there's a few dimensions to it. A necessary aspect of meaning is concepts like responsibility, accountability, etc. You can get rid of blame without getting rid of these (and since they're necessary, you need to keep non-blamey versions in order to be able to let go of blame.)

I haven't yet made a good write-up on exactly why one might want to let go of blame, but if you're familiar with "Should" Considered Harmful, it's basically the same line of reasoning.

Comment by malcolmocean on [deleted post] 2017-05-30T11:55:45.426Z

Not officially at this stage; we're in a process of overhauling a lot of things, including answers to questions like "who are we?" and "what are we calling ourselves?"

That said, this category of posts on my blog has a lot of content about our philosophy, models, culture, etc.

Comment by malcolmocean on [deleted post] 2017-05-29T21:27:31.015Z

We don't! Each of the individual members themselves aren't necessarily Kegan-5, but the person spearheading the project (who is in her 70s) certainly is. And so, therefore, are our models, our equivalent to a "charter", etc.

It's also the case that the mode of interaction that we're training here is fluid as opposed to systematic, which shows up in the ways that we make agreements, commitments, and the general way-we-do-things-here. I was very much operating in (and committed to!) systematic mode when I first joined several years ago, and I'm still getting comfortable with this. It's challenging but worth it, and we're working to build a bridge to meta-rationality to make that learning process easier.

I think that Duncan's intended context will potentially be (a) an awesome place to go from Kegan-3 to Kegan-4, and (b) an awesome place to operate in an exceedingly high-functioning Kegan-4 way. It asks that of its members. I don't expect it to create a demand for most Dragons to operate in a Kegan-5 way, which is the core different between it and the project I'm a part of.

Comment by malcolmocean on [deleted post] 2017-05-29T21:27:28.994Z

I'm totally with you in wishing that Kegan levels weren't getting socially entangled with claims to superiority!

...but that can't be achieved in the way you describe: they would be a fundamentally different thing if they didn't come in the order they do. It's not a personality typing system, it's a model of human development over time. Probably some people who are talking about them are self-aggrandizing; people are known to do that with just about everything they can get their hands on.

I suspect that your heuristics about not trusting people who brag about their Kegan levels are probably decently good heuristics, as it could be reasonably expected that that would be ineffective in just the way you're describing here.

I first learned about the CDT model from a conversation I had with someone who used to work with Kegan, and who readily noted that he was not himself consistently operating out of stage 5. Robert Kegan has said that about himself too, which I found surprising and originally interpreted as being a failure mode in the opposite direction—false humility or something. But now it strikes me as not that unlikely. There's a big difference between being able to recognize abstractly (or in others) what it means to be subject to one's own interpretations & ideologies, and being able to actually not do it.

There's an unfortunate phenomenon here, where the value of the concept gets diluted because the people who are finding the Kegan models helpful but aren't claiming to be at higher Kegan levels than others... are harder to notice.

Anyway, I realize that I may sound like I'm making a superiority claim here myself. I will address that directly, kind of like Duncan is doing re: skulls above.

My understanding—based more on reading things like this than Kegan's own work—is that the "fluid mode" (~=K-5) does have capabilities that the "systematic mode" (~=K-4) does not; much like multivariate calculus can be used to re-derive the equation for the volume of a sphere, but not the reverse. Is multivariate calculus superior to sphere equations? In functional senses yes, but not in a social status way. And also not in all domains! It's certainly slower if you just need to calculate the volumes of a bunch of spheres.

I've spent a considerable amount of time over the past year working to develop the ability to operate in the fluid mode, and I think that that makes a lot of sense for me and many other people, but I don't think that that's highest priority for everyone right now. Hence my strong support for Dragon Army.

Comment by malcolmocean on [deleted post] 2017-05-28T20:30:52.305Z

I want to publicly express my strong support for this experiment/meta-experiment.

I think that my support is particularly noteworthy as I'm presently a core member of a different taking-each-other-seriously co-living experiment that is profoundly different in its philosophy. (Mine is not in Berkeley, nor rationalist.) Therefore some people might assume that I would be opposed to Dragon Army Barracks.

Things in common between the experiment I'm part of and Dragon Army Barracks:

  • is "high-commitment, high-standards, high-investment"
  • is trying to actually make & achieve something together
  • is addressing unanchored abandoned loneliness thing
  • has consciously explicated commitments and assumptions
  • is intended to produce a high-level of consistent excellence and ability to effectively collaborate

Things that are different:

  • We're very far from authoritarian or hierarchical. Although we're also not egalitarian, consensus-based, or even democratic per se... but we have essentially zero of telling-other-people-what-to-do
  • Our basic collective navigating framework is [Kegan-5 / fluid mode / post-rational], rather than [Kegan-4 / systematic mode / rational] (good summary of this distinction)
  • Our focus is almost entirely on the meta-level of building the new cultural platform we're building. We don't have any expectations of each other on the levels of specific object-level projects or explicit behavioral norms (aside from ones necessary for the house's function)

I think that these differences are core to why I am part of this project that I'm part of, and why I consider it to be the most valuable investment I could be making with my time and energy. I am, therefore, non-Berkeley-residence aside, not going to be applying to DA. As I said above though, I strongly support Dragon Army Barracks as an experiment and potentially as an ongoing resource to individual and collective growth.

Reasons why I think that DA is a good idea:

  • Expected value of high amounts of worthwhile object-level output. As Sebastian Marshall says, "the gains made from living more purposefully are forever - the time you've spent well will remains well-spent even if you fall off for a while sometimes. Most people don't even try, which is why most people don't succeed."
  • I expect it will also produce a lot of developmental progress for people involved; that if you were to be able to sort rationalists by amount of growth in a year, the Dragons would all be in the top quartile, and would occupy many of the top 10 slots. This, even if the experiment were to end after 6 months.
  • The DA Barracks is an intervention that is attempting to produce change on a very fundamental level of the system that is a group house. This is a powerful leverage point (see Donella Meadow's article... I would say this is around a 2 or 3, and most group houses have only done mild experiments at the 4-6 level.)
  • I agree with and/or resonate with the six points that Duncan makes in Section 2 of this document.
  • The project-level value of learning here is also very high: this will greatly inform future experiments, whatever their leadership basis.
  • If I had kids, I would absolutely sign them up for any summer camps or classes Duncan was running. I think the amount of power he would have in relation to them would be similar to the amount of power he'll have in this situation.

A final reason is this: I think that we as humanity need to rapidly make progress on being able to effectively coordinate in non-hierarchical ways, which is what the project I'm part of is about. Corollarily, humanity is kind of mediocre at doing this in many contexts. Therefore if non-hierarchical projects aren't emphatically directed towards solving that challenge itself, I expect them to be outperformed by projects that are leveraging existing understanding about how to coordinate effectively in hierarchical ways. i.e. in this case, Dragon Army Barracks.

Comment by malcolmocean on [deleted post] 2017-05-28T20:27:09.802Z

I am open to being an outside advisor / buddy / contact etc to individuals within this and/or with the project as a whole.

Comment by malcolmocean on Group rationality diary, 8/20/12 · 2017-04-15T16:14:04.958Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

The nap tracks are no longer available from Matt's dropbox, but fortunately I saved all except the 15min one and have made them available here:

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/0BwP3_2aUw0uPczVqVHpKUFhMd1E

Comment by malcolmocean on Akrasia Tactics Review 3: The Return of the Akrasia · 2017-04-11T15:07:24.429Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

I think that both of those could make sense, but I'm not sure how I'd go about aggregating the scores from that. I would probably use the second one.

Comment by malcolmocean on Akrasia Tactics Review 3: The Return of the Akrasia · 2017-04-11T15:06:37.231Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Good call. Sorry for the messy experience in response to your question! I didn't think of it until afterwards.

Comment by malcolmocean on Akrasia Tactics Review 3: The Return of the Akrasia · 2017-04-11T15:03:35.673Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Well now we're totally screwed I guess.

Comment by malcolmocean on Akrasia Tactics Review 3: The Return of the Akrasia · 2017-04-10T16:50:15.363Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Easier to compile in some sense, perhaps, but much much less amenable to discussion, and also much less failproof. For example, the 2nd akrasia tactics review stopped getting its responses compiled after a short while, but at least people could still read the comments.

(Hm, maybe it would make sense to pull in some of those?)

Comment by malcolmocean on Akrasia Tactics Review 3: The Return of the Akrasia · 2017-04-10T16:03:03.354Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

(Can you recomment this on the meta thread then delete it? To help keep things organized)

Comment by malcolmocean on Akrasia Tactics Review 3: The Return of the Akrasia · 2017-04-10T16:02:32.125Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

META: Put discussion about the format etc in response to this comment

Comment by malcolmocean on MIRI: Decisions are for making bad outcomes inconsistent · 2017-04-10T15:23:16.875Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

My impression (based in part on this humorous piece) is that FDT is primarily a better formulation than UDT & TDT, but doesn't necessarily make better decisions.

Ah. And the paper says (emphasis mine)

Functional decision theory has been developed in many parts through (largely unpublished) dialogue between a number of collaborators. FDT is a generalization of Dai’s (2009) “updateless decision theory” and a successor to the “timeless decision theory” of Yudkowsky (2010).

Comment by malcolmocean on Musical setting of the Litany of Tarski · 2017-04-10T06:02:13.177Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Agreed! I wrote a song a few years ago after I first went to CFAR! It's not as directly connected to LW, but is... definitely connected ;)

video & lyrics

Comment by malcolmocean on I Want To Live In A Baugruppe · 2017-03-19T19:39:52.603Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Am very interested in this in various ways, whether as a participant or as a consultant to the challenge of how to effectively live together (something I've been studying extensively for the last few years). Not actually currently able to move to the states easily, so there's that.

Comment by malcolmocean on Update to the list of apps that are useful to me · 2017-01-28T20:15:00.311Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Aaaaand unfixed.

Comment by malcolmocean on Triaging mental phenomena or: leveling up the stack trace skill · 2016-12-23T05:36:21.170Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

"A few minutes a day for 3 weeks caused a noticeable effect that has endured."

As in you set the intention to catch this sort of thing, and then that ended up happening a few minutes each day?

Or you spent several minutes each day deliberately practising it somehow?

Comment by malcolmocean on On the importance of Less Wrong, or another single conversational locus · 2016-11-27T13:32:22.695Z · score: 5 (5 votes) · LW · GW

I'm very excited to have an Arbital-shaped discussion and writing platform. I've been thinking for awhile that I want some of my online writing to become less blog-like, more wiki-like, but I don't actually want to use a wiki because... yeah. Wikis.

Arbital seems way better. Is it at the point now where I could start posting some writing/models to it?

Comment by malcolmocean on Two kinds of Expectations, *one* of which is helpful for rational thinking · 2016-06-24T17:05:30.313Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Honestly, I'm not sure I will. The response on LW continues to be aversively critical, so I crosspost here relatively rarely. I really appreciate your comment though, in light of that.

If you want to stay on top of my posts, I recommend my newsletter or rss.

Although perhaps your saying "continue to crosspost" is less about you wanting to read my writing in particular and more you just generally wanting LW to have long-form content on it... in which case, well, we'll see.

Comment by malcolmocean on JFK was not assassinated: prior probability zero events · 2016-04-27T15:50:44.826Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Fascinating.

Is there any problem that might occur from an agent failing to do enough investigation? (Possibly ever, possibly just before taking some action that ends up being important)

Comment by malcolmocean on Several free CFAR summer programs on rationality and AI safety · 2016-04-21T14:19:14.378Z · score: 1 (3 votes) · LW · GW

These sorts of media are pretty good for learning simple course content but quite hard for teaching habits of thought. It's kind of like how it's hard to learn breakdancing from a textbook: the textbook doesn't know how to breakdance, and you can't watch it breakdance.

In order to really get the new habits, you need to practice them with good feedback (and ideally, watch them in action) and it's hard to do this through virtual courses. Not entirely impossible, just very hard! The sequences, for instance, have changed peoples' mental habits.

The other challenge is that this sort of approach gives way slower feedback to the instructors who are trying to iterate rapidly on their explanations. I expect that as CFAR begins converging on "this is a really effective way to teach skill X" we'll start seeing more of their content posted online. But it might be several years before that seems more worthwhile than the workshops, given their benefits in social ties and in increased information value regarding how to teach things.

Comment by malcolmocean on The Pink Sparkly Ball Thing (Use unique, non-obvious terms for nuanced concepts) · 2016-02-21T10:06:34.094Z · score: 3 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Ah, true. Yeah, as much as I like S1 and S2, I think they might be pretty annoying if we used them for lots of things. Or... maybe not! I easily track the 5 Kegan levels, the 9 personality types in the enneagram, and various other numbered things and only occasionally, briefly, become confused. I think these benefit of low-overshadowing is pretty good.

I like compat.

Comment by malcolmocean on The Pink Sparkly Ball Thing (Use unique, non-obvious terms for nuanced concepts) · 2016-02-21T10:02:26.192Z · score: 3 (3 votes) · LW · GW

"I've always hated jargon, and this piece did a good job of convincing me of its necessity."

:)

Feels good to change a mind. I'm curious if there were any parts of the post in particular that connected for you.

Comment by malcolmocean on Upcoming LW Changes · 2016-02-04T09:42:29.541Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Regarding "Less Wrong council" and StackOverflow...

What about meta.lesswrong.com? :P a LW to talk about LW? Or are we already meta enough...

Comment by malcolmocean on A concise version of “Twelve Virtues of Rationality”, with Anki deck · 2016-01-28T06:59:49.362Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Ehh, I've gotten a lot of value out of memorizing poems, and even definitions. I don't do many of the latter, but I've found that throwing a word in Anki usually causes me to have it available as a concept later, which is often helpful.

Comment by malcolmocean on Rationality Quotes Thread January 2016 · 2016-01-04T02:43:40.329Z · score: 0 (4 votes) · LW · GW

The career of truth is not a person's only vocation, but it may be the only one upon which the intervention into that person's life can be justified. Can any other basis – even if all parties agree to it – free itself of the partialities of convention?

— Robert Kegan, The Evolving Self

Comment by malcolmocean on Why CFAR? The view from 2015 · 2015-12-21T11:15:25.952Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

We created a metric for strategic usefulness

What is that metric?

It wouldn't surprise me if they didn't want to publish it because some of the aspects of the measure might be gameable, allowing people to pretend to be super useful by guessing the teacher's password.

Comment by malcolmocean on The value of ambiguous speech · 2015-12-05T22:21:49.908Z · score: 5 (5 votes) · LW · GW

Whoa, it never occurred to me that time could be the verb there.

Comment by malcolmocean on The map of double scenarios of a global catastrophe · 2015-12-05T22:04:20.320Z · score: 0 (0 votes) · LW · GW

Thanks for putting this together!

I googled "kapogen" and didn't find any relevant results. Maybe a misspelling?

Comment by malcolmocean on Group Rationality Diary, Dec. 1-13, 2015 · 2015-12-05T22:01:22.199Z · score: 3 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I was having a kind of unmotivated day yesterday, and eventually I tried doing an experiment where instead of trying to plan out a bunch of things to do, I just picked one thing, deliberately chosen to not be a super important thing, just a thing I vaguely felt like doing (adding a long-press menu to my app Complice). This led into me doing other useful things, and my day was somewhat recovered :)

Comment by malcolmocean on Marketing Rationality · 2015-12-05T21:44:53.971Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

By design, upvotes don't show public approval. Commenting +1 does.