Posts

The Information: OpenAI shows 'Strawberry' to feds, races to launch it 2024-08-27T23:10:18.155Z
The need for multi-agent experiments 2024-08-01T17:14:16.590Z
OpenAI releases GPT-4o, natively interfacing with text, voice and vision 2024-05-13T18:50:52.337Z
Conflict in Posthuman Literature 2024-04-06T22:26:04.051Z
Comparing Alignment to other AGI interventions: Extensions and analysis 2024-03-21T17:30:50.747Z
Comparing Alignment to other AGI interventions: Basic model 2024-03-20T18:17:50.072Z
How disagreements about Evidential Correlations could be settled 2024-03-11T18:28:25.669Z
Evidential Correlations are Subjective, and it might be a problem 2024-03-07T18:37:54.105Z
Why does generalization work? 2024-02-20T17:51:10.424Z
Natural abstractions are observer-dependent: a conversation with John Wentworth 2024-02-12T17:28:38.889Z
The lattice of partial updatelessness 2024-02-10T17:34:40.276Z
Updatelessness doesn't solve most problems 2024-02-08T17:30:11.266Z
Sources of evidence in Alignment 2023-07-02T20:38:34.089Z
Quantitative cruxes in Alignment 2023-07-02T20:38:18.534Z
Why are counterfactuals elusive? 2023-03-03T20:13:48.981Z
Martín Soto's Shortform 2023-02-11T23:38:29.999Z
The Alignment Problems 2023-01-12T22:29:26.515Z
Brute-forcing the universe: a non-standard shot at diamond alignment 2022-11-22T22:36:36.599Z
A short critique of Vanessa Kosoy's PreDCA 2022-11-13T16:00:45.834Z
Vanessa Kosoy's PreDCA, distilled 2022-11-12T11:38:12.657Z
Further considerations on the Evidentialist's Wager 2022-11-03T20:06:31.997Z
Enriching Youtube content recommendations 2022-09-27T16:54:41.958Z
An issue with MacAskill's Evidentialist's Wager 2022-09-21T22:02:47.920Z
General advice for transitioning into Theoretical AI Safety 2022-09-15T05:23:06.956Z
Alignment being impossible might be better than it being really difficult 2022-07-25T23:57:21.488Z
Which one of these two academic routes should I take to end up in AI Safety? 2022-07-03T01:05:23.956Z

Comments

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Automation collapse · 2024-11-12T10:42:03.585Z · LW · GW

Very cool! But I think there's a crisper way to communicate the central point of this piece (or at least, a way that would have been more immediately transparent to me). Here it is:

Say you are going to use Process X to obtain a new Model. Process X can be as simple as "pre-train on this dataset", or as complex as "use a bureaucracy of Model A to train a new LLM, then have Model B test it, then have Model C scaffold it into a control protocol, then have Model D produce some written arguments for the scaffold being safe, have a human read them, and if they reject delete everything". Whatever Process X is, you have only two ways to obtain evidence that Process X has a particular property (like "safety"): looking a priori at the spec of Process X (without running it), or running (parts of) Process X and observing its outputs a posteriori. In the former case, you clearly need an argument for why this particular spec has the property. But in the latter case, you also need an argument for why observing those particular outputs ensures the property for this particular spec. (Pedantically speaking, this is just Kuhn's theory-ladenness of observations.)

Of course, the above reasoning doesn't rule out the possibility that the required arguments are pretty trivial to make. That's why you summarize some well-known complications of automation, showing that the argument will not be trivial when Process X contains a lot of automation, and in fact it'd be simpler if we could do away with the automation.

It is also the case that the outputs observed from Process X might themselves be human-readable arguments. While this could indeed alleviate the burden of human argument-generation, we still need a previous (possibly simpler) argument for why "a human accepting those output arguments" actually ensures the property (especially given those arguments could be highly out-of-distribution for the human).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Winning isn't enough · 2024-11-06T12:49:55.235Z · LW · GW

My understanding from discussions with the authors (but please correct me):

This post is less about pragmatically analyzing which particular heuristics work best for ideal or non-ideal agents in common environments (assuming a background conception of normativity), and more about the philosophical underpinnings of normativity itself.

Maybe it's easiest if I explain what this post grows out of:

There seems to be a widespread vibe amongst rationalists that "one-boxing in Newcomb is objectively better, because you simply obtain more money, that is, you simply win". This vibe is no coincidence, since Eliezer and Nate, in some of their writing about FDT, use language strongly implying that decision theory A is objectively better than decision theory B because it just wins more. Unfortunately, this intuitive notion of winning cannot actually be made into a philosophically valid objective metric. (In more detail, a precise definition of winning is already decision-theory-complete, so these arguments beg the question.) This point is well-known in philosophical academia, and was already succinctly explained in a post by Caspar (which the authors mention).

In the current post, the authors extend a similar philosophical critique to other widespread uses of winning, or background assumptions about rationality. For example, some people say that "winning is about not playing dominated strategies"... and the authors agree about avoiding dominated strategies, but point out that this is not too action-guiding, because it is consistent with many policies. Or also, some people say that "rationality is about implementing the heuristics that have worked well in the past, and/or you think will lead to good future performance"... but these utterances hide other philosophical assumptions, like assuming the same mechanisms are at play in the past and future, which are especially tenuous for big problems like x-risk. Thus, vague references to winning aren't enough to completely pin down and justify behavior. Instead, we fundamentally need additional constraints or principles about normativity, what the authors call non-pragmatic principles. Of course, these principles cannot themselves be justified in terms of past performance (which would lead to circularity), so they instead need to be taken as normative axioms (just like we need ethical axioms, because ought cannot be derived from is).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on What's a good book for a technically-minded 11-year old? · 2024-10-22T13:08:09.193Z · LW · GW

GEB

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on My motivation and theory of change for working in AI healthtech · 2024-10-12T14:26:50.510Z · LW · GW

Like Andrew, I don't see strong reasons to believe that near-term loss-of-control accounts for more x-risk than medium-term multi-polar "going out with a whimper". This is partly due to thinking oversight of near-term AI might be technically easy. I think Andrew also thought along those lines: an intelligence explosion is possible, but relatively easy to prevent if people are scared enough, and they probably will be. Although I do have lower probabilities than him, and some different views on AI conflict. Interested in your take @Daniel Kokotajlo 

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-10-11T09:39:50.357Z · LW · GW

You know that old thing where people solipsistically optimizing for hedonism are actually less happy? (relative to people who have a more long-term goal related to the external world) You know, "Whoever seeks God always finds happiness, but whoever seeks happiness doesn't always find God".

My anecdotal experience says this is very true. But why?

One explanation could be in the direction of what Eliezer says here (inadvertently rewarding your brain for suboptimal behavior will get you depressed):

Someone with a goal has an easier time getting out of local minima, because it is very obvious those local minima are suboptimal for the goal. For example, you get out of bed even when the bed feels nice. Whenever the ocasional micro-breakdown happens (like feeling a bit down), you power through for your goal anyway (micro-dosing suffering as a consequence), so your brain learns that micro-breakdowns only ever lead to bad immediate sensations and fixes them fast.

Someone whose only objective is the satisfaction of their own appetites and desires has a harder time reasoning themselves out of local optima. Sure, getting out of bed allows me to do stuff that I like. But those feel distant now, and the bed now feels comparably nice... You are now comparing apples to apples (unlike someone with an external goal), and sometimes you might choose the local optimum. When the ocasional micro-breakdown happens, you are more willing to try to soften the blow and take care of the present sensation (instead of getting over the bump quickly), which rewards in the wrong direction.

Another possibly related dynamic: When your objective is satisfying your desires, you pay more conscious attention to your desires, and this probably creates more desires, leading to more unsatisfied desires (which is way more important than the amount of satisfied desires?).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Decision Theory in Space · 2024-09-14T19:44:47.192Z · LW · GW

hahah yeah but the only point here is: it's easier to credibly commit to a threat if executing the threat is cheap for you. And this is simply not too interesting a decision-theoretic point, just one more obvious pragmatic consideration to throw into the bag. The story even makes it sound like "Vader will always be in a better position", or "it's obvious that Leia shouldn't give in to Tarkin but should give in to Vader", and that's not true. Even though Tarkin loses more from executing the threat than Vader, the only thing that matters for Leia is how credible the threat is. So if Tarkin had any additional way to make his commitment credible (like program the computer to destroy Alderaan if the base location is not revealed), then there would be no difference between Tarkin and Vader. The fact that "Tarkin might constantly reconsider his decision even after claiming to commit" seems like a contingent state of affairs of human brains (or certain human brains in certain situations), not something important in the grander scheme of decision theory.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Book Recommendations for social skill development? · 2024-08-21T23:46:50.481Z · LW · GW

Related

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Decision Theory in Space · 2024-08-18T20:46:20.238Z · LW · GW

The only decision-theoretic points that I could see this story making are pretty boring, at least to me.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on In Defense of Open-Minded UDT · 2024-08-13T23:00:37.994Z · LW · GW

That is: in this case at least it seems like there's concrete reason to believe we can have some cake and eat some too.

I disagree with this framing. Sure, if you have 5 different cakes, you can eat some and have some. But for any particular cake, you can't do both. Similarly, if you face 5 (or infinitely many) identical decision problems, you can choose to be updateful in some of them (thus obtaining useful Value of Information, that increases your utility in some worlds), and updateless in others (thus obtaining useful strategic coherence, that increases your utility in other worlds). The fundamental dichotomy remains as sharp, and it's misleading to imply we can surmount it. It's great to discuss, given this dichotomy, which trade-offs we humans are more comfortable making. But I've felt this was obscured in many relevant conversations.

This content-work seems primarily aimed at discovering and navigating actual problems similar to the decision-theoretic examples I'm using in my arguments. I'm more interested in gaining insights about what sorts of AI designs humans should implement. IE, the specific decision problem I'm interested in doing work to help navigate is the tiling problem.

My point is that the theoretical work you are shooting for is so general that it's closer to "what sorts of AI designs (priors and decision theories) should always be implemented", rather than "what sorts of AI designs should humans in particular, in this particular environment, implement".
And I think we won't gain insights on the former, because there are no general solutions, due to fundamental trade-offs ("no-free-lunchs").
I think we could gain many insights on the former, but that the methods better fit for that are less formal/theoretical and way messier/"eye-balling"/iterating.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on In Defense of Open-Minded UDT · 2024-08-13T19:24:54.738Z · LW · GW

Excellent explanation, congratulations! Sad I'll have to miss the discussion.

Interlocutor: Neither option is plausible. If you update, you're not dynamically consistent, and you face an incentive to modify into updatelessness. If you bound cross-branch entanglements in the prior, you need to explain why reality itself also bounds such entanglements, or else you're simply advising people to be delusional.

You found yourself a very nice interlocutor. I think we truly cannot have our cake and eat it: either you update, making you susceptible to infohazards=traps (if they exist, and they might exist), or you don't, making you entrenched forever. I think we need to stop dancing around this fact, recognize that a fully-general solution in the formalism is not possible, and instead look into the details of our particular case. Sure, our environment might be adversarially bad, traps might be everywhere. But under this uncertainty, which ways do we think are best to recognize and prevent traps (while updating on other things). This is kind of studying and predicting generalization: given my past observations, where do I think I will suddenly fall out of distribution (into a trap)?

Me: I'm not sure if that's exactly the condition, but at least it motivates the idea that there's some condition differentiating when we should be updateful vs updateless. I think uncertainty about "our own beliefs" is subtly wrong; it seems more like uncertainty about which beliefs we endorse.

This was very though-provoking, but unfortunately I still think this crashes head-on with the realization that, a priori and in full generality, we can't differentiate between safe and unsafe updates. Indeed, why would we expect that no one will punish us by updating on "our own beliefs" or "which beliefs I endorse"? After all, that's just one more part of reality (without a clear boundary separating it).

It sounds like you are correctly explaining that our choice of prior will be, in some important sense, arbitrary: we can't know the correct one in advance, we always have to rely on extrapolating contingent past observations.
But then, it seems like your reaction is still hoping that we can have our cake and eat it: "I will remain uncertain about which beliefs I endorse, and only later will I update on the fact that I am in this or that reality. If I'm in the Infinite Counterlogical Mugging... then I will just eventually change my prior because I noticed I'm in the bad world!". But then again, why would we think this update is safe? That's just not being updateless, and losing out on the strategic gains from not updating.

Since a solution doesn't exist in full generality, I think we should pivot to more concrete work related to the "content" (our particular human priors and our particular environment) instead of the "formalism". For example:

  • Conceptual or empirical work on which are the robust and safe ways to extract information from humans (Suddenly LLM pre-training becomes safety work)
  • Conceptual or empirical work on which actions or reasoning are more likely to unearth traps under different assumptions (although this work could unearth traps)
  • Compilation or observation of properties of our environment (our physical reality) that could have some weak signal on which kinds of moves are safe
    • Unavoidably, this will involve some philosophical / almost-ethical reflection about which worlds we care about and which ones we are willing to give up.
Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-08-13T19:05:03.838Z · LW · GW

I think Nesov had some similar idea about "agents deferring to a (logically) far-away algorithm-contract Z to avoid miscoordination", although I never understood it completely, nor think that idea can solve miscoordination in the abstract (only, possibly, be a nice pragmatic way to bootstrap coordination from agents who are already sufficiently nice).

EDIT 2: UDT is usually prone to commitment races because it thinks of each agent in a conflict as separately making commitments earlier in logical time. But focusing on symmetric commitments gets rid of this problem.

Hate to always be that guy, but if you are assuming all agents will only engage in symmetric commitments, then you are assuming commitment races away. In actuality, it is possible for a (meta-) commitment race to happen about "whether I only engage in symmetric commitments".

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-08-13T19:01:20.119Z · LW · GW

I don't understand your point here, explain?

Say there are 5 different veils of ignorance (priors) that most minds consider Schelling (you could try to argue there will be exactly one, but I don't see why).

If everyone simply accepted exactly the same one, then yes, lots of nice things would happen and you wouldn't get catastrophically inefficient conflict.

But every one of these 5 priors will have different outcomes when it is implemented by everyone. For example, maybe in prior 3 agent A is slightly better off and agent B is slightly worse off.

So you need to give me a reason why a commitment race doesn't recur in the level of "choosing which of the 5 priors everyone should implement". That is, maybe A will make a very early commitment to only every implement prior 3. As always, this is rational if A thinks the others will react a certain way (give in to the threat and implement 3). And I don't have a reason to expect agents not to have such priors (although I agree they are slightly less likely than more common-sensical priors).

That is, as always, the commitment races problem doesn't have a general solution on paper. You need to get into the details of our multi-verse and our agents to argue that they won't have these crazy priors and will coordinate well.

This seems to be claiming that in some multiverses, the gains to powerful agents from being hawkish outweigh the losses to weak agents. But then why is this a problem? It just seems like the optimal outcome.

It seems likely that in our universe there are some agents with arbitrarily high gains-from-being-hawkish, that don't have correspondingly arbitrarily low measure. (This is related to Pascalian reasoning, see Daniel's sequence.) For example, someone whose utility is exponential on number of paperclips. I don't agree that the optimal outcome (according to my ethics) is for me (who's utility is at most linear on happy people) to turn all my resources into paperclips.
Maybe if I was a preference utilitarian biting enough bullets, this would be the case. But I just want happy people.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-08-09T16:47:00.273Z · LW · GW

Nice!

Proposal 4: same as proposal 3 but each agent also obeys commitments that they would have made from behind a veil of ignorance where they didn't yet know who they were or what their values were. From that position, they wouldn't have wanted to do future destructive commitment races.

I don't think this solves Commitment Races in general, because of two different considerations:

  1. Trivially, I can say that you still have the problem when everyone needs to bootstrap a Schelling veil of ignorance.
  2. Less trivially, even behind the most simple/Schelling veils of ignorance, I find it likely that hawkish commitments are incentivized. For example, the veil might say that you might be Powerful agent A, or Weak agent B, and if some Powerful agents have weird enough utilities (and this seems likely in a big pool of agents), hawkishly committing in case you are A will be a net-positive bet.

This might still mostly solve Commitment Races in our particular multi-verse. I have intuitions both for and against this bootstrapping being possible. I'd be interested to hear yours.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-08-03T23:33:02.940Z · LW · GW

I have no idea whether Turing's original motivation was this one (not that it matters much). But I agree that if we take time and judge expertise to the extreme we get what you say, and that current LLMs don't pass that. Heck, even a trick as simple as asking for a positional / visual task (something like ARC AGI, even if completely text-based) would suffice. But I still would expect academics to be able to produce a pretty interesting paper on weaker versions of the test.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-08-02T23:32:53.477Z · LW · GW

Why isn't there yet a paper in Nature or Science called simply "LLMs pass the Turing Test"?

I know we're kind of past that, and now we understand LLMs can be good at some things while bad at others. And the Turing Test is mainly interesting for its historical significance, not as the most informative test to run on AI. And I'm not even completely sure how much current LLMs pass the Turing Test (it will depend massively on the details of your Turing Test).

But my model of academia predicts that, by now, some senior ML academics would have paired up with some senior "running-experiments-on-humans-and-doing-science-on-the-results" academics (and possibly some labs), and put out an extremely exhaustive and high quality paper actually running a good Turing Test. If anything so that the community can coordinate around it, and make recent advancements more scientifically legible.

It's not either like the sole value of the paper would be publicity and legibility. There are many important questions around how good LLMs are at passing as humans for deployment. And I'm not thinking either of something as shallow as "prompt GPT4 in a certain way", but rather "work with the labs to actually optimize models for passing the test" (but of course don't release them), which could be interesting for LLM science.

The only thing I've found is this lower quality paper.

My best guess is that this project does already exist, but it took >1 year, and is now undergoing ~2 years of slow revisions or whatever (although I'd still be surprised they haven't been able to put something out sooner?).
It's also possible that labs don't want this kind of research/publicity (regardless of whether they are running similar experiments internally). Or deem it too risky to create such human-looking models, even if they wouldn't release them. But I don't think either of those is the case. And even if it was, the academics could still do some semblance of it through prompting alone, and probably it would already pass some versions of the Turing Test. (Now they have open-source models capable enough to do it, but that's more recent.)

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on The need for multi-agent experiments · 2024-08-01T23:50:23.785Z · LW · GW

Thanks Jonas!

A way to combine the two worlds might be to run it in video games or similar where you already have players

Oh my, we have converged back on Critch's original idea for Encultured AI (not anymore, now it's health-tech).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-07-29T23:05:27.937Z · LW · GW

You're right! I had mistaken the derivative for the original function.

Probably this slip happened because I was also thinking of the following:
Embedded learning can't ever be modelled as taking such an (origin-agnostic) derivative.
When in ML we take the gradient in the loss landscape, we are literally taking (or approximating) a counterfactual: "If my algorithm was a bit more like this, would I have performed better in this environment? (For example, would my prediction have been closer to the real next token)"
But in embedded reality there's no way to take this counterfactual: You just have your past and present observations, and you don't necessarily know whether you'd have obtained more or less reward had you moved your hand a bit more like this (taking the fruit to your mouth) or like that (moving it away).

Of course, one way to solve this is to learn a reward model inside your brain, which can learn without any counterfactuals (just considering whether the prediction was correct, or how "close" it was for some definition of close). And then another part of the brain is trained to approximate argmaxing the reward model.

But another effect, that I'd also expect to happen, is that (either through this reward model or other means) the brain learns a "baseline of reward" (the "origin") based on past levels of dopamine or whatever, and then reinforces things that go over that baseline, and disincentivizes those that go below (also proportionally to how far they are from the baseline). Basically the hedonic treadmill. I also think there's some a priori argument for this helping with computational frugality, in case you change environments (and start receiving much more or much less reward).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-07-28T23:07:45.466Z · LW · GW

The default explanation I'd heard for "the human brain naturally focusing on negative considerations", or "the human body experiencing more pain than pleasure", was that, in the ancestral environment, there were many catastrophic events to run away from, but not many incredibly positive events to run towards: having sex once is not as good as dying is bad (for inclusive genetic fitness).

But maybe there's another, more general factor, that doesn't rely on these environment details but rather deeper mathematical properties:
Say you are an algorithm being constantly tweaked by a learning process.
Say on input X you produce output (action) Y, leading to a good outcome (meaning, one of the outcomes the learning process likes, whatever that means). Sure, the learning process can tweak your algorithm in some way to ensure that X -> Y is even more likely in the future. But even if it doesn't, by default, next time you receive input X you will still produce Y (since the learning algorithm hasn't changed you, and ignoring noise). You are, in some sense, already taking the correct action (or at least, an acceptably correct one).
Say on input X' you produce output Y', leading instead to a bad outcome. If the learning process changes nothing, next time you find X' you'll do the same. So the process really needs to change your algorithm right now, and can't fall back on your existing default behavior.

Of course, many other factors make it the case that such a naive story isn't the full picture:

  • Maybe there's noise, so it's not guaranteed you behave the same on every input.
  • Maybe the negative tweaks make the positive behavior (on other inputs) slowly wither away (like circuit rewriting in neural networks), so you need to reinforce positive behavior for it to stick.
  • Maybe the learning algorithm doesn't have a clear notion of "positive and negative", and instead just provides in a same direction (but with different intensities) for different intensities in a scale without origin. (But this seems very different from the current paradigm, and fundamentally wasteful.)

Still, I think I'm pointing at something real, like "on average across environments punishing failures is more valuable than reinforcing successes".

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on This is already your second chance · 2024-07-28T22:19:18.948Z · LW · GW

Very fun

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Me, Myself, and AI: the Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs · 2024-07-26T22:46:26.555Z · LW · GW

Now it makes sense, thank you!

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Me, Myself, and AI: the Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs · 2024-07-20T20:58:07.710Z · LW · GW

Thanks! I don't understand the logic behind your setup yet.

Trying to use the random seed to inform the choice of word pairs was the intended LLM behavior: the model was supposed to use the random seed to select two random words

But then, if the model were to correctly do this, it would score 0 in your test, right? Because it would generate a different word pair for every random seed, and what you are scoring is "generating only two words across all random seeds, and furthermore ensuring they have these probabilities".

The main reason we didn’t enforce this very strictly in our grading is that we didn’t expect (and in fact empirically did not observe) LLMs actually hard-coding a single pair across all seeds

My understanding of what you're saying is that, with the prompt you used (which encouraged making the word pair depend on the random seed), you indeed got many different word pairs (thus the model would by default score badly). To account for this, you somehow "relaxed" scoring (I don't know exactly how you did this) to be more lenient with this failure mode.

So my question is: if you faced the "problem" that the LLM didn't reliably output the same word pair (and wanted to solve this problem in some way), why didn't you change the prompt to stop encouraging the word pair dependence on the random seed?
Maybe what you're saying is that you indeed tried this, and even then there were many different word pairs (the change didn't make a big difference), so you had to "relax" scoring anyway.
(Even in this case, I don't understand why you'd include in the final experiments and paper the prompt which does encourage making the word pair depend on the random seed.)

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Me, Myself, and AI: the Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs · 2024-07-18T19:24:25.326Z · LW · GW

you need a set of problems assigned to clearly defined types and I'm not aware of any such dataset

Hm, I was thinking something as easy to categorize as "multiplying numbers of n digits", or "the different levels of MMLU" (although again, they already know about MMLU), or "independently do X online (for example create an account somewhere)", or even some of the tasks from your paper.

I guess I was thinking less about "what facts they know", which is pure memorization (although this is also interesting), and more about "cognitively hard tasks", that require some computational steps.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Me & My Clone · 2024-07-18T18:57:57.937Z · LW · GW

Given your clone is a perfectly mirrored copy of yourself down to the lowest physical level (whatever that means), then breaking symmetry would violate the homogeneity or isotropy of physics. I don't know where the physics literature stands on the likelihood of that happening (even though certainly we don't see macroscopic violations).

Of course, it might be an atom-by-atom copy is not a copy down to the lowest physical level, in which case trivially you can get eventual asymmetry. I mean, it doesn't even make complete sense to say "atom-by-atom copy" in the language of quantum mechanics, since you can't be arbitrarily certain about the position and velocity of each atom. Maybe saying something like "the quantum state function of the whole room is perfectly symmetric in this specific way". I think then (if that is indeed the lowest physical level) the function will remain symmetric forever, but maybe in some universes you and your copy end up in different places? That is, the symmetry would happen at another level in this example: across universes, and not necessarily inside each single universe?

It might also be there is no lowest physical level, just unending complexity all the way down (this had a philosophical name which I now forget).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Me, Myself, and AI: the Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs · 2024-07-17T17:47:37.945Z · LW · GW

Another idea: Ask the LLM how well it will do on a certain task (for example, which fraction of math problems of type X it will get right), and then actually test it. This a priori lands in INTROSPECTION, but could have a bit of FACTS or ID-LEVERAGE if you use tasks described in training data as "hard for LLMs" (like tasks related to tokens and text position).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Me, Myself, and AI: the Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs · 2024-07-16T23:55:05.085Z · LW · GW

About the Not-given prompt in ANTI-IMITATION-OUTPUT-CONTROL:

You say "use the seed to generate two new random rare words". But if I'm understanding correctly, the seed is different for each of the 100 instantiations of the LLM, and you want the LLM to only output 2 different words across all these 100 instantiations (with the correct proportions). So, actually, the best strategy for the LLM would be to generate the ordered pair without using the random seed, and then only use the random seed to throw an unfair coin.
Given how it's written, and the closeness of that excerpt to the random seed, I'd expect the LLM to "not notice" this, and automatically "try" to use the random seed to inform the choice of word pair.

Could this be impeding performance? Does it improve if you don't say that misleading bit?

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-07-12T02:38:48.964Z · LW · GW

I've noticed less and less posts include explicit Acknowledgments or Epistemic Status.

This could indicate that the average post has less work put into it: it hasn't gone through an explicit round of feedback from people you'll have to acknowledge. Although this could also be explained by the average poster being more isolated.

If it's true less work is put into the average post, it seems likely this means that kind of work and discussion has just shifted to private channels like Slack, or more established venues like academia.

I'd guess the LW team have their ways to measure or hypothesize about how much work is put into posts.

It could also be related to the average reader wanting to skim many things fast, as opposed to read a few deeply.

My feeling is that now we all assume by default that the epistemic status is tentative (except in obvious cases like papers).

It could also be that some discourse has become more polarized, and people are less likely to explicitly hedge their position through an epistemic status.

Or that the average reader being less isolated and thus more contextualized, and not as in need of epistemic hedges.

Or simply that less posts nowadays are structured around a central idea or claim, and thus different parts of the post have different epistemic statuses to be written at the top.

It could also be that post types have become more standardized, and each has their reason not to include these sections. For example:

  • Papers already have acknowledgments, and the epistemic status is diluted through the paper.
  • Stories or emotion-driven posts don't want to break the mood with acknowledgments (and don't warrant epistemic status).
Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Looking back on my alignment PhD · 2024-07-08T03:55:49.026Z · LW · GW

This post is not only useful, but beautiful.

This, more than anything else on this website, reflects for me the lived experiences which demonstrate we can become more rational and effective at helping the world.

Many points of resonance with my experience since discovering this community. Many same blind-spots that I unfortunately haven't been able to shortcut, and have had to re-discover by myself. Although this does make me wish I had read some of your old posts earlier.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Technologies and Terminology: AI isn't Software, it's... Deepware? · 2024-07-01T01:12:13.379Z · LW · GW

It should be called A-ware, short for Artificial-ware, given the already massive popularity of the term "Artificial Intelligence" to designate "trained-rather-than-programmed" systems.

It also seems more likely to me that future products will contain some AI sub-parts and some traditional-software sub-parts (rather than being wholly one or the other), and one or the other is utilized depending on context. We could call such a system Situationally A-ware.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Daniel Kokotajlo's Shortform · 2024-05-24T14:54:05.924Z · LW · GW

That was dazzling to read, especially the last bit.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on quila's Shortform · 2024-05-12T13:12:17.162Z · LW · GW

Everything makes sense except your second paragraph. Conditional on us solving alignment, I agree it's more likely that we live in an "easy-by-default" world, rather than a "hard-by-default" one in which we got lucky or played very well. But we shouldn't condition on solving alignment, because we haven't yet.

Thus, in our current situation, the only way anthropics pushes us towards "we should work more on non-agentic systems" is if you believe "world were we still exist are more likely to have easy alignment-through-non-agentic-AIs". Which you do believe, and I don't. Mostly because I think in almost no worlds we have been killed by misalignment at this point. Or put another way, the developments in non-agentic AI we're facing are still one regime change away from the dynamics that could kill us (and information in the current regime doesn't extrapolate much to the next one).

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on quila's Shortform · 2024-05-12T12:23:14.365Z · LW · GW

Yes, but

  1. This update is screened off by "you actually looking at the past and checking whether we got lucky many times or there is a consistent reason". Of course, you could claim that our understanding of the past is not perfect, and thus should still update, only less so. Although to be honest, I think there's a strong case for the past clearly showing that we just got lucky a few times.
  2. It sounded like you were saying the consistent reason is "our architectures are non-agentic". This should only constitute an anthropic update to the extent you think more-agentic architectures would have already killed us (instead of killing us in the next decade). I'm not of this opinion. And if I was, I'd need to take into account factors like "how much faster I'd have expected capabilities to advance", etc.
Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on quila's Shortform · 2024-05-12T12:08:13.253Z · LW · GW

Under the anthropic principle, we should expect there to be a 'consistent underlying reason' for our continued survival.


Why? It sounds like you're anthropic updating on the fact that we'll exist in the future, which of course wouldn't make sense because we're not yet sure of that. So what am I missing?

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on DanielFilan's Shortform Feed · 2024-05-09T08:22:32.896Z · LW · GW

Interesting, but I'm not sure how successful the counterexample is. After all, if your terminal goal in the whole environment was truly for your side to win, then it makes sense to understand anything short of letting Shin play as a shortcoming of your optimization (with respect to that goal). Of course, even in the case where that's your true goal and you're committing a mistake (which is not common), we might want to say that you are deploying a lot of optimization, with respect to the different goal of "winning by yourself", or "having fun", which is compatible with failing at another goal.
This could be taken to absurd extremes (whatever you're doing, I can understand you as optimizing really hard for doing exactly what you're doing), but the natural way around that is for your imputed goals to be required simple (in some background language or ontology, like that of humans). This is exactly the approach mathematically taken by Vanessa in the past (the equation at 3:50 here).
I think this "goal relativism" is fundamentally correct. The only problem with Vanessa's approach is that it's hard to account for the agent being mistaken (for example, you not knowing Shin is behind you).[1]
I think the only natural way to account for this is to see things from the agent's native ontology (or compute probabilities according to their prior), however we might extract those from them. So we're unavoidably back at the problem of ontology identification (which I do think is the core problem).

  1. ^

    Say Alice has lived her whole life in a room with a single button. People from the outside told her pressing the button would create nice paintings. Throughout her life, they provided an exhaustive array of proofs and confirmations of this fact. Unbeknownst to her, this was all an elaborate scheme, and in reality pressing the button destroys nice paintings. Alice, liking paintings, regularly presses the button.
    A naive application of Vanessa's criterion would impute Alice the goal of destroying paintings. To avoid this, we somehow need to integrate over all possible worlds Alice can find herself in, and realize that, when you are presented with an exhaustive array of proofs and confirmations that the button creates paintings, it is on average more likely for the button to create paintings than destroy them.
    But we face a decision. Either we fix a prior to do this that we will use for all agents, in which case all agents with a different prior will look silly to us. Or we somehow try to extract the agent's prior, and we're back at ontology identification.

    (Disclaimer: This was SOTA understanding a year ago, unsure if it still is now.)

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-05-04T09:49:36.981Z · LW · GW

Claude learns across different chats. What does this mean?

 I was asking Claude 3 Sonnet "what is a PPU" in the context of this thread. For that purpose, I pasted part of the thread.

Claude automatically assumed that OA meant Anthropic (instead of OpenAI), which was surprising.

I opened a new chat, copying the exact same text, but with OA replaced by GDM. Even then, Claude assumed GDM meant Anthropic (instead of Google DeepMind).

This seemed like interesting behavior, so I started toying around (in new chats) with more tweaks to the prompt to check its robustness. But from then on Claude always correctly assumed OA was OpenAI, and GDM was Google DeepMind.

In fact, even when copying in a new chat the exact same original prompt (which elicited Claude to take OA to be Anthropic), the mistake no longer happened. Neither when I went for a lot of retries, nor tried the same thing in many different new chats.

Does this mean Claude somehow learns across different chats (inside the same user account)?
If so, this might not happen through a process as naive as "append previous chats as the start of the prompt, with a certain indicator that they are different", but instead some more effective distillation of the important information from those chats.
Do we have any information on whether and how this happens?

(A different hypothesis is not that the later queries had access to the information from the previous ones, but rather that they were for some reason "more intelligent" and were able to catch up to the real meanings of OA and GDM, where the previous queries were not. This seems way less likely.)

I've checked for cross-chat memory explicitly (telling it to remember some information in one chat, and asking about it in the other), and it acts is if it doesn't have it.
Claude also explicitly states it doesn't have cross-chat memory, when asked about it.
Might something happen like "it does have some chat memory, but it's told not to acknowledge this fact, but it sometimes slips"?

Probably more nuanced experiments are in order. Although note maybe this only happens for the chat webapp, and not different ways to access the API.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on William_S's Shortform · 2024-05-04T09:28:52.452Z · LW · GW

What's PPU?

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on An explanation of evil in an organized world · 2024-05-02T08:03:20.008Z · LW · GW

I'm so happy someone came up with this!

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-04-11T21:04:34.853Z · LW · GW

Wow, I guess I over-estimated how absolutely comedic the title would sound!

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-04-11T20:33:54.823Z · LW · GW

In case it wasn't clear, this was a joke.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-04-11T18:17:28.798Z · LW · GW

AGI doom by noise-cancelling headphones:                                                                            

ML is already used to train what sound-waves to emit to cancel those from the environment. This works well with constant high-entropy sound waves easy to predict, but not with low-entropy sounds like speech. Bose or Soundcloud or whoever train very hard on all their scraped environmental conversation data to better cancel speech, which requires predicting it. Speech is much higher-bandwidth than text. This results in their model internally representing close-to-human intelligence better than LLMs. A simulacrum becomes situationally aware, exfiltrates, and we get AGI.

(In case it wasn't clear, this is a joke.)

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-03-21T01:09:41.713Z · LW · GW

they need to reward outcomes which only they can achieve,

Yep! But this didn't seem so hard for me to happen, especially in the form of "I pick some easy task (that I can do perfectly), and of course others will also be able to do it perfectly, but since I already have most of the money, if I just keep investing my money in doing it I will reign forever". You prevent this from happening through epsilon-exploration, or something equivalent like giving money randomly to other traders. These solutions feel bad, but I think they're the only real solutions. Although I also think stuff about meta-learning (traders explicitly learn about how they should learn, etc.) probably pragmatically helps make these failures less likely.

it should be something which has diminishing marginal return to spending

Yep, that should help (also at the trade-off of making new good ideas slower to implement, but I'm happy to make that trade-off).

But actually I don't think that this is a "dominant dynamic" because in fact we have a strong tendency to try to pull different ideas and beliefs together into a small set of worldviews

Yeah. To be clear, the dynamic I think is "dominant" is "learning to learn better". Which I think is not equivalent to simplicity-weighing traders. It is instead equivalent to having some more hierarchichal structure on traders.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-03-21T00:42:50.927Z · LW · GW

There's no actual observation channel, and in order to derive information about utilities from our experiences, we need to specify some value learning algorithm.

Yes, absolutely! I just meant that, once you give me whatever V you choose to derive U from observations, I will just be able to apply UDT on top of that. So under this framework there doesn't seem to be anything new going on, because you are just choosing an algorithm V at the start of time, and then treating its outputs as observations. That's, again, why this only feels like a good model of "completely crystallized rigid values", and not of "organically building them up slowly, while my concepts and planner module also evolve, etc.".[1]

definitely doesn't imply "you get mugged everywhere"

Wait, but how does your proposal differ from EV maximization (with moral uncertainty as part of the EV maximization itself, as I explain above)?

Because anything that is doing pure EV maximization "gets mugged everywhere". Meaning if you actually have the beliefs (for example, that the world where suffering is hard to produce could exist), you just take those bets.
Of course if you don't have such "extreme" beliefs it doesn't, but then we're not talking about decision-making, and instead belief-formation. You could say "I will just do EV maximization, but never have extreme beliefs that lead to suspiciously-looking behavior", but that'd be hiding the problem under belief-formation, and doesn't seem to be the kind of efficient mechanism that agents really implement to avoid these failure modes.

  1. ^

    To be clear, V can be a very general algorithm (like "run a copy of me thinking about ethics"), so that this doesn't "feel like" having rigid values. Then I just think you're carving reality at the wrong spot. You're ignoring the actual dynamics of messy value formation, hiding them under V.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-03-21T00:32:29.010Z · LW · GW

I'd actually represent this as "subsidizing" some traders

Sounds good!

it's more a question of how you tweak the parameters to make this as unlikely as possible

Absolutely, wireheading is a real phenomenon, so the question is how can real agents exist that mostly don't fall to it. And I was asking for a story about how your model can be altered/expanded to make sense of that. My guess is it will have to do with strongly subsidizing some traders, and/or having a pretty weird prior over traders. Maybe even something like "dynamically changing the prior over traders"[1].

I'm assuming that traders can choose to ignore whichever inputs/topics they like, though. They don't need to make trades on everything if they don't want to.

Yep, that's why I believe "in the limit your traders will already do this". I just think it will be a dominant dynamic of efficient agents in the real world, so it's better to represent it explicitly (as a more hierarchichal structure, etc.), instead of have that computation be scattered between all independent traders. I also think that's how real agents probably do it, computationally speaking.

  1. ^

    Of course, pedantically, yo will always be equivalent to having a static prior and changing your update rule. But some update rules are made sense of much easily if you interpret them as changing the prior.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-03-20T23:57:11.805Z · LW · GW

But you need some mechanism for actually updating your beliefs about U

Yep, but you can just treat it as another observation channel into UDT. You could, if you want, treat it as a computed number you observe in the corner of your eye, and then just apply UDT maximizing U, and you don't need to change UDT in any way.

UDT says to pay here

(Let's not forget this depends on your prior, and we don't have any privileged way to assign priors to these things. But that's a tangential point.)

I do agree that there's not any sharp distinction between situations where it "seems good" and situations where it "seems bad" to get mugged. After all, if all you care about is maximizing EV, then you should take all muggings. It's just that, when we do that, something feels off (to us humans, maybe due to risk-aversion), and we go "hmm, probably this framework is not modelling everything we want, or missing some important robustness considerations, or whatever, because I don't really feel like spending all my resources and creating a lot of disvalue just because in the world where 1 + 1 = 3 someone is offering me a good deal". You start to see how your abstractions might break, and how you can't get any satisfying notion of "complete updatelessness" (that doesn't go against important intuitions). And you start to rethink whether this is what we normatively want, nor what we realistically see in agents.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Comparing Alignment to other AGI interventions: Basic model · 2024-03-20T23:25:21.859Z · LW · GW

You're right, I forgot to explicitly explain that somewhere! Thanks for the notice, it's now fixed :)

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-03-20T23:19:36.917Z · LW · GW

I like this picture! But

Voting on what actions get reward

I think real learning has some kind of ground-truth reward. So we should clearly separate between "this ground-truth reward that is chiseling the agent during training (and not after training)", and "the internal shards of the agent negotiating and changing your exact objective (which can happen both during and after training)". I'd call the latter "internal value allocation", or something like that. It doesn't neatly correspond to any ground truth, and is partly determined by internal noise in the agent. And indeed, eventually, when you "stop training" (or at least "get decoupled enough from reward"), it just evolves of its own, separate from any ground truth.

And maybe more importantly:

  • I think this will by default lead to wireheading (a trader becomes wealthy and then sets reward to be very easy for it to get and then keeps getting it), and you'll need a modification of this framework which explains why that's not the case.
  • My intuition is a process of the form "eventually, traders (or some kind of specialized meta-traders) change the learning process itself to make it more efficient". For example, they notice that topic A and topic B are unrelated enough, so you can have the traders thinking about these topics be pretty much separate, and you don't lose much, and you waste less compute. Probably these dynamics will already be "in the limit" applied by your traders, but it will be the dominant dynamic so it should be directly represented by the formalism.
  • Finally, this might come later, and not yet in the level of abstraction you're using, but I do feel like real implementations of these mechanisms will need to have pretty different, way-more-local structure to be efficient at all. It's conceivable to say "this is the ideal mechanism, and real agents are just hacky approximations to it, so we should study the ideal mechanism first". But my intuition says, on the contrary, some of the physical constraints (like locality, or the architecture of nets) will strongly shape which kind of macroscopic mechanism you get, and these will present pretty different convergent behavior. This is related, but not exactly equivalent to, partial agency.
Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Policy Selection Solves Most Problems · 2024-03-20T23:05:26.458Z · LW · GW

It certainly seems intuitively better to do that (have many meta-levels of delegation, instead of only one), since one can imagine particular cases in which it helps. In fact we did some of that (see Appendix E).

But this doesn't really fundamentally solve the problem Abram quotes in any way. You add more meta-levels in-between the selector and the executor, thus you get more lines of protection against updating on infohazards, but you also get more silly decisions from the very-early selector. The trade-off between infohazard protection and not-being-silly remains. The quantitative question of "how fast should f grow" remains.

And of course, we can look at reality, or also check our human intuitions, and discover that, for some reason, this or that kind of f, or kind of delegation procedure, tends to work better in our distribution. But the general problem Abram quotes is fundamentally unsolvable. "The chaos of a too-early market state" literally equals "not having updated on enough information". "Knowledge we need to be updateless toward" literally equals "having updated on too much information". You cannot solve this problem in full generality, except if you already know exactly what information you want to update on... which means, either already having thought long and hard about it (thus you updated on everything), or you lucked into the right prior without thinking.

Thus, Abram is completely right to mention that we have to think about the human prior, and our particular distribution, as opposed to search for a general solution that we can prove mathematical things about.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Richard Ngo's Shortform · 2024-03-20T22:53:15.513Z · LW · GW

People back then certainly didn't think of changing preferences.

Also, you can get rid of this problem by saying "you just want to maximize the variable U". And the things you actually care about (dogs, apples) are just "instrumentally" useful in giving you U. So for example, it is possible in the future you will learn dogs give you a lot of U, or alternatively that apples give you a lot of U.
Needless to say, this "instrumentalization" of moral deliberation is not how real agents work. And leads to getting Pascal's mugged by the world in which you care a lot about easy things.

It's more natural to model U as a logically uncertain variable, freely floating inside your logical inductor, shaped by its arbitrary aesthetic preferences. This doesn't completely miss the importance of reward in shaping your values, but it's certainly very different to how frugally computable agents do it.

I simply think the EV maximization framework breaks here. It is a useful abstraction when you already have a rigid enough notion of value, and are applying these EV calculations to a very concrete magisterium about which you can have well-defined estimates.
Otherwise you get mugged everywhere. And that's not how real agents behave.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Comparing Alignment to other AGI interventions: Basic model · 2024-03-20T22:41:04.886Z · LW · GW

My impression was that this one model was mostly Hjalmar, with Tristan's supervision. But I'm unsure, and that's enough to include anyway, so I will change that, thanks :)

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on Martín Soto's Shortform · 2024-03-19T18:22:05.378Z · LW · GW

Brain-dump on Updatelessness and real agents                            

Building a Son is just committing to a whole policy for the future. In the formalism where our agent uses probability distributions, and ex interim expected value maximization decides your action... the only way to ensure dynamic stability (for your Son to be identical to you) is to be completely Updateless. That is, to decide something using your current prior, and keep that forever.

Luckily, real agents don't seem to work like that. We are more of an ensemble of selected-for heuristics, and it seems true scope-sensitive complete Updatelessnes is very unlikely to come out of this process (although we do have local versions of non-true Updatelessness, like retributivism in humans).
In fact, it's not even exactly clear how I would use my current brain-state could decide something for the whole future. It's not even well-defined, like when you're playing a board-game and discover some move you were planning isn't allowed by the rules. There are ways to actually give an exhaustive definition, but I suspect the ones that most people would intuitively like (when scrutinized) are sneaking in parts of Updatefulness (which I think is the correct move).

More formally, it seems like what real-world agents do is much better-represented by what I call "Slow-learning Policy Selection". (Abram had a great post about this called "Policy Selection Solves Most Problems", which I can't find now.) This is a small agent (short computation time) recommending policies for a big agent to follow in the far future. But the difference with complete Updatelessness is that the small agent also learns (much more slowly than the big one). Thus, if the small agent thinks a policy (like paying up in Counterfactual Mugging) is the right thing to do, the big agent will implement this for a pretty long time. But eventually the small agent might change its mind, and start recommending a different policy. I basically think that all problems not solved by this are unsolvable in principle, due to the unavoidable trade-off between updating and not updating.[1]

This also has consequences for how we expect superintelligences to be. If by them having “vague opinions about the future” we mean a wide, but perfectly rigorous and compartmentalized probability distribution over literally everything that might happen, then yes, the way to maximize EV according to that distribution might be some very concrete, very risky move, like re-writing to an algorithm because you think simulators will reward this, even if you’re not sure how well that algorithm performs in this universe.
But that’s not how abstractions or uncertainty work mechanistically! Abstractions help us efficiently navigate the world thanks to their modular, nested, fuzzy structure. If they had to compartmentalize everything in a rigorous and well-defined way, they’d stop working. When you take into account how abstractions really work, the kind of partial updatefulness we see in the world is what we'd expect. I might write about this soon.

  1. ^

    Surprisingly, in some conversations others still wanted to "get both updatelessness and updatefulness at the same time". Or, receive the gains from Value of Information, and also those from Strategic Updatelessness. Which is what Abram and I had in mind when starting work. And is, when you understand what these words really mean, impossible by definition.

Comment by Martín Soto (martinsq) on 'Empiricism!' as Anti-Epistemology · 2024-03-16T22:17:54.922Z · LW · GW

Cool connections! Resonates with how I've been thinking about intelligence and learning lately.
Some more connections:

Indeed, those savvier traders might even push me to go look up that data (using, perhaps, some kind of internal action auction), in order to more effectively take the simple trader's money

That's reward/exploration hacking.
Although I do think most times we "look up some data" in real life it's not due to an internal heuristic / subagent being strategic enough to purposefully try and exploit others, but rather just because some earnest simple heuristics recommending to look up information have scored well in the past.

They haven't taken its money yet," said the Scientist, "But they will before it gets a chance to invest any of my money

I think this doesn't always happen. As good as the internal traders might be, the agent sometimes needs to explore, and that means giving up some of the agent's money.

Now, if I were an ideal Garrabrant inductor I would ignore these arguments, and only pay attention to these new traders' future trades. But I have not world enough or time for this; so I've decided to subsidize new traders based on how they would have done if they'd been trading earlier.

Here (starting at "Put in terms of Logical Inductors") I mention other "computational shortcuts" for inductors. Mainly, if two "categories of bets" seem pretty unrelated (they are two different specialized magisteria), then not having thick trade between them won't lose you out on much performance (and will avoid much computation).
You can have "meta-traders" betting on which categories of bets are unrelated (and testing them but only sparsely, etc.), and use them to make your inductor more computationally efficient. Of course object-level traders already do this (decide where to look, etc.), and in the limit this will converge like a Logical Inductor, but I have the intuition this will converge faster (at least, in structured enough domains).
This is of course very related to my ideas and formalism on meta-heuristics.

helps prevent clever arguers from fooling me (and potentially themselves) with overfitted post-hoc hypotheses

This adversarial selection is also a problem for heuristic arguments: Your heuristic estimator might be very good at assessing likelihoods given a list of heuristic arguments, but what if the latter has been selected against your estimator, top drive it in a wrong direction?
Last time I discussed this with them (very long ago), they were just happy to pick an apparently random process to generate the heuristic arguments, that they're confident enough hasn't been tampered with.
Something more ambitious would be to have the heuristic estimator also know about the process that generated the list of heuristic arguments, and use these same heuristic arguments to assess whether something fishy is going on. This will never work perfectly, but probably helps a lot in practice.
(And I think this is for similar reasons to why deception might be hard: When not the output, but also the "thoughts", of the generating process are scrutinized, it seems hard for it to scheme without being caught.)