Comment by slider on Economic Thinking · 2019-07-17T01:59:44.404Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Taking into account that happenings must conform to laws of physics is not economics but physics. The finiteness being a constraint doesn't mean that all constraints lead to finity. If the intention is to introduce a farter reaching conception of economics this seem like it is in danger of being too general.

I think post-scarcity economics should it be feasible would fall under the purfew of economics while it seems its outside of finitism. Just because physics was at one point dominated by newtonian mechanics doesn't mean that to be physics means to be newtonian. "To think like physics is to think like clockwork" would be blatantly untrue under quantum mechanics.

In the grocery example it's simultanoeusly true that you have a finite life and that you have finite money. Walshing throguth the shop might be time efficient. This forms a less of a strawman position. If you have a measure that is not the current bottleneck it doesn't make sense to optimise it but instead you focus on the bottleneck and other things become important mainly how they couple to the bottleneck. If you are in a good paying job that leaves you with little free time, saving some dollars on your groceries can be a destructive distraction. It's not that there is an assumption of infinity althought that perspective might be an interesting rhetorical hyberbole.

I could also see that when we are legislating if we give too much of weight what can be enforced we migth come up with something that is practical but where the vision for what kind of society we are building gets hazy. If a monarch and constituion conflict should the police follow the monarch or the consitution? If we give an answer someth8ing akin to "which ever option is most implementable in our situation" that is politically a total copout move.

If economist have something to say in the domain of other experts usually it doesn't overshadow in importance the opinion of domain experts. If you are tyirng to do phsyics with economics your models are going to be needlessly comp0licated and you are likely to get things either wrong or be less exact. Sure a kind of conception where exicted atoms try to "sell" photons into space is not obviously doomed, but it's not going to score high on heuristics like occams razor. (althought now that I start thinking about what kind of frankenstein theory it would be there seem to find somewhat natural analogies, temperature might be analogous to a price level where individual actors still do transactions/scatterings but they average out)

Theories work well within their domains. Within their domains their assumtions hold. Where their assumtions don''t hold the theory tends to be less useful. Finiteness isn't always relevant or the deciding factor and choosing to give such a framework much weight might mean that you miss out on understanding factors that are more pressing.

Comment by slider on Intellectual Dark Matter · 2019-07-16T17:40:14.998Z · score: 5 (4 votes) · LW · GW

With tacit knowledge there are arising new forms of text that can make them a lot more transferrable. A good video game will have player participation designed in the process and is designed to work with widish amount of player types. They are currently mainly shooting for fun rather than knowledge transfer but they circumvent the "purely teorethical" barrier which would mean that a frozen game code can preserve the "guiding structure" of an expert long after the expert is dead.

Comment by slider on Integrity and accountability are core parts of rationality · 2019-07-16T01:27:57.651Z · score: 4 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I got a strong associative bond with "authenticity" to contrast with "integrity". If you are under strong expectations you might just follow the incentives without really formulating your own stance in the matter. As discussed in the post integrity seems to focus on either words or actions changing but with autheticity it's about (duty to) discover who you are and communicating it to others. If unintegrity is a form of falsehood of dissonance between action and talk unauthenticity is a form of lieing by omission by not discovering facts, sharing irrelevant information or taking on the vaguest available role.

Comment by slider on Schism Begets Schism · 2019-07-10T17:30:53.108Z · score: 8 (3 votes) · LW · GW

This is very close to on how on magic color philosophy white sees red as dangerous, that order is required to keep chaos at bay. And lot of the of the standard counterarguments apply, red can argue that compromise stiffles freedom and having a to find a single solution that works for everyone takes forever compared to making quick local solutions to the persons that are affected by them.

For example it's probably not a error state that the globe has multiple states in it instead of a single super country. Instead of intolerable chaos it's more like diversity to be celebrated.

There is the argument that if you are a pack hunter then you need to be compromising enough to be able to form the hunt group instead of everyone hunting for themselfs. But then again people form villages and instead of doing a single super village around 150 they split of into multiple independent groups (this hints at hidden costs of unity).

Unity is not an unconditional requirement. Some things need / benefit from unity but the need is often finite or only in regards to some aspect. And it might be possible to solve the same need with some other method rather than unity.

Comment by slider on "Rationalizing" and "Sitting Bolt Upright in Alarm." · 2019-07-09T15:16:30.310Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

There is the concept of a "freudian slip" which refers to things that are explained by motivations that are not super socially acceptable. However the attitude towards them seems to be that such slips should not be held against the person and the fact that they try to minimise the impact of the tendency works for their favour. And an extreme case would be tourettes where a person constantly spats explatives where it's important to not take the insults at face value.

Might be too politcal, but it's not super controversial when wondering why America wars so much to refer to "military-industrial complex" which seems to refer to an incentive-structure or actor strategy. If you "bolt" too much on that people will file you in the same folder with conspiracists with or without cause. The whole concept of "political correctness" can be thought of as a critique of a positon held becuase of social approval rather than cognitive work done.

There are also such idioms such as "money talks" and "You sing the songs of the of the ones whose bread you eat".

The effects are pretty well known and the issue is not that the phenomenon can't be singled out but what kinds of valuations are attributed to it.

Usually if someone is doing motivated cognition they are doing cognition which can usually be turned to be beneficial. It's far too common for things to fail becuase nobody was thinking. And bad arguments once aired can be corrected. Courts have devils advocates and they are not seen to malfunction for having those.

post: a judge is expected to be impartial and undoing the negation part of that word the concept you are looking for is "being partial" or "partiality". Attorneys are expected to be "zealous advocates" it's okay for them to take sides. A judge being partial might get called a "corrupted" judge which has a pretty heavy connotation. Having a conversational move of "Alice is corrupted in thinking X!" would have the rhetorical weight but it seems to me hard to folow up in a constrcutive way from that and it would seem to imply a position of power that is probably missing in a peer-to-peer conversation.

Comment by slider on "Rationalizing" and "Sitting Bolt Upright in Alarm." · 2019-07-09T14:38:56.574Z · score: 12 (5 votes) · LW · GW

I know of a set of norms where if you want to decline an invitation you can make up an excuse and if it is discovered that the excuse doesn't hold water it's no big deal. Additionally I have seen norms where just saying a flat unexplained "no" is seen as more erroneous than obviously false excuse. I am of personally the inclination that if I don't have conflicting plans I won't fabricate them and it making the "unwillingness" more bare seems to get under some peoples nerves. This might be that some people value "keeping face" more than honesty. But there is a funny effect in that if somebody has just announced that they have an excuse not to go at some specific time and you make a suggestion for another actvity for exact same time they might declare to be free to do that. If everybody is "in on the game" that it's all "face" this doesn't seem to cause problems.

I do have a problem where if somebody makes what seems like english level claim of fact I tend to favour it being a claim of fact and having trouble when it's infact something else like invitation rejection. I also have bad understanding why people value "face-culture" and have trouble imagining what kinds of things would go wrong in a "faceless" dystopia.

Comment by slider on Self-consciousness wants to make everything about itself · 2019-07-05T22:47:47.028Z · score: 5 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I had a very approximate reading and understanding how the concept of "bad faith" enters into the mix. In my mind I was thinking of a situation that if what I say mainly implies whether I get hit in the face in the next second what I let out of my mouth can't be said to attest to the truth of any matter. Consent under duress is no consent and in a similar way testimony under duress would spoil it from being any claim of fact making it incapable of being a lie (yet I used term "lie" to refer to a statement that would on literal english level be a claim of fact which in a speech act sense it would not be). In a way when you give into a "appeal to stick" you are yielding, not affirming anything.

Comment by slider on Self-consciousness wants to make everything about itself · 2019-07-05T19:05:31.222Z · score: 5 (3 votes) · LW · GW

> It's clear why tone arguments are epistemically invalid. If someone says X, then X's truth value is independent of their tone, so talking about their tone is changing the subject.

If tone is independent of truth then it should be possible to make a truth-compliant and tone-compliant comment. That is the thing should be bad even if you sugarcoat it. you don't need ot be anti-tone to be pro-truth althought it is harder to be compliant on both and people typically need to spread their skills over those goods. There is the kind of problematic thing where any negative implication is forbidden. But then tone and truth are mingled.

Sometimes I value safety a lot and I have pretty general principle that discussions should be safe. I would totally lie to prevent my face from being punched. But even if I did that I don't think I would be acting in bad faith. If I am going to be talking about a touchy subject I need to be certain that I won't be touched in anger even if the other participant becomes furious. Bad faith can come to play if I exploit the safety boundaries to "be winning". But I don't need to be able to withstand all truths to be able to have a conversation. Some truths might be devastating and you as the messenger might not be committed to build me back up to working condition (ie building myself back to psychological working condition is my personal problem). So in a touchy subject conversation I might have a edge condition that I not be devastated and need at each step be sure that I am not left devastated. Sure it's tricky if I can't communicate that my participating is limited because of psychological self-preservance and I might not be always be aware that this is going on.

If someone doesn't share the commitment that everything that could be destoyred by the truth should it doesn't mean they are the champion of falsehood. That you trip over comfort safe guards in the name of truth doesn't mean you want to optimise for most tortorous discussion. If one person is truth ambivalent and the other person is comfort ambivalent it means a comfort-truth solution might exist and trying to enforce comfort-ambivalence over comfort-seekment is likely to be ineffective. If one ends up playing prisoners dilemma between a truth seeker and a comfort seeker then the quadrant to shoot for might not be the highest in truth value.

Comment by slider on No, it's not The Incentives—it's you · 2019-06-16T19:33:27.031Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Writing posts a certain way to get more karma on lesswrong is an area of application for this stance.

Comment by slider on Is "physical nondeterminism" a meaningful concept? · 2019-06-16T17:57:37.454Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

In the time travel game Achron my sense of what determinism is was really put into a stress test and I think it teased out distinctions that are not relevant in more casual settings.

The game has a world where time travel is not involved things appear very reliable and deteministic. When time travel influences things there are previously unfamiliar concepts to take into account. There are mechanics about that and it forms a system. The overall rules end up being deterministic in that the enlargened ontology works like a clockwork. However from the perspective of a entity that is not privy to the more esoteric parts fo the ontology things are not pure chaos but their sense of determinism will be of a different kind than what ontologically holds.

In the system you can have a system in grandfather paradox which approximately means that in half the timelines the system will be in one state and in half the timelines the system will be in another state. It's not obvious to non-time-travellers how paradoxes work (but there actually are rules about it). In all the timelines they can be in exact same epistemological state before they come in contact with such paradoxed systems. After they interact they are aware what the systems state is in this timeline. Ofcourse they do not think in terms of multiple timelines but it happens to be that in different timelines they are now in different epistemological states (ie the paradox has "spread" to them). It pretty much must appear to them that what the state of the system is is stochastic before they have done such interaction.

A being in such position might be well served to take note of when "weird" things happen and they might be able to narrow down what the relevant choice outcomes might be. For example if it is now T and someone is ordered to enter a chronoporter at T+20 to go back 10 seconds to shoot themselfs at T+10 you know that at T+15 the ordered person will either be alive or dead ie you know that those are the relevant alternatives. however becuase you don't know the esoterics you don't have the capability to determine which one of those it will be. The situation has strong paralells to schrödingers cat. However in this game we know that god does not indeed throw dice althought we might make use of two kinds of time to specify the esoterics. But even if we know that on game mechanics level no dice is thrown it would seem useful to refer to the fact that a person not having good access to the second kind of time really has a super hard time / impossible for them to figure things out. It's not because they observe the system sloppily or are undiligent. So in a sense it's not illusory that it's stochastic for them but really is effectively stochastic for them.

So it becomes meanigful and useful to say something to the effect of "The best linear time understanding of the game verse will neccesarily be stochastic".

Comment by slider on 0.999...=1: Another Rationality Litmus Test · 2019-06-16T16:48:48.369Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I think you are still treating infinite desimals with some approximation when the question you are pursuing relies on the more finer details.

**Appeal to graphical asymptotes**

Make a plot of the value of the series after x terms so that one plot F is 0.9, 0.99,0.999,... and another G is 0.A, 0.AA, 0.AAA,.... Now it is true that all of Gs have a F below them and that F never crosses "over" above G. Now consider the asymptotes of F and G (ie draw the line that F and G approach to). Now my claim is that the asymptotes of F and G are the same line. It is not the case that G has a line higher than F. They are of exactly the same height which happens to be 1. The meaning of infinite decimals is more closely connected to the asymptote rather than what happens "to the right" in the graph. There is a possibly surprising "taking of limit" which might not be totally natural.

**constustruction of wedges that don't break limit**

It might be illuminateing to take the reverse approach. Have an asymptote of 1 and ask what all series have it as it's asymtote. Note that among the candidates some might be strictly greater than others. If per term value domination forced a different limit that would push such "wedgings" to have a different limit. But given some series that has 1 as limit it's always possible to have another series that fits between 1 and the original series and the new series limit will be 1. Thus there should be series whose are per item-dominating but end up summing to the same thing.

**Rate mismatch between accuracy and digits**

If you have 0.9 and 0.99 the latter is more precise. This is also true with 0.A and 0.AA. However between 0.9 and 0.A, 0.A is a bit more precise. In general if the bases are not nice multiples of each other the level of accuracy won't be the same. However there are critical number of digits where the accuracy ends up being exactly the same. If you write out the sums as fractions and want to have a common denominator one lazy way to guarantee a common demoninator is to multiply all different demoniators together. This means that a fraction in a decimal number multiplied by 11 and a fraction in undecimal multiplied by 10 will have the same denominators. This means that 0.99999999999 and 0.AAAAAAAAAA are of same precision and have the same value but one has 11 digits and the other has 10. If we go by pure digits to digits comparison we end up comparing two 11 digit numbers when the equal value is expressed by a 10 and 11 digit numbers. At this level of accuracy it's fair to give decimals 11 digits and undecimals 10 digits. If we go blindly by digit numbers we are unfair to the amount of digits available for the level of accuracy demanded. Sure for most level of accuracy there is no nice natural number of digits that would be fair to both at the same time.

**Graphical rate mismatch**

One can highlight the rate mismatch in graphical terms too. Have a nice x=y graph and then have a decimal scale and undecimal salce on the x axis. Mark every point of the x=y that corresponds to a scale mark on both scales. Comparing digit to digit corresponds to firt going to 9/10th marker on decimal scale and 10/11th mark on the undecimal scale and then going 9th subdivison on the decimal scale and 10th subdivision on the undecimal scale. If we step so it's true that on each step the undecimal "resting place" is to the right and up to the decimal resting place. But it should also be clear that each time we take a step we keep within the original compartment and we end up in the high part of the orginal department and that right side of the comparment will always be limited by (x=1,y=1). By every 11 decimal steps we land in a location that was landed in by the undecimal series and by every 10 undecimal steps we land in a location that will be visited by the decimal steps. This gives a nice interpretation for having a finite number of digits. What you do when you want to take infinite steps? One way is to say you can't take infinite steps but you can talk about the limit of the finite steps. For every real number less than 1 both steppings will at some finite step cross over that number. 1 is the first real number for which this doesn't happen. Thus 1 is the "destination of infinite steps".

Comment by slider on All knowledge is circularly justified · 2019-06-13T20:44:28.540Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Sure you can carry on trying but you are not guaranteed to succeed. You could go increasingly meta without finding a loop.

If meta-justifications are just not adhoc you could employ them against loops. If I was unsatisafied with a level of justification being circular I could insist that there must be a further level of intuitions that warrant the situation which themselfs don't have the loopy nature.

I don't really think that infinite chains are a good approach but I am not convinced that the investigation is cast in solid enough of logic that it makes explicit the reasons to take its finding seriously. A method of exhaustion with open vents is comparatively weak.

Comment by slider on What kind of thing is logic in an ontological sense? · 2019-06-13T11:08:05.983Z · score: 3 (4 votes) · LW · GW

It would be really helpful to list the things that seem to be pointing to logic existing. One of the answers would be that establishing that there is reason to think that logic exists will fail thus there is no need to think of the mode of something that is not.

A lot of language that at one level seems to be about existence can be turned into forms where it's not neccesarily so. "There exists a" means a value can be picked to satisfy a condition. For example unicorn satisfies "being horned" but that doesn't make unicorns exist (ie it's perfectly resonable to assert both that unicorns are horned and that there are no unicorns).

There is also the interesting question whether logic could be any different. Could 2+2 equal 5? (note the danger how 5 would be just 4 by another name.) Could logic turn out to be different or be created differently? One issue for example that if you imagine that number times number could be -1 that just points to another entity (imaginary number) rather than change in existing entities. One pecular possible property of their mode of existence pointed by this would be that there is no state to point in their existence. You can look at a ball and there claims about it's position etc but when you "look" at numbers what you say can't be evidence in the same way that ball reports would be correspondences to world state. There is no ambiguity on the state of logic and it's questionable whether a "different state of logic" could even make sense. (All this kind of wackiness can be implied as perfectly expected and reasonable in such concepts such as "aprior")

Comment by slider on Logic, Buddhism, and the Dialetheia · 2019-06-10T14:06:49.209Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

There are lot of interferences used where its unclear whether one can use old defintions for them. For example in paraconsistent logics some sorts of negation propagations are not always available (ie you might not have ~(P^Q)=>~P^~Q or ~~P=>P). It raises a suspicion where the interferences presented are a pre-formal mess. Thus I have a feeling that I am constantly "repairing" the message of the post to get it be relevant to me while it does seem there is substance to be salvaged.

If Gary says "this statement’s metalanguage is false" and Alice says "Vad Gary säger är falsk" and David says "Was Gary sagen ist falsch" does Gary refer to Swedish or German? I think it's plausible that Gary's statement does not by itself succesfully refer to Swedish or German and it remains plausible for me that there is really no good way from the object language to get a refererence to the metalanguage.

Comment by slider on Ramifications of limited positive value, unlimited negative value? · 2019-06-10T13:22:52.839Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I am unsure whether I get the starting assumtions right but taking them to the extreme it seems contradictory enough that it should give pause for thought.

There are 1,000,000,000,000,000 people. Stick all of the people with needles or give all the people a candy. It would seem the negative gets multiplied by the subject amount but the positive doesn't. Adding another person that receives candy makes you stay at +1 candy but adding another person to be needled would seem to increase suffering.

I can understand if you care about the impact to the world instead of your subjective qualia (ie refuse pill that makes you artificially happy but doesn't improve the world) and I can understand a viewpoint where its all about your subjective wellbeing. But I would think you should use the same model for positive and negative things or that you are not taking into account subjective positivity and objective negativity.

Comment by slider on On why mathematics appear to be non-cosmic · 2019-06-10T12:58:49.849Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I don't understand how the heard world is less real than the seen world.

Comment by slider on On why mathematics appear to be non-cosmic · 2019-06-10T12:55:56.717Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I had a misunderstanding regarding a very similar topic. I was thinking of arithmetic being very core to mathematics when other people included all of formal deductive reasoning (ie stuff other than that has to do with numbers). Humans do have subconcious thoughts which are not well captured by mathematics.

The case for math being beyond human extends far bigger than cosmic. If you had a fictional story that fullfilled some axioms then math based on those axioms would be in full effect.

There are some activities that rely heavily on math yes, but I think we do have observations we don't arrange into neat systems. For example we can't do 3-body problems but we have general gravity kind of locked down (a bit math adjaccent but still an example how we can do without a mathematical theory despite knowing we would like one).

The concept of "one" can be made problematic. And there are systems were the concept is not an elementary one but emerges from deeper principles. For example one has to somehow argue why sexual reproduction doesn't make an example of "1+1=3". In some systems it could be argued that 0 is actually the first digit and more fundamental.

Comment by slider on Circle Games · 2019-06-07T02:51:51.773Z · score: 8 (5 votes) · LW · GW

The concept of a core game loop seems to point to similar phenomenon when explictly setting up games.

Comment by slider on Steelmanning Divination · 2019-06-07T00:38:02.378Z · score: -1 (2 votes) · LW · GW

You need background education in general to understand a language. No statement is really free of auxillary hypotheses.

In the limit you don't need any external prompt to start activating concepts you have gathered or booting up your imagination. But for some psychologies they don't automatically try to match every theory they know against every percept they have but only apply concepts very selectively. Sometime you proposefully make that selectivity wider but it's hard to say which level of selectivity is appropriate. On the other end there is akrasia where you don't answer direct questions but only activate your brain when somebody punches you in the face. And in the other extreme being constantly paranoid about everything can burn a lot of energy and thinktime for little improvement.

Comment by slider on Steelmanning Divination · 2019-06-07T00:19:56.037Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

A guess would be equally good without dice throwing. Indeed if you have access to the dice that generated the result we want to know about you can infer distribution information. But if you have a different die and determine that it's weighted it doesn't tell whether the orignal die is weighted. If you knew the dice came from the same factory you could infer something. But you manufacturing a fresh dice is justified to assume to not be distributionally connected. If you have information that you know to correlate your manunfacturing process to be similar then that contains your information and the actual rolling of the die doesn't tell you anything.

Comment by slider on Steelmanning Divination · 2019-06-06T19:18:08.564Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

You can't. But for example if they say what they rolled and you assume there is a correlation what they actually get and what they would say then you have a chance to narrow it down. If you know it's not corrrelated to anything (ie is pure dice) you know it can' t be evidence.

Comment by slider on Steelmanning Divination · 2019-06-06T13:06:39.440Z · score: 0 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Sure 23583450863409854 might not refer to any abstract concept fro you.

But I would hold that 23583450863409854 is a valid target for numerology and I would not be surprised if a numerologist did connect that number to some abstract concepts.

Comment by slider on Steelmanning Divination · 2019-06-06T13:03:53.558Z · score: 0 (3 votes) · LW · GW

If you throw a dice and read the results it's reasonable to assume that it's a trial independent of the rest of universes happenings. Thus conditioning on the dice result should not shift any probabilities concerning the rest of the world. If I throw an additional dice it doesn't help determine what already thrown dice are. Your expectation doesn't shift so no probability can shift.

Comment by slider on Yes Requires the Possibility of No · 2019-06-05T17:14:08.928Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Well described important effect.

I do point out that the emotional experience can also be positive which would increase my invitation chances.

I don't know what would be good terminology but I think system 1 reactions are not above critisms. For example if someone feels genuine disgust towards ethnicities that are not their own but verbally and formally is commited to equal treatment of all people I would still be tempted use words like "concerning" or "ugly".

Likewise in the use of deadly force for self-defence if you get easily frightened to "life in danger" levels it means more violence is permissible in more varied situations. If you get differentially more afraid towards certain groups of people it can weaken their right to life. I can undertstand how this could feel very unfair and in some non-staighforward way it is not fair. But on the other hand I would not want for person in fear of their life need to hesitate for fear of punishment. But I think there is such a thing as "fearing irresponcibly". An arachnophobe going into a house full of spiders and he ends up burning the house because he was killing spiders with fire in panic I would not classify as a total accident.

What we are mainly discussing here is not that extreme but I still think it's not automatically wrong to hold someone responcible for their feelings, althought it does need special care and in a signifcantly modified sense.

For example if I would feel negatively for not getting invited that would not be unproportionate responce.

Comment by slider on All knowledge is circularly justified · 2019-06-05T14:52:20.375Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I don't think 1) is so safe a bet. THere is atleast the possibility of an infinite chain to be ruled out. Furthermore if this refers to actual chains of questions of "why?" there can be other kinds of termination points. You can encounter confusion and you can encounter lack of imagination ("What you can question that?").

Wittgenstein has an argument about a table on how to consult a table and how it seems problematic that you would need inifinte tables in order to use one. Instead there is some level where you just are competent, able to perform the operations without instruction. Intuition as a word would suggest that there is some abstract thing that you just feel is "true". But other kind of termination is where you just function that way. One can for example understand the function of a eye cell as thought (atleast on the primitive level) that happens upon photon collision. "In the mind world" there is no preceding thought. It just happens just like a cosmic ray would bug out and malfunction an inner brain piece (which would in effect onlyh be a photoreceptor for a very different wavelength off-ocurse withouyt supporting structures like lenses etc).

But loopiness doesn't need to imply circularity. If you start with some system, make it reflect on itself until it stabilises the end result might seem circular. However it might be possible to reverse engineer the reflection and there are reflection balances that have only a finite history. With chicken and egg you find dinosaurs which is a story much longer than the lifespan of a chicken but still some finite generation number. With parents you can go back to start of sexual reproduction. With off-spring you can go back to multicellular-life. With lineage you can go back to start of cell membranes. With reproduction you can go to auto-catalysm. Progressively surprisingly longer stories but they end up being linear instead of the initial seeming circular nature. And there is a direction to the loopiness, it's only loopy towards "the future". Thus when you are tracking where a thought comes from or its justification (if it not constructive in the sense that the discovery process builds an entity that didn't exist before (ie you make up the why as you answer the question instead of discovering something preexisting)) you know you are going "in the wrong direction" and the circularity could end at any step.

Comment by slider on Yes Requires the Possibility of No · 2019-06-05T12:18:54.224Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I did end up thinking about whether it's always easy to be self-aware about the fact that you box other people.

You walk on the street and a passer by seem agitated and says "come at me bro". Thinking it as play or in general just wanting to went rage from your daily stresses you approach and punch the person. They feel sore about the situation and later decide to chare you with assault. You plead that the situation was mutual understanding informal boxing match. It's not a super strong defence but it's not to my mind automaticallly failing one. In judging such a case there might be multiple interpretation questions. Is the idiom regularly known enough that it establishes a code of conduct? Is it reasonable to hear as a non-idiom. If heard as a non-idiom, does "bro" indicate playfulness? If a conduct, does it amount to consenting to be punched? Or does the conduct invite someone to be a first aggressor, merely amounting to guarantee a retaliation and that the sayer won't first strike? Even if at the time of events the participants don't think in the terms of a boxing match it's different from an unannouced strike out of the blue.

Comment by slider on Yes Requires the Possibility of No · 2019-06-05T11:54:49.572Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Yes that does mean I probably register more honest questions that go without hiccups when actually there are honest questions with minor hiccups. I do not find it terribly relevant to my findings or positions reliability. They would be assholes for forming a grudge in the situations and carrying an indirect revenge whether I detect it or not. "Nobody asked for your opinion" is a valid complain for unprompted negative bashing. But in this situation "No, you did ask my opinion" would be a relevant defence. Even if they did not mean to ask, since people are not mindreaders, I might be in a position where to my effective reality I was asked.

It might be relevant that my national culture might favour directness and frankness more than the median culture does. This makes it more probable and expected that someone would genuinely ask for an honest opinion and it not being an fringe edge case. Banks usually clarify to their customers that they do not ever ask for credentials via email which helps customers more confidently identify scam emails. I could see some close relationships that would establish something to the effect of "I want you to always be unwaveringly on my side. If I ever say something its never election for opinion". Under this kind of understanding/assumption you would find every excuse to not find even explicit asking for opinions to actually be elections for opinion. But I could also see someone wanting to establish something to the effect of "If we had some issues you could tell me, right?". So under some relationships you would genuinely ask for opinion.

Comment by slider on Yes Requires the Possibility of No · 2019-06-03T17:25:05.311Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

As a person that does not find social situations intuitive I know social situations are not easy. In my experience my ignorance or disregard for social conventions has not really given me the benefit of a doubt. I feel that people that can intuitively mesh well with the social fabric without explicit modelling of it can have it kind of easy. When I painstakingly recreate behaviour which from my point of view is convoluted and arbitrary what the standard of acceptable behaviour is of great interest. Part of what makes that struggle easier that it's not that its the deck stacked against me but a standard that everyone has to adhere to. If the rules are slightly inconvenient for somebody else I dont' feel so bad in rules-laywering the conventions against them.

Sure you can't expect perfect introspection from anyone but it's not like total lack of introspection is allowed. There can be a duty to be informed. Say you are on the road and encounter a roadsign that you don't recognise (and thus can't obey). If you are driving abroad and it's a type of sign that has no correlate in your homecountry and is a rare type of sign anyway, no big fault. But if it is a sign that is highly standardised across borders with a simple design that is a common occurence (like a stopsign) it's a bigger issue. If you start driving a car on public roads without knowing streetsigns that would be reckless. And yet I don't expect there to be many drivers that recognise all signs and that many of them are not reckless for driving.

There can be situations where the local driving culture can develop to be inconsistent with formal traffic laws. A responcible driver needs to take into account that this is a viable alternative how people might act. But it doesn't mean that is how you should drive or really as an excuse for why they are driving the way thay are driving or that you need to be ambivalent about whether they do it or not. It's perfectly fine to hold that they are wrong and that they shouldn't be doing it. Recognising what the norm is doesn't mean you need to normatively endorse others to uphold it.

Comment by slider on Yes Requires the Possibility of No · 2019-06-03T14:18:11.467Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I am not claiming it's simple. But there is a distinct differrence between trying to make it work and just not giving a single thought for it.

In the boxing metaphor people do not react calmly to be beaten up but the agression is supposed to be channeled within rounds. If someone does punch outside of rounds people know what is happening and for example do not fear additional violence. But someone who consistently does that kind of outside-context punching can not really participate in the sport and would be liable to be charged with assault for those sorts of acts. It's plausible that someone has so strong reflexes to being punched that they can not pass the emotional competence standard to participate. If they see all punches as personal attacks and not part of the sport it can be a disqualifying factor. And it's plausible that more veteran boxers contextualise getting hit differently, ie having the right kind of attitude can be built up with practise.

Comment by slider on On alien science · 2019-06-02T17:45:54.165Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

When you have a deep explanation sure there are points that tell that it's deep. However I wouldn't exactly use the word "evidence" for that.

I think it's pretty hard to define "mathematical cleaniness". One is almost guaranteed to discriminate against undiscovered forms of math.

There is also the problem of where can you stop if matter of fact is not a good stopping point. That is if I have a theory that makes perfect predictions and someone comes and says "but you theory doesn't explain the phenomena" under which kind of conditions can I say "no, it does explain the phenomena?". I am reminded of quantum mechanics where there exist multiple formulaitons which are proven to be equivalent. Would one have to start discrimanting between these which are "explanining" formulations and which are "non-explaining" formulations? What would be the critera to raise one above others?

It would also be weird if biology was incomplete until it answered the quesition "why life?" in the "meaning of life" sense. That is other disciplines than science make use of explanation and it's not immidiately obvious which parts of that cluster is relevant to science.

Comment by slider on 0.999...=1: Another Rationality Litmus Test · 2019-06-02T15:38:18.980Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Yes, it happens to be that way.

Comment by slider on 0.999...=1: Another Rationality Litmus Test · 2019-06-01T17:23:36.347Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

You are assuming that there is a link between the per-term value and the whole series value. The connection just isn't there and if you think it would be it would be important to show why.

I could have two small finite series of A=10 and B=2+3+5 and compare that 2<10, 3<10 and 5<10 and then be surprised when A=B. When the term amount is not finite it's harder to verify thjat you haven't made this kind of error.

Comment by slider on 0.999...=1: Another Rationality Litmus Test · 2019-06-01T17:15:22.317Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

No I believe you are reaching a different concept. It is true that the difference squashes towards 0 but that would be different line of thinking. In a contex where infinidesimal are allowed (ie non-real) we might associate the series to different amounts and indeed find that they differ by a "minuscule amount". But as we normally operate on reals we only get a "real precision" result. For example if you had to say whether 3/4, 1 and 5/4 name which integers probalby your best bet would be that all of them name the same integer 1, if you are only restricted to integer precision. In the same way you might have 1 and 1-epsilon to be differnt numbers when infinidesimal accuracy is allowed but a real + anything infinidesimal is going to be the same real regardless of the infinidesimal (1 and 1-epsilon are the same real in real precision)

What I was actually going fo is that, for any r < 1 you can ask how many terms you need to get up to that level and both series will give a finite answer. Ie to get to the same "depth" as 0.999999... gets with 6 digits you might need a bit less with 0.AAAAA... .It's a "horizontal" difference instead of a "vertical" one. However there is no number that one of the series could reach but the other does not (and the number that both series fails to reach is 1, it might be helpful to remember that an suprenum is the smallest upper limit). if one series reaches a sum with 10 terms and other reaches the same sum in 10000 terms it's equally good, we are only interested what happens "eventually" or after all terms have been accounted for. The way we have come up what the repeating digit sign means refers to limits and it's pretty guaranteed to produce reals.

Comment by slider on Infinity is an adjective like positive rather than an amount · 2019-05-30T20:02:52.720Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Argument from lack of imagination isn't really convincing. And I do happen to think that surreal addition does make sense. Social reasons why not be interested in surreal numbers would be lack of applicability or unnaturalness reasonings. But lack of coherence really isn't one. I do agree that the onus of responcibilty of making things workable is on the mathematician.

If you did have "flying pedestrians" that would mean human piloted cars would not be adequate first-line law enforcement. But just assuming that anything flying is a brid that can't be criminally liable doesn't mean that worlds outside of that assumtion are unthinkable.

And giving an ethnicity second-class citizen status just because you are uncomfortable sitting next to them in a bus is not a defensible "practical problem".

Comment by slider on Infinity is an adjective like positive rather than an amount · 2019-05-30T19:36:04.750Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

> people are confused about infinity because they think it has a unique referant while in fact positive and negative infinity are different?

No, that is a different point. The point is that positive infinity would be better treated as multiple different values and trying to mesh them all into one quantity leads to trouble. We differentiate between 2,4,6 and don't use an umbrella term "a lot". Should you do so you could run into trouble with claims like "a lot is divisible by 4" (proof following 4/4=1 affirms, proof following 6%4!=0 refuses).

I did a bad job of fighting ambigioity of the word infinity. Of the listed understandings 2 is closes but I am really pointing ot transfinitism that there are multiple values outside of all finites that are not equal to each other (ie a whole world to play with instead of single islands).

Comment by slider on Infinity is an adjective like positive rather than an amount · 2019-05-30T19:24:05.741Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Yes indeed is -2 more precise than inpositivity. And so is omega + omega rather than just an infinity. There is more structure in infinity than most people give it credit for. If you already have distinctions between infinite cardinalities nothing here adds to that. But some people think of infinity as a single cardinality.

Infinity is an adjective like positive rather than an amount

2019-05-30T13:22:35.449Z · score: 2 (7 votes)
Comment by slider on Newcomb's Problem: A Solution · 2019-05-28T10:16:34.653Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I read the summation as "Liam applies generically known brute-force method" when you seemed to mean "Liam uses a brute force method he claims is the only one possible". If I say "The president of the United States is arrogant" am I making a claim that there is only one such president? This seems to be about how the definite article "the" is used in english language and I am genuinely unsure whether there is a reliable way to be unambigious about it.

Comment by slider on God is an AGI we make in the future. · 2019-05-27T19:45:01.960Z · score: -1 (5 votes) · LW · GW

It's pretty sure we live in a stimulation, but it's way more uncertain whether we live in a simulation.

Comment by slider on Does the Higgs-boson exist? · 2019-05-27T14:42:03.800Z · score: -1 (2 votes) · LW · GW

That is an understandable stance but there are other people that see that the main role of science is to produce technologies. In this kind of view if you have a reproducible capacity it is ok to be hazy why exactly does it work. Some "clients" might care about worldview implications but other types of "clients" might not (war machine). It might be a word-semantics matching game but for some people "world appriciation" is a philosophy activty and not a science activity. Sure ontology might be a regular customer of physics, but physics is going to leave the ontology questions to ontology.

I ended up deciding to cut a line of reasoing pertaining how knowledge-pessimistic bread-greedy person might engage in activity that looks like science but doesn't employ knowledge. Express interest if you wish for me to elaborate.

Comment by slider on Newcomb's Problem: A Solution · 2019-05-27T14:06:01.454Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

You are doing good work in salvaing my point. However I still think that there are multiple low-level methods and that the approach isn't evidently applicaple to all problems.

Comment by slider on Is AI safety doomed in the long term? · 2019-05-27T10:46:38.075Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The question is whether it's possible to win against more intelligent opponent and in your answer you say that a more intelligent will win without a "usually" modifier. That would read to me that you are saying an impossibility opinion. It's not obvious enough that it can be assumed without saying (it's the explicit target of the conversation).

Comment by slider on Newcomb's Problem: A Solution · 2019-05-27T10:39:08.102Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Okay feedback heeded. I did form an expression impression that since none of my comments went into negative that I was not harming anyone atmost being ineffective. I would really appriciate if people would hint at where my quality is low or where I am wrong ("you suck" is too general to be be used to improve). I can kinda appricate the fact that in order to get a valid downvote someone needs to parse it and it can end up being very unrewarding work. "You should understrand without explanation why you are too stupid to contribute" could be a very unhealhty moderation line that could result.

Comment by slider on 0.999...=1: Another Rationality Litmus Test · 2019-05-27T00:58:49.704Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW



f(x) > g(x) for all x but lim f(x) = lim g(x) = 0. Just becuause f gets there "later" does not mean it gets any less deep.

Repeating decimals are far enough removed from decimals its like mixing rationals and integers.

Comment by slider on Newcomb's Problem: A Solution · 2019-05-27T00:31:03.760Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

The charactes and the argument sides are not lacking in information how the world works. The important bit of your strategy is to argue how your static keeping statistics is relevant to the question and to the right question. The issue is going to be that the traditional problematic ways would suggest an incorrect experiment setup. Feels weird why I can't figure out what those would be but one obviously false would be that "if you could influence to be given one or two boxes contents should you take one or both" where answer would be "both" because no boxes ever hold negative amount of money. One of the relevant catches would be that naming "both boxes" is not an effective way to cause what is in boxes to be in your posession, answer "both" to the wrong question doesn't imply that you should choose option "both".

But instead of being able to skip theory you will end up recreating the "must be type of person" argument in why the experiment reflects the right question. In care you can't you will be subject to not being able to set up a an experiment in other thought experiments testing different decison theory failures.

Comment by slider on Newcomb's Problem: A Solution · 2019-05-26T19:50:40.540Z · score: 7 (6 votes) · LW · GW

Your thought experiement has failed to actually look at the world, you still do not have any empirical evidence. If the Galileo argumenters had made a thought-experiment and concluded "thus blessed by mysterious rituals falls faster" the result would still be firmly "within philosophy".

Comment by slider on Is AI safety doomed in the long term? · 2019-05-26T19:37:33.728Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

If the intelligences have properties in other dimensions than intelligence then the less intelligent can end up on top. For example ants have a lot of biomass but not thaaat much cognitive capabilities.

Comment by slider on 0.999...=1: Another Rationality Litmus Test · 2019-05-26T18:51:52.797Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Part 3. "the argument from contradiction" approach dikd historically activate for me. Except I found a way where the operations make sense: I appriciate that it needs to make sense with your current undertstanding level. But argument from lack of imagination is a pretty lousy one. One could say that "x^2 = -1" is absurd but considering what world would look like if it could be made true can be interesting and useful. By similar logic one could argue that negative numbers are "unreal". I ended up recogninsing how the standard formulation is transfinite hostile. Instead of whether a reulst is possible or not you end up asking whether the rules are inevitable or not.

Comment by slider on Does the Higgs-boson exist? · 2019-05-26T16:19:59.243Z · score: 1 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I think part of the idea is that the downsides of "too high" manifest if you need belief in order for something to function. If we design a system where "belief" is not consumed we don't need to produce it. So the question becomes "do we really need beliefs?" as in can we do without. I would imagine a lot of people have accustomed to the idea that "final theory" is not coming or atleast it's not reasonable to expect for it to come. The corresponding more radical idea is that "only suckers believe".

Somebody that takes probablity very seriously might reject from processing any claim with 100% degree of belief and insists on 99% versions. The more extreme stance claims that what your "belief degree" is irrelevant and what matters is your evidence and reasons for that support the idea. Like if a police officer had "reasonable suscpicion" to do something whether that thing suspected was or was not the case doesn't factor in whether it was reasonable to take that action. Truth of the suspicion would be irrelevant evidence.

Comment by slider on Complex Behavior from Simple (Sub)Agents · 2019-05-25T04:14:34.156Z · score: 6 (3 votes) · LW · GW

In posts about circular preferences that was appointed the role of "busy work amount to nothing" and the highest scorer on the utility function as the "optimal solution". However here roles are pretty much reversed in that cyclical movement is "productive work" and stable maximisation is "death".

The text also adds a lot of interpretative layer in addition to the experimental setups. Would not derive same semantics from the setups only.

Comment by slider on Separation of Concerns · 2019-05-25T03:48:18.997Z · score: -3 (3 votes) · LW · GW

If your code compiles into one program it's literallly one system.

Emotional valence as cognition mutator (not a bug, but a feature)

2019-05-15T12:49:40.661Z · score: 9 (4 votes)

Friendliness in Natural Intelligences

2014-09-18T22:33:31.750Z · score: -4 (7 votes)