Slider's Shortform 2019-08-14T14:01:35.789Z · score: 4 (1 votes)
How many researchers does a new paper reach? 2019-07-26T04:14:06.930Z · score: 4 (1 votes)
When does adding food make an organism reliably better? 2019-07-19T21:22:38.904Z · score: 9 (4 votes)
Infinity is an adjective like positive rather than an amount 2019-05-30T13:22:35.449Z · score: 1 (9 votes)
Emotional valence as cognition mutator (not a bug, but a feature) 2019-05-15T12:49:40.661Z · score: 10 (5 votes)
Friendliness in Natural Intelligences 2014-09-18T22:33:31.750Z · score: -4 (7 votes)


Comment by slider on What are some unpopular (non-normative) opinions that you hold? · 2019-10-23T22:59:31.252Z · score: 10 (6 votes) · LW · GW

Following instructions doesn't really ring as a bell as a site goal. The setting of the question seems fair but the ill committed in ignoring the context is different from disobeyance.

Comment by slider on Does the body have an almost infinite number of potential positions? · 2019-10-23T13:50:46.631Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I contaminated myself because I thought it was a weird question by itself and had a smell of the answer being embedded in the context. In general "Does this analysis miss anything? I have not included analysis to avoid bias" isn't really an answerable question.

One of the tricks ot ponder on meanings is to wonder what the meaning stands in opposition to. To me it seems the statement plays the role of "enumerating the positions is not a fruitful way of approaching handling of positions" and if it is not enumerable then by theorycrafting it is probably some kind of infinity. And the example "proof" seems to be that for any proposal enumerating scheme you can take a position, apply a small mutator and end up with a position that is not covered by the original enumeration. A weaker versions results if only ""unlikely to be already enumerated".

Taking the logic a bit further it seems that the problem is already in "this position" where the pointing "this" can be ambigious in microparameters where trying to point to "one" position actually results in pointing to a whole class of positions. Thus "counting" positions is problematic and not really needed if we just want to undertand positions and their parameters/positions. So rather than there being a great many number of them an analysis is employed where we do not number them.

A similar thing could be made with water/ice. If you have icecubes it might make sense to count them. However if you have a cup of water or a block of ice it would be unnatural to place a integer amount to describe amount of water (althought with connection to avocadros number there probably is such a number) but neither it would make sense to say that a cup of water contains "infinite" amount of water. One might still care about big cup of water vs small cup of water. However the uncountable sense of size is not directly related to the countable sense of size (measure one in liters and one in objects).

Comment by slider on Sets and Functions · 2019-10-15T17:05:30.451Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

You are making partially sense in that you are pointing to a modelling style but it does leave me unsure whether I can correctly fill in the missing bits. My thinking is interferred a lot by "getter functions" that are of the form [code]function get_color(self){ return self.color }. One of the point of such is that attributes tend to be private but methods are public and the programmer should he need to do so could change the implementation details without messing outside customers. So the modeeling style shares a similarity that objects are allowed to secretly have details outside of their interface. Sure if we have verbs and objects mixed up but can express object-like things as verbs by converting objects to verbs we only have to care about one basic ontology type. But I am unsure whether I missed it or is it fortcoming why it is important or valuable to focus on the verbs.

I am unsure what rule-basedness is but if it is different from extensional conception of functions then I would be super intrigued. I can get that sensing should be modelled with functions in that way but it seems contradictory how functions were supposed to be prediction or evolution models. So if I have a(b(c(d))) does it mean that first d goes throught two kinds of evolutions and is then observed or d goes throught one kind of evolution and then observation of that is observed. I am expecting this kind of divison is not an actual problem but I can't effortlessly go from the function formalism to observation/prediction formalisms and would likely make a lot of errors there.

Comment by slider on Sets and Functions · 2019-10-15T00:05:02.665Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

That would the ambush part?

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T23:43:39.007Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I think in your treatment between different monotheistic gods there would be evidence that would favour one god over another even if both start similarly dysmally low. However if you had two gods and they are indistinguishable from aliens then they should not be distinguishable from each other. I guess there are two senses in that in "evidence we currently have" vs "evidence that could ever exist". Like I would think that god hypothesis would not have increased probability for flying saucers. But if god doesn't raise the expectation of saucers does god raise the expectation of anything? If it doesn't raise the expectation of anything then there is nothing to disagree about because we don't mean anything.

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T23:13:35.875Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

What would count as successful contact? Can an outside person verify that contact has happened? If someone would convince you that your contact was actually confirmation bias would you change your opinion or probablity in god existing?

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T22:57:33.766Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Paraphrasing: By the miracle I understand event or series of events that have either: a) extremely low probability, b) seems to break the laws of Nature or c) have significantly higher probability to occur in the world with God rather than without.

"Low probability events happen all the time"

'I do not believe in "miracles", in the sense that you probably mean'

The sense in which you replied to "miracles" seems not to be able to be understood in the literal definition provided, so you either used your own private definition or did not believe that their definition was accurately spelled out. Now the discussion has shifted and there has been an additonal feature added that miracles are connected to christian worship. If you are assuming they have additional properties it might be fruitful to be explicit about them.

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T22:43:54.061Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

if the clairvoyant knows any thing ie their experience correlates to anything then the other being is present. But I guess it would be hopeless to establish how reliable the information channel is using that information channel only.

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T17:19:31.870Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

It could be entirely consistent that the programmer made nature_1 within the constraints of nature_2 and "laws of nature" referring to nature_2 laws is unstandard and surprising. it would be an assumption that nature_2 has time. Sure there are hardware constraints but their exact shape is hard to argue (I could come up with examples how simulated time takes simulator space and not time).

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T16:58:39.848Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

If the evidence would be exactly the same for god as for other things shouldn't it be equally likely to be god rather than less likely?

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T16:56:06.571Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Do you have reason to believe that valentinlespukhin is in fact using a different definition than he explicitly provided here? The explicit definition was of the form a,b or c and you claim to believe that entities of type a exist. Why would you not believe that the disjunction exists?

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T16:47:18.032Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

You are saying that you can totally communicate with a non-existent god so that point is only a single sided crux at the moment.

I don't really understand the difference between clairvoyant and telepathic. Either the contact mechanism is know or unknown. If it is known we can argue what kind of entities can be in that kind of contact. If it is not known there is no point in differentiating between different types as the details could be anything.

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T12:17:38.712Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Nature component doesn't really break the analogy and there are ways for which in can be made sense for part of the logic. If my program handles data a certain way as a programmer I would be free to alter that. I could for example go from using sets to using fuzzy sets. As I don't want to position myself as a crux party I will refrain from wanting what omnipotence should mean in this conversation.

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T12:06:33.046Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

3. What would you conclude about existence of god in the indistinguishable case? Would the programmer be god or would that be a separate entity? Do you think the perception is distinguishable?

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T11:57:18.193Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

If you would have telepathic contact with a foreign intelligence would that make you think that other communication party exists?

What would convince you that another person beside yourself was having communication contact with non-human intelligences?

Do you lack the communcation potential to non-human intelligences? If yes that would be material disagreement whether every person can.

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T11:44:48.127Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Do you believe in weak decay? Do you think weak decay is a low probablity event? Why does not weak decay fit within the sense of miracle here? Do you believe every kind of chess game that has played out has played out multiple times? If not why are the low frequency games not these low probablity event series? What kinds of events would be raised in probablity if god would exist? Would there be a separating signature from aliens and other fantasticals?

Comment by slider on I would like to try double crux. · 2019-10-14T11:34:40.432Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

1. Are magic tricks miracles because they seem to break the laws of Nature? Are lotteries miracles because they are extremely low probability? What counts as a law of nature? Does it factor human knowledge into it? Are superfluids an example of breaking the law of nature of liquids?

Comment by slider on What's going on with "provability"? · 2019-10-14T11:17:00.706Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

What kind of reference you are using for your reference to sets if not the axioms? That reads to me as if "Are they just totally unrelated objects to red busses that just happen to be a bus and red?"

Some times I have seen people argue for example that the word "yellow" is grounded by the set of all yellow things. But usually that kind of definition suffers from the list being ambigious/insufficient. Like if a give a thing it either is or is not a member of that set. But listing all the members or otherwise giving some procedure to give out all the members seems like is not the most natural thing to do. Thus if you tried to take the cartesian product of yellow things and red things because you can't exemplify a sample just from the concept you can't build up the product from members. The collection of yellow things propbably is not a set but it has many set-like properties. By having a close inventory of sets properties they can be distinguished from confused or nearby notions.

Another possible imagination prompt would be a person faced with coordinates. Is there a real number that you can spesify that the human can point out on the x axis? No, they are always going to be off. In the same way if you present the axis and ask the human to point out their "favourite number" (that is supposed to keep stable) they will point out a slightly different real number each time they supposedly point that point out. Such a person can't provide a choice function. It might still make sense to treat the person as being able to specify intervals, or refer to all of the points or being able to reference crossing points and others that have geometrical spesification. But in general a line is not guaranteed to have any referancale points falling within it.

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-13T12:51:18.016Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

It does not need to feel like context on the inside and arguably if you are recognising you are in a context you are thinking about the situation in a certain situation-independent way.

I don't know if the analog hold but a typical reinforcement neural network upon error just backpropagates a weigth adjustment. One could think that weights that are moved a lot are interpret to be "very in context" and weights that are moved a lilttle are "somewhat out of context" which would lead a very fuzzy sense of context where there are no hard lines (well before they are reinforced into place). While it might not be realistic it would be computationally tractable to compare two neural networks which are more sharp or diffuse in the propagation weighting which could lead to a different structure in the high-fit state (or different times for reaching that high fit state).

There are a lot of prejudices so there tends to be hiding of these things if they are not strictly neccesary. It feels good to be seen and have that curiosity and openness be a positive interaction.

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-12T14:38:09.288Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Well one of the other symptoms sensory-overload could be interpreted as not doing the filtering (I myself don't exhibit that so much but it is connected). In that way it is not strictly neccesary. It's also a multistage process so you might have a global-local-global-local alteration on different parts of the hierachy.

It isn't that absolute and while everyone probably can manage to follow the rules there might be a difference how effortful it is. The theory might not be detailed enough to address questions on that level and i don't have the most up to date familiarity with it (having wrong theory can do a lot of harm and it has fluxed quite a bit). While it is not context-blindness the related trait of literalmindedness would help with explicit rules as you don't have to "apply common sense" but just "execute". In a situation where there are literal rules to be followed and context-sensitive course of action context-blindness would drop the context sensitive option from being relevant. [What I think was such a conflict] ( a context heavy person might not even realise that a literal interpretation was possible.

In a way justice is supposed to be blind in a very near sense. If law is being applied to persons differently it easily and quickly becomes unfair. But if there is no special adhereing to such principles the application tends to get uneven.

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-12T10:45:52.656Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Atleast 1 and I guess 3 too but no 2

Comment by slider on What do the baby eaters tell us about ethics? · 2019-10-11T21:18:39.207Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Such games are not guaranteed to be morality free.

If you are playing against a chess player that will kill themselfs if they lose and their death is morally relevant then chess strategy becomes relevant (even if only for how to effectively lose)

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-11T20:51:25.465Z · score: 4 (3 votes) · LW · GW

One perceptual effect I happened to read on somewhat recently is that night vision and dayvision have different color balances which makes hue contrast inversions at twilight where the relative strenghts of night vision and dayvision smoothly vary.

The hypothesis I have in mind is that experience is the result of being aware of the nightvision information channel also at day. In effect "white "is now 4 colors which is "brighter" than 3 colored white.

Comment by slider on Categories: models of models · 2019-10-11T20:35:30.183Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Knowing that haskell I think the pattern to turn multiparty relations to two place relations is R(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) -> R(S(b,c,d,e,f,g)) -> R(S(T(d,e,f,g)) ... R(S(T(U(V(X(Z(g)))))))

The connection between "+2" and 2 would then be a function of +(2)="+2". You migth also need =(3)="=3" and then you can have =3(+2(2)) = "2+2=3" and maybe a T?("2+2=3")=False. In another style you would set it up that only true equations could be derived. Then one of the findings would be that any instance of +2(2) could be replaced with 4 and the mappings would still hold (atleast on the T? level). Mind you "2+2" could be a different object from "4"

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-11T17:15:06.472Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Well my point was that the experience isn't that your vision is replaced by another sensation. In the linked slatestarcodex there is a comparison picture. That kind of thing might suggest that the visual snow would appear the same as if there were mist or something. But it in fact superimposes or some relation which would only make sense in perceptual analysis. Like if you repeat the same word multiple times it can fail to seem like a word. But you are still aware of the all the phonemes/letters of the word. It would be weird if somebody could hear the word but could not hear the individual letters. And hearing the letters doesn't interfere with hearing the word. Saying that hearing single letters would be "hallucinating things that are not there" would be really backwards. So in vision when I can see the rawer visual data I am not seeing stuff that isn't there.

If you have a correctly working monitor and take it appart and study it's function it will stay as a functional monitor. If you wire it differntly then it might function differently but if you refrain from rewiring it stays correctly working. If you look inside and see how your visual cortex works you might change your opinion on your visual cortex but it is unlikely that it started to act up just because you looked into it (in the cognitive sense). On the opposite pole if you intentionally set out to imagine a picture of a apple if your visual cortex complies and provides a red apple picture that would be a hallucination. But if it shares what it already has anyway there is no fraudulent component. If it happens during normal operation it is not an artifact even if you were not aware of it's existence. There is some good quote that has parts to the effect of "People can handle the truth for they are already enduring it "

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-11T16:42:18.031Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Well having global set of rules is one feature of the context-blindness explanation for the kind of variation. One of the possible linkages is that appying this kind of universality to moral behaviour allows one to avoid being a hypocrite as you consistently and without fail apply the honed behaviour. In contrast a person with strong comparmentalization has trouble arriving at the generalization. You have "don't steal at shop", "don't steal from family", "don't steal from classmates" ie you accumulate contexts where the behaviour is appropriate/inappropriate. If you get caught stealing and it feels punishing you form an opinion that "I should not steal here" (a very context sensitive person could go "I should not steal at the north end of this store" separate from "I should not steal at the south end of this store") and do not form an opinion of "I should not steal". In away you have to solve the same appropriateness problem all over in a new context. It need not be that the contextes are not recognised but their role in cognition is not so pronounced.

What I was more getting at I guess iddn't write that explicitly is that context affects memory recall and attention too. That is when I try to see an object one doesn't pay attention to a narrow group fo neurons but a whole big data dump most of which is probably irrelevant to the task at hand. However what you don't recall can't be used in the end product of the mental processing. For example in programming it is usual to declare most variables private. But you could declare all variables public. If you do the program constructs can use each others functionality. At the most extreme you could have the program function as a holistic whole where classes refer to each other public variables willy nilly. However if you a have code where there are lots of private variables you can be sure that those variables are refererenced from a narrow range that having the one class definition open you are aware of all the code that could influence it. Trying to do otherwise would not make the program compile or would raise a segfault.

But in a world where there is no segfaults if higher abstraction level is interested in the details it can explicitly go look at them. That is if I call a function and I know that as a side-effect of that the objects internal variables have changed if I want I can go read those variables. [code] result=fruit_detectorIsApple(blob)

curiosity=fruit_detector.pearness [/code] If pearness was declared private this would not be permitted

In brains it could be that if each brain region has a separate memory store that only it has access that would lead to a type of encapsulation. In the reverse if all functionalities dump their data to a common information store then they can interfere/cooperate. At one extreme all data could be sent all the time to all functionalities but each functionality only really digests a small portion of it. But while the production is made seeking for a particular important pieces of data a lot of secondary data would be floating around too. Or in reverse a brain that gets easily confused by garbage data might limit by only transitting information really required for the operations. And this involves hiding/destroying data that doesn't directly answer questions it is asked. LIke in a math test you are supposed to show your midsteps but in this kind of arrangement the less steps revealed the better and preferably only the bottomline.

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-11T15:08:02.007Z · score: 6 (2 votes) · LW · GW

well neurodivergence would be the main factor for me. It makes sense based on how perception is a multilayered process. Your eye sees only a small portion so most of your visual field is mainly from memory rather than live feed like it feels like. It also feels like not being able to acces the rawer data would be a wierd limitation, that the neurotypical way of seeing where you only experience the abstract deduction is a form of blindness. There is possible shift in focus that is I am not always aware of the mode where the noise is apparent. I would think this is similar with a synesthetic person that sees certain letters a certain color. When such a letter is written in a color that mismatches the brain probably has simultaneous opinions that it should both be color 1 and color 2 and emphasising text context or hue context could make one stand out more.

One of the theories for the type of divergence I have is context-blindness. That would explain that if a more typical brain has very strong magisteria for each kind of context they can't cross-pollute as easily. Thus low-level pattern matching would be encapsulated to be invisible to the rest of the brain.

I guess with meditation black boxes become more white. The effect would depend a lot how how boxed things were to begin with. And it probably isn't activity that is generated but just acknowledged. Thus it is not really hallucinations.

Althought even with proper hallucinations they have some strcture to them probably. Even the super crazy types could be understood by for example experiencing guilt by visual or auditory synesthesia. If it corresponds to a real brain state isn't it in a sense accurate perception of a thing? One could think of a reinforcement learning agent that has one incentive strcture and suddenly shifts to a new one. Probably the old structures would be repurposed in a ad hoc way in service of the new goal. And while the abstraction used in that kind of zig-zag history would probably be weird and not happen in an agent trained directly for the later incentive structure it would probably be the most "directly ot the point" use of the old abstractions. In a similar way if the visual cortex is given raw visual data and then is tasked to produce any information that is useful to other brain parts there is no canon "right data" that would be the "real thing seen". Rather there could be various kinds of information which could tell different useful stories. And what is deemed useful could depend what kinds of data other parts of the brain can utilise.

Comment by slider on "Mild Hallucination" Test · 2019-10-11T12:36:01.773Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Visual snow is obvious.

Comment by slider on Sets and Functions · 2019-10-11T12:06:50.891Z · score: 6 (4 votes) · LW · GW

To my unnderstanding sets are defined by their members. The part about there having ot be some rule sounds very starng. Sure you need to somehow express what the members are. Inparticular if you have two rules but you end up picking the same members then you have defined only 1 set not 2. The rule is not part of the make up of the set. It is confusing because it seems a lot of real deduction uses the "intent" of setting up the set to deduce what it does or does not contain. But that kind of deduction could be carried out without reference to memberhips. If sets need to have rules, how do the composition functions obtain their rule?

There is also a big difference between a set containing the word "dog" and a set containing a dog. And while in the start it seemed that "dogs lose all properties" iam guessing that by the end we have things like legs(dog)=4 which does move all the interesting stuff to the morphisms but the labels are not arbitrary. In order to set up the correct morphisms I would need to know a whole lot about dogs.

It was also supposed to be that objects are nouns and morphisms are verbs. It is wierd to think that legs(x) is a verb or that legs turns dogs into numbers (in a sense of we predict this dog will spontaneusly combust into number 4)

Comment by slider on The sentence structure of mathematics · 2019-10-08T16:55:10.189Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I would suspect there are rules how it works that way but now it is not intuitive for me why that would be the result. Why it would not produce the empty function? And if you have a empty relation isn't it a relation of any type to any type at the same time? Would it or why it would not be an empty relation between letter-shapes and country-dances? But apparently you can have different kinds of empty morphisms based on what their source and target objects are.

I didn't also realise that composing is relative to how you view the objects.

Comment by slider on The sentence structure of mathematics · 2019-10-08T12:29:09.361Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I don't know whether it is a relevant fear but just I am unsure how much the other details other than type compatibility are preserved.

Say you have a mapping O: A->1, B->3 and a mapping P: 4-> france, 5->england. You could then go that O is letters to numbers and P is numbers to countries so you go that mapping from letters to countries should exist but if you start at A or B you don't end up at any country. Or is the case that {1,3} is a different category than {4,5} rather than letters being equal to letters?

Comment by slider on The sentence structure of mathematics · 2019-10-08T12:11:46.188Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

It might get weird for me as part of the past prgoress for me is how functions are actually objects ie non-verblike. You can example code a function into ordered pairs which can be represented as a set. You are meaning more in the sense that a function by itself is missing something has a "hole" in it? For example "It rains" can seem like a language construction where "rain" appears without holes (and in my native language you express that kind of thought without any formal subject, "rains" is a pertfectly fine sentence that descripbes a common wheather condition/activity.).

Comment by slider on The sentence structure of mathematics · 2019-10-07T23:13:17.802Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Well if I have a mapping (function, morphism?) that has some "rows" of

1 to 5 A to 3 B to cat cow to france

it doesn't seem that descriptive to say that this is a "B->5" mapping. Now usually programming functions are sensible in the sense that the inputs and outputs are of similar types. But if I am start and form the concept of morphism from the ground up how do I know whether such "mixed" types are allowed or not? Or rather given that I do not know of types how I get mapping over multiple inputs?

Comment by slider on The sentence structure of mathematics · 2019-10-07T20:50:26.968Z · score: 9 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Delighted that someone is wants to give a detailed explanation of this area. I tried to read the start of the introduction for programmers and it wasn't as self-evident that I would have thought.

I would have broken up the parts of speech as subject predicate object, s p o, which produces a pattern like a b c while the post wants to introduce a pattern like a b a. The verb also gets inflected in the examples. A starkly literal application of noun verb noun pattern would spell "cat drink milk" rather than "cat drinks milk". It is also ambigious whether it should carry over that the As are drawn form the same kind of entities (Alice and Bob are persons)

There is also the difference of a verb as it relates to place ina sentence and verb as descripbing an action. For example I do not think that addition is a verb but more of a relation. Part of the shakiness and insecurity on taking on odd concept areas can be the undefinedness of the basic concepts. To that effect I think the post seems me to think that I have a understanding of "objects" and "morphisms" but it really just says "translate these as nouns and verbs". Okay it is something I can hangs conceptual stuff on but referring to establihed concepts elsewhere seems like a lot of unwanted baggage might be imported in the same go.

If this is part of future steps refer to there but I got myself confused over what is the same or different between programming functions, mathematical functions and morphisms. How it relates to this post based on reading this if I have p: A -> B and q: A -> B these seem to define two separate morphisms. I get that if I have p:A->B and p:A->C there is a naming conflict and the second p is neccesarily different. But on language level it would seem that "Alice punches Bob" and "Alice hugs Bob" are two separate entities.

I have previous baggage since the difference between a programming function and a mathematical function gives me a theorethical headache. In particular I can imagine two programming functions that have the same input and output behaviour but work differently and are thus clearly separate. Yet mathematical functions are identified by their input/output behaviour. (then there is the problem that some of the extensions are in fact drawn from intensions which makes one wonder whether the extension definitions are just a front for the real thought processes. If you have a thing like "f(x)=x+x^2" it seems to be a different kind of entity than a infinite listing of value pairs) Then there is the thing that programming functions are geniunely verb in that you can execute functions and it corresponds to physical events happening on a computer. However there is no "time progression" for mathematical functions. The analog for morphisms to verbs seems to me that they also have time progression but it seems to be somewhat in conflict with the other source.

Comment by slider on Who lacks the qualia of consciousness? · 2019-10-07T15:57:44.600Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Fresh from birth babies have also trouble seeing and I think this is a simliar lack of sensory skill but I would characterise it as more of a cognitive one rather than a spatial one. Althought with babies their understanding is all-around limited whereas if someone is new to seeing but otherwise familiar with life the "noobiness" is very pinpointed to a narrow sector.

Comment by slider on Who lacks the qualia of consciousness? · 2019-10-06T16:48:14.308Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

What do you mean when any is particularised to the "there are a group of people and none stood out" that that is not a zombie nature?

The left foot thing made me think about the phantom hand illusion. Stroke your hand behind a mirror throught which you see a fake hand being similarly touched. One might come to feel that it is their hand. Some of the youtube videos have people drop hammers on the fake hand etc which makes it clear that selfpreservation is extended to that illusion.

If the self can be extended or redacted from limbs the dream state where it is removed from whole bodies seems like a state where there is atleast no spatial extension to the self. (You can still have knowledge of the objects because surprise you are omniscient about your dreams)

Comment by slider on Meeting the Dragon in Your Garage. · 2019-10-04T00:17:56.700Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I don't think that whether it worth investigating further depends on how well that area is figured out.

I woudl give that if I am interested in an area I would probably be interested in both X->Y and not(X->Y). But random facts are not enough for me to spend thaaat much effort ot figure them out. LIke if a random person makes a claim on a street corner I would not build a million dollar machine to test that out or apply for a grant to build one. I would need to have an independent reason to care or have it be beneficiary of general curiosity.

I am also more likely to spend effort in areas that I find "important" or "interesting". There is the fact that if there is a detailed description how a experiment is carried out I mostly take peoples word that they did it or suspect that their error is close to the level of description they are providing. But I don't actually personally verify any significant amount of things. I don't naturally measure zeroes and you kinda need to motivate me to unnaturally do so with money or theorycrafting.

Comment by slider on Honoring Petrov Day on LessWrong, in 2019 · 2019-10-03T18:36:02.684Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The downward chain of command holds appropriately but a person (I think the character is named Jack D Ripper) that shouldn't be making such a call is in a factual position to act as if he had received one. Part of the point is that it is surprising and that the remedy to have them court martialled is not comforting at all. Yes he does not personally go to nuke the soviets but he acts on his own without cooperation with the powers invested in him.

The points do not need to be in conflict. Ripper can doom the humanity by doing unauthorised things while the bomber crew dooms them by doing authorised things.

The bomber crew equivalents also kept the cold war cold because it was plausible that they could be used for the their trained purpose.

Comment by slider on Noticing Frame Differences · 2019-10-02T12:49:56.803Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

So the connection is "The straightforward way to increase epistemological competence is to talk about beliefs in detail. In introspection it is hard to apply this method because details can't be effectively shared to get an understanding". It seems to me it is not about gear-frames being special but that frames have preconditions to get them to work and an area that allows/permits a lot of frames makes it hard to hit any frames prequisities.

Comment by slider on Noticing Frame Differences · 2019-10-01T01:27:10.880Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I don't understand the question in the last point. I am being intentionally stupid and simple, what reason do you have to guess/believe that epistemic standards would be harder to apply to non-gear frames?

Comment by Slider on [deleted post] 2019-09-30T21:44:44.887Z

There is a big difference in classifying a mental stance as opinion rather than fact compared to deconstructing positions if they fail to be facts. To destroy a hunch because it doesn't have a watertight proof is a road to incompetence.

I do think that opinions that have corresponding facts will get shadowed by them. Often an opinion is prefaced with "all things considered" which also suggests a line how you can address bad opinons, you can consider more factors.

Comment by slider on Noticing Frame Differences · 2019-09-30T14:57:34.962Z · score: 4 (4 votes) · LW · GW

I feel like "gears" discussion is not the same type of discussion type as the others. I think "technical discussion" would be a better replacement that makes the discussion style have a same kind of type. The example in about trying programming doesn't talk about modelling differences so I fail to see how there is a gears framework being used.

In general "gears" is not common language but LW specific and I think here what is meant by it is so up in the air that it's not particuarly communicative.

Comment by slider on The Power to Teach Concepts Better · 2019-09-28T23:19:09.023Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I have serious reservations that any experience that can't be traded on a market has any value that can accurately be dominated in dollars. It triggers an impulse in me that this is a minor technical flaw that should be overlooked but it increases my cognitive burden and lowers my confidence that the author knows what they are talking about. Sticking your neck out is great. But making the thing long and the parts depend on each other makes errors compond.

In making a claim of "you would have been stuck on any explanation of "avoid the sunk-cost fallacy" until you understand how that kind of utility-scoring works" you are implying that it can not be explained without such scoring. I guess I couldn't in reality read the explanation of the fallacy on a clean slate because I already know about it beforehand. But science popularisers sometimes make misrepresentations in making curves straight. The good intention doesn't make up spreading misinformation.

Comment by slider on Attainable Utility Theory: Why Things Matter · 2019-09-28T22:54:30.551Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I would have agreed with "how we can get what we want" but "how well we can get what we want" kind of specifies that it is a scalar quantity.

Utility functions can be constructed or are translatable from/to choice rankings. There can be no meaningful utility change without it being understandable with choices.

Impact as a primitive feeling feels super weird. I get that it has something to do with the idiom "fuck my life". However there is another idiom "This is my life now" which more captures that quality change that is not neccesarily a move up or down.

There is a "so" word that would suggest theorethical implication but reference to simulated experience and feeling seem like callbacks to imagined emotions. Either or both apply?

I am also confused what the realtionship between expected utility and attainable utility is supposed to be. If you expect to maximise they should be pretty close.

I think I might be expereriencing goal directed behaviour very differntly on the inside and I am unsure how much of the terminology is supposed to be abstract math concepts and how much of it is supposed to be emotional language. It might be for other people there is a more natural link between being in a low or high utility state and feeling low or high.

I am now suspecthing it has less to do with "Objective-life" but rather "subjective-life" or life-as-experienced which tells the approach uses a differnt kind of ontology.

Comment by slider on Attainable Utility Theory: Why Things Matter · 2019-09-28T21:34:09.968Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The blowing up scenario might be a bit fantatical for me to properly apply intuitions. It did specify that I grew up in such a earth which would mean my family expectations have not really changed up to this point and I have hard time imagining what they would be. If a doomsday cult suddenly lives throught the expected date they do not go "omg profit" but "huh? what now?".

Then there is the case of knowing that this solar system has only a finite lifespan. It doesn't automatically feel like everything one has lived for melts to nothing even if before such a realization one might have thought that all improvements are for perpetuity. Cassandara migth be frustrated but it is because she has so low impact not becuase she has received demoralising information.

Comment by slider on Attainable Utility Theory: Why Things Matter · 2019-09-28T21:15:39.621Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I thought that "impact" was the word for that. What is there left of the focus of the sequence if you take "life-changes" away from that?

You think or would say there is no impact for the taxi driver?

Comment by slider on Attainable Utility Theory: Why Things Matter · 2019-09-28T21:07:01.358Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Yes I was using a little ambigious shorthands. The address announcing is impactful to the driver but there is no utility change. I think the "losing access to utility" does not well apply to the taxi-driver and the kind of conception that I have that does apply seems attractive in comparison.

Comment by slider on Attainable Utility Theory: Why Things Matter · 2019-09-28T21:00:08.791Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

In order to be upset I would need an expectation that the tile was reachable before. If I have zero clue how the nature works I don't have an expectation that it was possible beforehand so I am not losing any ability.

Then there is the technicality tht even if I know that I can't move I don't know anything about the nature of the world so maybe I think that the grey square can teleport to me? The framing seems to assume a lot of basic assumption about gridworlds. So which parts I can assume and which parts I geniunely do not know?

But yeah I did fail to read that there was a specification of the wanting.

Comment by slider on The Power to Teach Concepts Better · 2019-09-28T20:37:37.891Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

The post gives a lot of useful material even if I don't accept as-is a lot of it.

Trying to do specific concept building is very efficient if you are on point with your guess with details of the readers mental architechture. However if your guess is off the result can be actively harmful.

In particular I got seriously stuck with "blizzard is -$100". This is a pretty alien way to express things to me. And it seemed to be somewhat analogous to the concert grounding which seems that kind of thing might admit to rewording but the rewording didn't really succeed in my mind. Now I am tangled with problems with the auxillary tools and the point is obscured. Allthought it can be good in being spesific the possible issues are out in the open. If we stayed at more abstract level then my disagremeent on the details would not similarly interfere.

While it is good to be relevant and it is bad to leave the reader in a helpless state, I think there is a case not to subtitue the readers own participation. Mathematical style text where you are supposed to read very little very carefully can be completely approriate. It gets to the point. The long version while it didn't use that much memory took some time to read. A text that takes long to get gives you a better impression where the thing is going while text tha tis long one starts skimming or trying to guess where the text is heading.

I am reminded a lot about how in languages like C++ you CAN do your own memory management and it can be more efficent than standard automatic hanglng. But just because you CAN doesn't mean you SHOULD. Giving advice that you should always handle your own memory leads to cases where you spend a lot of routine work to get similar level performance that the automatic would get. And when the automatic solutions get better your code stays at the same level. Leaving out details means that an expert on them can get them better than you. As an author you main job is to say something interesting, to have a point.

In this way people have genuine cognitived diversity and not everyone work like the typical mind. Not spesifying your text to a narrow neuro/cognition type allows you to be polymorphic and be relevant for more people. It's also very differnt thing to provide hooks for differnt types to actively manage integration of your content than micromanage a very straight and narrow path.

Comment by slider on Eli's shortform feed · 2019-09-28T20:08:54.890Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I would think that inconsistencies are easier to appriciate when they are in the central machinery. A rationalist might have more load bearing on their beliefs so most beliefs are central to atleast something but I think a centrality/point-of-communication check is more upside than downside to keep. Also cognitive time spent looking for inconsistencies could be better spent on more constructive activities. Then there is the whole class of heuristics which don't even claim to be consistent. So the ability to pass by an inconsistency without hanging onto it will see use.