How Promising is Theoretical Research on Rationality? Seeking Career Advice

post by Aspirant223 · 2022-07-26T01:08:02.310Z · LW · GW · 3 comments

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As I come to the end of my undergraduate degree in philosophy, I am now faced with the decision of what to do next. I have spent a lot of time reading 80 000 hours, but have begun to wonder whether parts of their advice might not apply to me, or if they might be undervaluing certain kinds of research. For example, in their article on philosophy academia, they suggest that many people who are thinking about going to grad school for philosophy should instead study something like computer science, economics, or pursue a career in public policy. The problem is that I am much stronger verbally than I am quantitatively, and my scores on aptitude tests reflect this. So, subjects like computer science and economics are off the table, and I assume that one’s success in policy careers is going to depend (at least in part) on mathematical skills. The fact that I live in a smaller, less influential country could also affect the impact I would have if I went into politics or public policy.

I recently stumbled on a few LessWrong resources, such as What are the open problems in Human Rationality? [LW · GW], and some of the problems in this thread seem really interesting. It also seems that a person might make progress on these without strong quantitative abilities (though I will consider a counterargument to this point below). For instance, some people think that akrasia [LW(p) · GW(p)] could be a promising problem to work on, and a recurring issue in the LessWrong literature is whether it makes sense to conceive of oneself as containing multiple sub-agents [LW · GW] (in some sense), and if so, what the advantages and disadvantages of different theoretical views on this are. This is also the kind of thing you can get funding to work on for a couple of years in my country (from a philosophy department), without taking on any debt.

One advantage of doing so would be that certain aspects of this path could be really motivating. Though it is unlikely that I could rise to the level of certain heroic figures in the LessWrong community, even a small chance of one day becoming like some of my heroes would be really exciting. If I went to law school or worked for a government agency, I think this would be much less likely (though I welcome pushback on this idea— maybe I am underestimating the impact I could have on these paths).

I will now consider what I take to be the strongest counterargument to me pursuing this kind of research. As I noted earlier, my aptitude for maths is quite poor.^[1] But what if breakthroughs in theoretical research on rationality will only come from those who are good at maths? For example, parts of cognitive science involve simulating computation using mathematical models. Alternatively, one could think that making progress on these problems will involve analyzing huge troves of empirical data. If so, a person with a talent for maths will probably be faster at skimming through papers that involve statistical analysis. One could say: ‘Sure, the SEP article on akrasia is mostly conceptual analysis. But this traditional kind of philosophy isn’t what we need right now.’ However, even if this were correct,^[2] it seems possible that there are ways of integrating conceptual and empirical work which (bad at math) philosophical types could be good at. I don’t know how far this is true, so I am interested to hear your thoughts on this.

A final point I have been considering: even if I am less likely to make a breakthrough than somebody with a talent for maths, could spending a couple of years on this kind of research be my best option anyway? It seems like doing so would give me a better understanding of several LessWrong ideas, which could be good in all sorts of ways. For example, it might make me better at (responsibly) ‘spreading the word’ about said ideas. When discussing EA issues for instance, I have found that knowing common counterarguments in advance (and being ready with responses), has helped me engage with people immensely. It also helped me understand which parts of EA are slam dunks that I can confidently argue for, and which parts I think are on shakier ground or outright disagree with. I am much more of a ‘baby’ when it comes to the ideas of LessWrong (and epistemology, cog sci., phil. of psych, etc.— thus far I have mostly focused on ethics), so assuming that the material here (and in these areas in general) is worth critically engaging with, going through this process could yield great benefits.

Thank you to everyone who gives me career advice in this thread!

 

1. ^{^}

   Even though I may be ‘above average’ compared to the general population, I am significantly worse than the average CS/econ student.

2. ^{^}

   Though a lot of traditional philosophy seems to me to be really worthwhile, I don't have a deep enough understanding of metaphilosophy to say exactly how valuable this methodology will be in the future, compared to other approaches. Further, if it is true that some research employing the methods of traditional philosophy will continue to be really valuable, I don't have a solid position on how many people should be conducting such research.

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