Humans can be assigned any values whatsoever...

I think we should use "agent" to mean "something that determines what it does by expecting that it will do that thing," rather than "something that aims at a goal." This explains why we don't have exact goals, but also why we "kind of" have goals: because our actions look like they are directed to goals, so that makes "I am seeking this goal" a good way to figure out what we are going to do, that is, a good way to determine what to expect ourselves to do, which makes us do it.

Initially I wrote a response spelling out in excruciating detail an example of a decent chess bot playing the final moves in a game of Preference Chess, ending with "How does this not reveal an extremely clear example of trivial preference inference, what am I missing?"

Then I developed the theory that what I'm missing is that you're not talking about "how preference inference works" but more like "what are extremely minimalist preconditions for preference inference to get started".

And given where this conversation is happening, I'm guessing that one of the things you can't take for granted is that the agent is at all competent, because sort of the whole point here is to get this to work for a super intelligence looking at a relatively incompetent human.

So even if a Preference Chess Bot has a board situation where it is one move away from winning, losing, or taking another piece that it might prefer to take... no matter what move the bot actually performs you could argue it was just a mistake because it couldn't even understand the extremely short run tournament level consequences of whatever Preference Chess move it made.

So I guess I would argue that even if any specific level of stable state intellectual competence or power can't be assumed, you might be able to get away with a weaker assumption of "online learning"?

It will always be tentative, but I think it buys you something similar to full rationality that is more likely to be usefully true of humans. Fundamentally you could use "an online learning assumption" to infer "regret of poorly chosen options" from repetitions of the same situation over and over, where either similar or different behaviors are observed later in time.

To make the agent have some of the right resonances... imagine a person at a table who is very short and wearing a diaper.

The person's stomach noisily grumbles (which doesn't count as evidence-of-preference at first).

They see in front of them a cupcake and a cricket (the eye's looking at both is somewhat important because it means they could know that a choice is even possible, allowing us to increment the choice event counter here).

They put the cricket in their mouth (which doesn't count as evidence-of-preference at first).

They cry (which doesn't count as evidence-of-preference at first).

However, we repeat this process over and over and notice that by the 50th repetition they are reliably putting the cupcake in their mouth and smiling afterwords. So we use the relatively weak "online learning assumption" to say that something about the cupcake choice itself (or the cupcake's second order consequences that the person may think semi-reliably reliably happens) are more preferred than the cricket.

Also, the earlier crying and later smiling begin to take on significance as either side channel signals of preference (or perhaps they are the actual thing that is really being pursued as a second order consequence?) because of the proximity of the cry/smile actions reliably coming right after the action whose rate changes over time from rare to common.

The development of theories about side channel information could make things go faster as time goes on. It might even becomes the dominant mode of inference, up to the point where it starts to become strategic, as with lying about one's goals in competitive negotiation contexts becoming salient once the watcher and actor are very deep into the process...

However, I think your concern is to find some way to make the first few foundational inferences in a clear and principled way that does not assume mutual understanding between the watcher and the actor, and does not assume perfect rationality on the part of the actor.

So an online learning assumption does seem to enable a tentative process, that focuses on tiny little recurring situations, and the understanding of each of these little situations as a place where preferences can operate causing changes in rates of performance.

If a deeply wise agent is the watcher, I could imagine them attempting to infer local choice tendencies in specific situations and envisioning how "all the apparently preferred microchoices" might eventually chain together into some macro scale behavioral pattern. The watcher might want to leap to a conclusion that the entire chain is preferred for some reason.

It isn't clear that the inference to the preference for the full chain of actions would be justified, precisely because of the assumption of the lack of full rationality.

The watcher would want to see the full chain start to occur in real life, and to become more common over time when chain initiation opportunities presented themselves.

Even then, the watcher might even double check by somehow adding signposts to the actor's environment, perhaps showing the actor pictures of the 2nd, 4th, 8th, and 16th local action/result pairs that it thinks are part of a behavioral chain. The worry is that the actor might not be aware how predictable they are and might not actually prefer all that can be predicted from their pattern of behavior...

(Doing the signposting right would require a very sophisticated watcher/actor relationship, where the watcher had already worked out a way to communicate with the actor, and observed the actor learning that the watcher's signals often functioned as a kind of environmental oracle for how the future could go, with trust in the oracle and so on. These preconditions would all need to be built up over time before post-signpost action rate increases could be taken as a sign that the actor preferred performing the full chain that had been signposted. And still things could be messed up if "hostile oracles" were in the environment such that the actor's trust in the "real oracle" is justifiably tentative.)

One especially valuable kind of thing the watcher might do is to search the action space for situations where a cycle of behavior is possible, with a side effect each time through the loop, and to put this loop and the loop's side effect into the agent's local awareness, to see if maybe "that's the point" (like a loop that causes the accumulation of money, and after such signposting the agent does more of the thing) or maybe "that's a tragedy" (like a loop that causes the loss of money, that might be a dutch booking in progress, and after signposting the agent does less of the thing).

Is this closer to what you're aiming for? :-)

I think there are two ways that a reward function can be applicable:

1) For making moral judgements about how you should treat your agent. Probably irrelevant for your button presser unless you're a panpsychist.

2) If the way your agent works is by predicting the consequences of its actions and attempting to pick an action that maximises some reward (eg a chess computer trying to maximise its board valuation function). Your agent H as described doesn't work this way, although as you note there are agents which do act this way and produce the same behaviour as your H.

There's also the kind-of option:

3) Anything can be modelled as if it had a utility function, in the same way that any solar system can be modelled as a geocentric one with enough epicycles. In this case there's no "true" reward function, just "the reward function that makes the maths I want to do as easy as possible". Which one that is depends on what you're trying to do, and maybe pretending there's a reward function isn't actually better than using H's true non-reward-based algorithm.

what is the requirements for the framework to be applicable?

This framework lives in the map, not in the territory. It is a model feature, applicable when it makes a model more useful. Specifically, it makes sense when the underlying reality is too complex to deal with directly. Because of the complexity we, basically, reduce the dimensionality of the problem by modeling it as a simpler combination of aggregates. "Values" are one kind of such aggregates.

If you have an uncomplicated algorithm with known code, you don't need such simplifying features.

Isn't a big part of the problem the fact that you only have conscious access to a few things? In other words, your actions are determined in many ways by an internal economy that you are ignorant of (e.g. mental energy, physical energy use in the brain, time and space etc. etc.) These things are in fact value relevant but you do not know much about them so you end up making up reasons why you did what you did.

If we want to describe human values, we need to find values that don't go crazy when transformed into utility functions.

That seems misguided. If you want to describe human values, you need to describe them as you find them, not as you would like them to be.

The problem with your "in practice" argument is that it would similarly imply that we can never know if someone is bald, since it is impossible to give a definition of baldness that rigidly separate bald people from non-bald people while respecting what we mean by the word. But in practice we can know that a particular person is bald regardless of the absence of that rigid definition. In the same way a particular person can know that he went to the store to buy milk, even if it is theoretically possible to explain what he did by saying that he has an abhorrence of milk and did it for totally different reasons.

Likewise, in practice we can avoid money pumps by avoiding them when they come up in practice. We don't need to formulate principles which will guarantee that we will avoid them.

We can and do make judgements about rationality and values.

How do you know this is true? Perhaps we make judgements about predicted behaviors and retrofit stories about rationality and values onto that.

May I suggest a test for any such future model? It should take into account that I have unconsciousness sub-personalities which affect my behaviour but I don't know about them.

Also, the question was not if I could judge other's values, but is it possible to prove that AI has the same values as a human being.

Or are you going to prove the equality of two value systems while at least one of them of them remains unknowable?