Ideas for heuristics and biases research topic?

I did my high school science experiment on nootropics in rats, to see if it affected the time it took them to learn to navigate the maze compared to a control group that didn't take them.

The test subjects I gave the drugs to all died. The control group eventually learned how to go through the maze without making any wrong turns.

I was given a B+ and an admonishment to never let anyone know the teacher had pre-approved my experimenting on mammals.

cognitive reflectiveness: the disposition to choose to think carefully about something and avoid bias

I sometimes worry that this disposition may be more important than everything we typically think of as "rationality skills" and more important than all the specific named biases that can be isolated and published, but that it's underemphasized on LW because "I'll teach you these cool thinking skills and you'll be a strictly more awesome person" makes for a better website sales pitch than "please be cognitively reflective to the point of near-neuroticism, I guess one thing that helps is to have the relevant genes".

Do you know of research supporting debiasing scope insensitivity by introducing differences in kind that approximately preserve the subjective quantitative relationship? If not I will look for it, but I don't want to if you already have it at hand.

I am thinking in particular of Project Steve. Rather than counter a list of many scientists who "Dissent from Darwinism" with a list of many scientists who believe evolution works, they made a list of hundreds of scientists named Steve who believe evolution works.

Many people is approximately equal to many people in the mind, be it hundreds or thousands, but many people is fewer than many Steves. That's the theory, anyway.

Intuitively it sounds like it should work, but I don't know if there are studies supporting this.

how to debias base rate neglect

Convert numbers and rates into equivalent traits or dispositions: Convert "85% of the taxis in the city are green" to "85% of previous accidents involved drivers of green cabs". (Recent Kahneman interview)

Requisition social thinking: Convert "85%" to "85 out of 100", or "Which cards must you turn over" to "which people must you check further" (Wason test).

how to debias framing effects

Have people been trained in automatically thinking of "mortality rates" as "survival rates" and such? A good dojo game to play would be practicing thinking in terms of an opposite framing as quickly as possible, until it became pre-conscious, and one consciously became aware of what one heard and its opposite at the same time.

Fresh off the presses at Yale's American Political Science Review from August: http://bullock.research.yale.edu/papers/elite/elite.pdf

An enduring concern about democracies is that citizens conform too readily to the policy views of elites in their own parties, even to the point of ignoring other information about the policies in question. This article presents two experiments that undermine this concern, at least under one important condition. People rarely possess even a modicum of information about policies; but when they do, their attitudes seem to be affected at least as much by that information as by cues from party elites. The experiments also measure the extent to which people think about policy. Contrary to many accounts, they suggest that party cues do not inhibit such thinking. This is not cause for unbridled optimism about citizens’ ability to make good decisions, but it is reason to be more sanguine about their ability to use information about policy when they have it.

(Emphasis mine.)

If one knew the extent one was biased by cues, and one knew one's opinion based on cues and facts, it would be possible to calculate what one's views would be without cues.

Are you including inducing biases as part of "debiasing"? For example, if people are generally too impulsive in spending money, a mechanism that merely made people more restrained could counteract that, but would be vulnerable to overshooting or undershooting. Here is the relevant study:

In Studies 2 and 3, we found that higher levels of bladder pressure resulted in an increased ability to resist impulsive choices in monetary decision making.

Ah, I think you misunderstood me (on reflection, I wasn't very clear) — I'm doing an experiment, not a research project in the sense of looking over the existing literature.

(For the record, I decided on conducting something along the lines of the studies mentioned in this post to look at how distraction influences retention of false information.)

Have you included racism or its sub-components as fallacies? If so, what are the sub-components the fixing of which would ameliorate racism?