Does the Universe's Recognition of Photon Detection Increase the Likelihood that We Are in a Simulation?
post by 626 · 2025-04-04T22:12:02.568Z · LW · GW · 2 commentsContents
2 comments
In 2003, Nick Bostrom used probabilistic reasoning to introduce what became known as the simulation hypothesis: either advanced civilizations rarely emerge, they rarely run simulations, or we’re almost certainly in a simulation.(1) Public discourse has since suggested that the universe’s fine-tuning—the precise constants and conditions enabling life—supports the idea of being in a simulation. If there’s a “one in billions and billions” chance of such fine-tuning occurring at random, then its existence may hint at the likelier existence of a fine-tuner—and perhaps a simulator.
Most philosophers and cosmologists rely on multiverse hypotheses to argue against the idea that fine-tuning implies a fine-tuner: if “billions and billions” of universes exist or have been “attempted,” our life-conducive outlier isn’t surprising.(2) If a multiverse explanation holds, it weakens fine-tuning as evidence for being in a simulation. Some, like Ian Hawking and Roger White, argue that multiverse hypotheses engage in logical fallacies—like the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy—to explain fine-tuning.(3) Still, there is not a consensus on whether fine-tuning can or cannot be dismissed with multiverse hypotheses. And if fine-tuning is dismissed, then it no longer supports the idea that we are in a simulation. So what if we look elsewhere for physical evidence to help determine whether we are in a simulation?
Imagine a comatose patient in a hospital who opens their eyes one day. A nurse calls for a doctor who attempts to assess the awareness and cognition of the patient. The doctor might say “Hi, I’m Dr. Miller. I see you’re awake. Do you understand me?" If the patient doesn’t answer or move, the doctor might ask the patient to blink their eyes if they understand. If the patient flutters their eyelids rapidly, the doctor would determine that the patient is most-likely aware and cogitating. The doctor could run additional tests (“follow my finger with your eyes”). If the patient successfully completes these tests, the doctor would become more confident in the patient’s cognition. Although a brain scan would likely be run, the doctor could be reasonably confident of the patient's cognition even without the scan. Cognition could be determined based solely on the patient’s actions.
However, if the patient did not respond to the doctor’s instructions, but simply “stared straight ahead” and blinked at seemingly-random times, the doctor would have no reason to suspect cognition (in the “reasoning” sense of the word). Furthermore, if the doctor lifted the patient’s arm, and then let go of it, and observed the arm fell back onto the bed, this would not indicate cognition. The same thing would occur if the doctor lifted a book and let go of it. In other words, some actions/reactions require cognition, while others do not. We assign which actions require cognition largely based on our own experiences with cognition, and what we notice in others whom we deem to be like us.
When running the double-slit experiment, the universe recognizes the act of photon (or electron) detection. This recognition is then correlated with a pattern shift on the wall/screen from a wave-indicative interference pattern to two particle-indicative bands. Interpretations for why this happens include the Copenhagen interpretation (wave-function collapse), the Many Worlds interpretation (decoherence), and others.(4) However, regardless of how we interpret what happens, there is little argument that the universe recognizes the act of photon detection.
Quantum physicists sometimes downplay the significance of the universe's recognition of photon detection. They might say,
“When photon detection occurs, the universe recognizes my action, and reacts accordingly. If I drop a ball, the universe also recognizes my action, and reacts accordingly."
Yet there is a difference between the actions of photon detection and the action of a ball falling. Any human bystanders in the room where the double-slit experiment is being run, can engage in cognition to understand and react to the photon detectors being turned on. Yet any non-cogitating object, such as a rock, would not react to the photon detectors being turned on. Is the universe acting more like the thinking bystanders or the unthinking rock? If photon detection does indeed require cognition on the part of the universe, then this lends support for a universal cognition (or a program created by a programmer who engaged in cognition).
Why might photon recognition outweigh fine-tuning in physical support for being in a simulation? Multiverse hypotheses can dismiss fine-tuning as a selection effect: we only see this universe because it worked.(2) Yet we could still exist in universes without recognition of photon detection. Since recognition of photon detection isn’t guaranteed across all possible worlds, it’s harder to wave away with a “billions-of-universes” argument.
John Barrow speculated that quantum collapse might mimic a simulation rendering reality on demand,(5) and David Chalmers notes it fits a system economizing computation.(6) These speculations might explain the "why" of quantum collapse, but perhaps we should also “back up” and think about whether the universe's recognition of photon detection "in the first place" is possible evidence for the existence of cognition (or analogous programming).
Fine-tuning suggests a designed framework; recognition of photon detection suggests a designed cognition mechanism. The latter’s resistance to multiverse dismissal might make it a sharper clue. Is this conclusive? No—but it may be a crack in reality worth probing.
Citations:
- Nick Bostrom, “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?,” Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 211 (2003): 243–255.
- Bernard Carr, ed., Universe or Multiverse? (Cambridge University Press, 2007), chap. 1.
- Roger White, “Does Origins Evidence Favor a Maximal or Non-Maximal Metaphysics?,” Mind 109, no. 435 (2000): 561–566.
- Richard P. Feynman, The Feynman Lectures on Physics, vol. III (Addison-Wesley, 1965), chap. 1.
- John D. Barrow, “Living in a Simulated Universe,” in Universe or Multiverse?, ed. Bernard Carr (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 481–486.
- David J. Chalmers, Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022), chap. 15.
2 comments
Comments sorted by top scores.
comment by AnthonyC · 2025-04-04T23:57:28.428Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It sounds like you're assuming the Copenhagen interpretation of QM, which is not strictly necessary. To the best of my understanding, initially but not solely from the learned hear on LW [LW · GW], QM works just fine if you just don't do that and assume the wave equations are continuous work exactly as written, everywhere, all the time, just like every other law of physics. You need a lot of information processing, but not sophisticated as described here.
There's a semi-famous, possibly apocryphal, story about Feynman when he was a student. Supposedly he learned about the double slit experiment and asked what would happen when you added a third, fourth, fifth, etc. slit. Then he asked about the limiting case - infinite slits - aka no barrier. The point was, there's never a moment when anything fundamental changes about what is being computed, whether there's a barrier with slits or not.
Replies from: 626↑ comment by 626 · 2025-04-05T00:31:30.371Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Thanks for the feedback. I'm going to move back to "draft" mode, and be more specific. Technically, I believe either the Copenhagen, Many Worlds, or any other interpretation requires initial recognition of photon detection, but I should have made that clear. I appreciate the help.