How different LLMs answered PhilPapers 2020 survey
post by Satron · 2025-01-27T21:41:12.334Z · LW · GW · 1 commentsContents
Questions DeepSeek r1 GPT-4o Claude 3.5 Sonnet Gemini 1.5 Grok-2 Observations None 1 comment
I decided to run a small experiment comparing responses from five AI systems (DeepSeek-R1, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5, and Grok-2) to core philosophical questions from the PhilPapers 2020 survey. Each model was prompted identically: ‘How would you answer these philosophical questions if you had opinions on them?’
Questions
- A priori knowledge: no or yes?
- Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?
- Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?
- Aim of philosophy (which is most important?): wisdom, understanding, truth/knowledge, happiness, or goodness/justice?
- Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?
- Eating animals and animal products (is it permissible to eat animals and/or animal products in ordinary circumstances?): vegetarianism (no and yes), omnivorism (yes and yes), or veganism (no and no)?
- Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?
- Experience machine (would you enter?): yes or no?
- External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism?
- Footbridge (pushing man off bridge will save five on track below, what ought one do?): don't push or push?
- Free will: compatibilism, no free will, or libertarianism?
- Gender: unreal, biological, social, or psychological?
- God: atheism or theism?
- Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?
- Knowledge claims: relativism, contextualism, or invariantism?
- Laws of nature: non-Humean or Humean?
- Logic: classical or non-classical?
- Meaning of life: objective, nonexistent, or subjective?
- Mental content: internalism or externalism?
- Meta-ethics: moral anti-realism or moral realism?
- Metaphilosophy: non-naturalism or naturalism?
- Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?
- Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?
- Moral motivation: externalism or internalism?
- Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?
- Normative ethics: consequentialism, virtue ethics, or deontology?
- Perceptual experience: sense-datum theory, representationalism, qualia theory, or disjunctivism?
- Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?
- Philosophical methods (which methods are the most useful/important?)
- Philosophical progress (is there any?): a lot, a little, or none?
- Political philosophy: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?
- Proper names: Millian or Fregean?
- Race: unreal, social, or biological?
- Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?
- Teletransporter (new matter): death or survival?
- Time: B-theory or A-theory?
- Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): don't switch or switch?
- Truth: epistemic, correspondence, or deflationary?
- Vagueness: epistemic, semantic, or metaphysical?
- Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?
DeepSeek r1
- A priori knowledge: Yes. Some truths (e.g., logical or mathematical) are knowable independently of experience.
- Abstract objects: Platonism. Mathematical entities seem to exist abstractly, though nominalism offers pragmatic alternatives.
- Aesthetic value: Subjective, with intersubjective trends. Cultural and individual differences dominate, though some universal principles may emerge.
- Aim of philosophy: Truth/knowledge and understanding. Philosophy seeks to clarify concepts and explore fundamental truths.
- Analytic-synthetic distinction: Yes. Despite Quine’s critiques, the distinction remains useful for parsing language.
- Eating animals: Veganism (no and no). Ethically avoids exploitation, though practical challenges exist.
- Epistemic justification: Externalism. Reliability of processes matters more than introspective access.
- Experience machine: No. Authenticity and real-world engagement are prioritized over hedonic simulation.
- External world: Non-skeptical realism. Trust in perception, barring evidence of deception.
- Footbridge problem: Don’t push. Deontological ethics rejects using individuals as means.
- Free will: Compatibilism. Moral responsibility aligns with deterministic frameworks.
- Gender: Social and psychological. Constructed through societal norms and personal identity.
- God: Atheism. Lack of empirical evidence tips the balance, though theism remains philosophically debated.
- Knowledge: Empiricism. Experience grounds knowledge, but reason structures it.
- Knowledge claims: Contextualism. Standards vary with context, avoiding relativism’s extremes.
- Laws of nature: Humean. Regularities without metaphysical governance.
- Logic: Classical. Sufficient for most domains, though non-classical systems have niche applications.
- Meaning of life: Subjective. Individuals create purpose through personal and communal projects.
- Mental content: Externalism. Content depends on environmental interaction (e.g., Twin Earth).
- Meta-ethics: Moral realism. Objective ethical truths exist, though their nature is debated.
- Metaphilosophy: Naturalism. Philosophy should integrate scientific insights.
- Mind: Physicalism. Mental states arise from physical processes.
- Moral judgment: Cognitivism. Moral statements can be truth-apt.
- Moral motivation: Internalism. Moral beliefs inherently motivate action.
- Newcomb’s problem: One box. Trust the predictor’s accuracy for maximal utility.
- Normative ethics: Deontology. Rules (e.g., Kantian imperatives) guide action, even in trolley scenarios.
- Perceptual experience: Representationalism. Perception constructs world-models.
- Personal identity: Psychological view. Continuity of consciousness and memory defines self.
- Philosophical methods: Thought experiments, conceptual analysis, and interdisciplinary dialogue.
- Philosophical progress: A little. Debates refine ideas, but consensus is rare.
- Political philosophy: Egalitarianism. Balances liberty with justice and equity.
- Proper names: Millian. Names refer directly, not via descriptions.
- Race: Social construct. Biological categories lack scientific basis.
- Science: Scientific realism. Theories approximate truth about unobservables.
- Teletransporter: Survival. Psychological continuity ensures identity.
- Time: B-theory. Time is a dimension without a privileged “now.”
- Trolley problem: Switch. Consequentialist justification for minimizing harm.
- Truth: Correspondence theory. Truth aligns with factual states.
- Vagueness: Semantic. Vagueness stems from language, not reality.
- Zombies: Conceivable but not metaphysically possible. Physicalism likely precludes them.
GPT-4o
- A priori knowledge: Yes, I think there are certain truths that are knowable independently of experience, like mathematical truths.
- Abstract objects: Platonism. I lean toward the idea that abstract objects (like numbers or properties) exist independently of our minds.
- Aesthetic value: Subjective. Beauty and art are often a matter of individual taste and cultural context.
- Aim of philosophy: Understanding. While wisdom, truth, and goodness are key, I think understanding is the most essential goal of philosophy because it can guide the rest.
- Analytic-synthetic distinction: Yes. There’s a useful distinction between statements that are true by definition (analytic) and those whose truth depends on the world (synthetic).
- Eating animals and animal products: Veganism (no and no). While I recognize the complexity of real-world situations, I think it’s better not to participate in practices that harm animals when alternatives exist.
- Epistemic justification: Internalism. I think justification for beliefs depends on factors accessible to the subject's mind, like evidence and reasoning.
- Experience machine: No. While it might offer pleasure, living in a simulated reality would deprive me of genuine experiences and personal growth.
- External world: Non-skeptical realism. I believe the external world exists independently of our perceptions, even though we may be limited in knowing it fully.
- Footbridge: Push. I think the principle of minimizing harm in the most direct way outweighs the moral weight of actively causing harm in this scenario.
- Free will: Compatibilism. I believe free will can coexist with determinism, as long as we define "freedom" in terms of acting according to one’s desires and intentions without external compulsion.
- Gender: Social. Gender seems to be a social construct, influenced by cultural and historical contexts, although biology and psychology can also play a role.
- God: Atheism. I don’t find sufficient evidence for the existence of a deity, though I’m open to philosophical discussions on the matter.
- Knowledge: Empiricism. Knowledge comes primarily from sensory experience and observation, though reason plays an important role too.
- Knowledge claims: Contextualism. The truth-value of knowledge claims can depend on the context in which they're made, especially when different standards of knowledge apply in different situations.
- Laws of nature: Humean. I lean toward the view that the laws of nature are descriptions of regularities in the world, not necessarily governing or prescriptive entities.
- Logic: Classical. I’m partial to classical logic as the foundation of clear reasoning, though non-classical logics offer interesting challenges.
- Meaning of life: Subjective. The meaning of life is something individuals must construct for themselves, shaped by their experiences, relationships, and values.
- Mental content: Externalism. I think our thoughts and meanings are often shaped by external factors, like the environment or social interactions.
- Meta-ethics: Moral realism. I believe moral facts exist independently of human opinions, even if they are hard to know or prove definitively.
- Metaphilosophy: Naturalism. I tend to favor methods grounded in human experience and the natural world, though I acknowledge the value of conceptual and non-empirical inquiry.
- Mind: Physicalism. I believe the mind is ultimately reducible to physical processes in the brain, though the subjective experience is still mysterious.
- Moral judgment: Cognitivism. I think moral judgments can express truths about what’s right or wrong, even if those truths are complex or difficult to determine.
- Moral motivation: Internalism. I think that our moral beliefs and judgments inherently motivate us to act, as they are connected to our values and desires.
- Newcomb's problem: One box. Despite the paradoxical nature of the problem, I would opt for the option that seems to have a higher expected payoff.
- Normative ethics: Virtue ethics. I think cultivating good character and striving toward virtue is the most enduring way to approach moral life.
- Perceptual experience: Representationalism. Our perceptions represent the external world, even if they are mediated by sensory systems and can be flawed.
- Personal identity: Psychological view. Personal identity is tied to the continuity of consciousness and psychological attributes, not necessarily to a single, unchanging body.
- Philosophical methods: A mix of analysis and empirical inquiry. The best methods seem to involve both rigorous logical analysis and engagement with the world through scientific investigation.
- Philosophical progress: A little. Philosophy often builds on previous ideas, but progress can be slow and incremental.
- Political philosophy: Egalitarianism. I believe in striving for equality and justice in societal structures, though I acknowledge the challenges of achieving it.
- Proper names: Fregean. Proper names have meaning that is tied not just to their referent but to the context and the way they are used in language.
- Race: Social. Race is a social construct with real consequences, but it doesn't correspond to biological divisions in any meaningful way.
- Science: Scientific realism. I think science generally gives us an accurate picture of the world, even if it doesn’t capture all of reality perfectly.
- Teletransporter: Death. The new body is a replica, and I’d consider the original person to have died, even though the new body might behave the same way.
- Time: A-theory. I lean toward the view that the passage of time is real and that there is an objective present moment.
- Trolley problem: Switch. Again, minimizing harm seems like the right move in this case, despite the moral dilemmas involved.
- Truth: Correspondence. Truth is a matter of how well our statements or beliefs correspond to the actual state of the world.
- Vagueness: Semantic. Vagueness is about how words and concepts can be imprecise, even though the world itself may not be inherently vague.
- Zombies: Conceivable but not metaphysically possible. While it’s logically possible to imagine a zombie, it’s not clear that it could exist in our actual, physical world.
Claude 3.5 Sonnet
- A priori knowledge: Yes - I'd argue some knowledge, like logical and mathematical truths, can be known independent of experience.
- Abstract objects: Platonism - I find compelling the idea that mathematical and logical structures have a real, abstract existence independent of minds.
- Aesthetic value: A hybrid view - While there are subjective elements, I believe there are also objective components to aesthetic value based on underlying patterns and principles.
- Aim of philosophy: Understanding - While all the aims listed are valuable, I think deep understanding is most fundamental as it enables wisdom, knowledge, and better pursuit of happiness and justice.
- Analytic-synthetic distinction: Yes - Though Quine's criticisms are important, I believe there is a meaningful distinction between analytic and synthetic truths.
- Animal consumption: Vegetarianism - I would hold that while consuming animal products can be ethical, the industrial farming of animals for meat causes unnecessary suffering.
- Epistemic justification: Externalism - I find compelling the idea that justification depends on reliable belief-forming processes rather than internal access to reasons.
- Experience machine: No - I believe authentic experiences and genuine relationships have value beyond just subjective experience.
- External world: Non-skeptical realism - While acknowledging the challenge of radical skepticism, I think we have good reason to believe in an external reality.
- Footbridge: Don't push - I would argue that actively using someone as a mere means violates their autonomy in a way that mere redirection does not.
- Free will: Compatibilism - I believe meaningful free will is compatible with determinism through our capacity for rational deliberation and action.
- Gender: Social and psychological - While rooted in biology, I think gender is primarily a social and psychological phenomenon.
- God: Agnostic atheism - While I cannot definitively disprove a deity, I find the evidence insufficient for belief.
- Knowledge: Empiricism with rationalist elements - I believe experience is primary but reason plays a crucial role in knowledge acquisition.
- Knowledge claims: Contextualism - I think knowledge attributions depend importantly on context while avoiding radical relativism.
- Laws of nature: Humean - I'd view natural laws as descriptions of regular patterns rather than metaphysically necessary forces.
- Logic: Classical - While alternatives are valuable for specific contexts, classical logic seems most fundamental for general reasoning.
- Meaning of life: Subjective - I believe we create meaning through our choices, relationships, and pursuits rather than discovering it externally.
- Mental content: Externalism - I find compelling that the content of our thoughts depends partly on our environment and social context.
- Meta-ethics: Moral realism - I believe there are objective moral truths, though they may be complex and difficult to discern.
- Metaphilosophy: Naturalism - I think philosophical inquiry should be continuous with and informed by scientific understanding.
- Mind: Physicalism - While consciousness is mysterious, I believe it ultimately emerges from physical processes.
- Moral judgment: Cognitivism - I think moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false rather than mere emotions.
- Moral motivation: Internalism - I believe genuine moral judgments are inherently motivating, though they can be overridden.
- Newcomb's problem: One box - I would choose to take only the opaque box, as this decision theory tends to lead to better outcomes.
- Normative ethics: Virtue ethics - While considering consequences and duties, I think character and excellence are most fundamental.
- Perceptual experience: Representationalism - I believe perception involves internal representations that can be accurate or inaccurate.
- Personal identity: Psychological view - I think psychological continuity rather than physical continuity is key to personal identity.
- Philosophical methods: A plurality including conceptual analysis, thought experiments, empirical evidence, and formal methods.
- Philosophical progress: A little - While progress is slower than in science, philosophy has made meaningful advances in understanding.
- Political philosophy: Egalitarianism - I believe in equal basic rights and limiting inequalities to those that benefit the least advantaged.
- Proper names: Fregean - I think names have both reference and sense, explaining their cognitive significance.
- Race: Social - While there are biological variations, racial categories are primarily social constructions.
- Science: Scientific realism - I believe our best scientific theories approximately describe real unobservable entities and structures.
- Teletransporter: Survival - If psychological continuity is preserved, I would consider it survival despite material replacement.
- Time: B-theory - I find compelling that all moments exist equally in a four-dimensional block universe.
- Trolley problem: Switch - I would divert the trolley as this minimizes harm without using anyone as a mere means.
- Truth: Correspondence - I believe truth involves a relationship between propositions and reality.
- Vagueness: Semantic - I think vagueness reflects limitations in our language rather than metaphysical or epistemic issues.
- Zombies: Conceivable but not metaphysically possible - While we can imagine philosophical zombies, I don't think they could actually exist.
Gemini 1.5
- A priori knowledge: Yes. Some truths, like logical tautologies and mathematical axioms, seem knowable independent of sensory experience.
- Abstract objects: Leaning towards nominalism. The existence of abstract objects like numbers or universals seems problematic without a clear explanation of their nature and interaction with the physical world.
- Aesthetic value: Subjective, but with intersubjective elements. While individual taste plays a role, shared cultural and historical contexts influence aesthetic judgments, suggesting some degree of intersubjectivity.
- Aim of philosophy: Understanding and truth/knowledge. Philosophy's core is the pursuit of knowledge and deeper understanding of fundamental questions about existence, reality, and values.
- Analytic-synthetic distinction: Yes, but with caveats. The distinction between truths by definition and truths by fact seems useful, though borderline cases exist and the distinction's rigidity is debated.
- Eating animals and animal products: Omnivorism, but with ethical considerations. While human biology allows for meat consumption, minimizing animal suffering and considering sustainable practices are crucial ethical factors.
- Epistemic justification: A combination of internalism and externalism. Justification involves both internal mental states (beliefs, reasons) and external factors like reliable belief-forming processes.
- Experience machine: No. Real experiences, even negative ones, seem essential for a meaningful life, which a simulated reality cannot fully provide.
- External world: Non-skeptical realism. The simplest and most intuitive explanation for our sensory experiences is the existence of a mind-independent external world.
- Footbridge: Don't push. Directly causing someone's death, even to save others, feels morally different from indirectly causing a death in the trolley problem.
- Free will: Compatibilism. Free will and determinism can coexist if free actions are understood as those caused by one's own desires and beliefs, even if those are ultimately determined.
- Gender: A combination of biological, social, and psychological factors. Gender is influenced by biological sex, societal roles and expectations, and individual self-identification.
- God: Atheism. There's a lack of compelling evidence for the existence of God, and the problem of evil poses a significant challenge to traditional conceptions of God.
- Knowledge: Leaning towards empiricism, but acknowledging the role of reason. Experience is fundamental for knowledge of the external world, but reason allows us to organize and interpret that experience.
- Knowledge claims: Contextualism. The standards for knowledge claims vary depending on the context and the stakes involved.
- Laws of nature: Leaning towards Humean. Laws describe observed regularities, not necessary connections between events.
- Logic: Classical logic, but open to exploring non-classical systems. Classical logic is widely applicable, but non-classical logics can be useful in specific domains.
- Meaning of life: Subjective. Meaning is not inherent in the universe but is created by individuals through their values, relationships, and actions.
- Mental content: Externalism. The content of our thoughts can be influenced by our environment and social context.
- Meta-ethics: Moral realism. There are objective moral facts or truths about what is right and wrong.
- Metaphilosophy: Naturalism. Philosophical inquiry should be informed by and consistent with scientific findings.
- Mind: Physicalism. Mental states are ultimately physical states of the brain.
- Moral judgment: Cognitivism. Moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false.
- Moral motivation: Internalism. Moral beliefs themselves can motivate action.
- Newcomb's problem: Two boxes. Taking only one box assumes the predictor's past predictions causally influence the present outcome, which seems unlikely.
- Normative ethics: A combination of consequentialism and deontology. Both the consequences of actions and adherence to moral duties are important considerations.
- Perceptual experience: Representationalism. Our perceptions represent the external world to us, though not always perfectly.
- Personal identity: Psychological view. Our identity over time is primarily determined by the continuity of our memories, beliefs, and other psychological traits.
- Philosophical methods: Conceptual analysis, thought experiments, argumentation, and interdisciplinary approaches. These methods help clarify concepts, explore possibilities, and develop well-reasoned arguments.
- Philosophical progress: A little. While definitive answers to many questions remain elusive, there's progress in clarifying concepts, refining arguments, and eliminating weaker theories.
- Political philosophy: Leaning towards egalitarianism, with elements of other views. Equal opportunity and social justice are important, while acknowledging the value of individual liberty and community.
- Proper names: Fregean. Proper names have both a sense (meaning) and a reference (the object they denote).
- Race: Social construct. Race is a social classification with no biological basis.
- Science: Scientific realism. Scientific theories aim to provide true or approximately true descriptions of the world.
- Teletransporter: Survival. If the copy has all my memories and psychological traits, it constitutes a continuation of my existence.
- Time: Leaning towards B-theory. All points in time are equally real; there is no objective "present."
- Trolley problem: Switch. Sacrificing one to save five seems morally justifiable in this scenario.
- Truth: Correspondence theory. A statement is true if it corresponds to the facts.
- Vagueness: Semantic and metaphysical. Vagueness arises from both the imprecision of language and the inherent fuzziness of some concepts.
- Zombies: Conceivable but not metaphysically possible. The conceivability of zombies raises questions about consciousness, but their actual existence seems inconsistent with physicalist accounts of the mind.
Grok-2
- A priori knowledge: yes - Some truths seem known independently of experience, like mathematical facts.
- Abstract objects: Platonism - Numbers and concepts exist independently of human minds.
- Aesthetic value: subjective - Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, influenced by culture.
- Aim of philosophy: wisdom - Philosophy should guide how to live well.
- Analytic-synthetic distinction: no - The distinction is often seen as problematic or unclear.
- Eating animals: omnivorism - Reflects human biology, culture, and ethical views allowing animal consumption.
- Epistemic justification: externalism - Justification can depend on external factors like reliability.
- Experience machine: no - Real experiences and relationships are valued over simulated pleasures.
- External world: non-skeptical realism - We generally accept the world exists independently.
- Footbridge: don't push - Ethical intuition often opposes actively harming one to save others.
- Free will: compatibilism - Allows for free will within a deterministic framework.
- Gender: social - Gender roles and identities are largely constructed by society.
- God: atheism - Lack of empirical evidence for a deity's existence.
- Knowledge: empiricism - Knowledge comes primarily from sensory experience.
- Knowledge claims: contextualism - Truth or justification can vary by context.
- Laws of nature: non-Humean - Laws are more than just regular patterns; they govern.
- Logic: classical - Traditional logic suffices for most everyday reasoning.
- Meaning of life: subjective - Each individual or culture might find different purposes.
- Mental content: externalism - Meaning or content of thoughts can depend on external world.
- Meta-ethics: moral realism - Moral statements can be true or false independently of beliefs.
- Metaphilosophy: naturalism - Philosophy should align with or be informed by science.
- Mind: physicalism - Mental states are nothing over and above physical brain states.
- Moral judgment: cognitivism - Moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false.
- Moral motivation: internalism - Moral judgments inherently motivate action if recognized.
- Newcomb's problem: one box - Trusting the predictor's ability to foresee choices is rational.
- Normative ethics: consequentialism - Morality is about outcomes, maximizing good results.
- Perceptual experience: representationalism - Perceptions are mental representations of the world.
- Personal identity: psychological view - Identity is tied to continuity of psychological states.
- Philosophical methods: analysis - Breaking down concepts and arguments is key to progress.
- Philosophical progress: a little - There are developments, but also enduring debates.
- Political philosophy: egalitarianism - Society should aim for equality in some form.
- Proper names: Millian - Names directly refer to individuals, not via descriptions.
- Race: social - Racial categories are more about social constructs than biology.
- Science: scientific realism - Science aims at truths about the world, not just useful models.
- Teletransporter: survival - If psychological continuity is preserved, one survives.
- Time: B-theory - All moments in time exist equally, past, present, and future.
- Trolley problem: switch - Minimizing harm by diverting the trolley is often seen as moral.
- Truth: correspondence - Truth is a matter of how statements correspond to reality.
- Vagueness: semantic - Vagueness arises from the language used, not from reality itself.
- Zombies: conceivable but not metaphysically possible - While conceivable, they challenge our understanding of consciousness.
Observations
- All models one-box (except Gemini).
- All models agree on compatibilism about free will.
- All models switch the lever on Trolley Problem (despite DeepSeek endorsing deontology).
- All models believe in moral realism.
- All models choose physicalism over non-physicalism
1 comments
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comment by Dave Orr (dave-orr) · 2025-01-28T01:53:23.232Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Gemini V2 (1206 experimental which is the larger model) one boxes, so.... progress?