Subsuming Purpose, Part 1
post by OrphanWilde · 2012-08-10T18:45:34.081Z · LW · GW · Legacy · 10 commentsContents
Summary: Subsuming Purpose, Part 1 None 10 comments
Summary:
The purpose of this entry is to establish the existence of local equilibriums which introduce deviations from an ends-driven organization (an organization whose primary focus is a particular purpose) to transform it into a means-driven organization (an organization whose primary focus is the means to achieve its purpose, rather than the purpose itself).
Subsuming Purpose, Part 1
Imagine you run a charity, and you have two star employees; one shares your goals without any emphasis on a means, the other believes in the cause but believes firmly in fundraising as the best means to that end. Both contribute to your charity, but the fundraiser does more good overall. The fundraiser enables your organization. Who do you set as your successor?
Who will your successor choose as their successor?
The person who believes in the purpose will choose the best person for achieving that purpose. The person who believes in a specific means to achieve that ends will choose the best person for those means. The means will subsume the ends. A person who values specific means, say, fundraising, is more likely to promote fellow fundraisers; he values their contributions more. Specialists, and in particular the lines of thinking which lead to specialization, create rigidity in the organization.
Suppose that you choose the fundraiser. The fundraiser, by dint of having chosen to specialize in fundraising, probably believes that fundraising is more important than the alternative means of supporting the organization: he will probably choose to promote other effective fundraisers over their alternatives.
And now people who don't agree that fundraising will start protesting, seeing their charity becoming increasingly subverted; fundraising is rewarded over the charitable purpose of the organization. They will leave, or protest; if their protests aren't heeded, for example because fundraisers who believe in fundraising do already run the company, they may be marginalized. Such individuals may be selected out, either self-selectively, or by explicit opposition by management to introducing people who are likely to cause trouble for them in the future.
Generalized:
In the example above, I made one particular assumption: That somebody who possesses some choice-driven characteristic X (competency at fundraising in the example) is more likely to believe that X is important, and will favor X over alternative characteristics. It's not necessary that this is always the case; a generalist may also possess some characteristic X. It's only necessary that p(XY) > p(X!Y), where X is possession of characteristic X, and Y is belief that X is an important characteristic to have (belief that fundraising is the most valuable pursuit for the charitable organization in the example).
Any preference, once established, which follows a tendency such that p(XY) > p(X!Y) will concrete itself into the organization once given a foothold; those who are selected based on X will also have, on average, a preference for X. They will select individuals with X.
The danger of organization specialization, as opposed to individual specialization, arises when that preference extends to preference; when, given two people X, those who have a preference for X (those who have characteristic Y) are preferred over those who do not. This is the point at which selecting people for X and Y becomes a runaway process, a process which may subsume the original purpose of the organization.
When those who do not have a preference for X begin to believe that X has already overtaken the original purpose of the organization, the meaningful possibilities are that they will either fight it or leave. If they simply leave, they harden the preference for X; there are fewer individuals in the organization who oppose Y. If they fight it and win, they've won for a day; an equilibrium has not yet been reached. If they fight it and lose, they establish a preference for preference; people who disagree with the orthodoxy of X begin to be seen as potential conflict creators in the organization, and just as problematically, revealing the preference for X may alter the decisions of those who might enter the organization otherwise; a non-Y individual may choose another organization which better suits their preferences.
Every Cause Wants to be a Cult. Every belief wants to be an orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is a stable equilibrium, the pit surrounding the gently sloped hill of idea diversity.
10 comments
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comment by DaFranker · 2012-08-10T17:38:46.138Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This will be the subject of a future post, presuming this one is well-received.
I think your post would benefit from having "meta" or off-main-topic comments like this be put as footnotes rather than directly in the main text.
As for the article itself, it's a bit hard to follow properly. The flow of communication seems somewhat broken and appears to jump from point to point, eventually covering the entire matter but in a less effective manner than if the core ideas and beliefs were more clearly separated from the explanation, inferences, comparisons, examples, and other supportive material. Not implying there should be a clean division into two parts, but rather that paragraphs and text formatting could be reworked into a more effective and convincing whole.
Other than that, I like the content so far and am looking forwards to reading more!
Replies from: OrphanWilde↑ comment by OrphanWilde · 2012-08-10T17:58:45.844Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Looks like I need to pull this back into my drafts and fiddle with it. Thank you for the feedback!
comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2012-08-10T16:54:00.611Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This reads like a stream of consciousness. I wish you had at least a summary upfront.
Replies from: OrphanWilde↑ comment by OrphanWilde · 2012-08-10T17:59:34.101Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Doing some editing to improve that. Thank you for the feedback!
comment by David_Gerard · 2012-08-11T00:17:25.844Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
As a keen charity watcher (well, sometimes), much of this strikes me as reasonably obvious. This suggests that there is already a name for this. This reads like a good start to something longer.
Replies from: fubarobfusco↑ comment by fubarobfusco · 2012-08-11T05:49:01.406Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This suggests that there is already a name for this.
Jerry Pournelle calls it "The Iron Law of Bureaucracy".
Replies from: David_Gerard↑ comment by David_Gerard · 2012-08-11T12:58:17.650Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I mean more specifically this mechanism :-)
comment by Decius · 2012-08-11T00:30:44.875Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Now suppose that fundraising is indeed the current best way of accomplishing the goal. Further suppose that at some point in the future fundraising will no longer be the best way of accomplishing the goal. Why would B not be able to recognize that things have changed, and that fundraising is no longer the best method?
This might be better phrased as a cautionary 'don't let the means become the ends'.
comment by [deleted] · 2012-08-12T15:46:00.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
One earlier complimentary work is The Peter Principle from 1969.
I know Marx had some unkind words for bureaucracy but I don't know Marx well enough to offer a good quote or link here.