A brief theory of why we think things are good or bad
post by David Johnston (david-johnston) · 2024-10-20T20:31:26.309Z · LW · GW · 2 commentsContents
2 comments
2 comments
Comments sorted by top scores.
comment by cubefox · 2024-10-20T23:21:59.634Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
We believe many things because we are somewhat rational; we consider hypotheses, compare them with observed evidence, and emphasise those that are more compatible. Goodness and badness defy this practice; normal reasoning does not produce hypotheses of the form "if X is morally good then I will observe Y".
I disagree. If X is an action, is is usually considered good if it increases welfare, and bad if it decreases welfare. And we can find evidence for or against something being conducive to welfare. So we can find evidence for or against something being good.
Replies from: david-johnston↑ comment by David Johnston (david-johnston) · 2024-10-21T00:04:36.116Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I have a pedantic and a non-pedantic answer to this. Pedantic: you say X is "usually considered good" if it increases welfare. Perhaps you mean to imply that if X is usually considered good then it is good. In this case, I refer you to the rest of the paragraph you quote.
Non-pedantic: yes, it's true that once you accept some fundamental assumptions about goodness and badness you can go about theorising and looking for evidence. I'm suggesting that motivated reasoning is the mechanism that makes those fundamental assumptions believable.
I added a paragraph mentioning this, because I think your reaction is probably common.