Utilitarianism and the replaceability of desires and attachments
post by MichaelStJules · 2024-07-27T01:57:42.419Z · LW · GW · 2 commentsContents
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comment by Dagon · 2024-07-28T16:33:36.855Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I don't think I've seen a model of identity that I like, which makes many thought experiments run into existential/identification issues. If you can answer "why is it acceptable (or not) to destroy a being and create a higher-experienced-utility being in it's place", then you have a basis for why it's OK for humans to change their own preferences by repetition or practice, but not OK for others to change them, or to change them by too much.
Replies from: MichaelStJules↑ comment by MichaelStJules · 2024-08-16T05:37:06.707Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Sorry for the late response.
If people change their own preferences by repetition and practice, then they usually have a preference to do that. So it can be in their own best interests, for preferences they already have.
I could have a preference to change your preferences, and that could matter in the same way, but I don’t think I should say it's in your best interests (at least not for the thought experiment in this post). It could be in my best interests, or for whatever other goal I have (possibly altruistic).
In my view, identity preservation is vague and degreed, a matter of how much you inherit from your past "self", specifically how much of your memories and other dispositions.