The ethics of randomized computation in the multiverse

Shouldn't I be equally worried about stirring my coffee?

The measure of the branches where the computer contain any such program, as opposed to total nonsense, is so small as to be ignorable. There's no point in worrying about it, because it practically doesn't happen.

If the MWI is correct, then our reality already does something similar: there's always a very low but nonzero chance of a quantum fluctuation that will flip your brain into a suffering state. If you don't worry about that, you probably shouldn't worry about the computer.

as I said in Chapter 7, I am sure that they have more than enough to simulate a person

What's his argument, if any?

Many-worlds assisted mind uploading

Free the Everett Branches!

Or is it merely inadvisable, because the combined measure of all the histories containing suffering is very tiny?

I'm going to go with this one.

If you decided that, for some reason, all that matters is that there is a nonzero probability, then there's nothing you can do to stop it. The amplitude will only be zero at isolated points in configuration space. Move a photon a Planck length to the left, and it will now have non-zero amplitude.

This seems complicated. Here's what I've worked out after about an hour of thinking about it:

If we are considering this from a many worlds perspective, then am I correct if I say I have to multiply all entities? As an example, there isn't 1 person considering the switch, there are A people. There isn't 1 computer, there are B computers. In essence, there are A people deciding for B computers with all states, representing C simulations that may or may not be experiencing suffering, and based on my decision, there will either be D suffering(on) or E suffering(off).

Now, if my primary goal is to minimize suffering, then I should pick the smaller of D and E. If D=E, then my decision is irrelevant for my primary goal.

So the real question is, is D=E, or is D!=E?

The initial problem seems to assume that there will be less suffering with it off. But it doesn't actually lay out an argument for the size of D and E.

It seems like the size of D and E is an important consideration. My current understanding of math theory is:

1: There is a difference between 1 quadrillion units of suffering and 999 trillion units of suffering. Pick 999 trillion, it's smaller.

2: There is not a difference between the infinity of the natural numbers and the infinity of the natural numbers-1 trillion. Your choice doesn't matter.

3: There is a difference between the infinity of the natural numbers and the infinity of the real numbers. Pick the infinity of the natural numbers, it's smaller.

4: There is not a difference between the infinity of the real numbers and the infinity of the real numbers minus the infinity of the natural numbers. Your choice doesn't matter.

And despite all of that explanation, I haven't even yet taken to account the possibility of being wrong about my mathematical judgement of the sizes of D and E, or the possibility of being wrong about many worlds (note, not necessarily in general, but about the specifics I use to attempt to calculate D and E.)

Does it sound like I'm on the right track for considering this problem?

Deutsch poses the dilemma as though to do this would necessarily be either evil or trivial - he omits the possibility that such an action might create a net positive utility for humans. That seems worth pointing out as a potential source of bias.

Anyhow, I suppose we have to take into account what is in the computer's memory in the first place. If it is running a sentient simulation(s) of a human being tortured, then it is good to randomise it. If it is running a sentient simulation of a happy human, then it would be evil to randomise it. If the memory is already random with equal measure of 0 and 1, then it is neutral (ignoring the cost of performing the randomisation itself).

Given these results, it seems that the implicit assumption in this dilemma is that the computer's memory is initially set to all 0 or all 1. It could be that the memory was already random with a different proportion of 0 and 1, but as far as I can see that has no substantive bearing on the fundamental problem (are Boltzmann brain simulations more likely with 55/45 ratio of 1s and 0s rather than 50/50?) – what the dilemma is really probing is whether it is good to increase the probability of (simulated) Boltzmann brains coming into existence.

I would answer: humans primarily attach value to the experiences of qualia-rich – or sentient as some would have it – beings (including themselves). We understand very little of the “rules of qualia” – what is the maximum pain and maximum pleasure, how do they come about, how do they relate to everything else in the universe – but we have to form our best judgement given what we little we know.

Based on introspection and on what others have said about their qualia (or subjective experiences), negative-valued qualia (i.e. various kinds of physical and emotional pain) generally feel more intense than positive-valued qualia, and negative qualia appear to be more motivating to humans than positive qualia. Humans experience life-long trauma after intense negative qualia and memories can be very painful; positive qualia are comparatively feeble. In the immortal words of Rush, “They shout about love but when push comes to shove, They live for the things they’re afraid of”.

Therefore I would assign a somewhat greater moral weight to the negative qualia experienced by (simulated) Boltzmann brains, assuming that negative and positive qualia are otherwise equally likely to be generated in random computations (I don’t see any basis for assuming otherwise).

Of course this is a simplified view of human values; most of us don’t consider orgasmium, a pleasure centre containing an extremely large integer, to be the most desirable form of being to bring into existence. But if we try to include that moral complexity in our decision, this would seem to reduce the expected utility of randomising the computer memory still further. The vast majority of sentient Boltzmann brains, regardless of whether (if at all) they are experiencing what we would recognise as "pleasure" or "pain", are chaotic beings with chaotic experiences. The vast majority are also primitive – just complex enough to possess qualia. Anything that we would consider to be more or less a simulated human is likely to be torn apart in a fraction of a second by its hostile environment, and (setting aside pleasure/pain) if miraculously he is able to persist he will almost certainly live an aesthetically displeasing life from our perspective.

I conclude that, ceteris paribus, the computer memory should not be randomized.

I agree with those people who have pointed out that of course in reality, the conditions of bounded rationality and the fact that there are tangible expected costs and benefits of randomizing a computer memory (e.g. time wasted, electricity used) render this problem insignificant – although then again the unresolved problem of tiny probabilities of vast utilities is not to be taken lightly. Nonetheless I would point out that this is a thought experiment, intended to illuminate a point of philosophical interest rather than necessarily pose a problem of direct practical importance.

Reminds me of this.

There are also people in every possible state of suffering. So my question is: is it wrong to switch the computer on, setting it executing all those programs simultaneously in different histories? Is it, in fact, the worst crime ever committed? Or is it merely inadvisable, because the combined measure of all the histories containing suffering is very tiny? Or is it innocent and trivial?

I'm not so sure we have the computing power to "simulate a person," but suppose we did. (Perhaps we will soon.) How would you respond to this worry?

Pascal's Mugging rang. It wants tree-fiddy.

1. Assuming we have sufficiently dense register as to provide for a human consciousness within a quantum randomizer's memory bank.

2. Assuming many-worlds.

Every available mental state would occur infinitely many times despite being an infinitessimal likelihood of the device. Those mental states where the suffering is sufficiently great as to cause the sentience to prefer not existing at all is necessarily a minor portion of the total of those who suffer. Those who neither suffer nor prosper likely also prefer existing, in the main. Those who prosper also overwhelmingly (likely) prefer to exist.

Should we allow those entities, hypothetically, to vote on whether they should be brought into existence at all - as a group, it is my belief that they would vote "yes".

Of course, I'm something of a heretic here at LW in that I do not accept postulate #2. (Note: I do not accept the "Copenhagen Interpretation" either.)