Philosophers and seeking answers

Citizens of Mathematics-Land carry the Rapier of Proof at all times, and citizens of Physics-Land carry the Six-Shooter of Experiment, and anyone committing an offense or faux-pas meets swift and merciless punishment from his peers. Philosophy-Land is a weapon-free country, whose citizens can be rude to each other without risk.

In Medicine-Land and Engineering-Land, great material rewards befall those whose ideas are new and true, whereas those who cheat or deceive themselves may cause catastrophes. But in Philosophy-Land, there is no reward for honesty or hard work.

And how can philosophy do something about its level of internal disagreement without having to apply the "kick out everyone who disagrees with Less Wrong" solution?

I wouldn't expect progress in the field as a whole, I'd expect small subfields, departments, individual philosophers to try to solve those problems locally. And I don't know enough about academic philosophy to tell whether that's already the case; Experimental Philosophy may be a step in that direction. Maybe analytical philosophy was. Maybe the institutional incentives are such that any effort in the "right direction" tends to fail.

I am wary of criticizing the discipline of philosophy simply on the grounds that not everyone in it agrees with me.

Wrong meta-level. It's not disagreement with you, it's a long list of specific reasons that move you to a long list of specific conclusions that are different from those of many other philosophers.

Perhaps individual philosophers honestly seek answers, but academic philosophy as an institution has evolved to not really seek answers. That is, mechanisms that promote the spread of true ideas have atrophied or were never built, while mechanisms to promote diversity of positions have proliferated, without anyone consciously wanting these things to happen.

(This is just a guess as I'm not really familiar with the inner workings of academia.)

A link to this Paul Graham essay seems warranted.

It seems to me that one thing that could be done is for people who've "gotten it right" not to leave the discipline. And (then) for folks who do leave to remember that there are plenty of people like them left behind.

Although, at the risk of dissenting somewhat from what seems to be the consensus, I don't actually think that analytic philosophy is in particularly bad shape, certainly not by the standards of academic disciplines in general. We're talking about a field whose giants have included people like Russell, Quine, and (currently) Dennett. (And I mention these folks with particular reference to their views on the relationship of philosophy to science.) Yes, there are also some people who are Wrong, but that's pretty much life in academia (or, if you really want the truth, anywhere else in human society). I think one has to be happy with a field if those in it with good ideas are rewarded (which is not always the case in all subjects, but is something on which philosophy does a decent job, as far as I can tell); expecting those with bad ideas to be punished may be asking too much (even if we assume it is wholly desirable).

I'm not sure what you're worried about. Just as you can't force people to move on from a problem that you think has been solved, so too they can't force you to wait while they work it out.

In the early modern period various thinkers were asking questions that would ultimately lead to the foundations of modern science (I'm thinking of Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, John Locke and others). Philosophers have continued worrying about a lot of these issues (problem of induction, demarcation) while the scientists have moved on and made many fruitful discoveries. You may think that this shows that the philosophers have wasted their time, but so what? It hasn't slowed science down. It has also proved to be important. When new discoveries (particularly in physics) question the underlying assumptions, or where the method seems inadequate for solving the problem, then it turns out to be rather useful that there are some philosophers still thinking about these things.

So, you are free to carry on with your assumptions, and ignore others who think the matter is not solved, but further down the line you might be grateful that others were a bit more hesitant.

It occurred to me recently, while I was reading some article in the SEP, that academic philosophers (of the analytic variety) may be conceiving their project as one of charting the logical space of 'tenable' philosophical positions, rather than trying to eliminate as much of that space as possible. Of course the SEP may tend especially to give that impression, since it is meant to consist of review articles that summarise all the positions and arguments on a given topic which are taken seriously. But philosophers do often say that they are concerned with 'conceptual analysis', and to some extent this is taken to mean that philosophy is supposed to be the practice of analysing the subject matter (and methodology) of other fields, as opposed to having any subject matter of its own. Hence 'philosophy of physics', 'philosophy of ethics', 'philosophy of biology', ... In other words, philosophy is taken to be a mode of investigation rather than a subject.

I think it's worth distinguishing between cases where being correct has pragmatic advantages, and cases where it doesn't.

For example, there are plenty of people who reject the philosophical underpinnings of modern medicine. There always have been. Those people don't go to medical school, don't go to conferences, etc.; eventually a whole discussion emerges to which they are not invited. Believers in medicine don't convince the believers in homeopathy, they ignore them and concentrate on doing medicine.

And because doctors achieve more valuable things more reliably than homeopaths, over time they displace the homeopaths... they create their own community within which a belief in medicine is pervasive. That the homeopaths are not convinced isn't actually important; it just means they aren't part of that community.

Of course, if believing in homeopathy doesn't correlate with skill at carpentry, then the medicine/homeopathy disagreement may continue to exist among carpenters. But so what? Who cares what carpenters think about medicine? Why is resolving that disagreement worth devoting energy to? Better for medicinists to devote their efforts to advancing medicine.

Similarly, there are plenty of people who reject atheism. There always will be. The thing for the atheists to do is work in areas where atheism gives them a pragmatic advantage. Over time they will displace the theists in that area, and the atheism/theism disagreement will disappear in that area. If atheism confers no demonstrable advantage to carpenters, then the disagreement will continue to exist among carpenters. But, again, so what?

By the same token, if a philosophical problem turns out to not have any pragmatic implications -- that is, if there is no area where people with the correct answer can do something valuable that people with the incorrect answer can't do, or can't do as well -- then the disagreement will continue to exist everywhere. But, again, so what?

Nice posting. As a complete outsider/dilettante, I suppose I am allowed to make suggestions ...

How do we tell the difference between a discipline that doesn't really seek answers and a discipline which honestly seeks answers but just can't agree within itself?

First, I would ask whether the discipline has an agreed set of criteria which it uses to distinguish correct proposed answers from incorrect ones. Then, if the answer to that question is "no", I would ask whether the discipline is devoting the bulk of its effort toward coming up with such a set of criteria. If the answer to the second question is "no" as well, then I fear my view on the question of whether philosophy really seeks answers should be obvious.

And how can philosophy do something about its level of internal disagreement without having to apply the "kick out everyone who disagrees with [us]" solution?

Well, one approach suggested by my answer to the first question would be to embark on a crash program to find that set of criteria for correctness (and then kick out everyone who disagrees with the choices).

A better approach might be to abandon the pose that philosophers seek correct answers to precisely formulated questions. Instead take an approach which is both more holistic and more pluralistic (an approach which, incidentally, is actually not too far from what philosophy really does.) Instead of trying to systematically generate true facts about the world, philosophers should instead generate competing coherent systems of assumptions - systems which provide fruitful viewpoints toward the world. "Let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend". That is, it is not the philosopher's role to find truth, it is instead his role to suggest methodology.

As I see it, there can be no universally good set of criteria for correctness of philosophical answers. The reason being that both questions and answers are inevitably theory-laden. So, abandon the conceit that good answers exist to good questions simpliciter. Accept the fact that both questions and answers grow out of theories, and that there is no such thing as a correct theory - only more and less fruitful theories.

It seems systemic of the means of settling arguments.

When is a debate finished? When you have run out of arguments to evaluate (there is no shortage)?

It is, I think, particularly in periods of acknowledged crisis that scientists have turned to philosophical analysis as a device for unlocking the riddles of their field. Scientists have not generally needed or wanted to be philosophers.

• Thomas Kuhn