Why isn't AI containment the primary AI safety strategy?
post by OKlogic · 2025-02-05T03:54:58.171Z · LW · GW · No commentsThis is a question post.
Contents
Introduction Objection 1: A Super intelligent Will Always Escape (and a sufficiently advanced AI might be able to as well) Counterarguments: Objection 2: Containment Reduces AI Usefulness Counterarguments: 1. The AI companies need to be regulated anyways. 2. The Utility of a Contained Oracle AI 3. Strategic Considerations Sub-Objection: If AI Is Heavily Contained, Why Build It? Final Thoughts None Answers 2 avturchin None No comments
Introduction
When discussing AI safety, alignment—ensuring AI systems pursue human-approved goals—is often the primary focus. However, containment, which restricts AI’s ability to exert influence beyond controlled environments, is in my opinion a more intuitive and less complex approach. This post will outline common objections to AI containment, explain why they may be overstated, and invite counterarguments. You can tell me why I am wrong in the comments.
Objection 1: A Super intelligent Will Always Escape (and a sufficiently advanced AI might be able to as well)
For an AI to pose a risk, it must influence the external world. Strict air-gapping and controlled local communication channels (ie, insuring the AI has no access to the internet) can essentially eliminate the risk of AI leaking out directly. However, one of the strongest objections to containment is that no system can permanently constrain a super intelligent AI, as it will eventually exploit loopholes, manipulate humans, or find an escape route.
Counterarguments:
- Mitigating Human Manipulation
AI manipulating humans into circumventing containment is a valid concern, but countermeasures can reduce the risk. For instance:
- Training personnel to recognize and resist AI persuasion tactics.
- Implementing shift-based oversight to prevent prolonged exposure to the AI.
- Restricting AI interactions to personnel without the capability to unbox it.
- Structuring AI outputs to be dry and unpersuasive.
- Limiting the AI from addressing certain sensitive topics.
- Screening out personnel with certain risk factors for manipulation.
- Some of y'all might want to bring up the famous AI box experiment, but I really don't think this is that relevant. With serious preparation, I feel like the AI's task rapidly becomes unfeasible.
- A Response to the Chess Analogy
- Some might argue that attempting to contain a intelligent AI is like playing chess against a vastly superior opponent—defeat is inevitable. However, unlike chess, we control the rules. Following the analogy, its like if I start the game with a king and three rooks, and you start with nothing but a king. Proper containment checkmates the AI before the game begins.
Objection 2: Containment Reduces AI Usefulness
Another objection is that containment limits AI’s potential. If AI is confined, it cannot fully participate in scientific advancements or real-world decision-making. This argument is less relevant from a safety perspective, but AI companies may be less incentivized to pursue control for this reason, and thus make this a worse strategy overall.
Counterarguments:
1. The AI companies need to be regulated anyways.
At some point, we will probably need to regulate AI safety if we take it seriously. Hoping that all these countless AI companies will benevolently adopt effective AI safety standards without government action seems to me to be naive and overly optimistic. We have regulations on nuclear powerplants despite the much smaller risks involved (one region being affected vs the entire human race), and there is just about as much of an incentive not to mess things up. While I understand the desire to not rely on governments, ultimately I feel corners will be cut no matter what approach is forwarded unless the government gets involved.
2. The Utility of a Contained Oracle AI
- Even a misaligned AI limited to text/image output can likely provide valuable insights within a controlled setting, especially Scientific research (e.g., materials science, pharmaceuticals, mathematics).
- As the capabilities of AI increase, this will become more and more significant. Imagine if all drug development was just as easy as prompting ChatGPT and initiating trials.
- While obviously less valuable and less marketable, this form of AI should still generate hundreds of billions, if not trillions of dollars, for its originators.
3. Strategic Considerations
- Even temporary containment can provide a buffer period, allowing AI insights to accelerate alignment research progresses.
Regulations can ensure AI is not applied in high-risk areas where misalignment could be dangerous.
Sub-Objection: If AI Is Heavily Contained, Why Build It?
- A misaligned AI may still find cooperation beneficial in a contained scenario, especially when there is a sufficient examination of AI outputs. If an AI just provides useless and/or dangerous solutions to every problem, it will quickly be redesigned/tweaked.
- This paper[1] I believe supports this conclusion somewhat.
Perfect alignment is an extremely high bar. Properly contained AI, even if only somewhat aligned, should provide revolutionary amounts of utility while minimizing risk.
Final Thoughts
Alignment is a long-term challenge requiring solutions to both outer alignment (defining human-compatible goals) and inner alignment (ensuring AI actually follows them). These problems could take decades to solve under current levels of investment.
Containment, by contrast, provides a clear, actionable goal: physically and informationally isolating AI systems to prevent unintended influence. Unlike alignment, which requires near-perfection for safety, containment is incremental—even partial containment buys time, whereas partial alignment could be catastrophic.
While alignment remains a crucial research goal, prioritizing containment as an immediate safety strategy—alongside alignment and interpretability research—offers a more pragmatic approach (in my opinion). Where am I going wrong?
Writing Assisted by ChatGPT.
- ^
Greenblatt, Ryan, et al. “AI Control: Improving Safety despite Intentional Subversion.” ArXiv.org, 2023, arxiv.org/abs/2312.06942. Accessed 5 Feb. 2025.
Answers
I tried to model a best possible confinement strategy in Multilevel AI Boxing.
I wrote it a few years ago and most ideas will unlikely work for current situation with many instances of chats and open weight models.
However, the idea of landmines - secret stop words or puzzles which stop AI - may still hold. It is like jail breaking in reverse: unaligned AI finds some secret message which stops it. It could be realized on hardware level, or through anomalous tokens or "philosophical landmines'.
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