Schelling Point Strategy Training

Below are sixteen randomly-ordered films. sixes_and_sevens has selected one, and invites you to do the same. The object of the exercise is for all of us to pick the same one

[pollid:557]

I think the intended Schelling point on the list would have been much more reliable if you had emphasized that we were to imagine that the presentation order was different for each of us.

I'm pretty sure that I would have gotten it if that had been stated (of course, someone might not notice).

There is actually an unrelated meta-strategy here, whereby on all disputes one designated partner acquiesces to the wishes of the other. This behaviour is also far from unheard of in romantic partnerships. While this doesn't seem very egalitarian, I am wondering if it actually becomes a reasonable trade-off for partnerships which face coordination problems on a regular basis.

How common Battle of the Sexes situations are in real life? Almost always the partners can talk to each other, making strategies like ‘let's flip a coin’ or ‘I decided the last time, so you decide this time’ viable. (Also, if you face coordination problems that often, you probably aren't the right partner for each other and had better break up.)

What will the most common answer to this question be? [pollid:558]

What will the least common answer to this question be? [pollid:559]

I failed at coordinating with you (and any other who took the poll before me). Sbe zr n zber angheny Fpuryyvat cbvag jura gur dhrfgvba vf juvpu zbivr gb jngpu vf gur bar jvgu gur uvturfg VZQO engvat, engure guna gur svefg va yvfg be va nycunorg, juvpu ner hapbaarpgrq gb vagevafvp dhnyvgvrf bs gur zbivr. Onfrq ba gung V pubfr Gb Xvyy n Zbpxvatoveq.

66&77, I picked your selection for the same reason you did.

V nyfb snvyrq ng cvpxvat gur fnzr bar nf nalobql ryfr. V jnf cvpxvat haqre gur cerivbhf cerzvfr bs "trarevp qngr avtug", naq fb gevrq gb cvpx gur zbfg "qngr avtug-l" zbivr, juvpu frrzrq yvxr Ebzrb naq Whyvrg, juvpu vf na npgvbal ebznapr. (Nygubhtu, crefbanyyl zl zbivr qngr avtugf graqf gbjneq zber fpv-sv, fhcreureb, Wbff Jurqba, rgp, ohg gung'f zber bhgyvre-l guna trarevp, V guvax.)

Ybgf bs crbcyr erfcbaqrq gb yvfg beqrevat, be svyz zrgnqngn. V jnf cerggl qvssrerag va gung V gevrq gb pubbfr Gur Yrff-Jebatvrfg Svyz. Naq snvyrq, gubhtu V jnfa'g nybar.

Harold and Maude. By far, the film worth seeing once, or once more, on the list :)

Being able to reliably select a schelling point surely improves coordination in (large) groups but it doesn't neccessarily maximize utilons. At least the given obvious strategies have the disadvantage of selecting unique solutions but arguably ones that may yield less overall satisfaction.

On the movie example the best strategy may significantly depend on the number of participants (and options). Being alone in the movie is dissattisfactory for most but less likely if you are a large group in which case it'd be likely to meet somebody in any movie. In that case the best strategy is obviously to choose the movie you like most.

For a medium size group a strategy that is least likely to dissatisfy anyone may be a good strategy. I chose E.T. on the movie question for that reason which seems to be not that bad a real life choice (I didn't assume a romantic but a general setting due to the fact the the whole audience was invited).

[A] meta-strategy [], whereby on all disputes one designated partner acquiesces to the wishes of the other.

I always assumed that the partner doing the decision would choose the option preferred by the other who already has the burden of being late. This of course assumes that love is true and mutual thus both may assume good faith on the other. This may in itself by romantic and unrealistic though.

Vagrerfgvat. V jnf guvaxvat va grezf bs fhowrpg znggre bs gur zbivr. V gevrq gb rfgvzngr obgu jung traer bs zbivr gur nirentr YrffJebat crefba jbhyq yvxr gb jngpu, naq, bar fgrc erzbirq, gb rfgvzngr jung traer bs zbir gur nirentr YrffJebat crefba jbhyq cerqvpg gung gur nirentr YrffJebat crefba jbhyq yvxr gb jngpu. V qrpvqrq gung fpvrapr svpgvba jnf gur zbfg yvxryl traer, naq bhg bs gur guerr fpvrapr svpgvba zbirf, V cvpxrq Gur Qnl gur Rnegu Fgbbq Fgvyy.

Ybbxf yvxr bayl gjb bgure crbcyr pnzr gb gur fnzr pbapyhfvba. Bu jryy.

Please link the poll-comments in your post so that they will be seen before other comments (and so that their visibility doesn't depend on their score).

There is actually an unrelated meta-strategy here, whereby on all disputes one designated partner acquiesces to the wishes of the other. This behaviour is also far from unheard of in romantic partnerships. While this doesn't seem very egalitarian, I am wondering if it actually becomes a reasonable trade-off for partnerships which face coordination problems on a regular basis.

"Partner A gives on on odd days, and Partner B gives in on even days" seems pretty reasonable. I suspect the more common version, though, is something like "Partner A yields on what music to listen to, Partner B yields on what to eat for dinner" and so on through a lot of fairly specific categories. Which might or might not slowly build resentment on some of these categories but still seems better than one partner always losing.

I think the strategy is generally going to be choose n "yrnfg" ryrzrag onfrq ba gur zbfg boivbhf beqrevat. Jung'f na boivbhf beqrevat?

• Beqre cerfragrq
• Yrkvpbtencuvpny bs Ratyvfu gvgyr
• Nycunorgvpny va Ratyvfu gvgyr ("Oynphyn" nurnq bs "N Avtug gb Erzrzore")
• Nycunorgvpny / yrkvpbtencuvpny beqre bs gvgyr va angvir ynathntr
• Lrne eryrnfrq
• ZCNN svyz ahzore
• VZQO ahzore
• Ohqtrg (erirefrq)
• Erirahr (erirefrq)
• Ynfg anzr bs qverpgbe
• Uhaqerqf bs bguref

Fvapr gur pubvprf jrer cerfragrq va n fgngvp yvfg, V jrag jvgu gur beqre bs gung yvfg.