Qualitative differences

post by RST · 2017-11-18T09:02:08.102Z · LW · GW · 38 comments

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Probably I am making a huge mistake resuming a ten years old discussion, especially because this is my first post. Anyway, let’s make this experiment.

One common argument for choosing “dust specks” over “torture” is that the experience of torture is qualitatively different form the experience of receiving a dust speck in the eye and so the two should not be compared (assuming that there won’t be other long term negative consequences such as car accidents and surgical mistakes).

A moderate pain doesn’t cause the same reactions in the human organism that happen during an extreme and prolonged distress such as: panic attacks, alterations of physiological functions and psychological trauma with all the capacity impairment that derive from it.

But the most obvious characteristic that distinguishes the pain caused by a torture from the pain caused by a dust speck in the eye is the intolerability: people would rather die than feel 50 years of torture. Some argue that these qualitative differences don’t exist because we can create a sequence of injures each comparable to the previous and the next.

For example:

30 dust specks divided among 30 people≃1 slap.

10 slaps divided among 10 people≃1 punch.

10 punches divided among 10 people≃1 small cut.

10 small cuts divided among 10 people≃1 deep cut.

10 deep cuts divided among 10 people≃1 tonsillectomy without anesthesia.

10 tonsillectomies without anesthesia divided among 10 people≃1 torture.

So it seems that we can’t clearly distinguish what is tolerable from what is intolerable, unless we choose on the spectrum of the grades of pains an arbitrary limit, or rather a distance, that separate two incomparable kinds of injuries. Many have rejected this idea because the line would be subjective and because the difference between things near the limit is small.

However these limits have an important function in our decision making process: in some situations there could be a range of options which are similar among each other, but at same time have differences which accumulate step by step, until they become too relevant to be ignored.

Consider this mind experiment: a man has bought a huge house with many rooms, is favorite color is orange and he wants to paint all the rooms with it. Omega offers its help and gives five options, it will paint:

A) One room with R=255 G=150 B=0 paint

B) Two rooms with R=255 G=120 B=0 paint

C) Four rooms with R=255 G=90 B=0 paint

D) Eight rooms with R=255 G=60 B=0 paint

E) Sixteen rooms with R=255 G=30 B=0 paint.

What will the man prefer? Probably not the first option, but also not the last. He will find a balance between his desire to have orange rooms and his laziness. But what would the man choose if the only possible options were A) and E)?

Probably the first one: although red and orange are part of a continuous spectrum and he doesn’t know exactly where their separation line is, he can still distingue the two color, and no amount of red is comparable to his favorite color.

Also the lifespan dilemma shows that for many people the answer can’t be just a matter of expected value, otherwise everyone would agree on reducing the probability of success to values near to 0. When making a choice for the dilemma, people consider two emotions: the desire to live longer and the fear to die, the answer is found when people think that they have reached the line which separates an acceptable risk from an excessive one.

This line is quite arbitrary and subjective, like the separation line between red and orange. Nevertheless, most people can see that the colors of ripe strawberries and ripe oranges are different, that a minimum amount of safety is required and that annoyance and agony are different things, even if there are intermediate situations between them.

One last example: the atmosphere is divided in many layers but the limits of each layer are nebulous because their characteristics get more similar near their edges; moreover the last layer is made of very low density gas whose particles constantly escape into space. Nevertheless if we choose two points in the atmosphere we can see that their characteristics became more different as we increase the difference of their altitude, until we can affirm that they are in two different layer.

This distance is difficult to define and people will disagree on its precise length, however we cannot ignore the difference between things that are very distant from each other, as we cannot ignore that atmosphere is still present at 1km of altitude while it is not present at 100,000km of altitude, despite the fact that its outer limit is very ill defined.

Similarly we can use the knowledge of human physiology during the events of life to choose a distance that separate two incomparable kinds of experiences, and so give the priority to the actions that can really change people life quality. For instance I think it is preferable to give 1,000,000$ to a poor family rather than 3^^^3$ to 3^^^3 middle class families, because each single dollar in the latter case would cause an irrelevant change compared to the former case. In other words only the money in the first case will extinguish hunger.

Personally my empathy usually makes me prefer utilitarian, or rather quantitative choices, when the qualities of experiences are similar, but it also compels me to save one person from something intolerable, rather than 3^^^3 people from something tolerable. This is not scope insensitivity, but rather coherence: I could stand 3^^^3 annoyed but bearable lives, but not 3^^^3-1 not annoyed lives plus one unbearable life, which is quite tautological when you consider the definition of “unbearable”.

I don’t know exactly where my cut-off is, and I won’t be outraged if someone else’s cut-off is higher or lower, but I would be rather skeptical if someone claimed that he can’t bear a dust specks (or rather 3^^^3 dust speck diluted among 3^^^3 lives).

In addition, if we consider our utility to be something more than raw pleasure, then our disutility should be more than raw pain. Surely pleasure is valuable, but many people want something more from life, and for them no amount of pleasure can substitute the value of discovery, accomplishment, relationships, experiences, creativity, etc. All this things are valuable but only together they make something qualitatively more important, which is often called human flourishing or Eudaimonia.

Similarly only if pain is combined with frustration, fear, desperation, panic, etc. it becomes something qualitatively worst such as agony. Eudaimonia can resist a dust speck, or even a stubbed toe, especially since we have the ability to heal, find relief, and even become stronger after a tolerable stress, but it can’t resist 50 years of torture.

The distinction between pain and agony is the same between colours or between pain and pleasure: in each case neurons fires but in different ways, and pain is not the mere inhibition of pleasure centre, after all one can be happy also when feeling a moderate pain.

Utilitarianism has two orthogonal goals: minimize pain and maximize pleasure. People that choose dust specks could simply have another one: minimize agony. If physiological reactions can be used to distinguish pain from pleasure, then why shouldn’t we consider other characteristics and be more precise when considering people values?

Recognizing the importance of qualitative differences and physiological limits surely makes the utility calculus more complicate. However there are also advantages: the result would be a system more compatible with people intuitions, more egalitarian, and more safe from utility monsters.

One final thought: I don’t delude myself that I will change someone opinion on the problem. After all, people who choose torture consider humans intuitions wrong since they go against utilitarianism.

One the other hand people who choose dust specks consider utilitarianism (or at least some forms of utilitarianism) wrong because it goes against moral intuitions, and because we think that to simplify human morality is dangerous.

People in the first case care about maximizing pleasure, and minimizing pain.

We “dust specks chooser” have another aim. This aim is probably to create an ethical system that that establishes a safety net to protect people from unbearable and situations and from injuries that really destroy the capability to pursue a decent, serene, worthy life, which probably is the foremost goal of most people.

For utilitarianism is morally right to torture billions of people for 50 years if this will give someone 3^^^^^^3 years of happiness. There is no reason why we should endorse something so repugnant for the sake of simplicity: utilitarianism is an oversimplification, it deliberately ignores equality and justice which are part of people morality as much as compassion.

I don’t deny that utilitarianism usually works, however to shut up and multiply is an act of blind faith: it makes people stick to the unjust parts of system rather than reform it, and I can’t deny that I am rather worried, but also curios about the origins of this zeal.

I would really like to be able to discuss with some torture chooser. I am sure that it could be an interesting mutual occasion to learn more about minds that are very different from our own.

P.S. I am not from an English speaking country. The assertive manner in which I wrote this post was merely a way to expose my ideas more simply, any advice about style or grammar is appreciated.

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