Posts

A limit to punishment 2017-11-30T17:08:10.633Z
Some mind experiments 2017-11-25T12:46:47.713Z
Qualitative differences 2017-11-18T09:02:08.102Z

Comments

Comment by RST on Pascal's Mugging: Tiny Probabilities of Vast Utilities · 2018-01-12T12:56:32.051Z · LW · GW

It is threatening people just to test you. We can assume that Its behavior is completely different from ours. So Tom's argument still works.

Comment by RST on A Simple Two-Axis Model of Subjective States, with Possible Applications to Utilitarian Problems · 2018-01-05T09:11:55.373Z · LW · GW

The fact that he is not willing to kill his grandmother to save the chickens doesn't imply that chickens have 0 value or that his grandmother has infinite value.

Consider the problem from an egocentric point of view: to be responsible for one's grandmother's death feels awful, but also dedicating your life to a very unlikely possibility to save someone who has been declared dead, seems awful.

Comment by RST on A Simple Two-Axis Model of Subjective States, with Possible Applications to Utilitarian Problems · 2018-01-05T08:58:15.632Z · LW · GW

I think that he set the mind experiment in the Least convenient possible world. So your last hypothesis is right.

Comment by RST on Circular Altruism · 2017-12-24T22:15:45.667Z · LW · GW

To be more precise: let's assume that the time will be quite short (5 second for example), in this case I think it is really better to let billions of people suffer 5 second of bearable pain than to let one person suffer 5 second of unbearable pain. After all, people can stand a bearable pain by definition.

However, pain tolerance is subjective and in real life we don't know exactly where the threshold is in every person, so we can prefer, as heuristic rule, the option with less people involved when the pains are similar to each other (maybe we have evolved some system to make such approximations, a sort of threshold insensitivity).

Comment by RST on Torture vs. Dust Specks · 2017-12-22T09:09:10.293Z · LW · GW

I think it's worst for 3^999999999 people to feel two dust specks than for 3^1000000000 people to feel one dust speck. After all the next step is that it is worst for 3^1000000000 people to feel one dust speck than for 3^1000000001 people to feel less than one dust speck, which seem right.

Comment by RST on Torture vs. Dust Specks · 2017-12-19T13:15:45.539Z · LW · GW

I think that we “speckists” see injuries as poisons: they can destroy people lives only if they reach a certain concentration. So a greater but far more diluted pain can be less dangerous than a smaller but more concentrated one. 50 and 49 years of torture are still far over the threshold. One or two dust specks, on the other hand, are far below.

Comment by RST on Circular Altruism · 2017-12-15T21:34:59.441Z · LW · GW

But consider this: the last exemplars of each species of hominids could reproduce with the firs exemplars of the following.

However, we probably wouldn’t be able to reproduce with Homo habilis.

This shows that small differences sum as the distance between the examined subjects increases, until we can clearly see that the two subjects are not part of the same category anymore.

The pains that are similar in intensity are still comparable. But there is too much difference between dust specks in the eye/stubbed toe and torture to consider them as part of the same category

Comment by RST on Circular Altruism · 2017-12-15T06:39:03.092Z · LW · GW

Suppose that the qualitative difference is between bearable and unbearable, in other words things that are over o below the pain tolerance. A pain just below pain tolerance when experienced for a small quantity of time will remain bearable; however, if it is prolonged for lots of time it will become unbearable because human patience is limited. So, even if we give importance to qualitative differences, we can still choose to avoid torture and your second scenario, without going against our intuitions, or be incoherent.

Moreover, we can describe qualitative differences as the colors on the spectrum of visible light: their edges are nebulous but we can still agree that the grass is green and the sea is blue. This means that two very close points on the spectrum appear as part of the same color, but when their distance increases they became part of two different colors.

1,525,122 and 1,525,123 are so close that we can see them as shades of the same qualitative category. On the other hand, dust speck and torture are very distant from each other and we can consider them as part of two different qualitative categories.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-12-14T21:22:35.145Z · LW · GW

Thanks for the informations.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-12-14T13:46:05.592Z · LW · GW

I am rather new here and I would like to ask: what are the criterions that a post must respect to be put in the front page? How can I improve to reach such criterions?

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-12-04T19:47:51.101Z · LW · GW

Thanks for the article.

To better express my argument I could use this analogy.

Pain can be seen as a poison: people would prefer to avoid it altogether. However it is really dangerous only when it reaches a certain concentration and causes long term damages that really impairs people ability to experience a worthy, or at least bearable, life (which is probably the first goal of most people).

I too have reached the conclusion that people goals are too numerous, mutable, and nebulous to be expressed by a function; and even if I am wrong, probably the resulting function will be too complex to be applied by humans, at least in their everyday choices.

On the other hand, utility functions surely are useful to maximize our resources and efficiency. So they can be used as tools to reach our goals.

Comment by RST on A limit to punishment · 2017-12-02T13:15:55.409Z · LW · GW

Good points, I should have been more explicit.

It is true that no one will ever discover what has happened, but “good willed” people can make a social contract to ensure mutual protection.

Maybe it is just the opposite of Roko’s basilisk: rather than threatens people, the social contract protects them, and enhances solidariety.

Of coure the contract could work as motivator only if people trust each other: spontaneously choosing B) people signal that their “moral compass” recognize merit as a value in itself, and that they will punish or reward people because they want to do so.

Comment by RST on A limit to punishment · 2017-12-01T17:17:16.706Z · LW · GW

It depends if someone can trust our promises.

You answered A so I can think that you care equally about people, and you don’t see merit’s reward as an intrinsic good.

In this case I will be less motivated to collaborate with you.

I answered B (at least in the first case), so people can think that I care more about those who do good actions, and that I see merit’s reward as an intrinsic good.

Comment by RST on Some mind experiments · 2017-12-01T10:54:35.177Z · LW · GW

Thanks for the answers.

Yes, a possible application of B.4 is dust specks.

You answered A, to question B.1, why?

Comment by RST on A limit to punishment · 2017-12-01T10:03:33.553Z · LW · GW

Anyway, thanks.

I edited the post as you advised to be more comprehensible.

Comment by RST on A limit to punishment · 2017-12-01T09:52:49.851Z · LW · GW

Sorry, my fault.

The point is that the probability to really found yourself in such situation is very remote.

On the other hand, I think that many people dislike the lack of recognition of merit (me included), and a society that doesn't motivate others to behave right, will be more instable and will cause more pain in the long run.

Comment by RST on A limit to punishment · 2017-12-01T09:41:09.494Z · LW · GW

Choosing A here, in this moment, you signal that you care about merit, or rather you signal that you have certain emotions in response of certain behavior and that these emotions guide your actions. Which can motivate other to behave in a certain way.

Comment by RST on The Impossibility of the Intelligence Explosion · 2017-11-30T22:29:41.319Z · LW · GW

I am curious, what are the arguments that you find wrong? And what are your counterargument?

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-27T18:07:28.991Z · LW · GW

Then I agree with you, certain phenomena present characteristics that emerge only from the interactions of their parts.

I tried to express a similar concept when I wrote: "All this things are valuable but only together they make something qualitatively more important, which is often called human flourishing or Eudaimonia.

Similarly only if pain is combined with frustration, fear, desperation, panic, etc. it becomes something qualitatively worst such as agony."

I would like to ask you a question (because I became curious about people's opinion on the subject after I read these posts): do you think that humans are, or at least should be utility maximizer when pursuing their goals? (I think that we should be utility maximizer when pursuing the resources to reach our goals, but I wonder if people decision process is too incoherent to be expressed as a function)

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-24T14:13:54.751Z · LW · GW

Thanks for the encouragement.

I cannot agree with 2) because I think that a dust speck, or a stubbed toe have a disutility which is not ignorable. After all I still would prefer to avoid them.

The solution number 1) is more interesting, but I prefer to say that dust specks are irrelevant compared to torture because they are a different kind of pain (bearable rather than unbearable). The biggest advantage is that rather than use a different formula I just include a physiological limit (pain tolerance).

The bigger problem is: where does this limit exactly lays?

The post's aim is to bring some examples of limits which are nebulous but still evident.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-19T18:03:47.801Z · LW · GW

But then there would still be a very high value that could make you change idea.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-19T18:03:37.633Z · LW · GW

The limit of the logarithm of x when x approaches infinity is infinity, so: if someone wants to live forever, and doesn't care about a minimum amount of safety, he should accept the deal.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-19T08:21:56.892Z · LW · GW

I think that I found a better way to express myself.

Level 1: torture, agony. Depending on the type of torture, I could stand this level only for some second/minutes/hours.

Level 2: pain, depression, very low life quality. I could stand this level for some days/months/years.

Level 3: annoyance. I can stand this level. (especially if the annoyance is not constant.)

Level 4: Eudaimonia. I want to be in this level.

I think that to ignore human pain tolerance only to simplify our ethical system is wrong, for instance this means that I won’t tolerate years of torture to avoid annoyances, only to avoid greater/longer torture. So I think that I have different utility functions that I apply in a hierarchical order.

Then I use empathy and I don’t do to others what I won’t do to myself. Surely if someone has a different pain tolerance I will consider it. However I don’t think that someone would tolerate 50 years of torture.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-19T08:01:06.694Z · LW · GW

https://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Lifespan_dilemma

As is written in the page: Rejecting the Lifespan Dilemma seems to require either rejecting expected utility maximization, or using a bounded utility function.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T19:26:41.678Z · LW · GW

Then we agree. I too have limits that are defined by my physiology. This is why I think that I couldn't stand 50 years of torture but I could stand 3^^^3 dust speck diluted among 3^^^3 lives.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T18:20:21.063Z · LW · GW

I only want to add that switching from one level to another has the highest value. So saving people who are fine is still important, because dying would make them fall from a level X to 0.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T18:08:08.434Z · LW · GW

As I tried to express in my post, I think that here are different "levels of life quality". For me, people in the lower levels, have the priority. I adopt utilitarianism only when I have to choose what is better in the same level.

The post's purpose wasn't to convince someone that my values are right. I only want to show throught some examples that, even though some limits are nebulous, we can agree that things that are very distant from the edge can be associated to two different layer.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T17:38:19.152Z · LW · GW

If I have understood correctly, your utility function is asymptotic. I wonder if an asymptote in an utility function can be consider as a sort of arbitrary limit.

Anyway, I agree with you, an asymptotic utility function can work and maintain consistency.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T17:11:41.685Z · LW · GW

Good points I admit to have not considered. I live in a country where health care and instruction can be afforded by middle class families and as I have already written I assumed that their economical situation was stable. If we consider this factors then my answer will change.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T16:43:00.066Z · LW · GW

This is my reasoning: if we assume that the middle class families have a stable economic situation, and if we assume that they have enough money to obtain food, heath care, a good home, instruction for their children etc. while the poor family's members don't have this comforts and are suffering hunger and diseases for that, then the poor family has the priority in my system of values: I could easily stand the lack of a villa with swimming pool for 10,000 lives if this would make me avoid a miserable life. (I think that we can simplify my ethic as a Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.) Of course if the middle class families would donate lots of money to poor families, my answer would change.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T16:03:18.606Z · LW · GW

Ok let's try. From the most desirable to the least desirable: 4,3,2,1,8,6,7.

Both 4 and 3 will help 100 poor families so have the priority. 2 and 1 will help one poor family so have the priority compared to the last three options. 8 and 6 will help more people compared to 7. The rest is only a quantity difference.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T15:44:50.246Z · LW · GW

I think that I am consistent: as you said I disagree with the above, however my disagreement in this case is slightly minor (compared to the 3^^^3$ to 3^^^3 middle class families option) because the level of life quality improvement is starting to become more relevant. Nevertheless the desire to help people that are suffering for economical reason will remain greater than the desire to add happiness in the life of people who are already serene.

Thank you, for the opportunity of reflection.

Comment by RST on Qualitative differences · 2017-11-18T15:19:16.489Z · LW · GW

Thank you very much!