Three Dialogues on Identity

Spelling error?

Late one night, the shaman calls you to his test.

Do you mean "tent"?

oopsie fixed

Good stuff, this.

How about some dialogues between the first non-brain-based conscious mind and a soulist epiphenomenalist, just to really drive that stake home?

"I understand that you can think and feel, but do you have a soul in there?" "...f* knows mate. Do you?" "Yes, I do." "How do you know?" "Because there's a tiny part of my mind that doesn't interact with the phenomenal universe in any way, that listens to all my thoughts, and that's my soul." "...what the hell are you talking about, meatbag?"

"It is a teaching of my people," you say, "that what you call a 'soul' is... a confused idea." Since our current model of the universe doesn't explain it, obviously it doesn't exist; let's all laugh at those backwards idiots who question the eternal, unchanging and complete truth of Physics As It's Known As Of AD 2008.

Hey, this should make Eliezer's job much easier: The Standard Model doesn't mention good or bad either, so these are really just more confused ideas. All this worrying about FAI vs. UFAI is for nothing, because physics proves that a universe where everything is made of paperclips cannot be any "worse" than any other.

Goplat, I think that when we Occam's Razor something away, it's not so much that we're saying it obviously cannot exist, so much as that we don't have any particular reason to pay attention to this particular possibility. Sure, maybe there could be souls, but with a large answer space and so much evidence for materialism, it would be playing favorites to put a lot of probability mass on the soul hypothesis.

Also, even if there are no moral facts, don't you think the fact that no existing person would prefer a universe filled with paperclips is a sufficient condition for us to call such an outcome bad?---as a matter of common will, if not metaphysics proper.

Eliezer, that was just beautiful.

"Rest assured that you are not holding the mere appearance of a banana. There really is a banana there, not just a collection of atoms."

Similarly to "Zombies: The Movie", this was very entertaining, but I don't think I've learned anything new from it.

Z. M. Davis wrote:

Also, even if there are no moral facts, don't you think the fact that no existing person would prefer a universe filled with paperclips ...

For example, note that the set of people alive includes a significant number of people who are certifiably insane, and in all probability others who, while reasonably sane, have gotten very fed up with various forms of torture inflicted on them over the last few days and might be willing to neglect collateral damage if they could make it stop.

If such a survey were performed, and the results were actually what you claim, I would assign a higher probability to the possibility of a nefarious anti-paperclip conspiracy having infiltrated the survey effort than to the possibility of the results being correct.

Unanimous agreement of our entire species is also a much stronger claim than you need to make for your argument.

I think the anti-natalists prefer a universe full of paperclips. Let's hope they don't invent the first super intelligent AI.

Since our current model of the universe doesn't explain it, obviously it doesn't exist

Explain what, exactly? What observed phenomena are you saying our model doesn't explain? It is precisely because we have no need to generate an explanation that we say it doesn't exist.

let's all laugh at those backwards idiots who question the eternal, unchanging and complete truth of Physics As It's Known As Of AD 2008

You would be better off questioning the belief system that asserts that 'souls' must exist, rather than the physics that does not require such a hypothesis.

Sebastian, you're right. I shouldn't have exaggerated.

...

I'm actually wondering right now if it's right to say that one's "eyes, retina, and optic nerve are constantly painting images in [one's] visual cortex." I'm thinking specifically of, e.g., Dennett's discussion of "'Filling in' Versus Finding Out" in Consciousness Explained, but I'm having trouble right now finding a juicy bit to quote. The basic idea is that it's problematic to think of vision as being like a camera that projects content onto a screen in the brain, because that just prompts the question of how that internal projection is seen--and we have a regress.

The basic idea is that it's problematic to think of vision as being like a camera that projects content onto a screen in the brain, because that just prompts the question of how that internal projection is seen--and we have a regress.

Not really - it could form a straightforward pixelated representation in the cortex (an image, in my book) that's only then processed - but it's false anyway (e.g., the retina does edge detection).

However, an image certainly does form on the retina just as much as it does in a camera.

I think the anti-natalists prefer a universe full of paperclips.

Actually, anti-natalists seem to have a thing for coathangers rather than paperclips. (Sorry, too tempting :-P )

Z._M._Davis: I'm thinking specifically of, e.g., Dennett's discussion of "'Filling in' Versus Finding Out" in Consciousness Explained, but I'm having trouble right now finding a juicy bit to quote. The basic idea is that it's problematic to think of vision as being like a camera that projects content onto a screen in the brain, because that just prompts the question of how that internal projection is seen--and we have a regress.

I was just reading the Wikipedia articles about that stuff. Some good summaries are in the Multiple Drafts Model article, and the "image-in-brain" model that Dennett criticizes is what he calls Cartesian theater.

Suggested reading: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_cortex#Function "Conceptually, this retinotopy mapping is a transformation of the visual image from retina to V1. The correspondence between a given location in V1 and in the subjective visual field is very precise: even the blind spots are mapped into V1."

We can easily reject the Cartesian theater notions, but there are still "paintings" of images in our brains.

Beautiful, Eliezer.

Here is my attempt to summarize: everyone must remain open to the possibility that reality is structured differently than he believes.

A corollary is that everyone with a plan to affect reality must remain open to the possibility that his work on that plan was a waste of his time even if he devoted his life to that work.

Actually, anti-natalists seem to have a thing for coathangers rather than paperclips David Benatar thinks that abortion is harmful after about the midway point of pregnancy. Chip Smith says he finds "nothing morally or intuitively objectionable about abortion as such" but "it should nonetheless be legally proscribed".

It seems to me that there is an important distinction between these scenarios. Of course, it could be that I'm just not enlightened enough to see the total similarity.

In the first scenario, 'you' are at least attempting to explain yourself to the shaman. In fact, you have answered, both literally with "yes" and to the shaman's intent by explaining. That he does not believe your explanation is a separate matter.

In the second scenario, I imagine your literal answer to John would be "no"---because there is no such thing as "same stuff" anyway. Why, then, didn't you at any point tell him "no" or "there is no such thing as 'same stuff' anyway"? If John refused to believe your explanation, this would of course be similar to the first case.

In the third scenario, 'Eliezer' has refined his question to this point: "I want to know if the lower levels of organization underlying the banana have a substantially different structure than before, and whether the causal relation between that structure and my subjective experience has changed in style." What in the world is ill-defined in this question? What word do we have to taboo? (Perhaps 'structure', perhaps 'subjective experience'?) It seems deserving of a straight answer to me.

(One possibility is that you are suggesting future advances in understanding, so that you really don't know what could be ill-defined about such a question---you are just saying in general that seemingly commonsense ideas may not be as solid as they appear. In that case, it's hard to object, but it would be nice if I could imagine knowledge that would make me believe 'Eliezer' and John weren't asking real questions.)

You buy into the Hu'wha's belief system when you respond to "The Hu'wha set great store on the literal truth of words, as well as their intent. " as different from their belief in souls. Words have no literal truth independent of webs of beliefs. The true answer to a question is what you have most reason to believe will leave the questioner best informed. In this case, the true answer is "no".

BTW, it's definitely not just hunter gatherers who can not know what it would mean for a fundamental assumption to be mistaken. An example from myself recently relates to Turing Machines. That some algorithms are simpler than others is a very fundamental assumption to me. I know that we don't know how to rank the complexities of Turing Machines, and that for any complex program there is a Turing Machine that outputs the output of that complex program in response to a single bit, but I don't know what it means for the assumption that some things are simpler than others to be mistaken so I suspect, possibly in the absence of adequate evidence, that there is some relevant sense in which the complexity of the program has simply been shifted into the Turing Machine, which is thus more complex than some other Turing Machine.

unknown: Huh? I thought you were an anti-natalist, at least for insects.

The true answer to a question is what you have most reason to believe will leave the questioner best informed. In this case, the true answer is "no".

Is it really? Methinks the Hu'wha would consider a projection on a retina part of the extension of "image", even though by their intension it's not an "image" (there being no such thing). More generally, this statement sounds possibly paternalistic, although I can't think of where it badly breaks down (it's odd to call "that's a Wrong Question, this other one is more meaningful" a "true answer", but it's not like there's a more "true" one).

I don't remember saying I was against insects. If I did, I retract it.

Another interesting point about this post is that Eliezer reveals when he thinks cryonics will work. I would be willing to wager 100 credibility points that no one cryonically suspended before the year 2010 will be revived before the year 2050, whether directly, by uploading, or in any other way.

Another interesting point about this post is that Eliezer reveals when he thinks cryonics will work.

For the love of God, Montressor! Did I also reveal that the Bayesian Conspiracy will take over the world, and that bananas will be replaced with real bananas? Dialogues are written as fiction, and like all fiction, they don't get to use probability distributions.

Words have no literal truth independent of webs of beliefs. The true answer to a question is what you have most reason to believe will leave the questioner best informed.

No, words have meanings assigned to them, and those meanings have objective properties that require the words to be used in certain ways. The true answer to a question is one that accurately represents the data being requested.

In this case, the true answer is that human eyes function the same way that camera lenses do, and that you make an image of a thing every time you look at it.

"human eyes function the same way that camera lenses do, and that you make an image of a thing every time you look at it."

Cameras make a visible image of something. Eyes don't.

No, words have meanings assigned to them

Different people assign different meanings, and if you knowingly state something true under your definitions but false under those of the person you say it to, you're being dishonest.

"if you knowingly state something true under your definitions but false under those of the person you say it to, you're being dishonest." And that's just what you do when you call looking making an image.

Exactly, Vassar. And if you say that you're not making an image, that's also dishonest. It's like telling a cryonics patient that he's made out of the same atoms, or alternatively, telling him that he's not made out of the same atoms, or alternatively, remaining silent and letting him draw his own conclusions. No matter what you do, you can't convey the truth.

This is part of the hell of being a rationalist.

And if you say that you're not making an image, that's also dishonest.

This was my point about the extension vs. intension; the poor Hu'wha is inconsistent in a way that makes a straightforward and honest answer impossible.

Oh, and Michael, you may be confusing Unknown and Utilitarian.

If you showed this man a camera obscura, would he call that "making an image"? I suspect he would. It works on the same principles as an eye. If you performed the classic demonstration with a sheep's eye, and he saw the image made on the retina, it might easily fall into his category.

Really, you just have to acknowledge that you're dealing with a lesser mind and try as best you can to explain the reality of the situation.

(For extra credit, show him satellite photos of the location where you and he are and explain that people have been taking pictures of the villagers for years. Clearly, they've been p-zombies all this time.)

(Well, no. They probably aren't sophisticated enough to fall into the trap of believing in p-zombies. They might just conclude they don't have souls.)

One thing I'm looking forward to is the first lawsuit by a cryonics patient alleging that they no longer have a subjective conscious experience, despite being able to pass a turing test. Sort of in the tradition of recent wrongful birth lawsuits. They could submit evidence that their brain scans correspond to someone who is sleep-talking rather than someone who is conscious-awake or conscious-dreaming-a-dream-that-they'll-remember, that sort of thing.

The second story could never happen, because a real cryonic revival counselor would be trained to handle that question.

"That's nonsense," says the shaman. "You're right there! I'm seeing you, not an image of you! Now I ask you again, on your honor: Do we Hu'wha still have our souls since you came among us, or not?"

"Have you never seen yourself or someone else reflected into a poll of water or something? We've found out that something similar happens in your eyes."

John starts to look worried. "I was hoping for a simple 'Yes', there. Am I made of the same atoms as before, or not?"

"Well, according to quantum mechanics, all atoms of the same type are “the same” anyway, and even if that weren't the case, your body wasn't the same atoms when you were 18 as when you were 17, as you ate/drunk/inhaled lots of atoms and pissed/shitten/exhaled/puked lots of other atoms." "Whatever. Is my body still made of cells with my DNA? Is my brain still made of neurons?"

It is widely said that some primitive tribe or other once feared that photographs could steal their souls.

My dad is a photographer, but he has a strange avertion to being photographed, and use to describe how when he was little he thought that a camera must somehow capture some small part of him to stick in the photo, and he didnt like the thought of that, and that feeling never really left...

Well then. Rest assured that you are not holding the mere appearance of a banana. There really is a banana there, not just a collection of atoms.

...this would lead me to ask whether the collection of atoms had, in fact, been the simulation. Not immediately, but once I'd had time to think about it.

I do like the complete subversion of expectation in that sentance, though.

John Smith understands more cognitive science than the average American but apparently forgot the word "computer."