Does consciousness persist?

Useful heuristic: if a lot of smart people find something to be a hard problem, and you don't think it is a hard problem, you should assign most of the probability mass to you missing something.

Sorry to break it to ya, but you not only failed to dissolve the question, you failed to even formulate it. Consider reading the appropriate sequence and the many posts here discussing the issue to educate yourself on the basics.

To start, the sentence

If one's consciousness suddenly became a totally different one, we know of no quantum particles that would change.

is either false or meaningless, depending on your definitions and assumptions.

First you have to spend at least a few sentences on how you define "consciousness", otherwise you might risk this discussion to shift to the realm of semantics, like on the classic paradox of the sound of a fallen tree in a deserted forest.

It would be helpful to start this sort of discussion with a working definition of consciousness, as the term has various meanings in various contexts and still carries metaphysical connotations.

If one's consciousness suddenly became a totally different one, we know of no quantum particles that would change.

If we take the viewpoint that consciousness is a function of the brain's internal state, then swapping one consciousness with another should correspond to the appropriate change inside the brain.

Furthermore, swapping consciousnesses would make no changes to what is perceived. E.g. if one agent perceives p and time t and p' at the next time t+1, and another agent perceives q at time t and q' at time t+1, then if their consciousnesses are "swapped," the percepts would still be identical: p and q will be perceived at time t, and p' and q' will be perceived at t+1.

Observing an external event creates a change in the brain state that depends both on the actual event and on the current brain state. Thus, two people can observe the same event and come away with completely different perceptions (politics provides an illustrative example). If a change in consciousness implies a change in brain state, then we would not expect the brain state after the observation to be the same in both cases.

If we define consciousness as just "awareness" in general, which is admittedly a vague definition, then consciousness persists as long as we are awake. If your definition includes thought processes as distinct elements of consciousness, then the states do correspond to physical states; they are the physical state of the brain. With a better definition of consciousness we could more easily dissolve the question, but until you do that we don't know what question we're trying to dissolve.

If one's consciousness suddenly became a totally different one, we know of know quantum particles that would change.

Changing someone's personality would cause many changes to the brain, since the functioning of the brain is responsible for it. If by this you mean their "identity" changes rather than any actual measurable physical or mental characteristics, then what do you mean by identity? Does it correspond to anything in reality?

This reminds me of the "why am I me and not somebody else" question, the answer to which is that "you" are the result of a mind growing up in that particular body/environment, and "you" can't have grown up in a different body because a mind growing up in a different body would be a different mind. There's no mystical identity that can transfer between people or through time (which I think is what you were actually trying to prove in your post, and which requires further argument to prove).

Swapping consciousnesses would make no changes to what is percieved.

Again, what do you mean by consciousness; a person's mind or some sort of "identity"? There are entire movies whose premises are based on swapping minds and the very apparent changes that result.

E.g. if one agent perceives p and time t and p' at the next time t+1, and another agent perceives q at time t and q' at time t+1, then if their consciousnesses are "swapped," the percepts would still be identical: p and q will be perceived at time t, and p' and q' will be perceived at t+1.

Then what are we swapping? If I swap subject p's brain with subject q's, then how can I call the consciousness currently in q's body q?

I agree that reasoning along lines similar to this can lead one to reject the concept of numerical identity of consciousness, but one needs to define what they mean by consciousness first. If you are thinking more along the lines of identity rather than consciousness per se, there's a lot of information about the diachronic problem.

You would benefit from reading that post you linked to about dissolving questions. What you seem to be doing is like asking "does free will exist?" and trying to argue that it doesn't. To dissolve the question is to precisely show the thought process that produces the question.