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Here is the general form of my argument.
A person says, "X" is true of morality or of "moral judgments" in the public at large. This brings the talk of an objective morality to its knees. I answer that X is also true if science "or of "truth judgments" in the public at large. But it does not bring all talk of objectivity n science to its knees. Therefore, the original argument is invalid.
A case in point: whether somethis is moral depends on your definition of moral. But there is no objective way to determine the correct definition of "moral". Therefore, there is no chance of an objective morality.
Well, whether Pluto is a planet depends on your definition of "planet". There is no way todetermine an onjectively correct definition of "planet". Yet, planetology remains a science.
Yes, many moral judgments are projections of an individual's likes and dislikestreated as intrinsic properties. But, then, many of their perceptions and observations are theory-laden. This does not eliminate the possibility of objectivity in science. We simply incorporate these facts about our perceptions into our objective account.
The original post to which I responded did not provide a helpful definition. Defining "subjective" as "mind independent" denies the fact that minds are a part of the real world, and we can make objectively true and false claims about minds. Values may not exist without minds, but minds are real. They are a part of the world. And so are values.
Every "subjective" claim has an "objective" claim that says exactly the same thing.
In which case, you will be making a point - not that there are different facts, but that there are different languages. Of course, language is an invention - and there is no natural law that dictates the definition of the word "astronomy".
It is merely a convention that we have adopted a language in which the term "astronomy" does not cover chemical facts. But we could have selected a different language - and there is no law of nature dictating that we could not.
And, yet, these facts about language - these facts about the ways we define our terms - does not cause science to fall to its knees either.
So, what are you talking about? Are you talking about morality, or are you talking about "morality"?
Yes. Water is made up of two hydrogen and an oxygern atom is a different fact than the earth and venus are nearly the same size. It does not bring science to its knees.
If "objective" is "mind independent", then are facts ABOUT minds not objective? We cannot have a science that discusses, for example, how the pre-frontal lobe functions because no such claim can be mind-independent?
For every so-called subjective statement, there is an objective statement that says exactly the same thing from a different point of view. If I say, "spinich, yumm" there is a corresponding objective statement "Alonzo likes spinich" that says exactly the same thing.
So, why not just focus on the objective equivalent of every subjective statement? Why pretend that there is a difference that makes any difference?
Evolutionary Biology might be good at telling us what we value. However, as GE Moore pointed out, ethics is about what we SHOULD value. What evolutionary ethics will teach us is that our mind/brains are maleable. Our values are not fixed.
And the question of what we SHOULD value makes sense because our brains are malleable. Our desires - just like our beliefs - are not fixed. They are learned. So, the question arises, "Given that we can mold desires into different forms, what SHOULD we mold them into?"
Besides, evolutionary ethics is incoherent. "I have evolved a disposition to harm people like you; therefore, you deserve to be harmed." How does a person deserve punishment just because somebody else evolved a disposition to punish him.
Do we solve the question of gay marriage by determining whether the accusers actually have a genetic disposition to kill homosexuals? And if we discover they do, we leap to the conclusion that homosexuals DESERVE to be killed?
Why evolve a disposition to punish? That makes no sense.
What is this practice of praise and condemnation that is central to morality? Of deserved praise and condemnation? Does it make sense to punish somebody for having the wrong genes?
What, according to evolutionary ethics, is the role of moral argument?
Does genetics actually explain such things as the end of slavery, and a woman's right to vote? Those are very fast genetic changes.
The reason that the Euthyphro argument works against evolutionary ethics because - regardless of what evolution can teach us about what we do value, it teaches us that our values are not fixed. Because values are not genetically determined, there is a realm in which it is sensible to ask about what we should value, which is a question that evolutionary ethics cannot answer. Praise and condemnation are central to our moral life precisely because these are the tools for shaping learned desires - resulting in an institution where the question of the difference between right and wrong is the question of the difference between what we should and should not praise or condemn.
I believe it is poosible to scientifically determine whether people generally have many and strong reasons to promote or inhibit certain desires through the use of social tools such as praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment. I also believe that this investigation would make sense of a wealth of moral practices such as the three categories of action (obligation, prohibition, and non-obligatory permission), excuse, the four categories of culpability (intentional, knowing, reckless, negligent), supererogatory action, and. - of course - the role of praise, condemnation, reward, and punishment.