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Do you know Jon Williamson's work? It seems to give an answer to your question (but I've not read it yet). Here's the first paragraph of Section 9.1 “Mental yet Objective” of his book “Bayesian Nets and Causality”:
Epistemic causality embodies the following position. The causal relation is mental rather than physical: a causal structure is part of an agent’s representation of the world, just as a belief function is, and causal claims do not directly supervene on mind-independent features of the world. But causality is objective rather than subjective: some causal structures are more warranted than others on the basis of the agent’s background knowledge, so if two people disagree about what causes what, one may be right and the other wrong. Thus epistemic causality sits between a wholly subjective mental account and a physical account of causality, just as objective Bayesianism sits between strict subjectivism and physical probability.
Here's a link to his papers on causality. At least the fifth, “Causality”, contains an introduction to epistemic causality.
In fact this talk and the others in the same series have been transcribed and published as a book: “The character of physical law”; here is a direct pdf link.
On the FOM list, he writes:
Terrence Tao, at http://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/2011/09/ and independently Daniel Tausk (private communication) have found an irreparable error in my outline. (...)
(...) I withdraw my claim.
The consistency of P remains an open problem.
He gave a more detailed comment on the n-Category Café.