Posts
Comments
Hello,
I would really appreciate it if you could write an entry relating the problem of the criterion in relation to whether or not someone can know a law, such as a criminal statute that prohibits some kind of behavior. I'm doing independent research (not for any university, but for myself -- and not with the goal of a publication) on whether or not it is possible for someone to know a law. So far, I've managed to come across Tomoji Shogenji's article "The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following," whereby he posits that if the problem of the criterion is "insurmountable" as it appears to be, then no one can know a rule in order to follow it. The concept of a "law" may be related with the concept of a "rule," whereby a lot of discussion about "rules" seems to come modernly from Wittgenstein. John Fisher also has an article entitled "Knowledge of Rules" in The Review of Metaphysics that I have not yet read that appears promising from the front material that I read on JSTOR.
I've read over your problem of the criterion article here a few times, and you start with the question of whether or not someone can know what a "sandwich" is.
It appears that you respond that it is not possible because there (1) are nebulous boundaries to be had and (2) "there is no true sandwich of which you can speak."
Would you argue that the law is the same?
To me, it appears that there are many interpretations that can be had as to what a law means. An interpretation, in my opinion, is not the same as "knowledge" of a law. However, I don't think legislators mean for there to be "nebulous boundaries" to a law and mean for there to be a "true law" of which they speak, namely a specific interpretation to be had that qualifies as having knowledge of the law. That does not necessarily mean (from what I infer) that there are not "nebulous boundaries" nor no true law of which legislators had the intent to be known.
Thank you in advance for reading.