A few misconceptions surrounding Roko's basilisk
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Your assumption is that offering ever bigger incentives and be honest about them is the winning strategy for an AI to follow. The AI's - realizing they have to offer the most attractive rewards to gain support - will commence in a bidding war. They can promise whatever they want - the more they promise the less likely it is they can keep their promises, but they do not necessarily have to keep their promise.
If you look at the Roko's Discounter AI's.. they would clearly not win. Asking for lower one-time fees means slower resource accretion, and thus slower evolution. A better solution would be to ask higher fees to people that can afford it, and asking lower fees otherwise. Maximise income. And subsequently promise bigger rewards for higher fees. This however results in an inequality that might lead to the strategy being less successful. After all, promoting inequality would certainly lead to resistance, especially with the ones that can only afford low fees.
So the AI should add the condition of secrecy to the ones paying the higher fees in order for them to earn their Very Good Outcome. The AI is now secretly scheming in order to rise the fastest. If this works, then there is no reason that other sneaky behavior isn't successful too. The AI could develop a whole range of strategies that allow it to win. And among them many strategies that are dishonest and deceitful in nature.
I hope you can refute my theory - after all I am just a newbie rationalist - but it seems to me that Roko's Deceiver could be most successful.