Posts

Rationality Vienna Meetup July 2020 2020-07-14T13:06:10.730Z
Rationality Vienna Meetup, February 2020 2020-02-08T11:19:23.220Z
Rationality Vienna Meetup, September 2019 2019-08-22T09:02:59.362Z
Rationality Vienna Meetup, December 2018 2018-12-02T11:04:37.039Z
Rationality Vienna Meetup, October 2018 2018-10-16T14:51:40.409Z
Rationality Vienna Meetup, September 2018 2018-09-15T19:32:16.581Z
Rationality Vienna Meetup, June 2018-06-17T19:42:35.105Z

Comments

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Tracey Davis and the Prisoner of Azkaban - Part 6 · 2021-06-30T21:56:25.995Z · LW · GW

One more typo: " You've changed, though Harry. "

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Bayeswatch 3: A Study in Scarlet · 2021-06-12T18:05:59.655Z · LW · GW

Typo:

It's heat shield burned away.

It's » Its

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Where do LessWrong rationalists debate? · 2021-05-10T20:36:51.653Z · LW · GW

There is a Telegram group called “Less Wrong”, which mostly consists of participants of the European Less Wrong Community Weekend. There are on average 1-2 topics, 30 messages a day.

I suspect this group can’t be shared via link, so PM me with your Telegram ID and I can add you to it.

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Where do LessWrong rationalists debate? · 2021-05-02T10:07:32.537Z · LW · GW

most members are passive.

I suspect most members are even inactive there.

I assume only 30-50 read or write comments, suggesting that the group is far from Dunbar's number.

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Is this info on zinc lozenges accurate? · 2019-09-22T12:50:34.344Z · LW · GW

I recall Rhonda Patrick suggesting the TheraZinc oral spray (citation needed), which contains zinc gluconate. Unfortunately, it's a US-only product. (https://quantumhealth.com/shop/product/therazinc-oral-spray)

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on SSC Meetups Everywhere: Vienna, Austria · 2019-09-22T11:11:02.780Z · LW · GW

Directions to the meetup room:

Common room of Kaisermuehlenstrasse 24

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Rationality Vienna Meetup April 2019 · 2019-04-19T16:03:42.043Z · LW · GW

Talk topic has been settled: Kevin Simler & Robin Hanson's book, The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life http://elephantinthebrain.com

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Rationality Vienna Meetup April 2019 · 2019-04-18T08:11:30.459Z · LW · GW

Instructions on how to find the meetup room:

https://my.pcloud.com/publink/show?code=XZGJrE7Z8p72zalBbmH4xELOhiViwHpLNhpy

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Buridan's ass in coordination games · 2018-07-17T07:02:29.915Z · LW · GW

True, they will fail to cooperate for some R, but the values of such R have a low probability. (But yeah, it's also required that uy and R are chosen independently—otherwise an adversary could just choose either so that it results in the players choosing different actions.)

The smoothness comes in from marginalising a random R. The coordination comes from making R and ε common knowledge, so they cooperate using the correlation in their observations—an interesting phenomenon.

(How can I write LaTeX in the comments?)

Comment by Laszlo_Treszkai (Treszkai) on Counterfactual Mugging Poker Game · 2018-06-24T11:01:40.172Z · LW · GW

The game is indeed a clean example of Glomarization.

I might have misunderstood your main point, which I interpret as: “because of the counterfactual that I could have gotten a high card in this game, I shouldn't reveal a low card with probability 1.” Are you sure that it's because of the counterfactual in the current game, and not the possible consequences in my later interactions with B?

I would reveal my card if the game was truly unique, in that zero information leaks out. (Suppose B's memories of this game are erased afterwards.)

In real life, my decision would affect Player B's image of me, which affects how he will reason about similar games against me in the future. (And even how people close to him will reason about people like me.)

A multi-agent influence diagram on the iterated version shows how one can screw himself over in later games. If A first hides, then B cannot update her model of A:

If A first reveals a low card, then a pattern that's almost-but-not-quite-like Newcomb's is revealed: