Comment by yobbobandana on Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 17, chapter 86 · 2012-12-20T03:44:22.189Z · LW · GW

At one point the Defense Professor does give a plausible reason why he might have resolved not to use Legilimency.

From Chapter 74:

His head fell back against the chair, lolled to one side, the eyes no longer meeting Harry's. "But these small games hardly hold my interest as they stand. Add Legilimency, and it ceases to be a game at all."

Comment by yobbobandana on Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 17, chapter 86 · 2012-12-20T03:27:59.529Z · LW · GW

This really confused me until I realised you were referring to a comic book character, not a famous psychiatrist.

Comment by yobbobandana on The "Scary problem of Qualia" · 2012-12-20T02:49:45.007Z · LW · GW

...Which is to say that whenever there is (a physical arrangement with) a logical structure that matches (is transitive with) the logical structure of consciousness - then there would be consciousness. It gets more complicated. If you draw a line with a pencil on a piece of paper, so that it encodes a three dimensional trajectory over time of a sentient being's consciousness - you basically have created a "soulful" being. Except there's just a drawn line on a piece of paper.

Assuming this is possible, I would say the line on the paper is a "rendering" or "depiction" of a concious being at some point in time. In order for the rendering to in some way "be" a concious being, would it not require the ability to change itself somehow? At very least it must be able to accrue memories, meaning that over time some part or parts of the rendering must be updated to coincide with the new memories. If the rendering cannot physically update itself, it seems there must be at least one extra part required.

It's hard to discuss further without relying on my personal definition of conciousness. But now that I think about it, I probably came up with this definition by analyzing similar ideas. Perhaps in some way specifying precise boundary conditions is equivalent to having a precise definition?

Comment by yobbobandana on The "Scary problem of Qualia" · 2012-12-20T01:29:07.533Z · LW · GW

If you have four grains of sand arranged in a tetrahedron, you could conceivably call it a (very small) heap. When you take away one of the grains, you will no longer have a heap, just three grains of sand.

This is assuming that your definition of "heap" includes some of it being on top of the rest of it, which I'm fairly sure is standard.