LessWrong 2.0 Reader

It may be worth noting that, at least anecdotally, when you talk about AI development processes with DoD policy people, they assume that SCIFs will be used at some point.  

YMMV on whether that's their pattern-matching or hard-earned experience speaking, but I think worth noting. 

But we could have said the same thing of SBF, before the disaster happened.

I would honestly be pretty comfortable with maximizing SBF's CEV.

Please explain your thinking behind this?

TLDR: Humans can be powerful and overconfident. I think this is the main source of human evil. I also think this is unlikely to naturally be learned by RL in environments that don't incentivize irrationality (like ours did).

Sorrry if I was unclear there.

It's not, because some moral theories are not compatible with EU maximization.

I'm pretty confident that my values satisfy the VNM axioms, so those moral theories are almost definitely wrong.

And I think this uncertainty problem can be solved by forcing utility bounds.

This isn't that complicated. The halo effect is real and can go to extremes when romantic relationships are involved, and most people take their sense data at face value most of the time. The sentence is meant completely literally.

Luckily the de-facto nominees for this position are alignment researchers, who pretty strongly self-select for having cosmopolitan altruistic values.

But we could have said the same thing of SBF, before the disaster happened.

Due to very weird selection pressure, humans ended up really smart but also really irrational. [...] An AGI (at least, one that comes from something like RL rather than being conjured in a simulation or something else weird) will probably end up with a way higher rationality:intelligence ratio, and so it will be much less likely to destroy everything we value than an empowered human.

Please explain your thinking behind this?

Dealing with moral uncertainty is just part of expected utility maximization.

It's not, because some moral theories are not compatible with EU maximization, and of the ones that are, it's still unclear [LW · GW] how to handle uncertainty between them.

the inductive bias doesn’t precisely match human vision, so it has different mistakes, but as you scale both architectures they become more similar. that’s exactly what you’d expect for any approximately Bayesian setup.

I can certainly understand that as you scale both architectures, they both make less mistakes on distribution. But do they also generalize out of training distribution more similarly? If so, why? Can you explain this more? (I'm not getting your point from just "approximately Bayesian setup".)

They needed a giant image classification dataset which I don’t think even existed 5 years ago.

This is also confusing/concerning for me. Why would it be necessary or helpful to have such a large dataset to align the shape/texture bias with humans?

I'm 60% confident that SBF and Mao Zedong (and just about everyone) would converge to nearly the same values (which we call "human values") if they were rational enough and had good enough decision theory.

If I'm wrong, (1) is a huge problem and the only surefire way to solve it is to actually be the human whose values get extrapolated. Luckily the de-facto nominees for this position are alignment researchers, who pretty strongly self-select for having cosmopolitan altruistic values.

I think (2) is a very human problem. Due to very weird selection pressure, humans ended up really smart but also really irrational. I think most human evil is caused by a combination of overconfidence wrt our own values and lack of knowledge of things like the unilateralist's curse [? · GW]. An AGI (at least, one that comes from something like RL rather than being conjured in a simulation or something else weird) will probably end up with a way higher rationality:intelligence ratio, and so it will be much less likely to destroy everything we value than an empowered human. (Also 60% confident. I would not want to stake the fate of the universe on this claim)

I agree that moral uncertainty is a very hard problem, but I don't think we humans can do any better on it than an ASI. As long as we give it the right pointer, I think it will handle the rest much better than any human could. Decision theory is a bit different, since you have to put that into the utility function. Dealing with moral uncertainty is just part of expected utility maximization.

To solve (2), I think we should try to adapt something like the Hippocratic principle [LW(p) · GW(p)] to work for QACI, without requiring direct reference to a human's values and beliefs (the sidestepping of which is QACI's big advantage over PreDCA). I wonder if Tammy has thought about this.

What about the following:

My utility function is pretty much just my own happiness (in a fun-theoretic rather than purely hedonistic sense). However, my decision theory is updateless with respect to which sentient being I ended up as, so once you factor that in, I'm a multiverse-wide realityfluid-weighted average utilitarian.

I'm not sure how correct this is, but it's possible.

It probably began training in January and finished around early April. And they're now doing evals.

My birds are singing the same tune.

And then today I read this: “We yearn for the transcendent, for God, for something divine and good and pure, but in picturing the transcendent we transform it into idols which we then realize to be contingent particulars, just things among others here below. If we destroy these idols in order to reach something untainted and pure, what we really need, the thing itself, we render the Divine ineffable, and as such in peril of being judged non-existent. Then the sense of the Divine vanishes in the attempt to preserve it.” (Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals)