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Same question.

I don't think this was unexpected at all. As soon as Deepmind announced their Starcraft project, most of the discussion was about proper mechanical limitations since the real-time-aspect of RTS games favors mechanical execution so heavily. Being dumb and fast is simply more effective than smart and slow.

The skills that make a good human Stracraft player can broadly be divided into two categories: athleticism and intelligence. Much of the strategy in the game is build around the fact that players are playing with limited resources of athleticism (i.e. speed and accuracy) so it follows that you can't necessarily separate the two skill categories and only measure one of them.

The issue with the presentation was that not only did Deepmind not highlight the problematic nature of assessing the intelligence of their algorithm, they actively downplayed it. In my opinion, the pr spin was blatantly obvious and the community backlash warranted and justified.

Assuming the security risk of growing economic monopolization build in in the dna of proof of work (as well as proof of stake)  is going to prevail in the coming years:

Do you think it is possible to create a more secure proof of democratic stake? I know that would require a not yet existing proof of unique identity first. So the question implies also: Do you think a proof of unique identity is even possible?

P.S.: Ideas flowing around the web to solve the later challenge are for example:

• non-transferable proof of signature knowledge in combination with e-passports
• web of trust
• proof of location  - simultanous solved AI-resistant captchas

Assuming the security risk of growing economic monopolization build in in the dna of proof of work (as well as proof of stake) is going to prevail in the coming years:

Do you think it is possible to create a more secure proof of democratic stake? I know that would require a not yet existing proof of unique identity first. So the question implies also: Do you think a proof of unique identity is even possible?

P.S.: Ideas flowing around the web to solve the later challenge are for example:

• non-transferable proof of signature knowledge in combination with e-passports
• web of trust
• proof of location  - simultanous solved AI-resistant captchas

I feel the bomb problem could be better defined. What is the predictor predicting? Is it always predicting what you'll do when you see the note saying it will predict right? What about if you don't see this note because it predicts you'll go left? And assuming it's truthful, isn't right the only thing that it can predict assuming it writes the note? Then there's the issue that if it makes a prediction by a) trying to predict whether you'll see such a note or not, then b) predicting what the agent does in this case, then it'd already have to predict the agent's choice in order to make the prediction in stage a). In other words, a depends on b and b depends on a; the situation is circular.

She's probably alright in person, but the ideas don't seem to merit an interview.

I only just saw this comment. I think that there's a lot of value in imagining the possibility of both a real you and a hypothetical you, but I expect Schwarz would object to this as the problem statement says, "you". By default, this is assumed to refer to a version of you that is real within the scope of the problem, not a version that is hypothetical within this scope. Indeed, you seem to recognise that your reasoning isn't completely solid when you ask what these hypothetical selves even mean.

Fortunately, this is where some of my arguments from Deconfusing Logical Counterfactuals can come in. If we are being blackmailed and we are only blackmailed if we pay out, then it is logically impossible for us to not pay out, so we don't have a decision theory problem. Such a problem requires multiple possible actions and the only way to obtain this is by erasing some of the information. So if we erase the information about whether or not you are being blackmailed, we end up with two possibilities: a) you paying the the situation and getting blackmailed or b) you not being the kind of person who would pay and you not getting blackmailed. And in that case we'd pick option a).

We can then answer your the question about how your decision affects the past - it doesn't. The past is fixed and cannot be changed. So why does it look like your decision changes the past? Actually, your decision is fixed as well. You can't actually change what it will be. However, both you decision and the past may be different in counterfactuals, after all, they aren't factual. If we have a perfect predictor and we posit a different decision, then we must necessarily posit a different prediction in the past to maintain consistency. Even though we might talking colloquially about changing a decision, what's actually happening is that we are positing a different counterfactual.

I want to see a backlink feature, so people can find replies to a post that aren’t in the form of a comment.

Added to GreaterWrong.

Please share your example of using Tiddlywiki for quotes.

I would also like to register my opposition to using Facebook. While it might seem convenient in the short term, it makes the community more fragile by adding a centralized failure point that's unaccountable to any of its members. Communicating on LessWrong.com has the virtue of it being owned by the same community that it serves.