Semantic Stopsigns

post by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2007-08-24T19:29:10.000Z · LW · GW · Legacy · 110 comments

Contents

110 comments

And the child asked:

Q: Where did this rock come from?

A: I chipped it off the big boulder, at the center of the village.

Q: Where did the boulder come from?

A: It probably rolled off the huge mountain that towers over our village.

Q: Where did the mountain come from?

A: The same place as all stone: it is the bones of Ymir, the primordial giant.

Q: Where did the primordial giant, Ymir, come from?

A: From the great abyss, Ginnungagap.

Q: Where did the great abyss, Ginnungagap, come from?

A: Never ask that question.

Consider the seeming paradox of the First Cause. Science has traced events back to the Big Bang, but why did the Big Bang happen? It’s all well and good to say that the zero of time begins at the Big Bang—that there is nothing before the Big Bang in the ordinary flow of minutes and hours. But saying this presumes our physical law, which itself appears highly structured; it calls out for explanation. Where did the physical laws come from? You could say that we’re all a computer simulation, but then the computer simulation is running on some other world’s laws of physics—where did those laws of physics come from?

At this point, some people say, “God!”

What could possibly make anyone, even a highly religious person, think this even helped answer the paradox of the First Cause? Why wouldn’t you automatically ask, “Where did God come from?” Saying “God is uncaused” or “God created Himself” leaves us in exactly the same position as “Time began with the Big Bang.” We just ask why the whole metasystem exists in the first place, or why some events but not others are allowed to be uncaused.

My purpose here is not to discuss the seeming paradox of the First Cause, but to ask why anyone would think “God!” could resolve the paradox. Saying “God!” is a way of belonging to a tribe, which gives people a motive to say it as often as possible—some people even say it for questions like “Why did this hurricane strike New Orleans?” Even so, you’d hope people would notice that on the particular puzzle of the First Cause, saying “God!” doesn’t help. It doesn’t make the paradox seem any less paradoxical even if true. How could anyone not notice this?

Jonathan Wallace suggested that “God!” functions as a semantic stopsign—that it isn’t a propositional assertion, so much as a cognitive traffic signal: do not think past this point.1 Saying “God!” doesn’t so much resolve the paradox, as put up a cognitive traffic signal to halt the obvious continuation of the question-and-answer chain.

Of course you’d never do that, being a good and proper atheist, right? But “God!” isn’t the only semantic stopsign, just the obvious first example.

The transhuman technologies—molecular nanotechnology, advanced biotech, genetech, artificial intelligence, et cetera—pose tough policy questions. What kind of role, if any, should a government take in supervising a parent’s choice of genes for their child? Could parents deliberately choose genes for schizophrenia? If enhancing a child’s intelligence is expensive, should governments help ensure access, to prevent the emergence of a cognitive elite? You can propose various institutions to answer these policy questions—for example, that private charities should provide financial aid for intelligence enhancement—but the obvious next question is, “Will this institution be effective?” If we rely on product liability lawsuits to prevent corporations from building harmful nanotech, will that really work?

I know someone whose answer to every one of these questions is “Liberal democracy!” That’s it. That’s his answer. If you ask the obvious question of “How well have liberal democracies performed, historically, on problems this tricky?” or “What if liberal democracy does something stupid?” then you’re an autocrat, or libertopian, or otherwise a very very bad person. No one is allowed to question democracy.

I once called this kind of thinking “the divine right of democracy.” But it is more precise to say that “Democracy!” functioned for him as a semantic stopsign. If anyone had said to him “Turn it over to the Coca-Cola corporation!” he would have asked the obvious next questions: “Why? What will the Coca-Cola corporation do about it? Why should we trust them? Have they done well in the past on equally tricky problems?”

Or suppose that someone says, “Mexican-Americans are plotting to remove all the oxygen in Earth’s atmosphere.” You’d probably ask, “Why would they do that? Don’t Mexican-Americans have to breathe too? Do Mexican-Americans even function as a unified conspiracy?” If you don’t ask these obvious next questions when someone says, “Corporations are plotting to remove Earth’s oxygen,” then “Corporations!” functions for you as a semantic stopsign.

Be careful here not to create a new generic counterargument against things you don’t like—“Oh, it’s just a stopsign!” No word is a stopsign of itself; the question is whether a word has that effect on a particular person. Having strong emotions about something doesn’t qualify it as a stopsign. I’m not exactly fond of terrorists or fearful of private property; that doesn’t mean “Terrorists!” or “Capitalism!” are cognitive traffic signals unto me. (The word “intelligence” did once have that effect on me, though no longer.) What distinguishes a semantic stopsign is failure to consider the obvious next question.


1 See Wallace’s “God vs. God” (http://www.spectacle.org/yearzero/godvgod.html) and “God as a Semantical Signpost” (http://www.spectacle.org/1095/stop1.html).

110 comments

Comments sorted by oldest first, as this post is from before comment nesting was available (around 2009-02-27).

comment by Doug_S. · 2007-08-24T20:20:26.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Q. Where do priors originally come from?
A. Never ask that question.
Replies from: Rixie
comment by Rixie · 2013-01-25T04:34:12.689Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, this is extremely funny, and yes, we all get the reference, and yes, we all feel patriotic when we vote it up, but really? This is not rationality, it is a joke. It's awesome, but does it really deserve 31 votes up?

Replies from: Martin-2
comment by Martin-2 · 2013-02-28T07:25:37.045Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The number of upvotes indicates popularity, not quality. I just upvoted Doug's comment but that doesn't mean I think it's 8 times better than josh's comment.

comment by josh · 2007-08-24T20:59:00.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Doug,

from the before time. from the long long ago.

comment by Aaron3 · 2007-08-24T21:25:48.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Interesting post. It strikes me that semantic stopsigns join adoration of mystery and non-falsification as survival tricks acquired by story memes when curiosity -- and other stories -- threatened their existence.

comment by Aaron3 · 2007-08-24T21:27:54.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Oops, that should be "non-falsifiability," not "non-falsification."

comment by Michael_Rooney · 2007-08-24T23:53:19.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Eliezer: "How could anyone not notice this?"

Because the human brain -- like many simpler programs -- generally finds basic beliefs more practical than an infinite regress?

Replies from: DanielLC
comment by DanielLC · 2009-12-28T19:26:32.229Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Infinite regress is still a semantic stopsign. If all chickens came from eggs, and all eggs came from chickens, the obvious next question is "Why is there an infinite regress of chickens and eggs?"

There are certainly possible infinite regressions that don't exist, so it can't exist simply because of an infinite regress.

Replies from: MrMormon
comment by MrMormon · 2012-04-03T05:45:03.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sometimes, the question "why?" is meaningless. If "all chickens came from eggs, and all eggs came from chickens" is a premise, that is the "why". Asking the why of the why is a tautology.

Replies from: DanielLC
comment by DanielLC · 2012-04-03T16:09:32.419Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But why do you assume all chickens came from eggs and all eggs came from chickens?

How is this different than just having "God exists" as a premise?

Replies from: jopt2
comment by jopt2 · 2012-08-25T20:05:30.610Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think it is different in itself. I think some premises are more useful than others, an the anticipating-experience-sense.

Replies from: Rixie
comment by Rixie · 2013-01-25T04:36:57.521Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I know that this doesn't actually contribute in any way, but chickens were bred into exsistance by humans, so, one female bird was bred with a different male bird and the resulting eggs were chickens. Therefore, the egg came before the chicken.

Replies from: Rixie
comment by Rixie · 2013-01-30T02:36:05.528Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

NO!!

You did not just vote that stupid comment up! Someone vote it down Right Now!!!

People, on Less Wrong, you do not vote up silly comments on the topic of bird breeding. You vote up serious comments on the topic of rationality.

Got it?

comment by Constant2 · 2007-08-25T00:09:53.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Synonyms for "I don't know".

There might be more of these than we think. Two candidates:

Aesthetics. People have a lot of understandable preferences: they prefer bigger houses to smaller ones, longer vacations to shorter ones, air conditioned rooms to hot and humid ones, and so on. What these have in common is that we can easily understand and explain the preferences. Aesthetic preferences, however, are generally characterized by it being hard, maybe impossible, to explain what it is about one thing that makes it more aesthetically pleasing than another. This suggests when we say "aesthetically pleasing", we almost mean, "pleasing, but if you asked why I wouldn't really be able to give you a satisfactory explanation."

Intelligence. Many have observed that each new success in reproducing, in machinery, the capabilities of the human mind, has in turn led to a narrowing of what is considered "intelligent" - a narrowing that excludes whatever it is that machines can now do. This phenomenon is explained if "intelligent behavior" is a subclass of some larger class of behavior (a larger class that includes the things that we have gotten machines to do, such as play a strong game of chess). In particular, the subclass labeled "intelligent" is that subclass of behaviors whose mechanism we have not yet discovered. I have often heard or read people say something like, "this is not intelligent behavior because what the computer is doing is [description of mechanism]." What really seems to be getting said is, "this is not intelligent behavior because I am able to describe it to you."

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2007-08-25T04:28:41.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Constant, good points both - though no word is a stopsign of itself, the question is whether one uses it that way. There are definitely people out there who use "aesthetic" and "intelligent" as stopsigns.

Doug, "Never ask that question" is an Ambassador Kosh quote.

comment by Yahdah · 2007-08-25T05:00:47.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Programming. Its all in the program. Why do we think time is linear? Here in the States we control movement with stopsigns. Elsewhere they use round-a-bouts.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2007-08-25T05:22:09.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can think of a few semantic roundabouts as well. Postmodernism comes to mind.

comment by Googolplex · 2007-08-25T09:52:43.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The entire function of God seems to be as a multi-purpose philosophical semantic stop sign. It isn't just the horror of thinking about the beginning of the universe he protects us from. Consider for instance morality (an atheist's morality is empty if they just make it up, so where does God get his morality from?), and free will (can't see how a material being can have free will? It's controlled by an eternal soul with God-given free will. How does a soul - or for that matter a God - have free will? Still any aspect of its behaviour which is not related to anything is surely random!)

I can't see one function of a God that would actually answer anything.

http://meteuphoric.blogspot.com/2007/07/god-is-irrelevant.html

comment by Owain_Evans · 2007-08-25T10:40:45.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Even so, you'd hope people would notice that on the particular puzzle of the First Cause, saying "God!" doesn't help. It doesn't make the paradox seem any less paradoxical even if true. How could anyone not notice this?

Thinking well is difficult, even for great philosophers. Hindsight bias might skew our judgment here.

"About two years later, I became convinced that there is no life after death, but I still believed in God, because the "First Cause" argument appeared to be irrefutable. At the age of eighteen, however, shortly before I went to Cambridge, I read Mill's Autobiography, where I found a sentence to the effect that his father taught him the question "Who made me?" cannot be answered, since it immediately suggests the further question "Who made God?" This led me to abandon the "First Cause" argument, and to become an atheist."

– Bertrand Russell, Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 1, 1967.

Replies from: Mets
comment by Mets · 2014-05-24T19:57:55.550Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If I remember correctly, Russell thought that if anything could exist timelessly, without a cause, it might as well be the universe and not God. But the problem is, we now know (with some reasonable certainty) that the universe began with the Big Bang. The universe could have been timeless, but it isn't. Postulating that there is a timeless First Cause outside the universe solves this problem, since there is no similar theory that shows God has a cause, though it's not a falsifiable or very satisfying solution.

Replies from: gjm
comment by gjm · 2014-05-24T21:13:50.148Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We really don't know with much certainty that the universe began with the Big Bang. For instance, if "eternal inflation" is right then what we call the Big Bang was the beginning of "our" universe but not of the universe.

comment by RobbL · 2007-08-25T13:27:11.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Whatever happened to "I don't know"

comment by Stuart_Armstrong · 2007-08-25T15:12:48.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Another semantic stopsign often used, unfortunately: "that's biased".

comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2007-08-25T15:13:31.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Whatever happened to "I don't know"

Hear, hear! One of the most baffling things I've had a theist say to me is 'I don't really know where existence came from, but I need to believe something so I believe in God.' If you can't stand to say "I don't know", that's a serious bug.

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T04:49:06.665Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If we interpret it as an adaptation of religious memes, it's not a bug---it's a feature.

comment by Uselessness_of_metaphysics · 2007-08-25T16:39:27.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

From one point of view, all metaphysics is a semantic stopsign. I've always been sympathetic to the basic anti-metaphysics argument of Ayer, i.e. that if it's outside of the verifiable then discussion of the subject is literally meaningless, since we have no language or medium for such a discussion. I suppose Eliezer would say that belief in God is a proposition that does not control expectations, i.e. the God that explains everything is a God that explains nothing.

I hope that pre-Big Bang history doesn't remain a (literally) metaphysical subject. I'd really like to know how all this happened.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2007-08-25T18:14:39.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

From one point of view, all metaphysics is a semantic stopsign.

Not that I necessarily disagree, but, what is the obvious next question which metaphysics prevents you from asking?

comment by David_J._Balan · 2007-08-25T21:57:26.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think some theists would say that the "who made God" question is a semantic stop sign, but that this is OK. That is, they would say that they are not capable in probing into the question any further, but that the leaders of their religion (with the help of the sacred texts) are capable of doing so, and they bring back from the other side the answer that the religion is true and everything is OK.

As for liberal democracy, it's clearly an error to assert without further argument that liberal democracy will solve all future problems. But it is not a mistake to say that it is far and away the most successful thing that humans have ever come up with, and so that it is the best framework in which to try to address future problems.

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T04:51:29.745Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, I found the "liberal democracy" example somewhat unfair too. It may be a stopsign for some people, but it's also a pretty darn good idea in general. How well has liberal democracy done on similarly tricky problems? Might it be fair to say... better than anything else yet devised?

I guess I would agree it's not a complete answer. But answering "liberal democracy!" seems about as valid as answering "rationality" or "science", which we actually do give as answers sometimes (at least when pressed for time).

comment by MikeLee · 2007-08-28T19:39:58.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Remember.. God loves you

comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2007-08-28T20:35:12.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hmm... "Love" is also often used as a semantic stopsign, which may contribute to the cynicism with which some people regard it.

comment by Ed2 · 2007-09-04T15:33:14.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And "I love you, but..." is the start of an argument.

comment by Hopefully_Anonymous · 2007-09-04T16:55:56.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

David J. Balan, you write: "But it is not a mistake to say that it is far and away the most successful thing that humans have ever come up with, and so that it is the best framework in which to try to address future problems."

That sounds like a contestible claim. There often seems to be a "no true scotsman" element to arguments buttressing that claim.

comment by apotheon · 2007-11-21T20:10:23.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"What distinguishes a semantic stopsign is failure to consider the obvious next question."

I disagree. The distinguishing event is a refusal (not just a failure) to consider it, for reasons other than something like "I don't have the time right now." One cannot ask all questions in an average 70+ year lifetime, so one picks which avenues of questioning to pursue most fervently. Sometimes, one simply has to say "I choose to avoid thinking too much about what came before the big bang, because I have to spend more time thinking about the logical origin of ethics. That's more important to me."

A semantic stopsign is not marked by your failure to think past it, but by the belief in its inviolability as a rule of the road of thought.

comment by Richard_Kulisz · 2007-11-22T00:48:50.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Before the Big Bang is beyond the universe. Beyond the universe are other laws of physics. Which laws? All self-consistent laws. What are sets of laws of physics? They're mathematics. What is mathematics? Arbitrary symbol manipulation. And there you've reached a final stopping point. Because it isn't even intelligible to ask why there are symbols or why there is mathematical existence. They are meta-axiomatic, and there is nothing beyond or beneath them. More importantly, there is no meta-level above them because they are their own meta-level.

Replies from: Mass_Driver, Brilliand
comment by Mass_Driver · 2010-08-28T23:18:55.703Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is merely a semantic stop-sign; it appears wise because it uses modern vocabulary. The structure of the argument is identical to the structure of a neo-Platonist argument that most LW readers would instantly reject:

Before God's Creation is beyond the universe. Beyond the universe are other Creations. Which Creations? All Creations that God created. What are God's Creations? They are instantiations of God's will. What is God's will? Arbitrary manipulation of Form. And there you've reached a final stopping point. Because it isn't even intelligible to ask why there is Form or why God wills one thing and not another. Form and Will are eternal, and there is nothing beyond or beneath them. More importantly, there is no form from which they derive their pattern because they are their own perfect Form.

comment by Brilliand · 2015-09-01T17:56:50.574Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This looks like equivocation between the math-like structure of the universe and mathematics itself - mathematics proper is something invented by humans, which happens to resemble the structure of the universe. Whatever is outside the universe is unknown, but probably can be discovered with considerable difficulty (and will probably be describable by mathematics, but will not be mathematics itself).

comment by I_don't_know · 2007-11-22T05:32:55.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Can we even ask the question about what comes before the big bang and hope for a scientific answer? We can see light from the universe that took about 14 billion years to reach us, but that doesn't mean we see the beginning. If it took that light so long to reach us, then we cannot say definitively whether or not there is light that is 15 billion years old which has not yet reached us. We don't even know the shape of the universe or where we are in that shape. Are we in the middle? On the edge? Is there even an edge? I doubt we will ever be able to answer these questions. I'd say the only answer we could really give to the question of "What came before the big bang?" is "I don't know."

comment by GodBurger · 2007-11-22T07:11:29.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Mental masturbation over THIS? Go ahead and get bogged down in conversations as this one; get lost in its minute details. It only keeps one's head full and the spirit distracted from pure experience; ecstatic experience. What if y'all really did fund an answer. Its all dogma, other peoples' thoughts and distraction. Clear your minds. Don't look confused at the pointing finger aand scratch your egg shaped domes. look out try to understand what is being pointed at. All you're pseudo-, pop-scientific drivel is distancing you.

"don't want to walk and talk about jesus, i just want to see his face...." Mick Jagger

Replies from: daos
comment by daos · 2010-01-29T18:00:11.716Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"All you're pseudo-, pop-scientific drivel is distancing you."

immediately followed by:

""don't want to walk and talk about jesus, i just want to see his face...." Mick Jagger"

priceless.

comment by athiest · 2007-11-22T07:37:02.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is a disingenuous (though not uncommon among modern theists) interpretation of the first cause argument. The justification for stopping with God is that, supposedly, his existence is necessary. If a creative God had to exist, then this explains why there is so much stuff about when seemingly, there might not have been.

This is a defence that does not rest easily in the theists hands though, for it relies upon there being an argument that gods existence is necessary, and it is difficult enough to make out what that claim amoutns to let alone what reason, if any, there is for believing it true.

Replies from: bigjeff5, pnrjulius
comment by bigjeff5 · 2011-01-29T05:02:40.909Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's still a semantic stop sign, because it attempts to stop you from asking the next question, which you mentioned:

Why is God necessary?

The point is to never stop asking. You might be stuck at "I don't know", but that just means you need to find more information.

A "stop sign" is any answer that automatically causes you to stop asking the next question. It can be "God", but it can just as easily be "the big bang" or "evolution". If your intent in making the statement is to prevent further questions, it's a stop sign statement in that case.

If you believe there must be a God, there isn't really anything wrong with that as long as you aren't using the idea of God to keep you from asking the next question. I find the belief ridiculously hard to maintain though.

By the way, Eliezer, I think I have to officially recognize my atheism. I've been clinging to the last vestiges of my monotheistic upbringing up until now, but this post hits the nail on the head, so to speak.

comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T04:54:52.937Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We do have a pretty good understanding of some necessary claims, like "It is necessarily true that 2+2=4." Asking "why is that necessary?" has a fairly good answer: "Because it's what the symbols mean, and if you deny it you soon find yourself in incoherence."

Whereas, one does not seem to fall into incoherence when asserting "There is no such thing as an omniscient, omnipotent being whose son died by crucifixion." (I dare say one teeters upon that chasm when asserting the opposite!)

comment by Unknown · 2007-11-22T07:53:17.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Regarding the Big Bang, I don't know, you really don't know what you're talking about. The scientific estimate of the age of the universe is not based on how long light took to reach us. Nor is it based on whether there are parts of the universe which are not visible to us; it is assumed (reasonably) that there are.

comment by nephroglomerulus · 2007-11-22T11:58:40.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

C'mon, no theist arrives at God after 5 questions regarding existence. Nor after 4 or 6. It happens when we realize that there's an infinite number of existential questions before we can know God. We believe in God because we see there IS NO semantic stop sign.

For a metaphor, review your integral calculus. Belief is the Riemann sum of the existential questions as they approach infinity.

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T04:55:43.404Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Interesting theology. Completely irrelevant to 98% of believers I'm fairly sure. (I mean, how many people even know calculus, much less use it to justify religion?)

comment by Jose · 2007-11-22T13:34:50.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If god exist, it is not going to be what you want(Stopsign or whatever), it is going to be what it is.

Now matter what do you think about it, as buddhists say if you ask the wrong questions, you will get wrong answers.

Personally I believe God and the infinitum exist, you can't see the infinitum(it has no boundaries and we are limited), you seem to believe that it is a human concept created by humans that doesn't exist, fine. I just came here from reddit or digg, I only read this article and will forget this site when I left, I have real work to do.

Maybe humans need to believe in something, maybe is a concept created by humans, but it doesn't make it less real if it exist.

There are only two posibilities: God exist God doesn't exist

You can't prove either. That's the key. You can use semantic tools, tarot cards, or baseball hats to try to prove your position.

It won't work.Sorry.

For my friend's two years son, god is a portrait in the hall. He feel superior in their thoughts. I think there are superior thoughts over ours.

Have a good day

comment by Caledonian2 · 2007-11-22T14:48:30.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It happens when we realize that there's an infinite number of existential questions before we can know God. We believe in God because we see there IS NO semantic stop sign.
And you feel compelled to create one.

Religion is not a search for truth. It's a way to short-circuit the search.

Replies from: Mass_Driver
comment by Mass_Driver · 2010-08-28T23:22:35.938Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's a way to short-circuit the search.

Hang on; it depends what your religion consists of. If, having concluded that "there is a God," you stop thinking and stop asking existential questions, then, fine, you're short-circuiting out of something like fear.

But if you use religion to fast-forward a bit, to skip a few existential questions here and there and ask others further down the line, it's not clear why that would be ethically inappropriate. If existential inquiry is a journey without an end, why privilege the first several questions on that journey above all others?

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T04:56:24.108Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Does religion actually help us move ahead in the list of questions? I don't see how it does.

Replies from: Mass_Driver
comment by Mass_Driver · 2012-05-20T08:19:19.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It did for me for a while. Having decided that the world was purposefully created by a benevolent deity who left much of it unfinished because he wanted humans to have a chance to complete the world so that the god would have fellow creators that he could relate to, I then moved on to ask (a) what parts of the world are unfinished, (b) what can I do to improve them, (c) what does it mean to be a creator, (d) what parts of the world are already set up as if by a friendly-to-humans force, and (e) how, if at all, can I engage in a personal relationship with creative forces so abstract and mighty as to be impersonal?

To me, anyway, these questions seem more interesting than endless variations on the theme of "Oh, hey, what's this life stuff all about?" and "Is there any point in trying to accomplish things?"

At the moment, I'm an atheist, and don't have much use for religion. I wouldn't say religion is so useful to existential journeys that it's worth trying to cram thoughts into your head that you don't believe -- but while I did 'naturally' believe in a religion, it offered me some useful benefits, which I enjoyed.

comment by Passing_Through · 2007-11-22T16:00:27.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Eliezer: partway through your essay you make the claim that when someone hits their semantic stopsign (eg, starts to say "God" or "Liberal Democracy", full-stop), that their statement at that point is better classified as a statement of tribal membership (or, perhaps, a tribal ritual to ward off discomfort?) than as an actual semantic statement addressing the question at hand.

Or, rephrased, if I ask "from whence came those physical laws" and you say "from God!", then under this theory the fairest re-statement of the semantic content of your utterance would be more "I am saying that thing that my tribe says in situations like this; your acquiescence at this point will increase my perception of your degree-of-belonging-to-my-tribe, and your refusal to continue with the refusal will be taken as an affirmative sign of your non-membership", with the apparent (surface?) semantics of the statement -- "God made those physical laws" -- immaterial for the forward movement of the conversation and quite possibly not even intended to be asserted.

(I think the previous is clear, but when I say "not even intended to be asserted" I mean something like the following scenario: imagine that I have a banking account with a "security question" that I picked to be "what is your favorite restaurant?", with the answer -- this computer expects perfect grammar -- chosen as "My favorite restaurant is McDonald's". Thus, if I find myself needing to access my bank account, there is a challenge-and-response sequence I need to perform correctly to access my account: "What is your favorite restaurant?" "My favorite restaurant is McDonald's." However, it's possible that McDonald's is no longer my favorite restaurant, or even that it never was my favorite restaurant and I just picked it for its easy rememberability. In either case, I have arrived at a situation where a set of actions I am taking look to a naive observer as stating that McDonald's is my favorite restaurant, when as a matter of fact the real "content" of the situation is more along the lines of "I want access to my bank account", with no sense in which it'd be fair to say that when I make those statements I am actually intending to make the semantic claim visible in my surface semantics. This is the sense in which I was trying to say that the surface claim may not even be intended to be asserted, regardless of the appearance of the discourse.)

Assuming that's a fair approximation to what you're stating, I am curious if you anywhere address what for me would be the next obvious question: if at the end of a sequence of "semantic" discourses we hit a point at which the better characterization is one of tribal membership rituals than "semantic" exchange, what is it that makes you assume that the previous discourses were "semantic" at all? There is certainly the possibility that people belong to a great many tribes, each with a great collection of challenge-and-response rituals, of which some have the form "why is the sky blue"..."because the atmosphere refracts light a certain way" and some of which have the form _..."because God made it so?"; in effect, that what you are calling semantic stopsigns are pathological not because they aren't really semantic, but because they are the boundary nodes (reflexive nodes?) on a giant graph of challenge-and-response tribal rituals?

I apologize for the length of the comment and question: I don't actually have a blog to post this to, and I would like to know if you've anywhere addressed what it is that makes you think that the discourse leading up to a semantic stopsign is in fact "semantic".

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, pnrjulius
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2009-11-11T02:37:51.538Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You didn't need to phrase all that as a question; it makes a nicely plausible thesis when plainly stated.

comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T04:59:44.858Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, hopefully not ALL our statements amount to tribal membership... then we couldn't even assert that our statements amount to tribal membership, now could we?

And clearly some of the things you might ask along the chain are normal, unproblematic questions, like "Why is there a dog in the yard?" and "Will it rain tomorrow?"; so I don't think it's a big stretch to presume that our discourse is properly semantic until we're given reason to think otherwise.

(Truth be told, I'm dubious of non-cognitivism in general; obviously it does work in your ATM example, and maybe even in the "God did it" example... but lots of people try to apply it to things where there really is an obvious propositional interpretation.)

comment by Richard2 · 2007-11-22T19:35:17.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Saying "God" is saying that something outside our universe created it. It answers the question of the origin of the universe because we have looked outside of it for a cause. In doing so, we have brought forward the thought that there is a "universe" outside of our own where God is... perhaps consisting of only God himself. This second universe could possibly have different laws governing it... perhaps making it possible for God to have no beginning.

Put it in perspective: DO YOU KNOW EVERYTHING? No. Do you know half of everything? No... but for the sake of argument, we'll say that you know half of everything. Do you think God may exist in the other half that you know nothing about?

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T05:00:45.663Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Substitute the word "unicorn" or "aliens" for "God" in the above and you will understand why we do not find it compelling.

That which can be asserted without evidence... can be dismissed without evidence.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2007-11-22T19:55:48.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I wonder if a religious bulletin board linked to this page or something? Clearly a lot of commenters here who haven't read anything else on Overcoming Bias.

Passing Through, Sam Harris discusses this in The End of Faith - even when beliefs are tribal, they can still act as beliefs and control behavior. E.g. suicide bombers.

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T05:01:24.585Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Though then they do have to have propositional content, so maybe we should say that they are stopsigns---but not merely stopsigns?

comment by Caledonian2 · 2007-11-22T20:55:16.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Why would we need to postulate new laws of physics to avoid a beginning?

comment by Robert2 · 2007-11-23T01:35:51.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Everything, everywhere, everywhere - chaos Something, somewhere, some when - reality Nothing, nowhere, no when - literally as written it defines itself as impossible. So reality is simply life enforcing stability upon chaos, by establishing a mutual finite probability out of infinite possibility. Not that little bangs, don't allow for a localised start overs. Little in terms of galactic clusters versus an infinite universe. As far as we are concerned a bloody big bang. Even more impressive these events are null time events, quicker than instant.

comment by tony_bandero · 2008-03-09T14:50:24.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it might be more productive to simply ignore god.

IMO we extend (scientific) enquiry by ignoring questioning taboos - e.g. the 'Copernican revolution.' For me a stop-sign is usually a direct display of power (sometimes it's indirect, when the speaker is deferring to 'its' authority.) i.e. the difference between 'As a close personal friend of Herr Furrer, I know he will not be pleased with your question' AND 'God, what would the Furrer think if he heard you say that?'

comment by Mark_Carranza · 2009-01-08T02:55:24.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The obvious next question is, why should we care what people believe so long as they conform to act within the range of behavior standards agreed upon by our now-global tribe? E.g. not suicide bombers.

The obvious next question, somewhat after that, is, is there an end to next questions?

N.B. not sarcastic here, seriously asking both questions. Forgive me if I've not done enough coverage of this site to encounter such discussion. Pointers welcome.

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T05:31:39.327Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

1) Because beliefs matter; a world where people are epistemically rational is, ceteris paribus, better than a world in which they are not.

2) Because you can't just shield off all your beliefs from the real world. You can try, and thereby make them almost not beliefs at all; but as long as they reside in your brain, they are moving neurotransmitters around in ways that they should not be moved. For example, consider how the idea of immortality affects the way people view existential risks: If you believe, or even suspect, that you might live forever in Heaven after you die, you'll be just a little bit less inclined to worry about that plague, that asteroid, that cascade of Von Neumann machines. Maybe not a lot less---but a little less, and that could make all the difference.

comment by gwern · 2010-06-23T15:57:38.382Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

From the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad (~6-700 BC), Olivelle translation:

Then Gargi Vacaknavi began to question him. 'Yajnavalkya', she said, 'tell me - since this whole world is woven back and forth on water, on what, then, is water woven back and forth?
'On air, Gargi.'
'On what, then, is air woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of the intermediate region, Gargi.'
'On what, then are the worlds of the intermediate region woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of the Gandharvas, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of the Gandharvas woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of the sun, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of the sun woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of the moon, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of the moon woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of the stars, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of the stars woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of the gods, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of the gods woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of Indra, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of Indra woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of Prajapati, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of Prajapati woven back and forth?'
'On the worlds of brahman, Gargi.'
'On what, then, are the worlds of brahman woven back and forth?'
At this point Yajnavalkya told her: 'Don't ask too many questions, Gargi, or your head will shatter apart! You are asking too many questions about a deity about whom one should not ask too many questions. So, Gargi, don't ask too many questions!'
Thereupon, Gargi Vacaknavi fell silent.

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T05:32:24.802Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So here we have the literal and Ur-example of semantic stopsigning.

comment by Perplexed · 2010-07-23T18:33:40.341Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Eliezer writes: "What distinguishes a semantic stopsign is failure to consider the obvious next question."

I think that you are being unfair here, because you are not reading the fine print. The signs actually read "Stop, then proceed with caution." The subtext is that if you proceed beyond this point, you are going to need a different kind of explanation than the one which has served so far. Ask an atheist where life today came from and he will tell you that it came from past life (and definitely from more than 6000 years ago). Pursue the chain of causality and eventually you will come to a stop sign. "Abiogenesis" says the smart atheist. "Prebiotic soup" catechises the stupid one. These are stop signs, but they are necessary stop signs. They don't so much fail to consider the obvious next question as warn that the obvious next question may be a misleading question. What is going on in the vicinity of the stop sign may be completely different in kind from the kind of thing you are familiar with. Or so claims the stop-sign poster. It is not an explanation, to be sure. But it is something of a hypothesis. Like a notation in the unexplored area of a map. "Here there be phase-transitions."

And if Eliezer believes that defenders of the idea of a First Cause have really failed to consider the obvious next question, then I have to marvel at his lack of scholarship. Hey, I am as atheist as the next guy, but I'm getting pretty tired of finding that all of the negative examples in this series are theists and alchemists. There are plenty more examples of bad thinking to pick on.

Replies from: Jeff_Rubinoff
comment by Jeff_Rubinoff · 2010-08-28T22:36:35.767Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What if you are trying to explain evolution to someone and he states "Evolution is just another religion." Is that a stop sign? To me it is, in the sense that the only reason to continue at that point would be to enjoy the sound of your own voice. The person has just signalled his membership in a tribe; you recognize that you are not in that tribe; and you recognize that he will not consider anything further you have to say on the subject, because that would be disloyal to the tribe. Global warming is a religion, taxation is theft, property is theft, healthcare is not a right (I'm not sure if the reverse is used as a flag, too), there is no peace without justice, "allopathic medicine"; there are a lot of them. I'm old enough to remember "The Soviet Union is a state in transition," too. (Sadly, it was in transition to total collapse.) All these statements are what Eliezer calls "Green and Blue" (I think--those are the two chariot racing team colors, right?) markers. I'm not sure if these statements are also semantic stop signs. Anyway, I think that class of statement is very different than statements like abiogenesis or prebiotic soup, because the latter statements indicate that the original topic has been exhausted. That line of reasoning has gone to its logical end, and to continue conversing, we must switch to a different discussion. Not quite the same thing as saying that "tribal loyalty dictates that I do not use reason to consider anything further you say on this subject."

Replies from: PaulAlmond, Mass_Driver, Perplexed
comment by PaulAlmond · 2010-08-28T22:45:10.846Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not necessarily. Maybe you should persist and try to persuade onlookers?

comment by Mass_Driver · 2010-08-28T23:09:18.679Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd be careful before writing off otherwise polite and thoughtful people as irrational loyalists simply on the basis of a single semantic stop sign.

For one thing, you might be getting a false positive -- sometimes I say things like "there is no peace without justice," but I don't mean to cut off debate about political science; I'm just trying to call people's attention to the possibility that the people they see as violent troublemakers may simply be responding to a perceived injustice.

For another, even an intentional semantic stop sign might not indicate unthinking loyalty; it may simply indicate that your listener has erroneously concluded that there is nothing more to say about a particular topic. Some libertarians might think that taxation is theft, not because they refuse to listen to your counterarguments, but because they can't imagine a morally legitimate real-world government.

Finally, attempting to identify semantic stop signs with the motive of screening out those who are unworthy of further conversation will inevitably lead to improper rationalization; you will feel subjectively that someone is unworthy of conversation and then concoct a story for yourself about why the other person has been using stop signs.

Thus, it is better to ask people what kind of argument might convince them than to assume that people are irrational.

comment by Perplexed · 2010-08-29T00:19:29.151Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What if you are trying to explain evolution to someone and he states "Evolution is just another religion." Is that a stop sign? To me it is, in the sense that the only reason to continue at that point would be to enjoy the sound of your own voice. The person has just signaled his membership in a tribe ...

Oh, I agree that it is a tribal slogan, signaling tribal membership. But before interpreting it as a stop sign, I'd want to ask myself just why he had come up with that particular slogan at that point in our conversation. Did he somehow perceive that I wasn't really explaining evolution, I was preaching it? That I wasn't just trying to correct misconceptions regarding a set of ideas, that I was trying to convert him? That I wasn't really interested in his opinions, but that I wanted him to enjoy the sound of my voice?

Well, yes, if that seems to be the reason that slogan just happened to pop into his head, then stopping is probably the best option.

But if it seems that he said that simply because it was his turn to speak and that is one learned slogan he hadn't used yet, then I would treat the statement as a question, "Evolution is just another religion, isn't it?" And I would answer, "No not like a religion at all. Evolution only deals with the subject matter of two chapters of Genesis; it doesn't even attempt to answer the questions that the rest of the Bible deals with. Some evolutionists are Catholics, some are Jews, some are Protestants, some are atheists. What kind of crazy religion is that?" Who knows? Maybe that will make him think a bit. But yes, beyond trying to clarify what evolution is and is not, I wouldn't try to get him to leave his tribe. I would feel rather silly if I had been trying to do that in the first place.

Evangelizing, rather than simply explaining, about science is pointless. You cannot succeed unless the person is open to learning. And if they are open, then explaining should be all that is needed.

comment by MoreOn · 2010-12-10T19:15:16.473Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What’s the alternative? Say I can’t solve something, like I couldn’t solve 3n+1 (aka Collatz conjecture).

1) Accept that this is something I can’t solve, and give up? Should I live with the frustration of an open question, rather than take comfort in deferring to a semantic stopsign?

2) Try to figure it out on the off chance that I can do better than the 6.5 billion living people plus the scholars of the past? (Almost drove myself mad with 3n+1). There’re other problems that I want to tackle, ones I CAN possibly solve, ones with greater applicability to real life… should I work on this one instead?

3) Should I force myself not to care? (Really difficult; my mind keeps coming back to 3n+1 no matter how counter-productive that is for all other areas of my life).

Replies from: JohnH
comment by JohnH · 2011-04-21T21:30:39.466Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There have always been questions that are unanswered. What those questions are change over time. If one believes that it is impossible to answer a question then for that person it most likely is, but not because it actually is impossible to solve or even that it is impossible for them to solve it. If problems were unsolvable because no one has solved them yet then where did any solutions of any problems ever come from?

Economic growth can only happen by solving unsolved problems or solving solved problems in unknown ways.

If the problem bothers you and you believe that you might possibly be able to solve it by studying the problem and working on possible solutions then you should try and solve it. It might be worthwhile to dedicate set amounts of time to the problem so that it doesn't cut into productivity in other areas of life. This would allow you to not worry much about the problem during the rest of the day, which is often helpful in solving difficult problems.

comment by theflyingfrogfish · 2011-04-07T12:57:52.873Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I must say I resent the allegation that all readers of this blog must be atheist - is it not permitted for me to be interested in rationality just because I am one of these 'obviously deluded' religious types.

And should you not, as a rationalist, accept the explanation that God created the universe, which is an explanation that fits the facts, and makes predictions about the future (even if you do not believe that the results can be observed), than accept that something happened (the Big Bang) which your worldview has no explanation for?

And why is God creating the universe paradoxical? Outside of this universe, with the physical laws that require causality, why does He require a beginning?

Replies from: wedrifid, TheOtherDave
comment by wedrifid · 2011-04-07T13:02:08.324Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And should you not, as a rationalist, accept the explanation that God created the universe, which is an explanation that fits the facts, and makes predictions about the future (even if you do not believe that the results can be observed), than accept that something happened (the Big Bang) which your worldview has no explanation for?

No. Basically not. You lost all your righteous momentum here and started sounding nutty.

Replies from: theflyingfrogfish
comment by theflyingfrogfish · 2011-04-07T13:05:04.289Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Care to explain my error? I'm somewhat new to this - why is a theory that has no explanation of the facts be placed above that which does?

Replies from: Plasmon
comment by Plasmon · 2011-04-07T13:31:34.604Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

1) The universe itself is also not something that exists inside the universe. Hence, if you think causality doesn't apply to your god, you shouldn't think causality applies to the universe as a whole either. (thus, your characterization of the big bang as a "theory that has no explanation of the facts" vs. theism as a theory which does explain the facts, is wrong)

2) You claim your religion predicts the future ("makes predictions about the future (even if you do not believe that the results can be observed)"). Presumably you refer to various afterlife-scenarios. The big bang theory predicts far more things which can be observed. Hence there is no reason for your theory (theism) to rise to the status of a hypothesis in the first place. Read Privileging the Hypothesis

3) The notion of "causality" in physics has changed a lot since the days of classical physics. It no longer corresponds to the naive notion of causality that might naively seem to require an uncaused cause.

Replies from: theflyingfrogfish
comment by theflyingfrogfish · 2011-04-07T16:04:06.207Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
  1. An interesting point - all my learning in astrophysics up to now had basically said that 'we don't know how it can have happened given that the laws of entropy and thermodynamics seem to prevent it'. Although the universe as a whole seems to obey at least some physical laws, e.g. expanding at a constant rate, etc. I happen to believe that there is a scientific explanation to be found for the Big Bang - I doubt that God will have created a perfectly cohesive set of scientific laws until you get to a certain point where he says 'Oh, all right, you got me there'. My point was more directed at what seems to be 'any scientific theory, even if it can't explain all the evidence, is better than any other theory, even if it can't be disproved'.

  2. The Big Bang and theism are in no way mutually exclusive - I myself have no problem that the Big Bang is probably the origin of the universe. As for predictions, there are various prophecies and suchlike in the old testament that were fulfilled in the new testament - though you will probably call doubt onto the reliability of these sources.

  3. My understanding of quantum physics is not as good as I wish it were - what is different?

Replies from: Plasmon
comment by Plasmon · 2011-04-07T17:54:38.672Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The Big Bang and theism are in no way mutually exclusive

I agree

As for predictions, there are various prophecies and suchlike in the old testament that were fulfilled in the new testament - though you will probably call doubt onto the reliability of these sources.

Those are predictions about the past, not about the future. If you accept this as evidence, have you studied a large amount of other religions to see if they make similar claims? And if you had lived before the events of the new testament, would you have been able to distinguish the (supposedly true) "old testament" predictions from the (false) predictions made by thousands of other prophets of thousands other religions/sects?

My understanding of quantum physics is not as good as I wish it were - what is different?

First, radio-active decay is uncaused (or so it appears, to the extent that quantum mechanics is correct). But that is not the point I was trying to make.

In (special) relativity, "causality" basically refers to "all observers agree about light cones" or "if information flows from space-time point a to space-time point b, all observers will agree that the information went from a to b instead of vice versa", or simply "No one observes information travelling to the past". No notion of "all effects have a cause" or anything like that.

In mechanics, say the description of a billiard table, (naive) causality seems obvious: why did this ball change its direction? Because it was hit by another ball! all the way back to a player hitting the first ball. But, there is the principle of least action (the related principle of least time is better known but describes light only). The principle of least action says that the trajectory of all those billiard balls is a stationary point of some functional (the action). In this view, there is nothing special about ball collisions. We ask "why did the ball change its direction (when it was hit by another ball or by the wall)" but we might as well ask "why didn't the ball change its direction (when it wasn't hit by another ball or by the wall)" and the first question is no more natural than the second. And the answer to both questions is the same: "because that path is a stationary point of the action functional".

The naive notion of causality requires a known "natural" or "unperturbed" state. Only if we already know Newton's first law, then we can be surprised at the ball's change of direction. How would we apply this to the beginning of the universe? If you don't already know the natural unperturbed behaviour of the universe at/very near the big bang, how can you justify being surprised that it behaved the way it behaved? So surprised, in fact, that you have to imagine one or more high-complexity extra-universal entity(s) kick-starting the process?

So using scientific notions of causality near the big bang will get you nowhere - they don't say anything about causes, just about the order of certain events.

Replies from: JohnH
comment by JohnH · 2011-04-21T22:18:49.266Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Those are predictions about the past, not about the future."

So Deuteronomy 28 predicted the scattering of the Jews to all nations of the earth. Then in Deuteronomy 30 it is predicted that they will be gathered from all nations of the earth (as well as if they are driven to the outmost parts of heaven they will be gathered from their). The Jews during the Roman times were scattered (documented fact) to all nations and have more recently begun to be gathered again to their ancient lands. (see Isaiah 11:11 as well).

That was a prediction that up until this last century was about the future, and a prediction that the century before was considered impossible. Take from it what you will.

Replies from: Brilliand
comment by Brilliand · 2015-09-02T17:12:51.336Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

People who knew about that prophecy deliberately helped to fulfill it. That destroys much of its value as evidence.

comment by TheOtherDave · 2011-04-07T13:57:37.196Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

is it not permitted for me to be interested in rationality just because I am one of these 'obviously deluded' religious types.

Of course it's permitted. We couldn't prevent your interest in rationality even if we wanted to, which we don't. Nor could we prevent your reading the blog, even if we wanted to, which we don't.

Whether theism is permitted is an uninteresting question.

I must say I resent the allegation that all readers of this blog must be atheist

I can understand why you would resent that.

Do you find it any more objectionable than your implication that we should all be theists -- that is, that we should "accept the explanation that God created the universe"?

should you not, as a rationalist, accept the explanation that [etc.]

I agree that "as a rationalist" I should, in general, prefer to accept an explanation for an event that fits the facts rather than accept the existence of an event that has no explanation.

I don't agree with your implication that I am actually forced to choose between "God created the universe" and "the Big Bang happened" (indeed, I know many theists who believe both), nor with your assertion that my "worldview" has no explanation for the Big Bang happening.

makes predictions about the future (even if you do not believe that the results can be observed),

Observing the results really ought to count for a lot... that's not something to casually throw away.

I mean, think about it: if I propose a theory that predicts certain results to certain tests, and you go out and perform those tests and you don't observe those results, what conclusion would you come to about that theory?

Replies from: theflyingfrogfish
comment by theflyingfrogfish · 2011-04-07T16:11:04.081Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you find it any more objectionable than your implication that we should all be theists -- that is, that we should "accept the explanation that God created the universe"?

I did not intend to imply anything of the sort - as I said above, I was more challenging the general attitude and querying my understanding of rationality than attempting to directly challenge anyone's theism or lack of same.

I don't agree with your implication that I am actually forced to choose between "God created the universe" and "the Big Bang happened" (indeed, I know many theists who believe both), nor with your assertion that my "worldview" has no explanation for the Big Bang happening.

I agree completely - I also believe that the Big Bang occurred. My point was more about why and how it happened, not if.

I mean, think about it: if I propose a theory that predicts certain results to certain tests, and you go out and perform those tests and you don't observe those results, what conclusion would you come to about that theory?

I don't mean that performing the tests will not give visible results, I mean that performing the test leaves you with difficulty in reporting your findings. Large chunks of the Bible is about predicting either the future or what was the future when it was written. And most religions make a pretty big prediction of and event that will definitely happen to all of us.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2011-04-07T17:09:45.162Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I did not intend to imply anything of the sort -

OK, fair enough.

For future reference, phrasings like "should you not, as an X, do Y?" will frequently be interpreted by native English speakers as implying that Xes should do Y. (In this case, that rationalists should accept "God created the universe" as an explanation.)

My point was more about why and how [the Big Bang] happened, not if.

Ah. Thanks for clarifying that.

For my own part, I have no clear idea why or how the Big Bang happened. Neither am I very clear about why and how stars were formed, or why and how the state borders of Louisiana were established, or why and how the Connecticut state constitution was ratified.

So I suppose you could say that I have a "worldview" that has no explanation for these things. It's hard to know for sure, since I'm not quite sure what "my worldview" refers to. I certainly believe that there is an explanation for how and why those things happened (several explanations, actually), if that clarifies anything.

But in none of these cases does my ignorance of why and how that thing happened strike me as particularly compelling evidence for anything particularly significant, and it certainly doesn't seem to be evidence that God created the universe, or the stars, or the state of Louisiana, or the Connecticut state constitution.

I don't mean that performing the tests will not give visible results, I mean that performing the test leaves you with difficulty in reporting your findings.

Now you've just confused me. Can you describe more concretely the test you have in mind, and what I should expect to experience after performing that test if God created the universe, and what I should expect to experience if the universe came into being some other way?

most religions make a pretty big prediction of and event that will definitely happen to all of us.

Again, I'm unsure what you mean. Can you be clearer about what event most religions predict that will definitely happen, and how that prediction serves as evidence about how and why the universe came into being?

Replies from: theflyingfrogfish, khafra
comment by theflyingfrogfish · 2011-04-07T17:57:59.142Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The test I was referring to was dying - if the afterlife is as a religion says it is, then it can probably be accepted that the rest of the religion's doctrine is correct - at least the essentials. Or if not, you could ask the Supreme Being what IS correct.

Conversely, if there is no afterlife, then if can be accepted that the religion is incorrect.

Obviously this does not apply to all religions, but server the purpose here, I believe.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2011-04-07T18:05:08.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ah, I see. Thanks for clarifying.

Sure, I agree: if, upon my death, I find myself in an afterlife consistent with religion X's teachings about the afterlife, and/or able to ask questions of some entity who claims to be the Supreme Being, I should update my beliefs about the likelihood of such an afterlife/Being.

Replies from: pnrjulius
comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T05:41:18.018Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But of course, we're pretty sure this won't happen. Indeed, let's consider two alternatives:

  1. Afterlife exists, but God set it up so that you can't report back because... uh... I'll get back to you?
  2. Afterlife doesn't exist, which is why you can't report back (there's nothing to report back from).

In more explicitly Bayesian terms, which is larger: P(~report|afterlife) or P(~report|~afterlife)? Pretty clearly the latter, right? So the lack of reports is therefore evidence against an afterlife. (Maybe not conclusive evidence, but evidence.)

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-05-19T14:49:48.073Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed that this is evidence against an afterlife.

comment by khafra · 2011-04-07T18:01:16.562Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Theflyingfrogfish means "everybody's going to die;" and he doesn't view that as the end of each person's ability to sense and evaluate. I would recommend to TFFF, on the subject of what religion claims regarding provability, to read this Yudkowsky post.

comment by omeganaut · 2011-05-11T02:16:51.492Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I find most of this article extremely enlightening on the foundation of many problems with modern life. I also, however, have issues with your examples concerning government and other semantic stop signs. Liberal democracy is not necessarily a stop sign. It is easily countered by asking what that has to do with anything, as no current country in the world has a true democracy. They have republics due to the sheer size of countries rendering direct democracy pointless. Also, governments are reliant on the intelligence of their leaders and on those who chose policies and laws. Stopping at Liberal Democracy means that you fail to ask about the possibility that the leaders are misguided or just plain wrong. With the nature of politics, there will always be one current political representative that a voter dislikes. Finally, there is one spot where a stop sign must be placed, and this is on right and wrong. I cannot foresee anyway in which an argument can be advanced past the point where morality dictates one action as better than another. There are explanations, but essentially right and wrong cannot be questioned, otherwise humanity may end up in a world much less pleasant than the current one.

Replies from: Swimmer963, Nornagest, pnrjulius
comment by Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg) (Swimmer963) · 2011-05-11T02:25:25.068Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I cannot foresee anyway in which an argument can be advanced past the point where morality dictates one action as better than another. There are explanations, but essentially right and wrong cannot be questioned, otherwise humanity may end up in a world much less pleasant than the current one.

If only everyone had the same definition of what is right and what is wrong...

comment by Nornagest · 2011-05-11T02:29:16.919Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Restricting "true democracy" to direct democracy essentially renders the category meaningless.

comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T05:43:08.561Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How does it help us to put a stop sign there, and not say slightly before or slightly after? Indeed, what is "there" exactly (the proposition "we ought to do what is right" strikes me as obviously true, but also sort of trivial).

comment by Arandur · 2011-08-03T00:13:33.902Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So the logical conclusion is that there is no beginning to time. *nods*

comment by buybuydandavis · 2011-09-22T09:19:20.667Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think Stop Sign is the best metaphor here.

People like God as an answer because they dislike uncertainty and thinking. It's useful precisely because it predicts nothing, but explains everything. "God did it" acts as a Finish Line more than a Stop Sign. It says the race is done, and grants license to stop running.

Am I the only one who thinks of those Family Circus cartoons with the ghostly "Not Me" and "I Dunno" anytime someone says that "God did it"?

comment by pnrjulius · 2012-05-19T04:48:32.923Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You know, that First Cause problem really is kinda a big one. Maybe we should be working on that?

comment by jooyous · 2013-01-26T02:20:02.509Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Okay, there needs to be a semantic stop-sign after "But why doesn't s/he like me?" taught to all children in middle school.

comment by CCC · 2013-01-30T06:38:51.054Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Why wouldn't you automatically ask, "Where did God come from?"

I asked that a long time ago, in Sunday School. I don't think anyone has a good answer to that (at the time I came up with a recursive answer that relied on time travel; I have not yet found a better answer).

comment by telms · 2013-02-25T05:58:37.280Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Speaking for a moment as a discourse analyst rather than a philosopher, I would like to point out that much talk is social action rather than reasoning or argument, and what is said is rarely all, or even most, of what is meant. Does anyone here know of any empirical discourse research into the actual linguistic uses of semantic "stopsigns" in conversational practice?

Replies from: imaginaryphiend
comment by imaginaryphiend · 2013-02-27T17:50:39.625Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Telms, it seems you are looking to tread in the path of the logical positivists where they sought to sort this out within a context of early Wittgenstein. Taken to the logical extreme with regard to a logical epistemic foundationalism, they tend to be generally dismissed, but in the context of an semantics relavant to general, meaningful discourse, i thought they tended to make a lot of good sense. Ironically, i keep going back to positivism. The irony being in the potential paradoxes of me seeing my self as essentially an epistemic nihilist. lol... I see it all metaphorically as an epistemology modelled visually to appear as ever expanding circles of reasoning, looking like an outward moving psychedelic spiral. If we try to deconstruct that psychedelic, perpetually moving spiral, we reach further and further towards an propositional foundation, but find we can only approach it as an infinitessimal, proposed, but not actually realizable, absolute beginning.

Replies from: telms
comment by telms · 2013-07-27T22:12:31.678Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Mmm, that's not really where I'm coming from. There is an aggressively empirical research tradition in applied linguistics called "conversation analysis", which analyzes how language is actually used in real-world interaction. The raw data is actual recordings, usually with video so that the physical embodiment of the interaction and the gestures and facial expressions can be captured. The data is transcribed frame-by-frame at 1/30th of a second intervals, and includes gesture as well as vocal non-words (uh-huh, um, laugh, quavery voice, etc) to get a more complete picture of the actual construction of meaning in real time. So my question was actually an empirical one. It's one thing to guess at an analytical level that "God" might be a stop-signal in religious debates or in question chains involving children. But is the term really used that way? Has anyone got any unedited video recordings of such conversations that we could analyze? After making very many errors of my own based on expectation rather than actual data, I tend to be skeptical of any statement that says "language IS used in manner X", when that manner is not demonstrated in data. Language CAN be used in manner X, yes, but is that the normative use in actual practice? We don't know until we do the hard empirical work needed to find out.

comment by AshwinV · 2014-02-18T14:25:50.175Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Another thing that can act as a semantic stopsign is not just a word, but sometimes an image. What I mean is actually something quite similar to the emergence phenomenon.

For example, I am just learning the basics of Economics. I just came across the rules of Supply and Demand. Instead of analysing and observing how these play out in the real world, I am just content to form an image in my head of prices moving up and down (based on moving graphs and numbers), and deciding that I know all there is to know and not bother finding out more for myself.

I agree that this seems like a somewhat weird thought experiment, but it highlights a kind of failure to think and one that was very real to me in the past. I don't know how many other people go through the same thing, but if I had stopped to think what I could predict based on this, and how it wasn't really all that useful, I would've been (or at least feel that I would've been) a lot better off.

comment by hearherenow · 2014-09-03T06:44:16.734Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Q: Where did the great abyss, Ginnungagap, come from?

A: From the rock I chipped off the big boulder.

comment by hcutter · 2017-02-24T12:59:27.993Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In reading these Sequences, I am noting that it is sometimes difficult to tell when you are building on an older body of work and when you are unaware of the older body of work and are independently deriving an equivalent concept. Semantic stopsigns is a particularly good example of this. Are you aware of the existence of another term for this: the thought-terminating cliché? (Sometimes thought-stopping cliché.) There is some fascinating literature on the subject of their use in cults, which may be directly applicable to understanding Dark Side techniques. For example: Singer, Margaret Thaler, Maurice K. Temerlin, and Michael D. Langone. "Psychotherapy cults." Cultic Studies Journal 7.2 (1990): 101-125.

comment by gridflash · 2018-07-06T16:00:12.736Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Good morning Eliezer,

Someone on another website posted a link to this interesting blog of yours. Of course you've always had an interesting perspective on things, esp. AI. But I will confine my comments to this thread.

As far as I can tell this entire thread assumes 'facts not in evidence'.

It assumes that existence requires a beginning

People who assume an entity like God created everything try to solve the problem of First cause by claiming God had no beginning.

Of course people searching for First Cause ignore the fact the the universe itself may have had no beginning.

First cause is an assumption like God. We have no evidence of either.

Replies from: gjm
comment by gjm · 2018-07-06T16:43:13.264Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Are you saying that Eliezer's original post assumes that existence requires a beginning? (I can't see that it does.) Or that subsequent discussion in comments here assumes that? (Maybe some people here do, but who cares?)

Replies from: gridflash
comment by gridflash · 2018-07-07T04:10:16.140Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm impressed that someone actually responded this quickly to an 11 year old thread.

Anyway gjm, in response to your question. No. Eliezer specifically avoided that issue.

As I stated in my first sentence, my post was about the comments in the thread.

People searching for First cause are like the people who believe in a God. They're both searching for something that has no beginning.

If you don't care about the issue why respond?

Replies from: gjm
comment by gjm · 2018-07-08T22:30:12.768Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sorry, it wasn't clear to me whether you were talking about the comments or about the OP; thanks for the clarification.

So, you're talking about the comments rather than the original post, and specifically about Eliezer's comments. Except that I can't find any comments from Eliezer in this thread that show (to me) the slightest sign of assuming that existence requires a beginning. Nor, actually, do the other comments seem to me like they're making such an assumption. There are a lot of them and I might have missed some, but I'm not seeing a general trend of making that assumption.

I think it would help if you were more specific. Could you point to a few specific things in this discussion that show the assumption in question being relied on?

(As to "If you don't care about the issue, why respond?": whether I care depends on exactly what the issue is, and I'm not yet sure what it is. The specific point I was making there is that if you were just saying "one or two people in an 11-year-old discussion made a dubious assumption" then I don't see why you'd care about that or why anyone else should. If you're saying that Eliezer made that assumption, or that the whole LW community did, that surprises me more because it doesn't seem to me like the sort of assumption I would expect either Eliezer or the whole LW community to make.)

comment by tlhonmey · 2020-10-16T16:48:34.734Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In a couple of Paul Graham's essays about neural network computing he suggests that Semantic Stopsigns are a necessary part of the design for general-purpose, parallel-computing intelligences to keep them from getting stuck in infinite loops attempting to solve infeasibly large problems.

The key is learning to recognize it as an "overflow error" flag and not a "this problem is solved" flag.  Internally they feel almost the same.

comment by Pierrot · 2022-09-19T15:01:49.828Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"What distinguishes a semantic stopsign is failure to consider the obvious next question."
Why does one fail to consider the obvious next question ? I believe it is often due to fear.

Fear of the unknown is allayed by tricking the mind into believing a societal explanation, "God", which is less scary than "I don't know".

Fear of looking like an idiot is allayed by tricking the mind into believing what "everyone knows". It reminds me of a quote attributed to George Leonard:

“Man”, he said, “you are a learner. Tell me. How can I be a learner?” 
“It’s simple. To be a learner, you’ve got to be willing to be a fool.”