Robustness to Scale
post by Scott Garrabrant
I want to quickly draw attention to a concept in AI alignment: Robustness to Scale. Briefly, you want your proposal for an AI to be robust (or at least fail gracefully) to changes in its level of capabilities. I discuss three different types of robustness to scale: robustness to scaling up, robustness to scaling down, and robustness to relative scale.
The purpose of this post is to communicate, not to persuade. It may be that we want to bite the bullet of the strongest form of robustness to scale, and build an AGI that is simply not robust to scale, but if we do, we should at least realize that we are doing that.
Robustness to scaling up means that your AI system does not depend on not being too powerful. One way to check for this is to think about what would happen if the thing that the AI is optimizing for were actually maximized. One example of failure of robustness to scaling up is when you expect an AI to accomplish a task in a specific way, but it becomes smart enough to find new creative ways to accomplish the task that you did not think of, and these new creative ways are disastrous. Another example is when you make an AI that is incentivized to do one thing, but you add restrictions that make it so that the best way to accomplish that thing has a side effect that you like. When you scale the AI up, it finds a way around your restrictions.
Robustness to scaling down means that your AI system does not depend on being sufficiently powerful. You can't really make your system still work when it scales down, but you can maybe make sure it fails gracefully. For example, imagine you had a system that was trying to predict humans, and use these predictions to figure out what to do. When scaled up all the way, the predictions of humans are completely accurate, and it will only take actions that the predicted humans would approve of. If you scale down the capabilities, your system may predict the humans incorrectly. These errors may multiply as you stack many predicted humans together, and the system can end up optimizing for some seeming random goal.
Robustness to relative scale means that your AI system does not depend on any subsystems being similarly powerful to each other. This is most easy to see in systems that depend on adversarial subsystems. If part of you AI system is suggest plans, and another part is trying to find problems in those plans, if you scale up the suggester relative to the verifier, the suggester may find plans that are optimized for taking advantage of the verifier's weaknesses.
My current state is that when I hear proposals for AI alignment that do not feel very strongly robust to scale, I become very worried about the plan. Part of this comes from feeling like we are actually very early on a logistic capabilities curve. I thus expect that as we scale up capabilities, we can get eventually get large differences very quickly. Thus, I expect that the scaled up (and partially scaled up) versions to actually happen. However, robustness to scale is very difficult, so it may be that we have to depend on systems that are not very robust, and be careful not to push them too far.
Comments sorted by top scores.
comment by Vaniver ·
2019-11-22T19:25:11.898Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Robustness to scale is still one of my primary explanations for why MIRI-style alignment research is useful, and why alignment work in general should be front-loaded. I am less sure about this specific post as an introduction to the concept (since I had it before the post, and don't know if anyone got it from this post), but think that the distillation of concepts floating around meatspace to clear reference works is one of the important functions of LW.Replies from: Raemon
↑ comment by Raemon ·
2019-12-01T23:40:08.429Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
(5 upvotes from a few AF users suggests this post probably should be nominated by an additional AF person, but unsure. I do apologize again for not having better nomination-endorsement-UI.
I think this post may have been relevant to my own thinking, but I'm particularly interested in how relevant the concept has been to other people who think professionally about alignment)Replies from: Buck
comment by paulfchristiano ·
2018-02-22T02:36:49.876Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm less interested in robustness to scaling down than scaling up; if we can verify empirically that a relevant component is (well) above the capability level at which the overall system would fail, then I don't see a strong reason for concern.
I'm ambivalent about robustness to relative scale, since it seems like you can often have strong empirical evidence about relative capabilities + pretty good theoretical reasons. As a particularly extreme example, my current scheme probably requires some assumption like "The model after N+1 gradient updates isn't that much better than model after N gradient updates." which I think is likely to be OK.Replies from: Raemon, Scott Garrabrant
↑ comment by Raemon ·
2018-02-22T03:07:01.665Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
While I'm not an AI researcher so not sure which concerns are most relevant, I'll say that "risk of scaling down" and "risk to relative scale" hadn't even been on my radar as things to pay attention to, so having them succinctly given handles to refer to seemed handy.Replies from: paulfchristiano
↑ comment by paulfchristiano ·
2018-02-23T06:23:46.783Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It does seem nice to group them and have clear handles.
ML researchers more often think about risks from scaling down and relative scale, since those come up more frequently (and are harder to fix) today.
↑ comment by Scott Garrabrant ·
2018-02-22T02:54:12.587Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I am worried that if you train both sides of playing an asymmetric game, you run into problems where you scale up at playing one side faster than playing the other side. This makes me think "The model after N+1 gradient updates isn't that much better than model after N gradient updates." is not enough of an assumption if you operationalize it in a way that ensures you are using the model to do the same thing in both cases, and if you don't operationalize it in that way, it seem like too strong of an assumption.Replies from: paulfchristiano
comment by Jan_Kulveit ·
2018-02-22T00:00:26.066Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Nice explanation of a concept, thanks.
My intuition from complex systems studies is I wouldn't be too content even with things which look robust - "scale invariant" properties of systems in most cases hold only across some orders of magnitude.
comment by Stuart_Armstrong ·
2018-03-01T12:34:50.660Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
For things that are not robust to scale, it's useful to have a clear understanding of the ways it can fail. For instance, my Oracle designs are robust to scale if the boxing assumptions hold, but fail if those assumptions fail. This gives you a clear understanding of where the problems might lie.
comment by Vanessa Kosoy (vanessa-kosoy) ·
2019-12-11T13:35:35.247Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This essay makes a valuable contribution to the vocabulary we use to discuss and think about AI risk. Building a common vocabulary like this is very important for productive knowledge transmission and debate, and makes it easier to think clearly about the subject.
comment by habryka (habryka4) ·
2019-12-02T01:05:41.706Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I've used the concepts in this post a lot when discussing various things related to AI Alignment. I think asking "how robust is this AI design to various ways of scaling up?" has become one of my go-to hammers for evaluating a lot of AI Alignment proposals, and I've gotten a lot of mileage out of that.
comment by Roland Pihlakas (roland-pihlakas) ·
2018-03-17T14:14:12.540Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Besides potential solutions that are oriented towards being robust to scale, I would like to emphasise that there are also failure modes that are robust to scale - that is, problems which do not go away with scaling up the resources:
Fundamental limits to computation due to fundamental limits to attention-like processes:
comment by Roland Pihlakas (roland-pihlakas) ·
2018-03-02T10:34:55.797Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Hello Scott! You might be interested in my proposals for AI goal structures that are designed to be robust to scale:
Using homeostasis-based goal structures:
Permissions-then-goals based AI user “interfaces” + legal accountability:
comment by G Gordon Worley III (gworley) ·
2018-02-22T19:05:51.669Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Scaling down is an interesting challenge. To consider what happens in natural intelligent agents like humans and dogs, to the extent dogs are scaled down humans dogs reliably make mistakes about human values that we might not consider graceful failures. For example, a guard dog might bite an intruder it doesn't recognize but a human might notice this "intruder" is wearing a police uniform and would not want to attack the intruder. The usual solution to this is to then either train the dog about police or restrain the dog in some way so that it can't cause harm until a human approves its actions, such as by putting it on a leash. In AI this might mean containment for scaled down AI by more powerful systems (either humans or more powerful AI) to verify its actions before it takes them.
comment by TurnTrout ·
2018-02-22T01:01:44.585Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Counterpoint - let’s say you have a proposal that is safer than the frontier in some respects, but doesn’t always generalize / scale. I imagine it would be better to submit the proposal anyways, while highlighting failure modes (scaling included). Submitting imperfect proposals in this way allows the community to poke holes, fix problematic aspects, and perhaps even discover new angles of attack while discussing the shortcomings. Replies from: dxu
↑ comment by dxu ·
2018-02-22T01:43:02.398Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The purpose of this post is to communicate, not to persuade. It may be that we want to bit [sic] the bullet of the strongest form of robustness to scale, and build an AGI that is simply not robust to scale, but if we do, we should at least realize that we are doing that. Replies from: Scott Garrabrant, TurnTrout
↑ comment by Scott Garrabrant ·
2018-02-22T02:12:06.263Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
While this may not be what is happening here, in general I think that when an author opens with "I acknowledge the following criticisms to my argument" they make it unfairly socially unacceptable to respond with "Yeah, but the criticisms." I think this is a bad discourse norm, and people should give that response more often.
↑ comment by TurnTrout ·
2018-02-22T02:51:29.797Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I was imagining someone with a bright yet flawed idea reading this post, realizing their idea doesn't scale, and ending up scrapping something redeemable that people with more expertise could have steelmanned. I'm not presuming that Scott was advocating a "totally scalable or STFU" criterion, but I wanted to put that consideration out there.