Philosophical schools are approaches not positions
post by casebash · 2015-10-09T09:46:31.711Z · LW · GW · Legacy · 41 commentsContents
41 comments
One of the great challenges of learning philosophy is trying to understand the difference between different schools of thought. Often it can be almost impossible to craft a definition that is specific enough to be understandable, whilst also being general enough to convey to breadth of that school of thought. I would suggest that this is a result of trying to define a school as taking a particular position in a debate, when they would be better defined as taking a particular approach to answering a question.
Take for example dualism and monism. Dualists believe that there exist two substances (typically the material substance and some kind of soul/consciousness), while monists believe that there only exists one. The question of whether this debate is defined precisely enough to actually be answerable immediately crops up. Few people would object to labelling the traditional Christian model of souls which went to an afterlife as being a Dualist model or a model of our universe with no conscious beings whatsoever as being monist. However, providing a good, general definition of what would count as two substances and what would count as one seems extraordinarily difficult. The question then arises of whether the dualism vs. monism debate is actually in a form that is answerable.
In contrast, if Dualism and Monism are thought of as approaches, then there can conceivably exist some situations Dualism is clearly better, some situations where Monism is clearly better and some situations where it is debatable. Rather than labelling the situation to be unanswerable, it would be better to call it possibly unanswerable.
Once it is accepted that dualism and monism are approaches, rather than positions the debate becomes much clearer. We can define these approaches as follows: Monism argues for describing reality as containing a single substance, while dualism argues for describing reality as containing two substances: typically one being physical and the other being mental or spiritual. I originally wrote this sentence using the word ‘modelling’ instead of ‘describing’, but I changed it because I wanted to be neutral on the issue on whether we can talk about what actually exists or can only talk about models of reality. If it was meaningful to talk about whether one or two substances actually existed (as opposed to simply being useful models), then the monism and dualism approaches would collapse down to being positions. However, the assumption that they have a "real" existence, if that is actually a valid concept, should not be made at the outset, and hence we describe them as approaches.
Can we still have our dualism vs. monism debate? Sure, kind of. We begin by using philosophy to establish the facts. In some cases, only one description may match the situation, but in other cases, it may be ambiguous. If this occurs, we could allow a debate to occur over which is the better description . This seems like a positional debate, but simply understanding that it is a descriptional debate changes how the debate plays out. Some people would argue that this question isn’t a job for philosophers, but for linguists, and I acknowledge that's there's a lot of validity to this point of view. Secondly, these approaches could be crystalised into actual positions. This would involve creating criteria for one side to win and the other to lose. Many philosophers who belong to monism, for example, would dislike the "crystalised" monism for not representing their name, so it might be wise to give these crystilised positions their own name.
We also consider free will. Instead of understanding the free will school of philosophy to hold the position that F0 exists where F0 is what is really meant by free will, it is better to understand it as an general approach that argues that there is some aspect of reality accurately described by the phrase “free will”. Some people will find this definition unsatisfactory and almost tauntological, but no more precise statement can be made if we want to capture the actual breadth of thought. If you want to know what this person actually believes, then you’ll have to ask them to define what they are using free will to mean.
This discussion also leads us a better way to teach people about these terms. The first part is to explain how the particular approach tries to describe reality. The second is to explain why particular situations or thought experiments seems to make more sense with this description.
While I have maintained that philosophical schools should be understood as approaches, rather than positions, I admit the possibility than in a few cases philosophers might have actually managed to come to consensus and make the opposing schools of thought positions rather than approaches. This analysis would not apply to them. However, if these cases do in fact exist, the appear to be far and few between.
Note: I'm not completely happy with the monism, dualism example, I'll probably replace it later when I come across a better example for demonstrating my point.
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comment by DanArmak · 2015-10-09T11:20:52.846Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Can you give a concrete example of using the monist vs dualist approach? An approach is presumably a way to solve some other problem, or to choose some behavior or belief. What are things that monists and dualists would do or believe (i.e. predict or expect) differently?
Some people would argue that this question isn’t a job for philosophers, but for linguists, and I acknowledge that's there's a lot of validity to this point of view
Linguists are mainly descriptive. Philosophers appear to be in large measure prescriptive. Arguing (prescriptively) for an approach should imply arguing that it's better than other approaches, in which case the judgement criteria and the goal should be made explicit. Can philosophy be described in such terms? Or would you say that philosophy is indeed better understood as being descriptive?
Certainly some philosophy is concerned with being descriptive - it tries to describe what people actually believe or alieve, and to draw logical conclusions from that or to make it consistent. But I'm pretty sure the philosophical debates of monism vs dualism, or free will vs. lack of it vs. various ways of explaining it in other terms, aren't simply debates about what "normal" people (i.e. not philosophers) believe or alieve about these subjects.
We also consider free will. Instead of understanding the free will school of philosophy to hold the position that F0 exists where F0 is what is really meant by free will, it is better to understand it as an general approach that argues that there is some aspect of reality accurately described by the phrase “free will”. Some people will find this definition unsatisfactory and almost tauntological, but no more precise statement can be made if we want to capture the actual breadth of thought. If you want to know what this person actually believes, then you’ll have to ask them to define what they are using free will to mean.
("tauntological": using circular arguments in a debate to taunt your over-logical opponent into a frenzy)
That does seem tautological - and independently so of the words "free will". Every person who (honestly) claims that X believes in X, but you have to ask them what they're using the word X to mean. That's kind of obvious.
What interesting things are there to say about what philosophers actually use "free will" to mean, and what they believe about those things? Your post doesn't seem to say anything about this.
Replies from: casebash↑ comment by casebash · 2015-10-09T12:44:53.203Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Can you give a concrete example of using the monist vs dualist approach?
I've been thinking I need to find a better example, but I don't have one now. I'll have some more examples of use in future posts, right now I'm just trying to produce a coherent description of the core meta-philosophical concepts that I'll need.
"But I'm pretty sure the philosophical debates of monism vs dualism, or free will vs. lack of it vs. various ways of explaining it in other terms, aren't simply debates about what "normal" people (i.e. not philosophers) believe or alieve about these subjects"
I've edited my post to clarify that part of it - it only becomes linguistic after a certain point:
"We begin by using philosophy to establish the facts. In some cases, only one description may match the situation, but in other cases, it may be ambiguous. If this occurs, we could allow a debate to occur over which is the better description..." I've added this text in italics.
That does seem tautological - and independently so of the words "free will". Every person who (honestly) claims that X believes in X, but you have to ask them what they're using the word X to mean. That's kind of obvious.
My point is simply that no more precise statement that captures the full-breadth can be made. We can linguistically analyse "free will" to explain what the most common interpretations of the term are, but we'll always miss something. This vaguely reminds me of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, we can have a definition that captures the full-breath (but tells us almost nothing specific), or we can have something super-formally specified that completely fails at breadth.
Replies from: DanArmak↑ comment by DanArmak · 2015-10-09T13:13:42.127Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
We can linguistically analyse "free will" to explain what the most common interpretations of the term are, but we'll always miss something.
There are two completely different problems we can try to solve.
The first problem is, "what do people mean by the words 'free will', and what do they believe about the concept they reference, and why do they use these words or concepts to begin with"? This is a problem for linguists, anthropologists, historians, psychologists, neurologists, maybe even evolutionary biologists. And it's a completely empirical one, even if hard to solve.
Crucially, it doesn't seem to be a problem in need of philosophy, unless philosophers are somehow selected or self-selected so that their own self-reports are more valuable than those of other people, while still being representative of people in general. (Nobody really wants to know the answer to "'what do philosophers use the words 'free will' to mean, which is completely unrelated to what everyone else uses those words to mean?")
I hope everyone would agree that whatever people mean by words, and believe about their referent, doesn't necessarily prove any objective truths about the referent.
The second problem we can try to solve is whether there actually is free will and how it should be best described. Of course, if different people mean different things by "free will", then this is a set of different and unrelated problems. Since we're presumably motivated by actual problem(s) and not by the mere occurrence of these words - even if the problems are driven by intuition and not by empirical evidence - we should be able to taboo the words "free will" and state the problems directly. Solving the second kind of problem should not require first solving the first one.
Have philosophers done this? Did they turn out to be working on the same questions? Do they have any good arguments for any of their positions beyond intuitions (which should be used to solve the first kind of question, not the second one)?
ETA: for example, a dualist might say: "spirits can affect matter, creating material effects that don't have detectable material causes. This action is called the free will of the spirit, particularly a human spirit." This might be a strawman which no-one actually believes, but it would be a concrete statement about free will, trying to solve the second kind of problem.
Of course, everything I've said here about free will is applicable to any philosophical debate where not everyone agrees about the meaning of the words being debated.
Replies from: torekp, TheAncientGeek↑ comment by torekp · 2015-10-16T16:09:54.663Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In your first case, you gave a classic example of experimental philosophy. I completely disagree with your characterization of the subject as non-philosophical . Proto-philosophical , I'd suggest. Concept mapping is an excellent starting point for recommendations on how to improve our understanding of problems that involve substantial conceptual confusion.
Google x-phi (yes it has a nickname ) and you'll see plenty of work on free will, as well as plenty of metaphilosophical debate on its usefulness.
Up voted - great comment regardless of the above disagreement.
↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-11T02:18:16.320Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The second problem we can try to solve is whether there actually is free will and how it should be best described.> Of course, if different people mean different things by "free will", then this is a set of different and unrelated problems. Since we're presumably motivated by actual problem(s) and not by the mere occurrence of these words - even if the problems are driven by intuition and not by empirical evidence - we should be able to taboo the words "free will" and state the problems directly. Solving the second kind of problem should not require first solving the first one.
Have philosophers done this?
Yes, naturalistic Libertarians have put forward empirically testable theories of free will, in which the term "free will "is tabooable.
Replies from: DanArmak↑ comment by DanArmak · 2015-10-11T07:58:25.649Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I agree with the SEP when it says that:
If the truth of determinism would preclude free will, it is far from obvious how indeterminism would help.
If the non-deterministic behavior is entirely random (i.e. unpredictable), it clearly doesn't describe our free will. But if it obeys various rules, then how is it different from ordinary dualism, with these rules describing a non-material domain with 'uncaused causes'?
This approach seems so much based on trying to prove intuitions about free will that it persists long after any unbiased person would say, fine, we proposed an empiric theory and it was empirically proven false, case closed, there is no free will.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-11T10:29:04.386Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If the non-deterministic behavior is entirely random (i.e. unpredictable), it clearly doesn't describe our free will
That is exactly what naturalistic libertarians dispute. Here "clearly" means not "can be seen to be true at a glance", but "seems true when not thought about too much". The argument is on a par with "saying that of course things can travel faster than light, I don't see what is stopping them"? The SEP quote does not preclude non-obvious claims.
This approach seems so much based on trying to prove intuitions about free will that it persists long after any unbiased person would say, fine, we proposed an empiric theory and it was empirically proven false, case closed, there is no free will.
Wrong way round. Naturalistic libertarians are proposing empirically testable claims, the opponents who seek to reject their claims using the One-Line Argument are the ones using intuition. (Of course,naturalistic libertarians also have opponents who can make a detailed and informed critique).
Replies from: DanArmak↑ comment by DanArmak · 2015-10-11T10:44:45.565Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
When I say that:
If the non-deterministic behavior is entirely random (i.e. unpredictable), it clearly doesn't describe our free will
Here is what I mean.
Our free will is clearly partially predictable. We are somewhat rational and highly consistent actors, not random noise generators. I can predict what I'll do in various situations, and even what other people will do, much better than by chance.
Now of course you might say the predictable part comes from ordinary physics, and the unpredictable element is free will. But if free will is equated to pure random noise, I really don't think it's doing any useful work anymore except for saying "the universe isn't deterministic". It doesn't match the intuition we started out trying to explain.
What do nat-libs claim? Do they think free will is 'entirely random' or 'entirely unpredictable' (which may be slightly different), and what do they use those words to mean, exactly?
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-11T16:15:32.069Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Now of course you might say the predictable part comes from ordinary physics, and the unpredictable element is free will. But if free will is equated to pure random noise, I really don't think it's doing any useful work anymore except for saying "the universe isn't deterministic". It doesn't match the intuition we started out trying to explain.
If free will means the ability to do things that aren't entirely determined by previous and external circumstances, then partial randomness explain free will. If free will means having an inner homuncular self that is the ultimate source of deciion making, then it doesn't. Note the difference between the two definitions..one describes a kind of outcome or manifestation of free will, the other defines a possible underlying mechanism for it..in fact, a supernaturalistic mechanism. Natualistic liberatarians aren't beholden to defend a non-naturalistic theory of free will, so they are not obliged to defend the second definition of free will, only the first.
What do nat-libs claim? Do they think free will is 'entirely random' or 'entirely unpredictable' (which may be slightly different), and what do they use those words to mean, exactly?
No, they think it is partly random. See http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/two-stage_models.html
Replies from: DanArmak↑ comment by DanArmak · 2015-10-12T12:07:41.787Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
All two-stage models seem to have this in common: first there is a random, nondeterministic, unpredictable, or 'free' stage, which generates possibilities. Then there is a rational, at least partially predictable 'will' stage which chooses an action from the possibilities presented.
This might well be a good neurological or psychological model of decision making. (Although I'd expect the actual implementation to have multiple sources of suggestions, and multiple modules and layers of filtering and choosing.) I just don't see what it has to do with "free will".
All discussion of "free will" starts with the fact that we feel like we are freely choosing from possible alternatives. It doesn't matter here how the alternatives were generated: when presented with a multiple choice test, where the alternatives are fixed, we still we're exercising free will in answering it. Why does it help to specify that the generation of possibilities is random?
(Some of) the philosophers quoted in your link say the benefit is being able to choose otherwise in exactly identical repeating circumstances (e.g. simulation reruns) because the generation of alternatives is not deterministic. I don't see why that would be a good thing: it just means that some of the time you won't generate an alternative that you would have chosen in those runs where you did generate - in other words, you lose out because you don't or can't generate all the alternatives all the time.
If the generation process is thought to be completely random, and the selection process completely deterministic, I don't see how this matches an intuition of "free will". (Granted, arguing about intuitions is usually silly in the first place and assumes too much about the typical mind.)
So what are the empirical claims these models make? At least, that we should find in the brain a separation between random generation of ideas (e.g. amplification of chance or chaotic events) and rational selection of outcomes. That would be a great day for the neuro sciences. I just don't think it would convince anyone about anything regarding "free will" or the lack thereof. (After all, philosophers kept believing in free will even when physicists were quite sure the universe was deterministic...)
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-13T11:32:15.137Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
All discussion of "free will" starts with the fact that we feel like we are freely choosing from possible alternatives.
it might be the case that the issue "starts with" the feeling of being able to make choices, but it starts in the sense that what the debate is about is the most direct interpretation of this feeling that we actually can make free choices. The debate is about what causes, or underlies, or best explains the feeling. For centuries there has been a debate about the conflict between free will and determinism (or, earlier, between free will and divine omniscience or foreordination). That hasn't been centuries of people stupidly failing to notice that the feeling of freedom is trivially compatible with any amount of determinism so long as the feeling is taken to be an illusion.
It doesn't matter here how the alternatives were generated: when presented with a multiple choice test, where the alternatives are fixed, we still we're exercising free will in answering it.
How do you know? For what value of "free will"? It is now acknowledged that there are different concepts of free will. The compatibilist concept is about being able to make choices without external duress, so by that definition your answers are freely chosen so long as no one is pointing a gun at your head, or anything like that. But is is obvious that most people are free most of the time under that definition, so the historical debate cannot have been about that concept.
The incompatibilist concept of free will contains further conditions, in particular the condition that when we make a free choice we could have done otherwise. That is a straight contradicition to strict determinism, because under determinism, there is no way things could have been otherwise.
Why does it help to specify that the generation of possibilities is random?
Because random possibilities are free from determination by past events, thus allowing that affairs in fact could be otherwise, that multiple real possibilities are actually available.
(Some of) the philosophers quoted in your link say the benefit is being able to choose otherwise in exactly identical repeating circumstances (e.g. simulation reruns) because the generation of alternatives is not deterministic. I don't see why that would be a good thing: it just means that some of the time you won't generate an alternative that you would have chosen in those runs where you did generate - in other words, you lose out because you don't or can't generate all the alternatives all the time.
The point is to give an explanation of what the feeling of free choice seems, directly, to be, not to give an account of why it is valuable or optimal.
If the generation process is thought to be completely random, and the selection process completely deterministic,
The generation process cant be completely random, the range of ideas you can generate has to be constrained by your past history and experience...a caveman can't come up with relativity.
So what are the empirical claims these models make? At least, that we should find in the brain a separation between random generation of ideas (e.g. amplification of chance or chaotic events) and rational selection of outcomes. That would be a great day for the neuro sciences. I just don't think it would convince anyone about anything regarding "free will" or the lack thereof. (After all, philosophers kept believing in free will even when physicists were quite sure the universe was deterministic...)
A lot of philosophers kept believing in compatibilist free will, which is..well..compatible with determinsim. Very few kept believing in incompatibilist free will. In fact, the revival of incompatibilist libertarianism has come partly from physics, since the "news" that the universe isn't necessarily deterministic has filtered through very slowly to philosophy...Tony Dore, the Information Philosopher actually has a physics background.
Replies from: DanArmak↑ comment by DanArmak · 2015-10-13T12:20:33.505Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
That hasn't been centuries of people stupidly failing to notice that the feeling of freedom is trivially compatible with any amount of determinism so long as the feeling is taken to be an illusion.
Suppose we're in one of two possible worlds, and we don't know which. One is deterministic (or its random components are irrelevant to human choice) and has an illusion of free will. The other has 'real' free will, whether in a two-stage model or otherwise. The humans in both worlds have the same experiences and intuitions about free will.
How can we tell in which world we are? It would help if the fact of having this intuition was relevant evidence; after all, it's the only reason we're even investigating the subject. Is it evidence? And which way does it point? That's what I'd like to see addressed. Is there a specific argument that having this intuition is evidence that it is true?
This is just like the objection to p-zombies: they imply that the fact of consciousness isn't the cause of experiencing and talking about consciousness. Similarly, imagine p-fwills that behave the same as us and report the experience of free will, but they don't really have free will, they're just deterministic machines.
Two-stage models are supposed to make empirical predictions, so unlike p-zombies, we should be able to detect such creatures and differentiate them from us. One way to do this would be to prove that they are deterministic whereas we are not. But p-fwills have the same intuition as us about free will, so having free will isn't a cause of the intuition.
The question of whether having free will would be a cause of such an intuition is the one that should be settled proof.
The incompatibilist concept of free will contains further conditions, in particular the condition that when we make a free choice we could have done otherwise. That is a straight contradicition to strict determinism, because under determinism, there is no way things could have been otherwise.
Who cares whether we could have done otherwise? In real life we never actually experience the exact same circumstances twice, so why would whether or not we could do otherwise be causally related with us having the free will intuition, which is what we're trying to explain?
Replies from: TheAncientGeek, Jiro↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-14T08:20:25.305Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Suppose we're in one of two possible worlds, and we don't know which. One is deterministic (or its random components are irrelevant to human choice) and has an illusion of free will. The other has 'real' free will, whether in a two-stage model or otherwise. The humans in both worlds have the same experiences and intuitions about free will.
How can we tell in which world we are?
With naturalistic libertarianism you need to determine that physical indeterminism exists, which you can do with experiment based on EPR and Bell's theorem and suchlike, and you also need to verify that the brain uses indeterminiosm in some appropriate way. I stated earlier that naturalistic libertarians put forward falsifiable hypotheses.
But p-fwills have the same intuition as us about free will, so having free will isn't a cause of the intuition.
That doesn't follow. In the FW universe, individuals could feel they have FW because they do, in the other, the feeling could be caused by something else.
The question of whether having free will would be a cause of such an intuition is the one that should be settled proof.
I don't see why. The way fo verifying the existence of naturalistic FW I outlined above doesn't particularly dpeend on the feeling of FW, and could even be applied in a third hypothetical universe where FW exists, but people don't feel they have it.
It would help if the fact of having this intuition was relevant evidence; after all, it's the only reason we're even investigating the subject.
That's the "starts with" problem again. It might well be the psychological motivation for getting interested int he subject, but that doesn't at all means it is the sole evidence that can be brought to bear, or the only thing that needs explaining.
Who cares whether we could have done otherwise?
Free will is what the feeling of free will seems to be. Since we feel that we could have done otherwise, as when we regret an action, the actual ability to have done otherwise is something to look for when looking for the reality of free will.
Is it evidence?
When you are trying to find if something exists, you are looking for something that has all the characteristics it is supposed to have, and that is one of the characteristics it is supposed to have.
ETA Bu that is just the beginning. A decision that could have been otherwise has potentially far greater importance than a "decision" that was inevitable, because it potentially brings about a different future.
Replies from: torekp↑ comment by torekp · 2015-10-16T16:39:48.220Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In the FW universe, individuals could feel they have FW because they do,
Not if it's ours or like ours. Here I'm taking the two stage model as the definition of FW; ordinarily I wouldn't. We feel we have FW because we notice that our intentions cause our actions, and because we aren't aware of any sufficient cause of our intentions, and because we are usually liable to think our minds are much more transparent to ourselves than they actually are. Since we see no cause and think it's transparent we often infer there is no cause.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-17T10:10:20.373Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You are implicitly taking it that "has a cause" means "no free will". I am taking it "that having an external cause" means no FW. It seems reasonable that FW means causing one's own actions, so it is not exclusive of all forms of causality.
Replies from: torekp↑ comment by torekp · 2015-10-19T01:24:05.360Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
When I wrote "we aren't aware of any sufficient cause of our intentions," you should charitably interpret that as "any sufficient external cause." That doesn't change the result. Suppose the two stage model is correct for us. In a universe as like ours as possible but deterministic, human beings would think their actions lacking in any external cause. They would think so for the same reason we think so about ourselves.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-19T10:09:51.639Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
There's a difference between would and might. Lack of knowledge of causes, etc, could explain the feeling of Fw. The actual existence of FW could explain the feeling of FW. Your response to the second hypothesis is "Not if i[the universe is] ours or like ours". You are taking one of the possible , mechanisms for a feeling of FW to be the only possible one, or as somehow masking the other, without supplying a reason for believing it to be so.
Replies from: torekp↑ comment by torekp · 2015-10-22T00:14:11.168Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yes, masking, or better, confounding. If 50% of the time when you say "horse", your horse-beliefs are actually caused by cows, then you're not a reliable horse detector. The research by Libet, Wegner, etc. applies to the selection of options stage, not just the generation stage, and shows significant influence of "external" causes. Scare quotes: "external" by most libertarians' lights. (In my view, this is not a problem, but I'm a dyed in the wool compatibilist.) Supposing our universe to have some decisions fitting the libertarian two-stage model, nevertheless in other cases we are just as prone as the guys in the other universe to think ourselves "initiators" of causal chains.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-23T16:23:17.990Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
e research by Libet, Wegner, etc. applies to the selection of options stage, not just the generation stage, and shows significant influence of "external" causes.
From what I have seen of such research ""external" equates to "unconscious", ie free will is tacitly taken to be conscious volitional control. That idea is part of the cluster of issues that make up the problem of free will, but its not the same as libertarian free will. As far as I am concerned, the beliefs and values of my unconscious mind are my beliefs and values..I don't think I am taken over by an external force when my System 1 decides something.
Understanding the topic conceptually is important, and is often what goes missing in the naiver empirical approaches.
(In my view, this is not a problem, but I'm a dyed in the wool compatibilist.)
Compatibilist free will is almost trivially compatible with determinism, which is a strong clue that is is not what the historical debate has been about. So now we have three things: libertarian free will, compatibilist free will, and conscious control.
Replies from: torekp↑ comment by torekp · 2015-10-24T00:43:55.384Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm with you on System 1, and that is a big flaw in the way Libet and Wegner present their results. But more importantly, on further thought, their causal diagrams are probabilistic. So possibly, you're right: our beliefs about lack of cause could be caused by an actual indeterminacy, while in an otherwise similar deterministic universe their beliefs are caused by something else. I was wrong to object to that claim.
I still see no appeal in such indeterminism, but that's another story.
↑ comment by Jiro · 2015-10-13T15:34:37.080Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Who cares whether we could have done otherwise? In real life we never actually experience the exact same circumstances twice, so why would whether or not we could do otherwise be causally related with us having the free will intuition, which is what we're trying to explain?
In real life, we never experience having to divert a trolley to run over a fat man, either.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek, DanArmak↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-14T08:47:21.238Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Equivalents occur, for instance Churchill's decision to destroy the French fleet to prevent it falling into German hands.
↑ comment by DanArmak · 2015-10-13T20:41:52.991Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
These two things are not the same.
Trolley problems are useful as test cases of moral theories in unusual and cleanly-defined situations. They can help confirm or disprove a moral theory which we would then apply in the situations we do encounter in real life.
Experiencing the same circumstances twice, down to the level of large-scale physical determinism, is the only case free-will incompatibilists seem to be concerned with. If we could all agree that "free will doesn't matter because even in a deterministic world we are never in the same situation twice", then there would be no mystery of free will left to solve. Two-stage models are only necessary or useful because they introduce indeterminancy or randomness. If the circumstances never repeat exactly, you don't need randomness or indeterminancy, you just need input-sensitivity.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-14T09:08:13.115Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It is a mistake to think that the exact repetition of circumstances is the only thing that could make CHDO matter. In the absence of FW, all decisions are equally inevitable, and the future happens as it must, so there is no criterion for identifying an important decisions. Given FW, different alternate futures pivot on decisions made at a point in time.
comment by Douglas_Knight · 2015-10-11T01:38:25.175Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If you can't think of any examples, maybe your theory is wrong.
Replies from: casebashcomment by polymathwannabe · 2015-10-09T16:29:07.882Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
From my high school philosophy classes I only remember phenomenology as an example of a philosophical school that preferred to operate as a method instead of as a set of claims.
comment by ChristianKl · 2015-10-10T20:50:18.666Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I don't think the drive to classify philosophers into schools is very helpful.
comment by buybuydandavis · 2015-10-11T21:31:15.833Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This is the kind of question where Korzybski comes in handy.
The map is not the territory. Maps can be more or less accurate, and more or less easy to use. The question is whether the map helps me get where I want to go, or leads me astray. Dualism or monism are two different structural commitments. What does each buy, and what do they cost?
Philosophical schools are approaches not positions
Yep. A map is a means to get somewhere.
comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2015-10-09T15:26:55.646Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"One of the great challenges of learning philosophy" is actually separating the chaff ( something like 99% of what philosophers talk about) from the wheat.
Let's take your examples. Dualism vs monism can be boiled down to something like "can p-zombies exist?", which can eventually be answered by AI research and cognitive sciences. The rest is chaff. With free will, the situation is even worse. You write "no more precise statement can be made if we want to capture the actual breadth of thought", whereas plenty of more precise statements can be made, and are made, by outside researchers, like Scott Aaronson (see his paper The Ghost in the Quantum Turing Machine and the relevant discussion on his blog: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1951).
Incidentally, the two examples you mention are basically equivalent, as solving one clears up the other.
Replies from: Dagon, TheAncientGeek↑ comment by Dagon · 2015-10-09T18:15:57.037Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"can p-zombies exist?", which can eventually be answered by AI research and cognitive sciences
Wait, what?
I agree it's a good example, but I think it's a good example that many philosophical distinctions (whether you call them approach, model, or position) are linguistic and definitional rather than factual debates or predictions of future experiences.
The whole point of the p-zombies (and the earlier chinese room) thought experiment is that there is no test or measurement which can distinguish whether some not-you entity is conscious. No research or science can resolve it - it's purely about whether something non-physical exists.
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2015-10-09T22:48:43.234Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The whole point of the p-zombies (and the earlier chinese room) thought experiment is that there is no test or measurement which can distinguish whether some not-you entity is conscious. No research or science can resolve it - it's purely about whether something non-physical exists.
Yudkowsky's argument about consciousness, as I understand it, is:
There is some cognitive experience that we have that we label 'consciousness', and seems to be a listener that also speaks. Because it is heard in-universe, it must be generated in-universe, because we define the boundaries of our universe causally.
We can imagine that there is a listener that cannot speak--i.e., there is some audience somewhere listening to our mental life and experiencing things, but this audience has no causal interaction with the universe that our bodies live in.
It is a category error to combine the two into one concept, and there cannot be, in principle, an in-universe difference between p-zombies and conscious people.
So if we discover the in-universe generator for the cognitive experience we label consciousness, then the question of whether or not there are other universes listening in on us becomes way less interesting, and obviously distinct from the question of "why do I feel like I'm experiencing things?" AI research and cognitive sciences can plausibly discover that generator in the material universe, which means we no longer need to rely on an immaterial universe to provide cognitive experience.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-11T11:03:32.821Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
We can imagine that there is a listener that cannot speak--i.e., there is some audience somewhere listening to our mental life and experiencing things, but this audience has no causal interaction with the universe that our bodies live in.
It is very unclear what that means. The overall thrust seems to be trying to say something about consciousness by saying something about p-zombies by saying something about epiphenomenalism. But epiphenomenalism is a one way cuausal interaction..the "listener" has to be on the end of a causal chain coming form whaterver it is listening too.
There is some cognitive experience that we have that we label 'consciousness', and seems to be a listener that also speaks. Because it is heard in-universe, it must be generated in-universe, because we define the boundaries of our universe causally.
What does "we define the boundaries of our universe causally" mean? Does it mean everything has a cause , or an effect or both , or what?
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2015-10-11T12:11:53.054Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
What does "we define the boundaries of our universe causally" mean? Does it mean everything has a cause , or an effect or both , or what?
In this context, everything "inside the universe" has an effect, directly or indirectly, on other things in the universe. This means being 'in the same universe' isn't a symmetric relationship--if A and B can both affect C, but not be affected by C or each other, C perceives the universe as containing all three of them, and A and B both perceive the universe as only containing themselves.
This sequence has more.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-11T16:07:22.714Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In this context, everything "inside the universe" has an effect, directly or indirectly, on other things in the universe. This means being 'in the same universe' isn't a symmetric relationship--if A and B can both affect C, but not be affected by C or each other, C perceives the universe as containing all three of them, and A and B both perceive the universe as only containing themselves.
Let's suppose that C means epiphenomenal consciousness. Now consider:
There is some cognitive experience that we have that we label 'consciousness', and seems to be a listener that also speaks. Because it is heard in-universe, it must be generated in-universe, because we define the boundaries of our universe causally.
But consciousness is heard by itself. All the above suggests is that consciousness would perceive a physical universe, ie its universe would contain both itself and matter, wand that is consistent with what is perceived. If consciousness is an epihenomenal dangler, then , by the above, it wouldn't be in the universe as it appears to A and B, taken as physical events. But that just restates what epiphenomenalism state...it's not a contradiciton to anything.
PS: Not a sincere believer in epiphenomenalism. Just pointing out that you can't argue against epiphenomenalism by pointing out that it is epiphenomenalism.
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2015-10-11T20:06:51.510Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
But that just restates what epiphenomenalism state...it's not a contradiciton to anything.
It is a contradiction to the claim that epiphenomenal consciousness is why in-universe bodies discuss the experience of consciousness. That has to be done by phenomenal consciousness, and that strikes me as the only interesting sort of consciousness.
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-12T10:32:26.618Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It is a contradiction to the claim that epiphenomenal consciousness is why in-universe bodies discuss the experience of consciousness.
Which would be more significant if epiphenomenalists made that claim. Actually, they don't, they bite the bullet about the issue. But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
That has to be done by phenomenal consciousness, and that strikes me as the only interesting sort of consciousness.
Phenomenal consciousness contrasts with access consciousness, not epiphomenal consciousness.
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2015-10-12T20:08:12.966Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
But since it is intutive that reports of conscious states are caused by those states, that is an argument against epiphenomenalism..a well known one, which can be expressed a lot more succinctly than EY did.
If so, I would expect this to come up in one of lukeprog's posts on how LW philosophy is close to positions held in mainstream philosophy, like this one, but I didn't check the whole sequence, and in this case absence of evidence is only weak evidence of absence. What well-known and succinct treatment do you have in mind?
Replies from: TheAncientGeek↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-13T10:53:17.014Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"The most powerful argument against epiphenomenalism is that it is self contradictory: If we have knowledge about epiphenomenalism, then we know about the existence of the mind, but if epiphenomenalism were correct, then we should not have any knowledge about the mind, as it does not affect anything physical. [9]" -- WP
"Epiphenomenalism is absurd; it is just plain obvious that our pains, our thoughts, and our feelings make a difference to our (evidently physical) behavior; it is impossible to believe that all our behavior could be just as it is even if there were no pains, thoughts, or feelings. (Taylor, 1963 and subsequent editions, offers a representative statement.)"--SEP
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by TheAncientGeek · 2015-10-11T10:08:01.798Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Let's take your examples. Dualism vs monism can be boiled down to something like "can p-zombies exist?", which can eventually be answered by AI research and cognitive sciences.
Is that a fact?
Incidentally, the two examples you mention are basically equivalent, as solving one clears up the other.
..and where is that demonstrated?