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comment by supposedlyfun · 2022-08-09T12:47:40.555Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm having trouble defining your definition of counterfactual. In "Information is a Counterfactual...", you define a counterfactual property as one which only conveys information if the property could have been in a different state. This makes sense relative to the previous uses of "counterfactual" I'm familiar with.

In this piece, you introduce the category of "counterfactual law in physics" including the one "that says ‘it is impossible to build a perpetual motion machine’." Are these two different uses of the word 'counterfactual', in which case can you explain what a counterfactual law is? 

Or (more likely) is the connection obvious and I'm too dense to see it, in which case, can you explain what the lamp's lightedness-status (first post) and the physics law (this post) have in common that makes them counterfactual?

Replies from: AlfredHarwood
comment by A.H. (AlfredHarwood) · 2022-08-09T14:49:59.227Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hi, thanks for the question. I am using the term 'counterfactual' (admittedly somewhat loosely) to describe facts that refer to whether things are possible or impossible, regardless of whether they actually happen. 

In the first post, I claimed that it is only meaningful to say that the lamp transmits information if it is possible for the lamp to be a in a different state. Conversely, if the lamp was broken, then it is impossible for the lamp to be in a different state, and information does not get transmitted. If you just describe the system in terms of what actually happens (ie. 'the lamp is on'), you miss out on this fact. In the first post, I called statements about what actually happens in the system 'factual statements', and statements about what is possible/impossible 'counterfactual statements'.

Similarly, in the case of the perpetual motion machine, you can make a factual statement about what actually happens (ie, some gears turn around and eventually the machine stops moving, failing to achieve perpetual motion), or you can make a counterfactual statement (that it is impossible to make perpetual motion machine, regardless of the specifications of that machine). In this post, I again claimed that just making the factual statement misses out on the important counterfactual claim.

Of course, in the first post, when the lamp is broken, and we say it is 'impossible' to send another signal, this is specified by the parameters of the thought experiment, rather than the laws of physics (in practice, the laws of physics might not prevent you from fixing the lamp, for example). Whereas in the this this post, when we say it is 'impossible' to build a perpetual motion machine, the restriction does come from the laws of physics.

Hope this helps clear things up!

Replies from: supposedlyfun, TAG
comment by supposedlyfun · 2022-08-10T02:31:22.531Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Confusion removed; you were using "counterfactual" in a way I had never seen here or anywhere else. (Is that the best word, though?)

Replies from: AlfredHarwood
comment by A.H. (AlfredHarwood) · 2022-08-10T09:55:15.766Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Glad that confusion is removed!

I think that it is the best word to use. When used as an adjective Collins defines 'counterfactual' as 'expressing what has not happened but could, would, or might under differing conditions '. I think that this fits the way I was talking about it (eg. when referring to 'counterfactual laws'). In the first post, I talk about whether the lamp 'could would, or might' have been in a different state. In this post, we talk about whether a perpetual motion machine  'could would, or might' work if it was made using a different configuration. (maybe some of the confusion comes from using 'counterfactual' as both an adjective and a noun?)

Though if you have any suggestions on other words that might be clearer, let me know.

Replies from: supposedlyfun
comment by supposedlyfun · 2022-08-10T11:54:02.254Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm bothered by something else now: the great variety of things that would fit in your category of counterfactual laws (as I understand it). The form of a counterfactual law ("your perpetual motion machine won't work even if you make that screw longer or do anything else different") seems to be "A, no matter which parameter you change". But isn't that equivalent to "A", in which case what makes it a counterfactual law instead of just a law?  Don't all things we consider laws of physics fit that set? F=ma even if the frictionless sphere is blue? E=mc^2 even if it's near a black hole that used to be Gouda cheese?

Replies from: AlfredHarwood
comment by A.H. (AlfredHarwood) · 2022-08-11T14:27:32.048Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The form of a counterfactual law ("your perpetual motion machine won't work even if you make that screw longer or do anything else different") seems to be "A, no matter which parameter you change".


I don’t think this is right. As I am using it, ‘counterfactual’ refers to a statement about whether something is possible or impossible. Statements of the form "A, no matter which parameter you change" are not always like this. For example if A=’this ball has a mass of 10kg’. This is not a statement about what is possible or impossible. You could frame it as ‘it is impossible for this ball to have a mass other than 10kg, no matter which parameter you change’, but doesn’t give us any new information compared to the original statement. 

Another important feature is that the impossibility/possibility is not restricted to specific dynamical laws. In your example ‘F=ma, even if the frictionless sphere is blue’, this statement is only true when Newton’s laws apply. But the statement ‘it is impossible to build a perpetual motion machine’ refers, in principle, to all dynamical laws-even ones we haven’t discovered yet-which is why principles like this may help guide our search for new laws.

comment by TAG · 2022-08-10T17:50:42.762Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hi, thanks for the question. I am using the term ‘counterfactual’ (admittedly somewhat loosely) to describe facts that refer to whether things are possible or impossible, regardless of whether they actually happen

Standardly, a counterfactual didn't happen.

The term that means "whether things are possible or impossible, regardless of whether they actually happen" is "modal".

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/

Replies from: AlfredHarwood
comment by A.H. (AlfredHarwood) · 2022-08-11T14:29:59.891Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I didn’t use ‘modal’ because that is used to refer to logical possibility/impossibility, whereas I am interested in referring to physical possibility/impossibility. Depending on your philosophical views, those two things may or may not be the same.


 

comment by Charlie Steiner · 2022-08-05T22:37:39.689Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think this was well-written and clear, so good job there! I also happen to disagree with the contents.

First off, I'm highly suspicious of any definition of a "prevailing conception" of physics that excludes the second law of thermodynamics! It seems like in actual practice, sometimes people make predictions by simulation, (the "PC") sometimes they make predictions by generalizing about the character of physical law (the quantum gravity example), and sometimes they do something in between those things and make abstractions/generalizations but then treat those abstractions as tools to do simulation (condensed matter theorists I see you).

And so what does it mean to recast physics in a different picture? Does this mean people are going to be rendered unable to do simple simulations about what actually happens when you shoot a particle at a barrier? No, that would be madness - you either give people the tools to do such calculations, or you get laughed out of the room.

So then does it mean that we're going to be able to make new exciting arguments that physicists were unable to make before? I mean, I'd love it if this were true, but I'm skeptical. My cynical side expects that there will be few new sorts of arguments, but plenty of flag-planting on old sorts of arguments.

Replies from: AlfredHarwood
comment by A.H. (AlfredHarwood) · 2022-08-09T11:04:57.910Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think this was well-written and clear, so good job there! I also happen to disagree with the contents.

Thanks for your comment!

First off, I'm highly suspicious of any definition of a "prevailing conception" of physics that excludes the second law of thermodynamics! It seems like in actual practice, sometimes people make predictions by simulation, (the "PC") sometimes they make predictions by generalizing about the character of physical law (the quantum gravity example), and sometimes they do something in between those things and make abstractions/generalizations but then treat those abstractions as tools to do simulation (condensed matter theorists I see you).

Yeah, the term 'prevailing conception' is Deutsch's. It refers specifically to formulating things in terms of initial conditions and dynamical law. I agree its not a great term, as it implies that all current physics comes under its umbrella, which, as you pointed out, is not true.

And so what does it mean to recast physics in a different picture? Does this mean people are going to be rendered unable to do simple simulations about what actually happens when you shoot a particle at a barrier?

The idea isn't to throw away the dynamical laws picture, but to provide a different angle of attack on some problems that seem intractable when expressed in the PC.

So then does it mean that we're going to be able to make new exciting arguments that physicists were unable to make before?

That's the hope!

I mean, I'd love it if this were true, but I'm skeptical. My cynical side expects that there will be few new sorts of arguments, but plenty of flag-planting on old sorts of arguments.

Fair enough. I'm skeptical as well. Constructor theory has produced a couple of interesting results, but as far as I can see, nothing world-changing yet. But I am still convinced that the problems described here (eg. the incompatibility of reversible dynamics with irreversibility of the 2nd law) are real problems. Even if counterfactuals/constructor theory don't work (who knows?), we will need something new to address them!

comment by TAG · 2022-08-15T19:41:18.568Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Explaining the Turing principle using the PC is difficult. In, fact it is difficult enough to state the Turing principle in the language of the PC

The Church Turing thesis is a fact about computation as well as physics. As such , there is no particular reason it should be easily expressed in physics.

comment by TAG · 2022-08-15T17:59:05.084Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

They can all be broadly framed as: ‘How can we be sure that laws which apply in one situation generalise to other situations?’. These questions are solved by taking Karl Popper’s approach to science, where scientific theories are viewed as conjectures, tentatively put forward to solve problems

Emphasis added.

Poppers approach doesn't solve the problem as stated, because it disregards certainty. Other approaches can also address the problem of induction by replacing certainty with probability.

comment by TAG · 2022-08-15T17:53:50.331Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We know this because there is a broad counterfactual law in physics that says ‘it is impossible to build a perpetual motion machine’.

Well, it's not really a law as such , because it's an outcome of more general laws such as the second law of thermodynamics. And since the second law is a macroscopic law, it's only macroscopic perpetual motion machines that are impossible. Any stable atom is a little PM machine.

Because the claim that energy is bounded from below is itself a counterfactual principle

Sure, but that doesn't mean it isn't a physics principle, or needs some novel explanation. Any deterministic law makes a bunch of things impossible....the determined outcomes happens of necessity, everything else is impossible.

The reason for this is that the second law is also a counterfactual principle which cannot be expressed in the PC.

!!!!!!!

As it stands, reconciling the irreversible second law with reversible dynamical laws in the PC is impossible without resorting to some sort of averaging or coarse-graining

I can think of two other solutions:

  1. The 2LT is only an approximation, and things actually do cycle round to a low entropy state after a sufficiently long period.

  2. Reversible microphysical laws are only special cases of irreversible macrophysical laws.