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Comment by tag on The Power to Understand "God" · 2019-09-15T21:42:58.471Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

So whats superior about your epistemology?

Comment by tag on The Power to Demolish Bad Arguments · 2019-09-15T11:50:15.153Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The hope is that they’ll hit on something big like self-driving car technology that fundamentally improves Uber’s marginal profit.

Or the old fashioned thing where you kill off competition and then raise prices.

Comment by tag on Proving Too Much (w/ exercises) · 2019-09-15T11:23:42.422Z · score: 4 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Ex. 8: I believe in a soul because I have a really strong gut feeling.

OTOH, thinking without any intuitions or assumptions at all remains an unsolved problem.

Comment by tag on The Power to Understand "God" · 2019-09-15T09:03:43.799Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Naively defining space as the gaps between stuff produces as much clarity and conviction as defining god as a warm fuzzy feeling. Which could conceivably go missing.

Comment by tag on Looking for answers about quantum immortality. · 2019-09-14T17:25:03.317Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

If its at all possible for consciousness to transfer between worlds

I suppose it’s not.

Then you dont need the lengthy detour about measure.

Physics doens’t say how consciousness works.

It exists in brains, brains are made of atoms, and physics has a story or two about the atoms

And consciousness isn't a common or hard higher level phenomenon. Again, the point of reductionism is to understand the higher level phenomena in terms of Lower level activity, not just to notice that big things are made of little things.

Comment by tag on The Power to Understand "God" · 2019-09-14T13:25:49.905Z · score: 5 (4 votes) · LW · GW

A believer in God is an easy target. Can you find a deep belief in something that you are holding and go through the same steps you outlined above for Stephanie?

It turns out to be hard to be clear and specific about the basic concepts of materialism, like time, space, matter and energy.

Comment by tag on The Power to Understand "God" · 2019-09-14T12:54:24.522Z · score: -1 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Okay but I don’t even know where to begin imagining what a lack of objective reality looks like

I would think it is like dreaming.. an individual having experiences that aren't shared with or comparable to anyone else's.

Comment by tag on The Power to Understand "God" · 2019-09-14T12:53:43.103Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Okay but I don’t even know where to begin imagining what a lack of objective reality looks like

I would think like dreaming.. an individual having experiences that aren't shared with or comparable to anyone else's.

Comment by tag on Looking for answers about quantum immortality. · 2019-09-13T11:03:11.161Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The meaning of “you will always find” has a connotation of certainty or high probability, but we are specifically talking about essentially impossible outcomes

High subjective probability is compatible with low objective probability.

Comment by tag on Looking for answers about quantum immortality. · 2019-09-12T12:47:14.185Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Now, let’s take a bit more timeless perspective here. Let’s look at the universe in its entirety. According to quantum immortality, there are you-moments in the arbitrarily distant future. Yes; but most of them are extremely thin. Most of the mass of the you-moments is here, plus or minus a few decades.

Why does that matter?

Under single universe assumptions, there is no quantum immortality or torment, because low probability things generally don't happen.

Under the single-mind multi-universe view -- where there is one "real" you that switches tracks in proportion to their measure -- you are also unlikely to find yourself immortal or tormented. But it's a form of dualism -- it assumes that mind and matter operate by different rules.

Under actual multiversal assumptions, multi-mind+multi-world, everything that is unlikely but above zero measure is real, from an objective point of view. The question is what happens from a subjective POV. If its at all possible for consciousness to transfer between worlds, then the subjective probability of ending up very old in a low-measure world is actually high, because there as you age past a normal human lifespan, you run out of high-measure worlds where you are alive. The assumption that beings in low-measure worlds have a faint, zombie-like consciousness can still stave off QI and QT , but lacks independent motivation. Physics doens't say how consciousness works.

Comment by tag on Counterfactuals are an Answer, Not a Question · 2019-09-04T11:48:20.642Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

This means that it is a mistake to search for an objectively true definition.

Comment by tag on Counterfactuals are an Answer, Not a Question · 2019-09-04T11:44:46.841Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

So let’s start with regular counterfactuals. What are they? Do they exist in the universe itself? Unless you’re a modal realist (ie. David Lewis and his clones) the answer is no. Given the exact state of universe and an agent, the agent can only make one decision*.

Yudkowsky and Deutsch's MWI has exactly the same implications as Lewisian modal realism in this regard. (One of the basic problems with this ).

Quantum mechanics allows this to be a probability distribution, but then it’s just probabilistically deterministic instead, so it only complicates the issue without really changing anything

It changes something: it allows real counterfactuals in a single universe. There is a (contentious) argument that free will based on quantum indeterminism isn't free enough to be considered genuine free will because it is still constrained to probability distributions...but , whether true or false, that isn't relevant to the topic at hand, the existence of real counterfactuals. Real counterfactuals don't depend purely on some fairly "thick" concept of free will, they can follow from indeterminism alone. If it really was the case that a coin toss could have gone differently , then the case where it did is a real counterfactual.

(But not an actual counterfactual. MR and MW have the further implication that all outcomes are actual from their own perspective).

P.S If the overall point is that there is not and should be a single notion counterfactuals, I would agree .. so long as real counterfactuals are included!

Comment by tag on The Power to Demolish Bad Arguments · 2019-09-02T18:47:22.292Z · score: 3 (7 votes) · LW · GW

Here's how Steve could have demolished Liron's argument:

"If a company makes $28/h out of their workers and pays them $14/h, they are exploiting them".

Comment by tag on ike's Shortform · 2019-09-02T09:45:56.047Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Which anti p zombie argument? You can argue that no one has qualia, that physical duplicates necessarily have non physical qualia, that physical duplicates necessarily have physical qualia, etc

Comment by tag on Matthew Barnett's Shortform · 2019-08-30T13:03:26.771Z · score: 6 (4 votes) · LW · GW

physics is public, effable, and objective and therefore contradicts the existence of qualia.

Physics as map is. Note that we can't compare the map directly to the territory.

Comment by tag on Matthew Barnett's Shortform · 2019-08-30T13:01:58.716Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Qualia are intrinstic; you can’t construct a quale if you had the right set of particles.

I'm pretty sure that's not what "intrinisc" is supposed to mean. From "The Qualities of Qualia" by David de Leon.

Within philosophy there is a distinction, albeit a contentious one, between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Roughly speaking “extrinsic” seems to be synonymous with “relational.” The property of being an uncle, for example, is a property which depends on (and consists of) a relation to something else, namely a niece or a nephew. Intrinsic properties, then, are those which do not depend on this kind of relation. That qualia are intrinsic means that their qualitative character can be isolated from everything else going on in the brain (or elsewhere) and is not dependent on relations to other mental states, behaviour or what have you. The idea of the independence of qualia on any such relation may well stem from the conceivability of inverted qualia: we can imagine two physically identical brains having different qualia, or even that qualia are absent from one but not the other.

Comment by tag on I think I came up with a good utility function for AI that seems too obvious. Can you people poke holes in it? · 2019-08-30T10:24:19.929Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I think if you were to spend time fleshing this out, operationalizing it and thinking of how to handle various edge cases (or not-so-edge-cases), you’d probably end up with something closer to Coherent Extrapolated Volition.

That was never fleshed out itself.

Comment by tag on Chris_Leong's Shortform · 2019-08-30T09:53:42.074Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

He does not resolve the conflict that it feels SOOO real as it happens.

That's an odd thing to say since the feeling of free will is about the only thing be addresses.

Comment by tag on Simulation Argument: Why aren't ancestor simulations outnumbered by transhumans? · 2019-08-27T19:54:40.479Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The problem with Dust theory is that it assumes that conscious states supervene on brain states instantaneously. There is no evidence for that. We should not be fooled by the "specious present". We seem to be conscious moment-by-moment, but the "moments" in question are rather coarse-grained, corresponding to the specious present of 0.025-0.25 second or so. It's quite compatible with the phenomenology that it requires thousands or millions of neural events or processing steps to achieve a subjective "instant" of consciousness. Which would mean you can't salami-slice someone's stream-of-consciousness too much without it vanishing, and also mean that spontaneously occurring Boltzman-consciousnesses are incredibly unlikely (because you would need a string of states to arise that are "as if" causally connected). Additionally, the idea of computational supervening on instantaneous snapshots of physical activity, irrespective of causal connection and temporal sequence, doesn't make much sense as a theory of computation. What is the difference between a computational state and any old state, if not the fact that is part of a computation, that is, a sequence of states.

Comment by tag on Chris_Leong's Shortform · 2019-08-27T19:51:38.041Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

So Yudkowsky's theory isn't new?

Comment by tag on Chris_Leong's Shortform · 2019-08-27T15:18:52.781Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I used to find the discussion of free will interesting before I learned it was just people talking past each other

Semantic differences almost always happen, but are rarely the only problem.

There are certainly different definitions of free will, but even so problems, remain:-

There is still an open question as to whether compatibilist free will is the only kind anyone ever needed or believed in, and as to whether libertarian free will is possible at all.

Comment by tag on Matthew Barnett's Shortform · 2019-08-25T23:31:30.090Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I am not suggesting that qualia should be identified with neural activity in a way that loses any aspects of the philosophical definition... bearing in mind that the he philosophical definition does not assert that qualia are non physical.

Comment by tag on Is LW making progress? · 2019-08-25T07:47:45.956Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

On the AI safety side, I feel like there’s been an enormous amount of progress. Most notably for me was Stuart Armstrong’s post: Humans can be assigned any values whatsoever..

There has been significant work on utility functions, but it's not so much incremental progress and more correction of a mistake.

Comment by tag on Matthew Barnett's Shortform · 2019-08-23T09:38:18.496Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Nietzsche go to the there first. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternal_return

Comment by tag on Matthew Barnett's Shortform · 2019-08-22T08:27:18.533Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

And we know that such an explanation requires only the components which make up the ANN, and not any conscious or phenomenal properties.

That's an argument against dualism not an argument against qualia. If mind brain identity is true, neural activity is causing reports, and qualia, along with the rest of consciousness are identical to neural activity, so qualia are also causing reports.

Comment by tag on Matthew Barnett's Shortform · 2019-08-20T09:28:19.740Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

If we are able to explain why you believe in, and talk about qualia without referring to qualia whatsoever in our explanation, then we should reject the existence of qualia as a hypothesis

That argument has an inverse: "If we are able to explain why you believe in, and talk about an external without referring to an external world whatsoever in our explanation, then we should reject the existence of an external world as a hypothesis".

People want reductive explanation to be unidirectional,so that you have an A and a B, and clearly it is the B which is redundant and can be replaced with A. But not all explanations work in that convenient way...sometimes A and B are mutually redundant, in the sense that you don't need both.

The moral of the story being to look for the overall best explanation, not just eliminate redundancy.

Comment by tag on Prokaryote Multiverse. An argument that potential simulators do not have significantly more complex physics than ours · 2019-08-18T23:58:01.572Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

If we are to define some prior distribution over what exists, out beyond what we can see, kolmogorov complexity seems like a sensible metric to use. A universe generated by a small machine is much more likely a-priori—perhaps we should assume it occurs with much greater frequency—than a universe that can only be generated by a large machine.

But an unsimulated universe is likeliest of all, by the same reasoning.

Actually, you don't need to use K complexity specifically...most versions of occams razor weigh against a simulated universe.

I propose that the maximum number of simple simulated universes that could be hosted within a supercomplex universe is unlikely to outnumber the natural instances of simple universes that lay about in the multiverse’s bulk.

That's uncountable infinity in many versions of MW theory,so it's hard to exceed. But if you are going to treat MW theory as the main alternative to simulationism, you need to argue for it to some extent.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-17T10:05:10.575Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

How do we disambiguate between objective indeterminacy in a nondeterministic world and subjective indeterminacy in a deterministic one?

I’m asking because I expect the two to be subjectively indistinguishable and your answer should help shed light on the nature of our disagreement.

I don't expect them to be be objectively indistinguishable for reasons I've already stated, to do with Bell's theorem and so on. (And even if they are not distinguishable, they have very different implications).

The books and movies question seems like a disguised argument. People don't like reading the same thing over and over, and don't like spoilers, so there is a case that the subjective surprise if the ending is what matters even if it is determined. But that doesn't generalise to subjective indeterminism being the only kind that matters. Because people don't just passively consume books and movies, people also try to change objective states of affairs.

Comment by tag on Matthew Barnett's Shortform · 2019-08-13T12:18:39.113Z · score: 8 (6 votes) · LW · GW

Wow! You left out the whole of analytical philosophy!

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-12T14:20:16.505Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Unless you want to postulate some sort of branching-future superposition, there will be one eventual outcome.

That's not the point. Under determinism, the one outcome had to happen, had prior probability 1.0. etc. Under indeterminism, it didn't have to happen and the alternatives had non-zero probability. You can't infer from the fact that something happened to the conclusion that it happened inevitably and necessarily.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-12T10:37:14.553Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

You consider a number of choices. You judge them according to your decision criteria and choose the one that seems best. What difference does it make if some hypothetical omniscient observer could tell in advance which choice you’ll make? You’ll still choose just one, and you want it to be the best one.

You are portraying decision making as always having a determinate outcome, and that isn't even true if computational decision making.

In what sense is the unchosen counterfactual a real one.

As examined before the... in the sense that if my decision making was indeterminate, then I could have decided differently, meaning that counterfactual was real in the sense that it could have occurred.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-11T17:14:48.424Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

If my decision making process could not be different , how does it make a difference? I have already covered the difference between logical counterfactuals and real countefactuals.

Comment by tag on Does human choice have to be transitive in order to be rational/consistent? · 2019-08-11T10:12:47.508Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

You can also protect yourself against money pumping by having vague preferences and unstable preferences. Money pumping doesn't seem to happen IRL.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-11T09:27:33.704Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Thats a standard argument for compatibilism. It isn't considered a proof of compatibilism, because that would require assuaging all the worries that people have, and not just the subset compatibilist have ready answers for. I've already put forward another issue which is harder to answer from the compatibilist perspective: making a difference.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-11T09:22:07.444Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Thats a standard argument for compatibilism. It isn't considered a proof of compatibilism, because that would require assuaging all the worries that people have, and not just the subset compatibilist have ready answers for. I've already put forward another issue which is harder to answer from the compatibilist perspective: making a difference.

Comment by tag on Occam's Razor: In need of sharpening? · 2019-08-09T08:16:31.028Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

S.I is a inept tool for measuring the relative complexity of CI and MWI because it is a bad match for both. It's a bad match for MWI because of the linear, or., if you prfer sequential, nature of the output tape, and its a bad match for CI because its deterministic and CI isn't. You can simulate collapse with a PRNG, but it won't give you the right random numbers. Also, CI'ers think collapse is a fundamental process, so it loads the dice to represent it with a multi-step PRNG. It should be just a call to one RAND instruction to represent their views fairly.

Comment by tag on Occam's Razor: In need of sharpening? · 2019-08-09T07:58:08.137Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

First, can you define “SWE”?

SWE=Schroedinger Wave Equation. SU&C=Shut Up and Calculate.

You should want a theory that requires as few assumptions as possible to explain as much as possible

The topic is using S.I to quantify O's R, and S.I is not a measure on assumptions , it is a measure on algorithmic complexity.

The fact that it explains more than just your point of view (POV) is a good thing. It lets you make predictions.

Explaining just my POV doesn't stop me making predictions. In fact predicting the observations of one observer is exactly how S.I is supposed to work. It also prevents various forms of cheating. I don't know why you are using "explain" rather than "predict". Deutsch favours explanation over prediction but the very relevant point here is that how well a theory explains is an unquantifiable human judgement. Predicting observations, on the other hand, is definite an quantifiable..that's the whole point of using S.I as a mechanistic process to quantify O's. R.

Predicting every observers observations is a bad thing from the POV of proving that MWI is simple, because if you allow one observer to pick out their observations from a morass of data, then the easisest way of generating data that contains any substring is a PRNG. You basically ending up proving that "everything random" is the simplest explanation. Private Messaging pointed that out, too.

The point is to explain the patterns you observe.

How do you do that with S.I?

It most certainly is. If you try to run the Copenhagen interpretation in a Turing machine to get output that matches your POV, then it has to output the whole universe and you have to find your POV on the tape somewhere.

No. I run the TM with my experimental conditions as the starting state, and I keep deleting unobserved results, renormalising and re-running. That's how physics is done any way -- what I have called Shut Up and Calculate.

Same thing for the Many Worlds interpretation. It explains the results of our experiments just as well as Copenhagen, it just doesn’t posit any special phenomenon like observation, observation is just what entanglement looks like from the perspective of one of the entangled particles (or system of particles if you’re talking about the scientist)

If you perform the same operations with S.I set up to emulate MW you'll get the same results. That's just a way of restating the truism that all interpretations agree on results. But you need a difference in algorithmic complexity as well.

Same thing for the Many Worlds interpretation. It explains the results of our experiments just as well as Copenhagen, it just doesn’t posit any special phenomenon like observation, observation is just what entanglement looks like from the perspective of one of the entangled particles (or system of particles if you’re talking about the scientist).

You seem to be saying that MWI is a simpler ontological picture now. I dispute that, but its beside the point because what we are discussing is using SI to quantify O's R via alorithmic complexity.

First of all: Of course you can use many worlds to make predictions,

I didn't say MW can't make predictions at all. I am saying that operationally, predicition-making is the same under all interpretations, and that neglect of unobserved outcomes always has to occur.

You just don’t need to make up some story about how your perspective is special

The point about predicting my observations is that they are the only ones I can test. It's operating, not metaphysical.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-09T07:45:35.892Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

The whole point is that determinism (or timelessness for that matter) need not invalidate our notions of agency, consequence or morality.

Care to turn that assertion into an argument?

Comment by tag on Occam's Razor: In need of sharpening? · 2019-08-09T04:25:50.565Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Well, you've got to test that the programme is at least correct so that you can can go on to find the simplest correct programme. How would you do that?

Comment by tag on An Intuitive Explanation of Solomonoff Induction · 2019-08-09T04:20:17.898Z · score: -3 (3 votes) · LW · GW

SI is so bad, it doesn't even prove the one thing people say it proves.

Edit:

The S.I is a inept tool for measuring the relative complexity of CI and MWI because it is a bad match for both. It's a bad match for MWI because of the linear, or., if you prfer sequential, nature of the output tape, and its a bad match for CI because its deterministic and CI isn't. You can simulate collapse with a PRNG, but it won't give you the right random numbers. Also, CI'ers think collapse is a fundamental process, so it loads the dice to represent it with a multi-step PRNG. It should be just a call to one RAND instruction to represent their views fairly.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T19:13:46.816Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Previously, you said that people need to give up their intuitions about free will. Well, under full strength compatibilism, they don't. That's the difference.

This feels like worrying about losing the colors of the rainbow if optics is true.

Care to turn that feeling into an argument?

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T18:30:57.766Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

That's the bone of contention. Compatiblists say nothing that's "worth having", their opponents say otherwise. It's hard to dispute that the ability to choose between really possible alternatives goes missing.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T17:46:30.636Z · score: 0 (2 votes) · LW · GW

If determinism is true, then nondeterminist intuitions are mistaken.

If determinism is true and compatibilism is false.

You keep commenting on determinism but given your intuitions, you end up sounding a bit like “Nondeterminism, therefore X.”

I have pointed out what people worry they are going to lose under determinism. Yes, they only going to have those things under nondeterminism..that's just another way of saying the same thing.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T16:42:23.926Z · score: -2 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Tu quoque, my friend. From my perspective, your reasoning is tacitly relying on intuitive assumptions that don’t apply in the (hypothetical) domain of a deterministic universe. In other words, you’re implicitly assuming your conclusion.

What do you think I am reasoning toward?

Remember, people like me started out with the intuition of nondeterminism. We’ve already worked through the basic objections about things like choices, consequences and morality.

But you don't have a proof of determinism. People like you keep advising me that I need to "update" and treat determinism as true, and drop all intuitions counter to it, ahead of the evidence.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T15:23:48.365Z · score: -4 (4 votes) · LW · GW

It's also hard to have a good discussion under the tacit assumption that determinism is true, and the answer is to avoid tacit assumptions.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T14:51:34.026Z · score: -1 (2 votes) · LW · GW
  1. In which direction? Remember, if compatibilism is true there is no need to give on standard intuitions.

  2. Determinism=true, compatibilism-false.

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T13:38:13.146Z · score: -2 (3 votes) · LW · GW
  1. We have no pressing need to update, since we don't know that determinism is true or that compatibilism is false.

  2. Please state your assumptions. Other people might not agree with them.

Comment by tag on Occam's Razor: In need of sharpening? · 2019-08-08T13:36:32.329Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Incidentally, this was pointed out before:-

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Kyc5dFDzBg4WccrbK/an-intuitive-explanation-of-solomonoff-induction#ceq7HLYhx4YiciKWq

Comment by tag on Weak foundation of determinism analysis · 2019-08-08T13:19:32.362Z · score: -2 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Nothing about the type of a universe determines the content of a judgement. Anyone can have a false belief in any universe. Determinists typically believe that many people have false beliefs about freedom and responsibility.

You have misunderstood the kind of issue I am talking about. I am not talking in terms of solipsistic decision-making, or ethically unloaded attempts by one agent to predict another, I am talking about why societies pin medals on one person and put another in the stocks.

This sort of thing: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/

Comment by tag on Occam's Razor: In need of sharpening? · 2019-08-08T10:44:54.892Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

That’s not how algorithmic information theory works. The output tape is not a factor in the complexity of the program. Just the length of the program.

And that's the problem! You want the shortest programme that predicts your observations, but output of a TM that just runs the SWE doesn't predict your and only your observations. You have to manually perform an extra operation to extract them, and that's extra complexity that isn't part of the "complexity of the programme". The argument that MWI is algorithmically simple cheats by hiding some complexity outside the programme.

The size of the universe is not a postulate of the QFT or General Relativity.

That's not relevant to my argument.

If you take the Many Worlds interpretation and decide to follow the perspective of a single particle as though it were special, Copenhagen is what falls out.

Operationally, something like copenhagen, ie. neglect of unobserved predictions, and renormalisation , has to occur, because otherwise you can't make predictions. Hence my comment about SU&C. Different adds some extra baggage about what that means -- occurred in a different branch versus didn't occur -- but the operation still needs to occur.