Tax Price Gouging?

post by jefftk (jkaufman) · 2025-01-17T14:10:03.395Z · LW · GW · 6 comments

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6 comments

In the aftermath of a disaster, there is usually a large shift in what people need, what is available, or both. For example, people normally don't use very much ice, but after a hurricane or other disaster that knocks out power, suddenly (a) lots of people want ice and (b) ice production is more difficult. Since people really don't want their food going bad, and they're willing to pay a lot to avoid that, In a world of pure economics, sellers would raise prices.

This can have serious benefits:

On the other hand, raising prices in response to a disaster is widely seen as unfair:

So raising prices in emergencies is generally strongly socially discouraged and often also illegal. Stores quickly sell out, there's no increase in supply, and allocation is relatively arbitrary.

Is there a way to get the benefits of keeping prices responsive, while mitigating some of the unfairness?

Consider the introduction of congestion pricing in NYC. Charging money to keep people from overusing a common resource is a traditional economics solution, reducing traffic jams and allowing streets to move more people in less time. While this even helps people who can no longer (or never could) afford to drive, by speeding up buses, it is still often considered too unfair to implement. The NYC approach, however, of charging drivers but then using the money to fund public transit, resolves enough of the unfairness to be put into practice.

What could something similar look like for disasters?

While this still has some of the downsides of existing price gouging laws [1] I think it's quite a bit better than the status quo.

The biggest advantage is that if the government disagrees with you about how much of your price increase is due to increased costs, it can be sorted out later. There are famous cases where someone tried to increase supply in a disaster by doing something unusual (ex: renting trucks to drive generators or ice hundreds of miles into hurricane-affected areas) and then were prevented from selling. Much better to have a system where we all agree they're good to go ahead and sell, and tax disagreements can be worked out afterwards. It still doesn't fully remove the risk that the government will disagree with you and make your efforts not worth your while, but at least you're arguing with a judge in a courtroom where you can present evidence, and not a cop in front of a mob.

It also:

Would people be more ok with responsive prices in emergencies if the money were primarily going to disaster relief?


[1] I've previously written about discouraging investments, but another issue is not handling cases where people might be convinced to sell something they wouldn't normally. For the latter, imagine an empty nester couple living in a 3BR in LA. They prefer to have the house to themselves, but for $5k/month would be willing to rent out their guest room. In normal times no one would pay $5k, so they don't bother putting it on AirBnB. With the emergency, however, there might now be people willing to pay this much. There's no way for the owners to demonstrate increased costs, though, so it would probably be illegal for them to list it for $5k both under current laws and with my proposed change above.

Similarly, say I have a bunch of $150 air purifiers because I'm especially concerned about infectious aerosols, and then with a nearby wildfire stores all sell out. By default I would keep them and enjoy my clean air, but I'd be willing to sell a few for $300 each. That would benefit both me and the buyers, but same issue.

6 comments

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comment by Dagon · 2025-01-17T19:11:13.701Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is a novel (to me) line of thinking, and I'm happy to hear about it!   I'm not sure it's feasible, as one of the things the public hates more than price increases during a shortage is higher taxes any time.

That said, the REVERSE of this - slightly raise taxes in normal times, and make emergencies a tax holiday, might really work.  This gives room for producers/distributors to raise prices WITHOUT as much impact on the consumers.  Gets some of the good bits of market pricing, with less of the bad bits (both limited to the magnitude of the tax change relative to the scarcity-based price change).

 

Replies from: jkaufman
comment by jefftk (jkaufman) · 2025-01-17T19:20:41.368Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

one of the things the public hates more than price increases during a shortage is higher taxes any time

Maybe? Though in this case what we're taxing is the disliked activity--price increases during a shortage. So possibly this would be popular, like taxes on alcohol, tobacco, or gambling?

make emergencies a tax holiday

The main good bit of market pricing this would miss is the demand reduction and reallocation caused by the higher prices. I might be willing to buy 100lb of ice at $1/lb but only 10lb of ice at $5/lb: it's easier for me to just dump a bunch of ice into my fridge, but if I prioritize and put the important stuff into a cooler I can make do with much less. If the government is subsidizing suppliers to keep the price at the pre-disaster rate I don't have this incentive to ice more efficiently.

comment by Rochambeau · 2025-01-17T18:38:35.169Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree this would certainly be better than an outright ban on price gouging, though I don't understand the advantage over not treating disasters differently.

The larger the tax base, ceteris peribus, the less distortionary the tax, so if you want more money for the poor during disasters, just raise normal sales/income/or property tax rate an amount to equal the revenue needed to help poorer people in disasters, and then don't have the more heavily distortionary high tax that only applies to disasters. As an added plus, doing it this way avoids a high tax when adherance is lower and may be more popular than an onerous tax when goods are at their most expensive.

Replies from: jkaufman
comment by jefftk (jkaufman) · 2025-01-17T19:23:09.096Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The thing that I think would be overall better (no price controls) is politically unpopular, strongly socially discouraged, and often illegal. This is a proposal that tries to move us in a direction I think is better, while addressing some of what price gouging opponents dislike.

comment by RamblinDash · 2025-01-17T14:39:18.951Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Just to make the math easy, let's suppose the gouging tax is 50%. 

 

The air purifiers problem seems like not a big problem? If they are normally "worth" $150 and you value having them at $300, you could post them up for sale at $450. Then, if someone really needs them, you get your $300, they get their air purifier, and $150 goes to disaster relief. This tax only prevents the trade if the buyers would buy them for $300 but not for $450, which limits the amount of deadweight loss here to a maximum of $149, rather than potentially unbounded deadweight loss under current policy.

Replies from: jkaufman
comment by jefftk (jkaufman) · 2025-01-17T14:59:05.146Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A new air purifier is $150, but mine have been hanging around my house collecting dust and viruses; I don't think a used air purifier would have gone for $150 pre-emergency. Let's say the used value was $75. To get the same benefit as selling for $300 with no surcharge I'd need to charge $525: 2x my $300, less the $75 used value.

But I agree: the air purifiers situation is still improved when moving from the status quo (illegal) to the proposal (taxed). My point with that footnote is that the proposal still does some to discourage supply increases relative to a world without this regulation.