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Retracted. I apologize for mischaracterizing the report and for the unfair attack on your work.
Indeed, I find it somewhat notable that high-level arguments for AI risk rarely attend in detail to the specific structure of an AI’s motivational system, or to the sorts of detailed trade-offs a not-yet-arbitrarily-powerful-AI might face in deciding whether to engage in a given sort of problematic power-seeking. [...] I think my power-seeking report is somewhat guilty in this respect; I tried, in my report on scheming, to do better.
Your 2021 report on power-seeking does not appear to discuss the cost-benefit analysis that a misaligned AI would conduct when considering takeover, or the likelihood that this cost-benefit analysis might not favor takeover. Other people have been pointing that out for a long time, and in this post, it seems you’ve come around on that argument and added some details to it.
It's admirable that you've changed your mind in response to new ideas, and it takes a lot of courage to publicly own mistakes. But given the tremendous influence of your report on power-seeking, I think it's worth reflecting more on your update that one of its core arguments may have been incorrect or incomplete.
Most centrally, I'd like to point out that several people have already made versions of the argument presented in this post. Some of them have been directly criticizing your 2021 report on power-seeking. You haven't cited any of them here, but I think it would be worthwhile to recognize their contributions:
- Dmitri Gallow
- 2023: "Were I to be a billionaire, this might help me pursue my ends. But I’m not at all likely to try to become a billionaire, since I don’t value the wealth more than the time it would take to secure the wealth—to say nothing about the probability of failure. In general, whether it’s rational to pursue something is going to depend upon the costs and benefits of the pursuit, as well as the probabilities of success and failure, the costs of failure, and so on"
- David Thorstad
2023, about the report: "It is important to separate Likelihood of Goal Satisfaction (LGS) from Goal Pursuit (GP). For suitably sophisticated agents, (LGS) is a nearly trivial claim.
Most agents, including humans, superhumans, toddlers, and toads, would be in a better position to achieve their goals if they had more power and resources under their control... From the fact that wresting power from humanity would help a human, toddler, superhuman or toad to achieve some of their goals, it does not yet follow that the agent is disposed to actually try to disempower all of humanity.
It would therefore be disappointing, to say the least, if Carlsmith were to primarily argue for (LGS) rather than for (ICC-3). However, that appears to be what Carlsmith does...
What we need is an argument that artificial agents for whom power would be useful, and who are aware of this fact are likely to go on to seek enough power to disempower all of humanity. And so far we have literally not seen an argument for this claim."
- Matthew Barnett
- January 2024: "Even if a unified agent can take over the world, it is unlikely to be in their best interest to try to do so. The central argument here would be premised on a model of rational agency, in which an agent tries to maximize benefits minus costs, subject to constraints. The agent would be faced with a choice: (1) Attempt to take over the world, and steal everyone's stuff, or (2) Work within a system of compromise, trade, and law, and get very rich within that system, in order to e.g. buy lots of paperclips. The question of whether (1) is a better choice than (2) is not simply a question of whether taking over the world is "easy" or whether it could be done by the agent. Instead it is a question of whether the benefits of (1) outweigh the costs, relative to choice (2)."
- April 2024: "Skepticism of the treacherous turn: The treacherous turn is the idea that (1) at some point there will be a very smart unaligned AI, (2) when weak, this AI will pretend to be nice, but (3) when sufficiently strong, this AI will turn on humanity by taking over the world by surprise, and then (4) optimize the universe without constraint, which would be very bad for humans.
By comparison, I find it more likely that no individual AI will ever be strong enough to take over the world, in the sense of overthrowing the world's existing institutions and governments by surprise. Instead, I broadly expect unaligned AIs will integrate into society and try to accomplish their goals by advocating for their legal rights, rather than trying to overthrow our institutions by force. Upon attaining legal personhood, unaligned AIs can utilize their legal rights to achieve their objectives, for example by getting a job and trading their labor for property, within the already-existing institutions. Because the world is not zero sum, and there are economic benefits to scale and specialization, this argument implies that unaligned AIs may well have a net-positive effect on humans, as they could trade with us, producing value in exchange for our own property and services."
There are important differences between their arguments and yours, such as your focus on the ease of takeover as the key factor in the cost-benefit analysis. But one central argument is the same: in your words, "even for an AI system that estimates some reasonable probability of success at takeover if it goes for it, the strategic calculus may be substantially more complex."
Why am I pointing this out? Because I think it's worth keeping track of who's been right and who's been wrong in longstanding intellectual debates. Yudkowsky was wrong about takeoff speeds, and Paul was right. Bostrom was wrong about the difficulty of value specification. Given that most people cannot evaluate most debates on the object level (especially debates involving hundreds of pages written by people with PhDs in philosophy), it serves a genuinely useful epistemic function to pay attention to the intellectual track records of people and communities.
Two potential updates here:
- On the value of external academic criticism in refining key arguments in the AI risk debate.
- On the likelihood that long-held and widespread beliefs in the AI risk community are incorrect.