Comment by chickcounterfly on Forecasting Newsletter: July 2020. · 2020-08-01T17:40:14.717Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Great links, thanks.

The Augur launch has unfortunately been a complete catastrophe, as the high transaction costs of ETH right now make it so that simply making a trade costs about $30...I hope they manage to come up with some sort of solution.

Comment by chickcounterfly on Sam Harris and the Is–Ought Gap · 2018-11-18T11:17:30.810Z · score: 11 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Could you point out where he does that exactly? Here's the transcript:

Comment by chickcounterfly on Sam Harris and the Is–Ought Gap · 2018-11-17T21:55:42.881Z · score: 5 (3 votes) · LW · GW

The whole thing hangs on footnote #4, and you don't seem to understand what realists actually believe. Of course they would dispute it, and not just "some" but most philosophers.

Comment by chickcounterfly on Against Modest Epistemology · 2017-11-30T17:48:11.554Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

> If we were fully rational (and fully honest), then we would always eventually reach consensus on questions of fact.

The things you cite right before this sentence say the exact opposite. This is only possible give equal priors, and there's no reason to assume ratioanl and honest people would have equal priors about...anything.

Comment by chickcounterfly on Moloch's Toolbox (2/2) · 2017-11-07T14:41:25.283Z · score: 7 (4 votes) · LW · GW

>Lee Kuan Yew gained very strong individual power over a small country, and unlike the hundreds of times in the history of Earth when that went horribly wrong, Lee Kuan Yew happened to know some economics.

Actually, this isn't a one-off. Monarchies in general achieve superior economic results ( ):

>We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. [...] The logic that we have exploited is essentially that put forward in Olson (1993) who emphasized that hereditary rule can provide a means improving inter-temporal incentives in government.