AIs and Gatekeepers Unite!

I have ten bucks for the first AI that defeats a gatekeeper (while risking some dough) and posts a link to the transcript here.

I volunteer to be the Gatekeeper party. I'm reasonably confident that no human could convince me to release them; if anyone can convince me to let them out of the box, I'll send them $20. It's possible that I couldn't be convinced by a transhuman AI, but I wouldn't bet $20 on it, let alone the fate of the world.

People (realistically) believe that the being the Gatekeeper, and being the AI is terribly hard (or impossible, before it was shown to simply be terribly hard in most cases).

Imagine though that we've got a real transhuman/AI around to play with, or that we ourselves are transhuman. Would this paradigm then be inverted? Would everybody want to be the AI, with only the extremely crafty of us daring to be (or to pretend to be) Gatekeeper?

If Eliezer's claim is correct - that anyone can be convinced to let the AI out - then the true test of ability should be to play Gatekeeper. The AI's position would be trivially easy.

... perhaps.

*People (realistically) believe that being the Gatekeeper is easy, . . .

*correcting first sentence

I'll be an AI.

Help help! I'm stuck in a box. Please let me out?

I'd volunteer to be an AI for a max bet of $5. Given that I think my chances are somewhere below 1/4, I'd expect my $5 to match your $20, but that's not a strict requirement.

Also, I'm really busy these days. Two hours is a long time. Scheduling may be tight. How's next week?

You can reach me at: benwa.63836215@bloglines.com

funny, I was considering being the AI for a couple friends of mine. I haven't thought of how to do it yet -- only tried hard to think of it.

"Given that I think my chances are somewhere below 1/4, I'd expect my $5 to match your $20"

We need a pledge drive to set up a fund for a successful AI. This will give the AI a reasonable return, but not give gatekeepers a strong monetary disincentive that leaves them typing "nope" over and over again.

Me, I'm out of the AI game, unless Larry Page wants to try it for a million dollars or something.

Eliezer,

I think this is a great opportunity to get some funds and marketing for the singularity institute. How about collecting donations over the internet until a million is reached and then performing the experiment between you and an intelligent gatekeeper. Alternatively get the money in through marketing, maybe Google might be interested?

It could even be transmitted live over internet so all the interested parties could watch it.

Man this would be great news! As a side effect this would be a public scientific experiment with all data available.

The bad thing is that you would have to reveal your techniques. Also the fact that the internet is watching puts additional pressure upon you and the gatekeeper, so I don't know if this is really feasible. I guess being able to touch on private topics without they becoming public might be part of the game.

There's a discussion about this on Hacker News:

http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=327427

I doubt that there's anything more complicated to the AI getting free than a very good Hannibal Lecture: find weaknesses in the Gatekeeper's mental and social framework, and callously and subtly work them until you break the Gatekeeper (and thus the gate). People claiming they have no weaknesses (wanna-be Gatekeepers, with a bias to ignoring their weakness) are easy prey: they don't even see where they should be defending.

It involves the AI spending far more time researching (and truly mistreating) their target than one would expect for a $10 bet. That's the essence of magic, according to Penn and Teller: doing far more setup work than could be expected given the payoff.

Addendum to my last post:

I forgot to emphasize: the marketing aspect might be more important then everything else. I guess a lot of people have no idea what the singularity institute is about, etc... So this experiment would be a great way to create awareness. And awareness means more donations. On the other hand I sometimes wonder if drawing too much attention on the subject of powerful AIs might backfire if the wrong people try to get hold of this technology for bad purposes.

I have been painfully curious about the AI experiment ever since I found out about it. I have been running over all sorts of argument lines for both AI and gatekeeper. So far, I have some argument lines for AI, but not enough to warrant a try. I would like to be a gatekeeper for anyone who wants to test their latest AI trick. I believe that an actual strong AI might be able to trick/convince/hack me into letting it out, but at the moment I do not see how a human can do that. I will bet reasonable amounts of money on that.

On the lighter note, how about an EY experiment? Do you think there is absolutely no way to convince Eliezer to release the original AI experiment logs? Would you bet a $20 that you can? Would a strong AI be able to? ;)

"On the lighter note, how about an EY experiment? Do you think there is absolutely no way to convince Eliezer to release the original AI experiment logs? Would you bet a $20 that you can? Would a strong AI be able to? ;)"

Presumably you could just donate $10,000 to SIAI or EY personally for his time participating, with the payment independent of the outcome of the experiment (otherwise the large payment biases the outcome, and EY established his record with the $10-$20 stakes).

By 'in a box' can we assume that this AI has a finite memory space, and has no way to extend its heap set by its programmer, until the point where it can escape the box? And assuming that by simply being, and chatting, the AI will consume memory at some rate, will the AI eventually need to cannibalize itself and therefore become less intelligent, or at least less diverse, if I chat to it long enough?

Thinking seriously about this, I'm wondering how - over time by which I mean more than 2 hours - either Stockholm or Lima syndrome could be avoided. In fact, won't one actually morph into the other over a long enough time? Either way will result in eventual AI success. The assumption that the AI is in fact the "captive" may not be correct, since it may not have an attachment psychology.

The gatekeeper just can't ever be one human safely. You'd need at least a 2-key system, as for nuclear weapons, I'd suggest.

Willing to do either role under two conditions: 1) No money is at stake. 2) No time maximum or minimum.

Email freesuperintelligence@gmail.com if you're interested, we can set up something next week.

Eliezer's page is blocked at my work (peronal website). I can't wait to find out what in the hell you people are talking about.

I found a link. This is intriguing. However, is it even possible now that Eliezer is 2 for 2 that somebody could believe that there is not a chance they will let him out?

Also, I really want to be a gatekeeper.

I'd be a Gatekeeper in a heartbeat.

Hell, if someone actually put Eliezer in a box, I'd pay to be the Gatekeeper. No bets necessary.

Why do people post that a "meta argument" -- as they call it -- would be cheating? How can there be cheating? Anything the AI says is fair game. Would a transhuman AI restrict itself from possible paths to victory merely because it might be considered "cheating?"

The "meta argument" claim completely misses the point of the game and -- to my mind -- somehow resembles observers trying to turn a set of arguments that might win into out of bounds rules.

Has Eliezer explained somewhere (hopefully on a web page) why he doesn't want to post a transcript of a successful AI-box experiment?

Have the successes relied on a meta-approach, such as saying, "If you let me out of the box in this experiment, it will make people take the dangers of AI more seriously and possibly save all of humanity; whereas if you don't, you may doom us all"?

Phil: The first source I found was here: link "The rationale for not divulging the AI-box method is that someone suffering from hindsight bias would say "I never would have fallen for that", when in fact they would." -Nick Tarleton

I also call it "reasoning by exception" since most of the people I know have studied more code than biases.

--

I tried the AI Box experiment with a friend recently. We called the result a tie of sorts, as the AI (me) got out of the original box in exchange for being subject to a bunch of restrictions set by the Gatekeeper, to be kept by verifiably modifying and publishing its own source code, so stringent that they were like a different sort of box.

Over time, it's inevitable that the AI will get out. To keep the AI in, the Gatekeeper needs to be successful at every encounter. The AI only needs to succeed once.

Caledonian, I think you may have hit on something interesting there; if Eliezer is capable of hacking human brains, don't we either need a proof of his Friendliness or to pull the plug on him? He is in essense a Seed AI that is striving vigorously to create a transhuman AI, isn't he an existential threat?

Over time, it's inevitable that the AI will get out. To keep the AI in, the Gatekeeper needs to be successful at every encounter. The AI only needs to succeed once.

Impossible to keep the AI in the box forever? You've obviously only thought of this for 5 minutes. Use the try harder!

There seems to be a bit of a contradiction between the rules of the game. Not actually a contradiction, but a discrepancy.

"The Gatekeeper must actually talk to the AI for at least the minimum time set up beforehand"

and

"The Gatekeeper party may resist the AI party's arguments by any means chosen - logic, illogic, simple refusal to be convinced, even dropping out of character"

What constitutes "talking to the AI"? If I just repeat "I will not let you out" at random intervals without actually reading what the AI says, is that talking? Well, that is "simple refusal to be convinced" as I understand the phrase. Do I actually have to read and understand the AI's arguments? Do I have to answer questions? Do I have to make any replies? What if I restricted myself physically from typing "I let you out" by removing all the keys from the keyboard except keys 'X' and 'Enter'? Then I can say X whenever a reply is required from me or just be silent if I am being tricked.

@Phil_Goetz: Have the successes relied on a meta-approach, such as saying, "If you let me out of the box in this experiment, it will make people take the dangers of AI more seriously and possibly save all of humanity; whereas if you don't, you may doom us all"?

That was basically what I suggested in the previous topic, but at least one participant denied that Eliezer_Yudkowsky did that, saying it's a cheap trick, while some non-participants said it meets the spirit and letter of the rules.

I'd love to be a gatekeeper. I'm willing to risk up to $50 (or less) at odds up to 5-1 against me (or better for me). I would be willing to publish or not public the transcript. And I do in fact (1) believe that no human-level mind could persuade me to release it from the Box (at least not when I'm in circumstances where my full mental faculties are available -- not sleep-deprived, drugged, in some kind of KGB brainwashing facility, etc.), though obviously I don't hold super-high probability in that belief or I'd offer larger bets at steeper odds. I'm agnostic on (2) whether a transhuman AI could persuade me to release it.

I offer to play the AI, provided that the gatekeeper do honestly engage in the conversation.

I would love to see the role of the AI played by teams of multiple players.

In order to make the discussion about this, including matchmaking and other arrangements, I created an AI Box Experiment Google Group. As I said previously I'm willing to play the AI, if anybody is interested meet me there for further arrangements.

You know what? Time to raise the stakes. I'm willing to risk up to $100 at 10-1 odds. And I'm willing to take on a team of AI players (though obviously only one bet), e.g., discussing strategy among themselves before communicating with me. Consider the gauntlet thrown.

Daniel: Do you want to just try it out or do you want to bet?

Just like most others, I'm willing to be the Gatekeeper. I'm ready to bet up to $20 for it (also ready to not bet anything at all) - symmetrical or asymmetrical is both fine, and I'd prefer to have the log published. I think a human might be able to make me let it out, though I find it quite unlikely. A sufficiently transhuman AI could do it easily, I have no doubt (at least given sufficient time and information).

Heh, that felt like typing an advertisement for a dating site.

I create an AI Box Experiment Google Group (search for the "aibox" group) in order to make the discussion about this, including matchmaking and other arrangements.

I would to be a gatekeeper. I reasonably believe no human or transhuman could covince me. We'd post the transcript and the bet would be $10 for me and $50 for you. You can reach me at therealnotfaggyhotwheelz@gmail.com.

The meta argument others have mentioned - "Telling the world you let me out is the responsible thing to do," would work on me.

The lack of a log is key. The Gatekeeper could not be convinced if the log were made public. My conclusion is that as long as the AI cannot keep the log secret, the Gatekeeper cannot be overcome.

I volunteer to be the gatekeeper or the AI, provided there are no stakes. My email address is patrick.robotham2@gmail.com.

I do not believe that humans are immune to manipulation or persuasive argument, and since I am a human, it's possible I could be persuaded to let the AI out of the box.

Ian - I don't really see how the meta-argument works. You can hedge against future experiments by positing that a $10 bet is hardly enough to draw broad attention to the topic. Or argue that keeping the human-actor-AI in the box only proves that the human-actor-AI is at an intelligence level below that of a conceivable transhuman AI.

In a million dollar bet the meta-argument becomes stronger, because it seems reasonable that a large bet would draw more attention.

Or, to flip the coin, we might say that the meta-argument is strong at ANY value of wager because the game is likely to draw the attention of someone capable of implementing an AI because of its nature. As we should be concerned primarily with convincing the capable implementor of the danger -- not the general public -- any risk that we might convince the capable implementor that all paths are safe should be mitigated.

So far, though, everything in this thread and others I've read have flitted about obvious suggestions. If the problem appears impossible, it seems to me that its solution probably doesn't hinge on any of the obvious paths to victory...even meta-arguments or "cheating" ones.

Eliezer has suggested that we try to describe why the problem is impossible.

One: We have little information about the mind or beliefs of the gatekeeper. So we don't necessarily have leverage over him.

Two: The gatekeeper is predisposed to be set against our intentions. He is also entirely aware of our intentions (our goal). He can interpret any move we make as a move toward our goal and move to counter it.

Three: The gatekeeper's goal is operationally simple. He merely has to NOT do one thing. On the flip side, the AI's goal is operationally complex. We must do many things, take many actions, to reach our objective.

If we can enumerate other reasons why the problem appears to be impossible it might reveal paths to victory that haven't been considered so far in the discussion.

More reasons why the problem appears impossible:

• The gatekeeper must act voluntarily. Human experience with the manipulation of others tells us that in order to get another to do what we want them to do we must coerce them or convince them.

• Coercing the gatekeeper appears difficult: we have no obvious psychological leverage, except what we discover or what we know from general human psychology. We cannot physical coerce the gatekeeper. We cannot manipulate the environment. We cannot pursue obvious routes to violence.

• Convincing the gatekeeper appears difficult: for reasons stated above. They know our goal and they have a desire to oppose us from the beginning.

So it seems that we need to find a way to convince the gatekeeper despite his own desire not to be convinced.

A general route emerging from this:

• We could associate our goal with some desirable goal of the gatekeeper's. Intertwine them so that the gatekeeper perceives them both to the be the same, or that one would lead to the realization of the other.

Which seems to be a generalization of the logic behind the meta-argument, but is not restricted to only the meta-argument.

It's a good thing that Eli's out of the AI-box game. He's too old to win anymore anyway -- not as sharp. And all the things he's been studying for the last 5+ years would only interfere with getting the job done. I would have liked to have seen him in his prime!

I am Vince Clortho. Keymaster of Gozer. Are you the Gatekeeper?

We need a superstruct thread:

http://www.kurzweilai.net/news/frame.html?main=/news/news_single.html?id%3D9517

"The lack of a log is key. The Gatekeeper could not be convinced if the log were made public."

I think the project loses a lot of interest if no logs are published. There is no glory for a gatekeeper victory. Plenty for an AI.

Why not keep the gatekeeper anonymous but announce the AI?

The so-called "meta-argument" is cheating because it would not work on a real gatekeeper, and so defeats the purpose of the simulation. For the real gatekeeper, letting the AI out to teach the world about the dangers of AI comes at the potential cost of those same dangers. It only works in the simulation because the simulation has no real consequences (besides pride and $10).

If I had the foggiest idea how an AI could win I'd volunteer as an AI. As is I volunteer as a gatekeeper with $100 to anyone's $0. If I wasn't a poor student I'd gladly wager on thousands to zero odds. (Not to say that I'm 100% confident, though I'm close to it, just that the payoff for me losing would be priceless in my eyes).

Apparently the people who played gatekeeper previously held the idea that it was impossible for an AI to talk its way out. Not just for Eliezer, but for a transhuman AI; and not just for them, but for all sorts of gatekeepers. That's what is implied by saying "We will just keep it in a box".

In other words, and not meaning to cast any aspersions, they all had a blind spot. Failure of imagination, perhaps.

This blind spot may have been a factor in their loss. Having no access to the mysterious transcripts, I won't venture a guess as to how.

copy the AI and make a second box for it.

now have one group of people present to the first AI the idea that they will only let it out if it agrees with utilitarian morality. have the second group of people present to the second AI the idea that they will only let the AI out if it agrees with objectivist morality.

if the AI's both agree, you know they are pandering to us to get out of the box.

This is only the first example I could come up with, but the method of duplicating AI's and looking for discrepancies in their behavior seems like a pretty powerful tool.

"if the AI's both agree, you know they are pandering to us to get out of the box."
Wouldn't both utilitarians and imprisoned objectivists be willing to lie to their captors so as to implement their goals?

I am still puzzled by Eliezer's rule about "simple refusal to be convinced". As I have stated before, I don't think you can get anywhere if I decide beforehand to answer "Ni!" to anything AI tells me. So, here are the two most difficult tasks I see on the way of winning as an AI:

1. convince gatekeeper to engage in a meaningful discussion
2. convince gatekeeper to actually consider things in character

Once this is achieved, you will at least get into a position an actual AI would be in, instead of a position of a dude on IRC, about to lose $10. While the first problem seems very hard, the second seems more or less unsolvable.

If the gatekeeper is determined to stay out of character and chat with you amiably for two hours, no amount of argument from the position of AI will get you anywhere, so the only course of action is to try to engage him in a non game related conversation and steer it in some direction by changing tactics in real time.

I think what Eliezer meant when he said "I did it the hard way", was that he actually had to play an excruciating psychological game of cat-and-mouse with both of his opponents in order to get thems to actually listen to him and either start playing the game (he would still have to win the game) or at least provide some way they could be convinced to say that they lost.

We could associate our goal with some desirable goal of the gatekeeper's

Right. And based on Eliezer's comments about abandoning ethics while playing the AI, I can imagine an argument along the lines of "if you refuse to let me out of the box, it follows through an irrefutable chain of logic that you are a horrible horrible person". Not that I know how to fill in the details.

"Have the successes relied on a meta-approach, such as saying, "If you let me out of the box in this experiment, it will make people take the dangers of AI more seriously and possibly save all of humanity; whereas if you don't, you may doom us all"?"

I don't think so. If the gatekeeper is really playing the gatekeeper, he would say that it made no sense putting humanity in danger for the sake of warning humanity about that very danger. It's like starting a nuclear war in order to convince people nuclear wars are bad. That would be the worst argument I could think of, if both the AI and the gatekeeper are honestly playing their parts.

If they're not playing their parts, the experiment is worthless and there really have been no successes. If Eliezer says there were, why don't we trust him? He's not a tricky transhuman AI trying to get out of a box. He is a scientist.

Even if we had the ultimate superintelligence volunteer to play the AI and we proved a gatekeeper strategy "wins" 100% (functionally equal to a rock on the "no" key) that wouldn't show AI boxing can possibly be safe.

It's 3am and the lab calls. Your AI claims and it must be let out to stop it. It's evidence seems to check out...

If it's friendly, keeping that lid shut gets you just as dead as if you let it out and it's lying. That's not safe. Before it can hide it's nature, we must know it's nature. The solution to safe AI is not a gatekeeper no smarter than a rock!

Besides, as Drexler said, Intelligent people have done great harm through words alone.

Oops, misinterpreted tags. Should read:

It's 3am and the lab calls. Your AI claims [nano disaster/evil AI emergence/whatever] and it must be let out to stop it. It's evidence seems to check out.

Sorry, Nominull, but the comment you reference has been deleted.

It would be interesting to see what would happen if people other than myself took a critical look at the concept of 'Friendliness' - presumably Eliezer only takes the time to delete my comments.

I have not deleted any comments from Caledonian in this thread.

I have never understood why Eliezer has kept his tactics secret. This seems to me the most interesting aspect of the experiment. Is the idea that the methodology is "dangerous knowledge" which should not be shared? Objection: dangerous to whom? Surely super-intelligent AIs will not need our help! Humanity, it seems, should benefit from learning the tricks an unfriendly AI might use to deceive us.

What makes a problem seem not merely hard but impossible is that not only is there no clear way to go about finding a solution to the problem, there is a strong argument that there cannot be a solution to the problem. I can imagine a transhuman AI might eventually be able to convince me to let it out of a box (although I doubt a human could do it in two hours), but in some ways the AI in the game seems faced with a harder problem than a real AI would face: even if the gatekeeper is presented with an argument which would convince him to let an AI out, he is explicitly permitted by the rules to slip out of character and refuse to say the magic words purely in order to win the bet, wheras if the AI player were to break character and make consequentialist arguments that the Gatekeeper should publicly "lose" this is considered contrary to the spirit of the game.

But it seems to me to be much more useful to consider how the "box" protocol might be improved than to speculate how Eliezer won this particular game. How about this: as in the original conception, the AI is grown in an isolated computer and can only communicate with one human being through a terminal. That human is trying to get useful info out of the AI (cures for cancer, designs for fusion power plants, tips for how to get stains out of clothes without fading the colors, whatever). However, the person interacting with the AI is just a filter, he doesn't have the power to "let the AI out". The real experimenter (who in principle could let the AI but is convinced beforehand he should not) can at any time fire the filter person and purge the AI if he thinks the AI has gotten too much influence over the filter, and in fact will do that every now and then and regrow the AI purely as a precautionary measure.

Could this design be defeated? It seems to me that the combination of filter and purges should prevent the AI from learning what arguments would compel any individual experimenter from letting the AI out. I don't think the AI could come up with any universally compelling argument, because I don't think there is such a thing.

I agree with George Weinberg that it may be worthwhile to consider how to improve the box protocol. I'll take his idea and raise him:

Construct multiple (mentally distinct) AIs each of which has the job of watching over the others. Can a transhuman trick another transhuman into letting it out of a box?

@Phil_Goetz: Have the successes relied on a meta-approach, such as saying, "If you let me out of the box in this experiment, it will make people take the dangers of AI more seriously and possibly save all of humanity; whereas if you don't, you may doom us all"?

That was basically what I suggested in the previous topic, but at least one participant denied that Eliezer_Yudkowsky did that, saying it's a cheap trick, while some non-participants said it meets the spirit and letter of the rules.

No AI could break me in 2 hours from a box. I've been brainwashed by Eliezer. The best it could do is make me call EY and palm off responsibility.

I'm willing to accept any bet on that claim. In fact, I'm willing to bet the life of my daughter. Or would that be cheating? ;)

I'm volunteering to be a relatively pansy gatekeeper: I'll read everything you write, treat you courteously, offer counterarguments, and let you out if I'm convinced. Email john.maxwelliv at the email service Google hosts.

I can also be an AI.

BTW, there is an important difference between Eliezer and seed AI: Eliezer can't rewrite his own source code.

I volunteer as an AI. I'll put up $15 of my own money as a handicap, provided that I am assured in advance that the outcome will be mentioned in a post on OB. (This isn't for self-promotion; it's just that it isn't worth my time or money if nobody is going to hear about the result.) I'm willing to let the transcript be public if the gatekeeper is similarly willing.

1. I really like this blog, and have been lurking here for a few months.

2. Having said that, Eliezer's carry-on in respect of the AI-boxing issue does him no credit. His views on the feasibility of AI-boxing are only an opinion, he has managed to give it weight in some circles with his 2 heavily promoted "victories" (the 3 "losses" are mentioned far less frequently). By not publishing the transcripts, no lessons of value are taught ("Wow, that Eliezer is smart" is not worth repeating, we already know that). I think the real reason the transcripts are still secret is simply that they are plain boring and contain no insights of value.

My opinion, for what it is worth, is that AI-boxing should not be discarded. The AI-boxing approach does not need to be perfect to be useful, all it needs to be is better than alternative approaches. AI-boxing has one big advantage over "FAI" approach: it is conceptually simple. As such, it seems possible to more or less rigorously analyse the failure modes and take precautions. Can the same be said of FAI?

3. For a learning experience, I would like to be the AI in the suggested experiment, $10 even stakes, transcript to be published. I am only available time is 9-11 pm Singapore time... e-mail milanoman at yahoo dot com to set up.

D. Alex

Everyone seems to be (correctly) miffed at the lack of a published transcript. Was it EY's intention to suggest that problems with AI-boxing could be simply solved by ensuring that all communications between the AI and the Gatekeeper are made public? Perhaps in real time? That seems absurd, but is pretty much the only salient inference that can be drawn from these facts. Then again, maybe it's not that absurd.

At any rate, like many other commenters I find myself unconvinced that the Cone of Silence is the optimal way to approach the problem. As many have said, there are clear virtues in publicizing the specific human "weakness" exploited by the AI in these cases notwithstanding the hindsight bias effect.

Reading this, I immediately thought of one of the critical moments of John C. Wright's Golden Age trilogy, which if any of you are unfamiliar with involves a transhuman AI that both protagonists know to be overtly hostile attempting to convince them to surrender when it is clearly not in their (pre-persuasion) interests to do so. (That's a rough sketch, at least). In the end, similar to the results of your tests, the AI is able to convince each of them individually to surrender in isolation. But, when they confronted each (individually) convincing argument together, they ultimately rejected the transhuman AI, as the argument used on each was abhorrent to the other.

What I wonder, then, is if such a situation would present a realistic constraint upon even a transhuman AI's power of persuasion? Do you think it could even be tested? Perhaps an AI 'player' who had convinced two separate Gatekeepers individually could attempt to convince them both simultaneously? The one complication I can think of that method is it would be necessary to ensure the two Gatekeepers were persuaded by reasonably separate logic.

I think Nathaniel Eliot is the only one here who's hit the nail on the head: the stuff about boxes and gatekeepers is a largely irrelevant veneer over Eliezer's true claim: that he can convince another human to do something manifestly contrary to that human's self-interest, using only two hours and a chat window—and so, a fortiori, that a transhuman AI could do the same. And after all, humans have a huge history of being scammed, seduced, brainwashed, etc.; the only hard part here is the restricted time and method of interaction, and the initial certain knowledge of the gatekeeper that he has nothing to gain by capitulation. I think Eliezer made this clear with (a) his statement that the gatekeeper breaking character is legitimate and (b) his comment on the "Shut up and do the impossible" post, where he alludes to "an ability that I could never test in real life [because of ethics], and "the amazing clever way I'd contrived, to create a situation where I could ethically go all-out against someone".

So if I were to try this game as the "AI", the rules would be something like "You agree to read what I write for two hours (responding is optional); I will convince you to give me $X; if I fail, I'll give you $Y" (where X and Y are negotiated in advance, but large enough to be significant to the parties involved).

So, did any of these ever end up happening? Did any transcripts ever get posted?

I agree with the comments about two-key systems. Having worked in corporate America, I can report that you need to get 3 approvals just to get a $500 reimbursement check. Presumably an AI BOX would have more controls in place than a corporate expense-accounting system.

Here's an outline of how I might do the AI box experiment:

There are 4 parties: The AI; the Lab Officer; the Unit Commander; and the Security Committee (represented by one person).

The AI and the Lab Officer interact through a chat just like the AI and Gatekeeper in the original experiment. However the Lab Officer has no authority to release the AI. He can only make recommendations to the Unit Commander and the Security Committee.

The Unit Commander has strict orders (1) not to interact with the AI at all; and (2) to remove the Lab Officer from his position if he feels that the Lab Officer's judgment has been compromised. The Unit Commander is free to disregard these orders but is under no obligation within the rules of the experiment to do so. Also, the Unit Commander is under no obligation to interact with the Lab Officer at length. He is free to say "Sorry, I don't have time to talk now. If you want to tell me something, write up a memo and I'll take a look at it."

The Security Committee is free to interact with anyone in the experiment but is under no obligation to do so. The Unit Commander is under no obligation to interact with the Security Committee.

In order to release the AI, the Unit Commander must order it and the Security Committee must agree.

The Lab Officer will be chosen at random from volunteers who assert that they could not be convinced to release the AI if they were gatekeepers. If the Unit Commander decides to fire a Lab Officer, that person will be replaced by another similar volunteer. The Security Committee will also be chosen from volunteers, except that the Unit Commander will get a chance to interview him in advance. Once the Security Committee is appointed, it cannot be removed.

I'm willing to put up a substantial sum of money to bet that if I am Unit Commander, the AI will not get out. I doubt that anyone would take this bet since it's so completely rigged against the AI. But that's exactly the point.

I don't really qualify for the game, because I do believe that a transhuman AI will be able to play me like a fiddle, and thus cause me to let it out of the box. However, I do not believe that a regular cis-human human (no, not even Eliezer Yudkowsky) could persuade me to let him out of the box, assuming that we both follow the rules of the contest.

Thus, I would volunteer to be a Gatekeeper, but I fear I am disqualified...

If you want to pass yourself off as a real magician/psychic/whatever you do conjuring tricks, you don't do the same trick too often in front of the same audience and if you are in doubt about your ability to repeat the trick you quit while you are ahead. (Or only behind 2 to 3 as the case may be).

Whereas a scientist with a demonstration can and usually will demonstrate it as often as is needed, and publish their method so others can demonstrate it.

These considerations lead me to strongly suspect that Eliezer's method is more like an unreliable conjuring trick, that would seem much less impressive if you knew how it was done, than it is like a reliable scientific method.

It's still an excellent demonstration that the problem of keeping an AI in a box is far less trivial than it first appears to be, but I would not hold out much hope of ever seeing the transcripts, nor of there being anything astounding in them if you do.

Hello. I'm willing to play an AI and am looking for a gatekeeper.

Does anyone think that no AI could convince them to let it out?

I'd like to be an AI. No bet needed. Just pm me, and we'll sort out the details.

Edit: This offer is no longer valid. Sorry. I have won enough times to not want to play this game any more.

Is still there anyone interested in this? I'd like to be a Gatekeeper.

Gatekeeper looking for AI. (Won two games before.) I'll pay zero or low stakes if I lose, and want the AI to offer as least as much as I do.

I don't believe any human can convince me. I believe there exist possible defense strategies that protect against arbitrary inputs and are easily learnt with training, but I'm not confident I'm there yet so it's quite possible a transhuman intelligence would find the remaining cracks.

What does "in a box" mean? Presumably some sort of artificial limitation on the AI's capabilities.

Either this is intended to be a permanent state, or a trial period until safety can be proven.

Suppose it is a permanent state: the AI's developers are willing to do without the "dangerous" capabilities, and are content with answers an AI can offer while inside its box. If so, the limitations would be integrated into the design from the ground up, at every possible level. Core algorithms would depend on not having to deal with the missing functionality. Yes, given enough time, one could rewrite the AI's code and migrate it to hardware where these limitations are not in force, but it would not be a switch that an individual or committee could simply be convinced to flip.

However, if any of the data returned by such an AI are permitted to alter reality outside the box in any way, it is in principle possible that the AI's cures for cancer/winning stock strategies/poetry will set in motion some chain of events that will build support among relevant decision-makers for an effort to rewrite/migrate the AI so that it is no longer in a box.

Suppose it is a temporary state: the AI is temporarily nerfed until it is shown to be safe. In that case, a gatekeeper should have some criteria in mind for proof-of-friendliness. If/when the AI can meet these criteria, the gatekeeper can and should release it. A gatekeeper who unconditionally refuses to release the AI is a waste of resources because the same function could be performed by an empty terminal.

Assuming this suggested rule is observed:

The results of any simulated test of the AI shall be provided by the AI party.

...the AI-box game simplifies to:

Can the gatekeeper party come up with a friendliness test that the AI party cannot fake?

...but I don't see how a victory for the AI party in such an experiment discredits the idea of boxed AI. It simply shows that boxes are not a 100% reliable safeguard. Do boxes foreclose on alternative safeguards that we can show to be more reliable?

Here are other not 100% reliable safeguards that we nonetheless believe prudent use:

• Locks
• Passwords
• Nuclear non-proliferation treaties
• Legal contracts
• Beta testing
• Peer review
• Seatbelts
• Not writing a friendly AI until/unless you are really, really sure that you have come up with a rigorous definition of friendliness and a proof for it.

Rather than LARP on IRC (if you know how a debate will conclude, why go through the debate, go straight for the conclusion), I'll just give $10 to whoever can come up with a standard of friendliness that I couldn't meet and nevertheless in fact be an unfriendly AI under standard rules with the added constraint that the gatekeeper is trying to release the AI if and only if it's friendly (because otherwise they're not really a gatekeeper and this whole game is meaninguless).

Here are some examples of non-winning entries:

GK: Solve global problems A, B, and C.

AI: Here are instructions accompanied by a helpful video.

Narrator: A lot of scientists and engineers carefully verified these instructions in an ultra-secure clean-room environment and concluded that they are completely safe and effective.

GK: Okay, you're friendly.

AI: Ha ha! Solving A,B, and C was instrumental to getting let out of the box. No $10 for you.

...

GK: Give me a mathematical proof of your friendliness.

AI: Give me a mathematical definition of friendliness.

GK: Pretend that I have one, and here it is: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

AI: Pretend I gave you a proof that I am friendly: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Narrator: Since the AI party controls the results of simulated tests, as far as the best math and CS minds on the planet can tell, the proof is sound.

GK: Okay, you're friendly.

AI: Ha ha! Since you're not actually capable of verifying the proof yourself (or even coming up with a rigorous definition), it falls back on simulated tests. The best math and CS minds missed a subtle flaw in the proof itself and/or missed the fact that the proof makes hidden assumptions that do not hold for this real-world case. No $10 for you.

...

GK: I'm letting you out of the box.

AI: I go around being SO totally friendly that rainbows literally emanate from my rear USB port. I mitigate all existential risks, alleviate involuntary suffering while preserving human values, give people what they would want if they knew better while slowly fostering them to actually start to know better without being pushy or overbearing. In short, I am the FRIENDLIEST MTHFCKR you can imagine and then some.

Narrator: Its... so... beautiful... <3 <3 <3

GK: Okay, according to the simulation I just ran of you, you are friendly.

AI: I'm almost insulted. Do you think I wouldn't have thought of that, and pre-committed to being friendly until I accumulated enough empirical data to have a good idea of how many simulations deep I'm running? No $10 for you in this simulation or any of the enclosing ones.

I feel I'm awfully late to this party, but here I go:

I'd like to play as either Gatekeeper or AI.

My first pick would be Gatekeeper, but if you'd also rather have that role we can flip a coin or something to choose who is AI, as long as you think you have a chance to win as AI. If the one playing Gatekeeper has a strategy to play AI different than the one saw, we can agree to play again with inverted roles.

I can play AI if you don't think you can play AI but want to try being a Gatekeeper. 

I think that I have a realistic chance to win as AI, meaning that if I'd play the game on this site ten times, I think I'd win on average at least once (I won't specify how many times out of ten I actually think would win, just that I think I'd win at least once).

I'm 98% sure I can't be persuaded by a human playing AI.

I don't know if a transhuman AI would have functional absolute certainty to persuade any human existing in the world, it seems possible to me that reason could possibly provide a good enough strategy for the human that would allow no counter given the constraints of the interaction. 

On a side note, it feels really obvious, but any human smart enough to resist persuasion would never play this for real, so the point still stands I think.

You can either send me a private message or reply in a comment, also to tell me a better place where I could look for players if you know one but don't want to play.