I opened the survey but how it was asked throught thick "isms" thought it was sufficiently confused / stupid that I didn't want to engage and answer. Seeing how others have used the "other" field should have gone for something like that.

Is my answer (patternism/mathematical monadism) separate from reductive functionalism? My view is that the algorithmic description of my brain is already phenomenologically conscious; physically evaluating it accesses these experiences but does not create them. I think the materialist view still holds that there is some sort of "secret fire" to things actually physically happening.

(If not, just count me under red func.)

Voted "unclear question" due to the word choice of "fundamental".

I figure that consciousness "exists" like gods and luck: whether or not it exists "objectively"/"materially", thinking about it appears to change peoples' observable behaviors.

I figure that matter "exists" like language: the laws of physics are what make many ideas possible to communicate between consciousnesses, and test whether that communication succeeded.

I don't see a contradiction between explanations of the form "matter exists because we think it does" and "consciousness exists as an emergent property of matter". Most situations which require* an explanation are distinctly better served by one or the other, so I use whichever explanation seems the better fit for the context.

Another way to describe this position would be that I have encountered situations where it's useful to model matter as an artifact of consciousness, and situations where it's useful to model consciousness as an artifact of matter. However, I cannot recall any situation where it was helpful to strictly rule out the possibility of either position. You can get to some interesting ideas by choosing to include or emphasize one view or the other, but I have not encountered a benefit from explicitly ruling out either.

In short, I can only tell you which explanation I think is "best" in the context of what you want the explanation for.

* and most of the time, situations which superficially seem to "require" an explanation can be reframed to not need one at all.

With only two questions about what people believe, I expected to see a matrix showing number of people in each 2-d category. The most interesting result is how do answers to the two questions correlate.

anyone who said Objective Idealism but also that laws of physics are complete. [How does that work?]

I'm not an objective idealist, but I would assume that its much more impactive against the physical part of physical closure than the closure part. Given that every apparent thing is some sort of mental entity or "idea in the mind of God", there is no reason why every apparent thing should not follow a set of rules that allow complete determinism.

the person with the dual-aspect neutral monism answer. [How is that different from panpyschism?]

Physicalism privileges the physical over the mental. Panpsychism privileges the mental over the physical. DANM does neither

Panpsychism holds the difference between the mental and the physical to be a matter of degree. If the problem of reconciling mental and physical causation is just that mental and physical properties belong to two different and irreconcilable categories, then it's solved. But if the causal closure of the physical is true, it's another story. If physical properties are sufficient to explain causality, then mental properties are redundant (or there is overdeteminism). Panpsychists regard physical properties as a kind of mental property, but the point remains the same ... if a subset of properties is sufficient to explain and predict behaviour, the others are redundant. So panpsychism doesn't address physical closure. If the higher level of mental properties are somehow identical to the load level or physical ones ,the difficulty is removed...But that it the step from panpsychism to DANM.

It's desirable for solutions to the mind-body problem to explain the distribution of consciousness in a way that matches intuition. Sceptical theories, such as illusionism and eliminative materialism, predict too little -- ie., none at all. Panspsychism, on the face of it, has the opposite problem: it suggests that everything, including sticks and stones, has mentality (or, for panexperientialism, consciousness). DANM is able to predict a distribution of conscious experience that is not wildly unintuitive. A rich subjective experience can only be the inner perspective on an informationally rich physical state, because the inner or mental perspective can't add any new information -- it is always a representation of existing information. So informationally simple entities don't have significant mental life.

re the first question I assumed it was asking "what are you symathetic to" rather than "what is", more than any particular view I'm dubious of anyone who's feels 100% confident in their view on the nature of conciousness 

I suspect "what is consciousness" is downstream of "what is life", and the answer to "What is the relationship between matter and consciousness?" depends on what one counts as alive, and a survey like that doesn't explicate a bunch of hidden assumptions. 

Well now I've finally got what Dual Aspect Neutral Monism is - it's just panpyschism with "physics can be formulated differently" observation!