Aaron_Scher's Shortform

Note on something from the superalignment section of Leopold Aschenbrenner's recent blog posts:

Evaluation is easier than generation. We get some of the way “for free,” because it’s easier for us to evaluate outputs (especially for egregious misbehaviors) than it is to generate them ourselves. For example, it takes me months or years of hard work to write a paper, but only a couple hours to tell if a paper someone has written is any good (though perhaps longer to catch fraud). We’ll have teams of expert humans spend a lot of time evaluating every RLHF example, and they’ll be able to “thumbs down” a lot of misbehavior even if the AI system is somewhat smarter than them. That said, this will only take us so far (GPT-2 or even GPT-3 couldn’t detect nefarious GPT-4 reliably, even though evaluation is easier than generation!)

Disagree about papers. I don’t think it takes merely a couple hours to tell if a paper is any good. In some cases it does, but in other cases, entire fields have been led astray for years due to bad science (e.g., replication crisis in psych, where numerous papers spurred tons of follow up work on fake things; a year and dozens of papers later we still don’t know if DPO is better than PPO for frontier AI development (though perhaps this is known in labs, and my guess is some people would argue this question is answered); IIRC it took like 4-8 months for the alignment community to decide CCS [LW(p) · GW(p)] was bad (this is a contentious and oversimplifying take), despite many people reading the original paper). Properly vetting a paper in the way you will want to do for automated alignment research, especially if you’re excluding fraud from your analysis, is about knowing whether the insights in the paper will be useful in the future, it’s not just checking if they use reasonable hyperparameters on their baseline comparisons. 

One counterpoint: it might be fine to have some work you mistakenly think is good, as long as it’s not existential-security-critical and you have many research directions being explored in parallel. That is, because you can run tons of your AIs at once, they can explore tons of research directions and do a bunch of the follow-up work that is needed to see if an insight is important. There may not be a huge penalty for having a slightly poor training signal, as long as it can get the quality of outputs good enough. 

This [how easily can you evaluate a paper] is a tough question to answer — I would expect Leopold’s thoughts here to dominated by times he has read shitty papers, rightly concluded they are shitty, and patted himself on the back for his paper-critique skills — I know I do this. But I don’t expect being able to differentiate shitty vs. (okay + good + great) is enough. At a meta level, this post is yet another claim that "evaluation is easier than generation" will be pretty useful for automating alignment — I have grumbled about this before (though can't find anything I've finished writing up), and this is yet another largely-unsubstantiated claim in that direction. There is a big difference between the claims "because evaluation is generally easier than generation, evaluating automated alignment research will be a non-zero amount easier than generating it ourselves" and "the evaluation-generation advantage will be enough to significantly change our ability to automate alignment research and is thus a meaningful input into believing in the success of an automated alignment plan"; the first is very likely true, but the second maybe not. 

On another note, the line “We’ll have teams of expert humans spend a lot of time evaluating every RLHF example” seems absurd. It feels a lot like how people used to say “we will keep the AI in a nice sandboxed environment”, and now most user-facing AI products have a bunch of tools and such. It sounds like an unrealistic safety dream. This also sounds terribly inefficient — it would only work if your model is very sample-efficiently learning from few examples — which is a particular bet I’m not confident in. And my god, the opportunity cost of having your $300k engineers label a bunch of complicated data! It looks to me like what labs are doing for self play (I think my view is based on papers out of meta and GDM) is having some automated verification like code passing unit tests, and using a ton of examples. If you are going to come around saying they’re going to pivot from ~free automated grading to using top engineers for this, the burden of proof is clearly on you, and the prior isn’t so good.

Leaving Dangling Questions in your Critique is Bad Faith

Note: I’m trying to explain an argumentative move that I find annoying and sometimes make myself; this explanation isn’t very good, unfortunately. 

Example

Them: This effective altruism thing seems really fraught. How can you even compare two interventions that are so different from one another? 

Explanation of Example

I think the way the speaker poses the above question is not as a stepping stone for actually answering the question, it’s simply as a way to cast doubt on effective altruists. My response is basically, “wait, you’re just going to ask that question and then move on?! The answer really fucking matters! Lives are at stake! You are clearly so deeply unserious about the project of doing lots of good, such that you can pose these massively important questions and then spend less than 30 seconds [LW · GW] trying to figure out the answer.” I think I might take these critics more seriously if they took themselves more seriously. 

Description of Dangling Questions

A common move I see people make when arguing or criticizing something is to pose a question that they think the original thing has answered incorrectly or is not trying sufficiently hard to answer. But then they kinda just stop there. The implicit argument is something like “The original thing didn’t answer this question sufficiently, and answering this question sufficiently is necessary for the original thing to be right.”

But importantly, the criticisms usually don’t actually argue that — they don’t argue for some alternative answer to the original questions, if they do they usually aren’t compelling, and they also don’t really try to argue that this question is so fundamental either. 

One issue with Dangling Questions is that they focus the subsequent conversation on a subtopic that may not be a crux [? · GW] for either party, and this probably makes the subsequent conversation less useful. 

Example

Me: I think LLMs might scale to AGI. 

Friend: I don’t think LLMs are actually doing planning, and that seems like a major bottleneck to them scaling to AGI. 

Me: What do you mean by planning? How would you know if LLMs were doing it? 

Friend: Uh…idk

Explanation of Example

I think I’m basically shifting the argumentative burden onto my friend when it falls on both of us. I don’t have a good definition of planning or a way to falsify whether LLMs can do it — and that’s a hole in my beliefs just as it is a hole in theirs. And sure, I’m somewhat interested in what they say in response, but I don’t expect them to actually give a satisfying answer here. I’m posing a question I have no intention of answering myself and implying it’s important for the overall claim of LLMs scaling to AGI (my friend said it was important for their beliefs, but I’m not sure it’s actually important for mine). That seems like a pretty epistemically lame thing to do. 

Traits of “Dangling Questions”

1. They are used in a way that implies the target thing is wrong vis a vis the original idea, but this argument is not made convincingly.
2. The author makes minimal effort to answer the question with an alternative. Usually they simply pose it. The author does not seem to care very much about having the correct answer to the question.
3. The author usually implies that this question is particularly important for the overall thing being criticized, but does not usually make this case.
4. These questions share a lot in common with the paradigm criticisms discussed in Criticism Of Criticism Of Criticism, but I think they are distinct in that they can be quite narrow.
5. One of the main things these questions seem to do is raise the reader’s uncertainty about the core thing being criticized, similar to the Just Asking Questions phenomenon. To me, Dangling Questions seem like a more intellectual version of Just Asking Questions — much more easily disguised as a good argument.

Here's another example, though it's imperfect.

Example

From an AI Snake Oil blog post:

Research on scaling laws shows that as we increase model size, training compute, and dataset size, language models get “better”. … But this is a complete misinterpretation of scaling laws. What exactly is a “better” model? Scaling laws only quantify the decrease in perplexity, that is, improvement in how well models can predict the next word in a sequence. Of course, perplexity is more or less irrelevant to end users — what matters is “emergent abilities”, that is, models’ tendency to acquire new capabilities as size increases.

Explanation of Example

The argument being implied is something like “scaling laws are only about perplexity, but perplexity is different from the metric we actually care about — how much? who knows? —, so you should ignore everything related to perplexity, also consider going on a philosophical side-quest to figure out what ‘better’ really means. We think ‘better’ is about emergent abilities, and because they’re emergent we can’t predict them so who knows if they will continue to appear as we scale up”. In this case, the authors have ventured an answer to their Dangling Question, “what is a ‘better’ model?“, they’ve said it’s one with more emergent capabilities than a previous model. This answer seems flat out wrong to me; acceptable answers include: downstream performance, self-reported usefulness to users, how much labor-time it could save when integrated in various people’s work, ability to automate 2022 job tasks, being more accurate on factual questions, and much more. I basically expect nobody to answer the question “what does it mean for one AI system to be better than another?” with “the second has more capabilities that were difficult to predict based on the performance of smaller models and seem to increase suddenly on a linear-performance, log-compute plot”.

Even given the answer “emergent abilities”, the authors fail to actually argue that we don’t have a scaling precedent for these. Again, I think the focus on emergent abilities is misdirected, so I’ll instead discuss the relationship between perplexity and downstream benchmark performance — I think this is fair game because this is a legitimate answer to the “what counts as ‘better’?” question and because of the original line “Scaling laws only quantify the decrease in perplexity, that is, improvement in how well models can predict the next word in a sequence”. The quoted thing is technically true but in this context highly misleading, because we can, in turn, draw clear relationships between perplexity and downstream benchmark performance; here are three recent papers which do so, here are even more studies that relate compute directly to downstream performance on non-perplexity metrics. Note that some of these are cited in the blog post. I will also note that this seems like one example of a failure I’ve seen a few times where people conflate “scaling laws” with what I would refer to as “scaling trends” where the scaling laws refer to specific equations for predicting various metrics based on model inputs such as # parameters and amount of data to predict perplexity, whereas scaling trends are the more general phenomenon we observe that scaling up just seems to work and in somewhat predictable ways; the scaling laws are useful for the predicting, but whether we have those specific equations or not has no effect on this trend we are observing, the equations just yield a bit more precision. Yes, scaling laws relating parameters and data to perplexity or training loss do not directly give you info about downstream performance, but we seem to be making decent progress on the (imo still not totally solved) problem of relating perplexity to downstream performance, and together these mean we have somewhat predictable scaling trends for metrics that do matter.

Example

Here’s another example from that blog post where the authors don’t literally pose a question, but they are still doing the Dangling Question thing in many ways. (context is referring to these posts):

Also, like many AI boosters, he conflates benchmark performance with real-world usefulness.

Explanation of Example

(Perhaps it would be better to respond to the linked AI Snake Oil piece, but that’s a year old and lacks lots of important evidence we have now). I view the move being made here as posing the question “but are benchmarks actually useful to real world impact?“, assuming the answer is no — or poorly arguing so in the linked piece — and going on about your day. It’s obviously the case that benchmarks are not the exact same as real world usefulness, but the question of how closely they’re related isn’t some magic black box of un-solvability! If the authors of this critique want to complain about the conflation between benchmark performance and real-world usefulness, they should actually bring the receipts showing that these are not related constructs and that relying on benchmarks would lead us astray. I think when you actually try that, you get an answer like: benchmark scores seem worse than user’s reported experience and than user’s reported usefulness in real world applications, but there is certainly a positive correlation here; we can explain some of the gap via techniques like few-shot prompting that are often used for benchmarks, a small amount via dataset contamination, and probably much of this gap comes from a validity gap where benchmarks are easy to assess but unrealistic, but thankfully we have user-based evaluations like LMSYS that show a solid correlation between benchmark scores and user experience, … (if I actually wanted to make the argument the authors were, I would be spending like >5 paragraphs on it and elaborating on all of the evidences mentioned above, including talking more about real world impacts, this is actually a difficult question and the above answer is demonstrative rather than exemplar)

Caveats and Potential Solutions

There is room for questions in critiques. Perfect need not be the enemy of good when making a critique. Dangling Questions are not always made in bad faith. 

Many of the people who pose Dangling Questions like this are not trying to act in bad faith. Sometimes they are just unserious about the overall question, and they don’t care much about getting to the right answer. Sometimes Dangling Questions are a response to being confused and not having tons of time to think through all the arguments, e.g., they’re a psychological response something like “a lot feels wrong about this, here are some questions that hint at what feels wrong to me, but I can’t clearly articulate it all because that’s hard and I’m not going to put in the effort”.

My guess at a mental move which could help here: when you find yourself posing a question in the context of an argument, ask whether you care about the answer, ask whether you should spend a few minutes trying to determine the answer, ask whether the answer to this question would shift [? · GW] your beliefs about the overall argument, ask whether the question puts undue burden on your interlocutor. 

If you’re thinking quickly and aren’t hoping to construct a super solid argument, it’s fine to have Dangling Questions, but if your goal is to convince others of your position, you should try to answer your key questions, and you should justify why they matter to the overall argument. 

Another example of me posing a Dangling Question in this [LW(p) · GW(p)]:

What happens to OpenAI if GPT-5 or the ~5b training run isn't much better than GPT-4? Who would be willing to invest the money to continue? It seems like OpenAI either dissolves or gets acquired. 

Explanation of Example

(I’m not sure equating GPT-5 with a ~5b training run is right). In the above quote, I’m arguing against The Scaling Picture [LW · GW] by asking whether anybody will keep investing money if we see only marginal gains after the next (public) compute jump. I think I spent very little time trying to answer this question, and that was lame (though acceptable given this was a Quick Take and not trying to be a strong argument). I think for an argument around this to actually go through, I should argue: without much larger dollar investments, The Scaling Picture won’t hold; those dollar investments are unlikely conditional on GPT-5 not being much better than GPT-4. I won’t try to argue these in depth, but I do think some compelling evidence is that OpenAI is rumored to be at ~$3.5 billion [EA · GW] annualized revenue, and this plausibly justifies considerable investment even if the GPT-5 gain over this isn’t tremendous. 

Some prompts I found interesting when brainstorming LLM startups

I spent a little time thinking about making an AI startup. I generally think it would be great if more people were trying to build useful companies that directly add value, rather than racing to build AGI. Here are some of the prompts I found interesting to think about, perhaps they will be useful to other people/AI agents interested in building a startup:

• What are the situations where people will benefit from easy and cheap access to expert knowledge? You’re leveraging that human expert labor is hard to scale to many situations (especially when experts are rare, needs are specific, it’s awkward, it’s too expensive — including both raw cost and the cost of finding/trusting/onboarding an expert). What are all the things you occasionally pay somebody to do, but which requires them coming in person? What is a problem people know they have but they don’t seek out existing solutions (because of perceived cost, awkwardness, unsure how). e.g., dating profile feedback, outfit designer. 
• Solve a problem that exists due to technological development, e.g., preventing the social isolation from social media, reducing various catastrophic risks during and after intelligence explosion.

Some other problem attack surface opened up by LLMs:

• Cheaply carry out simple straightforward tasks.
• Analyze data at scale.
• Do tasks that there was no previous market for (e.g., provided $5 of value but took an hour, and you can’t hire people for $5/hour because they don’t want to work for that little and the overhead is high). Reasons for lack of market: not enough money to be made, can’t trust somebody (not worth the time needed to grow trust, or substantial privacy concerns), communication cost too high (specify task), other overhead too high (travel, finding person), training cost too high compared to salary (imagine it took 8 years to become a barber).
• Provide cheap second opinions, potentially many of them (e.g., reviewing a low-importance piece of writing).

Some other desiderata I had (for prompting LLMs):

• I want to have a clear and direct story for making people's lives better or solving problems they have. So I have a slight preference for B2C over B2B, unless there's a clear story for how we're significantly helping the business in an industry that benefits people.
• We don't want to be obsoleted by the predictable products coming out of AI development companies; for instance a product that just takes ChatGPT and adds a convenient voice feature is not a good idea because that niche is likely to be met by existing developers fairly soon.
• We don't want to work on something that other well resourced efforts are working on. Our edge is having good ideas and creative implementations, not being able to outcompete others according to resource investment. We should play to our strengths and not try to get in a losing battle with strong existing products.
• I mainly don't want to be directly competing with existing products or services, instead I want to be creating a large amount of counterfactual value by solving a problem that nobody else has solved.
• The MVP should be achievable by a team of 5 working for <6 months, ideally even a very basic MVP should be achievable in just a week or two of full-time work.
• I want to be realistic, we won't be able to solve everything or do everything. I want to aim for a fairly niche product, rather than solving a huge-scale problem like fixing medical care. That is, instead of a general medical chatbot, a better idea would be a first-aid tutor that can help people learn first-aid basics and refresh their knowledge later.
• I want to be providing a service people are excited to receive. For instance, a sustainable living advisor isn't a great idea because if it actually got people to make more sustainable decisions, that would be annoying — people don't actually want to hear that they shouldn't fly home to their family for the holidays, even though this is one of the more important sustainability decisions they could make.
• I probably want to provide a service that is not currently provided by a simple google search. For instance, a cooking assistant is pretty much just glorified google search. I want to be providing more value than that. Services which can be provided by a simple google search are likely to be filled in by existing developers.
• I do not want to be pushing the frontier of AI capabilities in dangerous domains such as: synthetic biology, cybersecurity, autonomous weapons, ML engineering and AI development, manipulation and persuasion. Generally pushing the frontier of scientific capabilities may also be in this group due to its effects on the other domains, but it is unclear.

I sometimes want to point at a concept that I've started calling The Scaling Picture. While it's been discussed at length (e.g., here, here, here), I wanted to give a shot at writing a short version:

• The picture:
  • We see improving AI capabilities as we scale up compute, projecting the last few years of progress in LLMs forward might give us AGI (transformative economic/political/etc. impact similar to the industrial revolution; AI that is roughly human-level or better on almost all intellectual tasks) later this decade (note: the picture is not about specific capabilities so much as the general picture).
  • Relevant/important downstream capabilities improve as we scale up pre-training compute (size of model and amount of data), although for some metrics there are very sublinear returns — this is the current trend. Therefore, you can expect somewhat predictable capability gains in the next few years as we scale up spending (increase compute), and develop better algorithms / efficiencies.
  • AI capabilities in the deep learning era are the result of three inputs: data, compute, algorithms. Keeping algorithms the same, and scaling up the others, we get better performance — that's what scaling means. We can lump progress in data and algorithms together under the banner "algorithmic progress" (i.e., how much intelligence can you get per compute) and then to some extent we can differentiate the source of progress: algorithmic progress is primarily driven by human researchers, while compute progress is primarily driven by spending more money to buy/rent GPUs. (this may change in the future). In the last few years of AI history, we have seen massive gains in both of these areas: it's estimated that the efficiency of algorithms has improved about 3x/year, and the amount of compute used has increased 4.1x/year. These are ludicrous speeds relative to most things in the world. 
  • Edit to add: This paper seems like it might explain that breakdown better. 
  • Edit to add: The below arguments are just supposed to be pointers toward longer argument one could make, but the one sentence version usually isn't compelling on its own.
• Arguments for:
  • Scaling laws (mathematically predictable relationship between pretraining compute and perplexity) have held for ~12 orders of magnitude already
  • We are moving though ‘orders of magnitude of compute’ quickly, so lots of probability mass should be soon (this argument is more involved, following from having uncertainty over orders of magnitude of compute that might be necessary for AGI, like the approach taken here [AF · GW]; see here for discussion)
  • Once you get AIs that can speed up AI progress meaningfully, progress on algorithms could go much faster, e.g., by AIs automating the role of researchers at OpenAI. You also get compounding economic returns that allow compute to grow — AIs that can be used to make a bunch of money, and that money can be put into compute. It seems plausible that you can get to that level of AI capabilities in the next few orders of magnitude, e.g., GPT-5 or GPT-6. Automated researchers are crazy.
  • Moore’s law has held for a long time. Edit to add: I think a reasonable breakdown for the "compute" category mentioned above is "money spent" and "FLOP purchasable per dollar". While Moore's Law is technically about the density of transistors, the thing we likely care more about is FLOP/$, which follows similar trends. 
  • Many people at AGI companies think this picture is right, see e.g., this, this, this (can’t find an aggregation)
• Arguments against:
  • Might run out of data. There are estimated to be 100T-1000T internet tokens, we will likely hit this level in a couple years.
  • Might run out of money — we’ve seen ~$100m training runs, we’re likely at $100m-1b this year, tech R&D budgets are ~30B, governments could fund $1T. One way to avoid this 'running out of money' problem is if you get AIs that speed up algorithmic progress sufficiently.
  • Scaling up is a non-trivial engineering problem and it might cause slow downs due to e.g., GPU failure and difficulty parallelizing across thousands of GPUs
  • Revenue might just not be that big and investors might decide it's not worth the high costs
    • OTOH, automating jobs is a big deal if you can get it working
  • Marginal improvements (maybe) for huge increased costs; bad ROI. 
    • There are numerous other economics arguments against, mainly arguing that huge investments in AI will not be sustainable, see e.g., here
  • Maybe LLMs are missing some crucial thing
    • Not doing true generalisation to novel tasks in the ARC-AGI benchmark
    • Not able to learn on the fly — maybe long context windows or other improvements can help
    • Lack of embodiment might be an issue
  • This is much faster than many AI researchers are predicting
  • This runs counter to many methods of forecasting AI development
  • Will be energy intensive — might see political / social pressures to slow down. 
  • We might see slowdowns due to safety concerns.

Thinking about AI training runs scaling to the $100b/1T range. It seems really hard to do this as an independent AGI company (not owned by tech giants, governments, etc.). It seems difficult to raise that much money, especially if you're not bringing in substantial revenue or it's not predicted that you'll be making a bunch of money in the near future. 

What happens to OpenAI if GPT-5 or the ~5b training run isn't much better than GPT-4? Who would be willing to invest the money to continue? It seems like OpenAI either dissolves or gets acquired. Were Anthropic founders pricing in that they're likely not going to be independent by the time they hit AGI — does this still justify the existence of a separate safety-oriented org?  

This is not a new idea, but I feel like I'm just now taking some of it seriously. Here's Dario talking about it recently, 

I basically do agree with you. I think it’s the intellectually honest thing to say that building the big, large scale models, the core foundation model engineering, it is getting more and more expensive. And anyone who wants to build one is going to need to find some way to finance it. And you’ve named most of the ways, right? You can be a large company. You can have some kind of partnership of various kinds with a large company. Or governments would be the other source.

Now, maybe the corporate partnerships can be structured so that AGI companies are still largely independent but, idk man, the more money invested the harder that seems to make happen. Insofar as I'm allocating probability mass between 'acquired by big tech company', 'partnership with big tech company', 'government partnership', and 'government control', acquired by big tech seems most likely, but predicting the future is hard. 

Slightly Aspirational AGI Safety research landscape 

This is a combination of an overview of current subfields in empirical AI safety and research subfields I would like to see but which do not currently exist or are very small. I think this list is probably worse than this recent review [LW · GW], but making it was useful for reminding myself how big this field is. 

• Interpretability / understanding model internals
  • Circuit interpretability
  • Superposition study
  • Activation engineering
  • Developmental interpretability
• Understanding deep learning
  • Scaling laws / forecasting
  • Dangerous capability evaluations (directly relevant to particular risks, e.g., biosecurity, self-proliferation)
  • Other capability evaluations / benchmarking (useful for knowing how smart AIs are, informing forecasts), including persona evals
  • Understanding normal but poorly understood things, like in context learning
  • Understanding weird phenomenon in deep learning, like this paper
  • Understand how various HHH fine-tuning techniques work
• AI Control
  • General supervision of untrusted models (using human feedback efficiently, using weaker models for supervision, schemes for getting useful work done given various Control constraints)
  • Unlearning
  • Steganography prevention / CoT faithfulness
  • Censorship study (how censoring AI models affects performance; and similar things)
• Model organisms of misalignment
  • Demonstrations of deceptive alignment and sycophancy / reward hacking
  • Trojans
  • Alignment evaluations
  • Capability elicitation
• Scaling / scalable oversight
  • RLHF / RLAIF
  • Debate, market making, imitative generalization, etc. 
  • Reward hacking and sycophancy (potentially overoptimization, but I’m confused by much of it)
  • Weak to strong generalization
  • General ideas: factoring cognition, iterated distillation and amplification, recursive reward modeling 
• Robustness
  • Anomaly detection 
  • Understanding distribution shifts and generalization
  • User jailbreaking
  • Adversarial attacks / training (generally), including latent adversarial training
• AI Security 
  • Extracting info about models or their training data
  • Attacking LLM applications, self-replicating worms
• Multi-agent safety
  • Understanding AI in conflict situations
  • Cascading failures
  • Understanding optimization in multi-agent situations
  • Attacks vs. defenses for various problems
• Unsorted / grab bag
  • Watermarking and AI generation detection
  • Honesty (model says what it believes) 
  • Truthfulness (only say true things, aka accuracy improvement)
  • Uncertainty quantification / calibration
  • Landscape study (anticipating and responding to risks from new AI paradigms like compound AI systems or self play)

Don’t quite make the list: 

• Whose values? Figuring out how to aggregate preferences in RLHF. This seems like it’s almost certainly not a catastrophe-relevant safety problem, and my weak guess is that it makes other alignment properties harder to get (e.g., incentivizes sycophancy and makes jailbreaks easier by causing the model’s goals to be more context/user dependent). This work seems generally net positive to me, but it’s not relevant to catastrophic risks and thus is relatively low priority. 
• Fine-tuning that calls itself “alignment”. I think it’s super lame that people are co-opting language from AI safety. Some of this work may actually be useful, e.g., by finding ways to mitigate jailbreaks, but it’s mostly low quality. 

Quick thoughts on a database for pre-registering empirical AI safety experiments
 

Keywords to help others searching to see if this has been discussed: pre-register, negative results, null results, publication bias in AI alignment. 

The basic idea:

Many scientific fields are plagued with publication bias where researchers only write up and publish “positive results,” where they find a significant effect or their method works. We might want to avoid this happening in empirical AI safety. We would do this with a two fold approach: a venue that purposefully accepts negative and neutral results, and a pre-registration process for submitting research protocols ahead of time, ideally linked to the journal so that researchers can get a guarantee that their results will be published regardless of the result. 
 

Some potential upsides:

• Could allow better coordination by giving researchers more information about what to focus on based on what has already been investigated. Hypothetically, this should speed up research by avoiding redundancy. 
• Safely deploying AI systems may require complex forecasting of their behavior; while it would be intractable for a human to read and aggregate information across many thousands of studies, automated researchers may be able to consume and process information at this scale. Having access to negative results from minimal experiments may be helpful for this task. That’s a specific use case, but the general thing here is just that publication bias makes it hard to figure out what is true compared to if all results. 

Drawbacks and challenges:

• Decent chance the quality of work is sufficiently poor so as to not be useful; we would need monitoring/review to avoid this. Specifically, whether a past project failed at a technique provides close to no evidence if you don’t think the project was executed competently, so you want a competence bar for accepting work. 
• For the people who might be in a good position to review research, this may be a bad use of their time
• Some AI safety work is going to be private and not captured by this registry. 
• This registry could increase the prominence of info-hazardous research. Either that research is included in the registry, or it’s omitted. If it’s omitted, this could end up looking like really obvious holes in the research landscape, so a novice could find those research directions by filling in the gaps (effectively doing away with whatever security-through-obscurity info-hazardous research had going for it). That compares to the current state where there isn’t a clear research landscape with obvious holes, so I expect this argument proves too much in that it suggests clarity on the research landscape would be bad. Info-hazards are potentially an issue for pre-registration as well, as researchers shouldn’t be locked into publishing dangerous results (and failing to publish after pre-registration may give too much information to others). 
• This registry going well requires considerable buy in from the relevant researchers; it’s a coordination problem and even the AI safety community seems to be getting eaten by the Moloch of publication bias
• Could cause more correlated research bets due to anchoring on what others are working on or explicitly following up on their work. On the other hand, it might lead to less correlated research bets because we can avoid all trying the same bad idea first. 
• It may be too costly to write up negative results, especially if they are being published in a venue that relevant researchers don’t regard highly. It may be too costly in terms of the individual researcher’s effort, but it could also be too costly even at a community level if the journal / pre-registry doesn’t end up providing much value
   

Overall, this doesn’t seem like a very good idea because of the costs and likelihood of success. There is plausibly a low cost version that would still get some of the benefit. Like higher-status researchers publicly advocating for publishing negative results, and others in the community discussing the benefits of doing so. Another low-cost solution would be small grants for researchers to write up negative results. 
 

Thanks to Isaac Dunn and Lucia Quirke for discussion / feedback during SERI MATS 4.0