"Which Future Mind is Me?" Is a Question of Values

But instead of experiencing it from the perspective of your current body (e.g. in my case that of Dadadarren's), now you do it from that of Elon's. The subjective experience felt and consciousness accessible is now from the Billionaire's physical point of view instead of your current case, viz. you are Elon. 

I don't think this dualism is justified.  There IS NO distinct "me", separate from the embodiment in the brain that is physically separated from Elon's embodied experiences.  My subjective experience is inseparable from the perspective of my current body.  Elon's experience (presumably) is also simply part of his physical state.   In other words, I am Elon, when Elon's body is the subject of the sentence.

I fully agree that intuitions about identity and continuity are not trained on upload and copy situations.  Those things are just out-of-domain for our beliefs about how it works.

Have you seen Relativity Theory for What the Future 'You' Is and Isn't [LW · GW]? It's making pretty much exactly the same point, in response to the same post. I didn't get around to commenting there, so here we are.

You are technically correct, but I don't think that's the best kind of correct.

You could decide that future you isn't you if it's wearing a blue hat, but that would make no sense at all. So I don't think logic is out of play here. Technically those could be your values, but it would be really remarkable to find someone that genuinely held those values.

Threaten someone today, then tomorrow tell them you're a different person, because that's what your values say. They'll look at you funny and go on distrusting and disliking you.

If you threaten someone, then go through a perfect duplication process, they'll dislike and distrust both of you. I doubt you'll find this relevant, but just to note that both perfect clones are you from an outside perspective. Almost no one would disagree and trust and like the clone that happened to be the duplicate, not the original.

"But which am I, really?" you ask again. I submit that the you of today is logically both, or neither, depending on your definition. Your conscious experience of right now does not "have" the conscious experience of you tomorrow. Each moment of consciousness is linked only by memories, beliefs, and having very similar patterns. No two moments of consciousness are the same; when we say they're the same individual, that's all we mean.

This sounds absurd. Of course the you of tomorrow is you, and a clone is not you.

But people can and do treat the them of tomorrow as not-them. The most dramatic is extreme short-term decision-making, as in the meme where someone leaves a note for drunk them to drink water and eat food, and in the morning find a note back from drunk-them saying "fuck you, morning self!". Other I'll-pay-for-this-later decisions are partly in the same boat.

So, which perfect clone is you tomorrow? Both if you take a standard view of identity and why to care about future you. Neither if you don't. But choosing one as "you" and not the other is just like disowning future you if they wear a blue hat. 

To demonstrate this position imagine this: You are Elon Musk instead of whoever you actually are. Here it is not suggesting that your physical body and Elon's switch places. The world is still objectively the same. But instead of experiencing it from the perspective of your current body (e.g. in my case that of Dadadarren's), now you do it from that of Elon's. The subjective experience felt and consciousness accessible is now from the Billionaire's physical point of view instead of your current case, viz. you are Elon. 

It's not clear what you mean here. As we are talking about the question "Which future mind is me?", could you make the example in its terms? For instance, consider this:

1. Dadadarren and Elon Musk participate in an experiment where their brains are swapped between their bodies. Both go to sleep, then the operation is performed and then they awake. Dadadarren's first person perspective goes to sleep in Dadadarren's body and awakens in Elon Musk's, while having memories of being Dadadarren. As a result both perspective inhabitiung bodies of Dadadarren and Elon Musk notice the change.
2. Nothing has physically changed about the brains and body of Elon Musk or Dadadarren, even though Dadadarren's and Elon Musks first person perspective were swapped. Now it's not Elon Musk's perspective who awakens in Elon Musk's body, but Dadadarren's. However noone notices anything. When Elon Musk's body awakens, its perspective remembers being Elon Musk and not Dadadarren because memories are physical and therefore were not changed. 

In the 2. case how do we know that anything happened at all? How do we know that the perspectives were swapped? Or, for that matter, how do we know that all perspective are not constantly being swapped a hundred times every second? Here "First person perspective" seems to be not just epiphenomenon but epiepiphenomenon, completely irrelevant to anything even to conscious experience of a person in question. Which is probably not what you meant, so I'm a bit at a loss. 

Suffice to say, thinking about such scenario doesn't make me see the question "Why is that you are you and I am me?" as less of a tautology.

Everyone but Elon himself would say the above is a different scenario from reality. Each of us knows which body our first-person perspective resides in. And that is clearly not the physical human being referred as Elon Musk. But the actual and imaginary scenarios are not differentiated by any physical difference of the world, as the universe is objectively identical.

They are either differentiated by a physically different location of some part of your experience - like your memory being connected to Elon's sensations, or your thought being executed in other location - or it would be wrong to say that this scenario is different from reality: what you imagine would just correctly correspond to Elon's experiences also being real.

This experience-based primitivity also means inter-temporal self identification only goes one way. Since there is no access to subjective experience from the future, I cannot directly identify which/who would be my future self. I can only say which person is me in the past, as I have the memory of experiencing from its perspective. 

While there is large difference in practice between recalling past event and anticipating future event, on conceptual level there is no meaningful difference. You don't have direct access to past events, memory is just an especially simple and reliable case of inference.

Would you say that the continuity of your consciousness (as long as you're instantiated by only one body) only exists by consensus?

What if the consensus changed? Would you cease to have the continuity of consciousness?

If the continuity of your consciousness currently doesn't depend on consensus, why think that your next conscious experience is undefined in case of a duplication? (Rather than, let's say, assigning even odds to finding yourself to be either copy?)

Also, I see no reason for thinking the idea of your next subjective experience being undefined (there being no case on the matter as to which conscious experience, if any, you'll have) is even a coherent possibility. It's clear what it would mean for your next conscious experience to be something specific (like feeling pain while seeing blue). It's also clear what would it mean for it to be NULL (like after a car accident). But it being undefined doesn't sound like a coherent belief.

You are Elon Musk instead of whoever you actually are.

This is a combination of descriptions only locally accurate in two different worlds and not coherent as a thought experiment asking about the one world fitting those descriptions.