Sleeping Beauty: Is Disagreement While Sharing All Information Possible in Anthropic Problems? 2019-08-01T20:10:46.445Z · score: 6 (4 votes)
Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning 2019-03-09T15:21:02.258Z · score: 2 (3 votes)
Perspective Reasoning and the Sleeping Beauty Problem 2018-11-22T11:55:22.114Z · score: 4 (3 votes)
The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency 2018-08-05T13:45:27.185Z · score: 2 (3 votes)


Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty: Is Disagreement While Sharing All Information Possible in Anthropic Problems? · 2019-08-29T22:17:06.298Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Probability should not depend on the type of rewards. Of course, a complicated system of reward could cause decision making to deviate from simple probability concerns. But probability would not be affected. If it helps then consider a simple reward system that each correct answer is awarded one util. As a participant, you take part in the same toss and clone experiment every day. So when you wake up the following day you do not know if you are the same physical person the day before. So you guess again for the same reward. Let your utils be independent of possible clones. E.g. if for each correct guess you are rewarded with a coin then the cloning would apply to the coins in your pocket too. Such that my cumulative gain would only be affected by my past guesses.

Why the extent of care to other clones matter? My answer and other clones' utils are causally independent. The other clone's utility depends on his answer. If you are talking about the possible future fissions of me it is still unrelated. Since my decision now would affect the two equally.

Surely, if "the probability distribution of me being the original or the clone" exists then it would be simple to devise a guessing strategy to maximize my gains? But somehow this strategy is elusive. Instead, the purposed self-locating probability could only help to give strategies to maximize the collective (or average) utilities of all clones even though some are clearly not me as the probability states. And that is assuming all clones make exactly the same decision as I do. If everyone must make the same decision (so there is only one decision making) and only the collective utility is considered then how is it still guided by a probability about the indexical me? That decision could be derived from the probability distribution of a randomly selected participant. Assuming I am a randomly selected participant is entirely unsubstantiated, and unnecessary to decision making as it brings nothing to the table.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty: Is Disagreement While Sharing All Information Possible in Anthropic Problems? · 2019-08-29T15:31:39.033Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Sorry for abandoning the discussion and reply so late. I think even if the sole purpose of probability is to guide decision making the problem remains about these self-location probabilities. In the cloning example, suppose we are giving a reward for participants' every correct guess whether they are the original or clone. "The probability distribution of me being the original or the clone" doesn't help us to make any decision. One may say these probabilities guide us to make decisions to maximize the overall benefit of all participants combined. However such decisions are guided by "the probability distribution of a randomly selected participant being the original or the clone" without the use of indexical. And this purposed use of self-locating probability is based on the assumption that I am a randomly selected observer among certain reference class. In effect, an unsupported assumption is added yet it doesn't allow us to make any new decisions. From a decision-making point of view, the entire purpose of this assumption seems to be finding an use of these self-locating probabilities.

"The probability distribution of me being the original or the clone" would be useful to decision making if it guides us on how to maximize the benefit of me specifically as stated in the probability distribution. But such a strategy do not exist. If one holds the view that other than decision making probability serves no purpose, then he should have no problem accepting self-locating probabilities do not exist since they do not have any purpose.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty: Is Disagreement While Sharing All Information Possible in Anthropic Problems? · 2019-08-04T04:01:29.775Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I can relate to that. In fact, that is the most common criticism I have faced. After all, it is quite counter-intuitive.

I want to point to the paradox regarding the probability of me being a Boltzmann Brain. The probability of "this awakening being the first" is of the same format: the probability of an apparent indexical being a member of some default reference class. There is no experiment deciding which brain is me just as there is no experiment determining which day is today. There is no reason to apply a principle of indifference among the members of the default reference class. Yet that is essential to come up with a probability.

Of course one can define the experience. But I am not arguing "today is Monday" is a nonsensical statement, only there is no probability distribution. Yes, we can even wager on it. But we do not need probability to wager. Probability is however needed to come up with a betting strategy. Imagine you are the participant in the cloning-with-a-friend example who's repeating the experiment a large number of times. You enter wagers about whether you are the original or clone after each wake-up. Now there exist a strategy to maximize the total gain of all participants or a strategy to maximize the average gain of all participants . (assuming all participants would act the same way as I do.) However, there is no strategy to simply maximize the gain of the self-apparent me. That is a huge red flag for me.

Of course one may argue there is no such strategy because of this beneficiary me is undefined. (it's just an indexical after all). Then would it be consistent to say the related probability exists and well-defined?

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty: Is Disagreement While Sharing All Information Possible in Anthropic Problems? · 2019-08-04T03:28:59.481Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Obviously I don't agree but I respect your judgment.

I agree with your first example. It is equivalent to the cloning with a friend experiment. (I'm sorry but I'm so used to Head 1 awakening, Tail 2 awakenings setups as most literatures set it that way. I know it is reversed in your example. But for the sake of consistency, I would still discuss it this way. Please forgive my stubbornness.) In that setup Alice and Bob would come into disagreement as long as Alice is a halfer, no matter her reasons. I can understand if you treat this as evidence for halferism being wrong. At the end of the day, I have to admit this is very peculiar. Nonetheless, what I did was try to explain why this disagreement is valid. The reason I used a cloning example instead of the original memory wipe example is that it makes the expression much easier. But I would like to take this opportunity to apply the same argument to explain the disagreement in a memory wipe setup.

Frequentist reason: repeating the experiment from a participant's perspective is different from repeating it from an observer's perspective. While this is much easier to show in the cloning example, it is messier for memory wipes. The SBP is essentially, in case of Tails, dividing the total duration of the experiment (2 days) into 2 halves with a memory wipe. So there would be 2 subjectively indistinguishable instances. For Alice, repetitions must be in the same structure. Yet prior iterations should not affect the later ones. So each subsequent experiment must be shorter in duration. So if the first experiment takes 2 days. Then the second can only take 1 day. The third half a day, the fourth quarter a day, etc. This way Alice can repeat the experiment as many times as needed. And the relative frequency would approach to 1/2. For Bob, repeating it would always be randomly waking up at a potential awakening of Alice. Structure of repetition is irrelevant. for him. The relative frequency of Heads is 1/3 given he wakes up with Alice.

Bayesian reason: they interpret the meeting differently. To Bob, the meeting means one of Alice's awakening(s) is on the day Bob's awake. To Alice, the meeting means this specific awakening is on the day that Bob's awake. Alice is able to specify this specific awaken from any possible others because it is her perspective center. It is inherently special to her.

Regarding the second experiment. I am aware of this type of argument. Jacob Ross calls it *Hypothetical priors arguments". Variations of it have been purposed by Dorr 2002, Arntzenius 2003, and Horgan 2004, 2008. Basically it adds the missing identical awakening of Heads back. And sometime after waking up that added awakening is rejected by some information. Since the four possible awakenings are clearly symmetrical so each of which must have a probability of 1/4. Removing a possibility would call for a Bayesian update to cause the probability of Heads to drop to 1/3. This argument was not successful in convincing the opposition because it relies on its equivalency to the original Sleeping Beauty Problem. This equivalency however is largely intuition-based. So halfers would just say the two problems are different and noncomparable and thirders would disagree. There would be some back an forth between the two camps but not many valuable discussions can be had. That explains why this argument is typically seen in earlier papers. Nonetheless, I want to present my reasons why they are not equivalent. The first-person identification of today or this awakening is based on its perspective center. Which is based on its perception and subjective experience. If there is no waking up, then there is no first-person perspective to begin with. It is vastly different from wake up first then reject this awakening as a possibility. Also, as discussed in the main post., there is no probability distribution for an indexical being a member of default a reference class. So I'm against assigning 1/4 to the four events and the subsequent conditional update.

I am grateful for your reply. I'm not naive enough to think I can change your mind. Yet I appreciate the opportunity you gave for me to present some ideas that don't fit in the flow of the main post. Especially the messy explanation of the disagreement in memory-wipe experiments​.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty: Is Disagreement While Sharing All Information Possible in Anthropic Problems? · 2019-08-02T16:24:54.109Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Not trying to put it in any negative way, but I honestly find the reply vague and hard to respond to. I get a general impression about what you are trying to say but feel I'm guessing. Do you disagree with me interpreting probability as relative frequencies in the disagreement example? Or do you think there has to be a defined cost/reward setup to make it a decision-making problem to talk about probabilities in anthropics? Or maybe something else?

Regarding different answers to different questions of the various instances of me. Again I'm not very sure what the argument is or how is it related to anthropics. Are you trying to say the disagreement on probability is due to different interpretations of the question? Also, I want to point out that not all anthropic problems are related to different instances of an observer. Take the Doomsday Argument, or the cloning experiment for example, the paradox is formed at the agent level, no special consideration of time/instances is needed.

Comment by dadadarren on Perspective Reasoning and the Sleeping Beauty Problem · 2019-05-20T19:45:49.338Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Hello Marc,

Appreciate the reply. Allow me to explain why the perceived ambiguity is in my opinion caused by mixing of perspectives. When we try to analysis an anthropic related problem, such as sleeping beauty or an equivalent cloning experiment, there are actually two school of thoughts. One is to reason from the participant's first person perspective. The other is to reason purely objectively as an impartial observer (third-person perspective).

Reasoning from the participant's first-person perspective makes concepts such as I, now or here primitively understood. These indexical concepts inherently standout to the first-person as they are defined by their subjective immediacy to the perspective center. (an everyday example would be an identical twin can inherently distinguish himself from his brother. He can do this without knowing any difference between them which is impossible for an impartial outsider.) At the same time, reasoning from the first-person perspective would affirm self-existence/consciousness. It is necessarily true that from first-person perspective "I am, here, now." (cogito ergo sum)

If reasoned objectively then no agent, time or place would be inherently unique. It is uncentered. So technically from the third-person perspective there is no I now or here. e.g. to objectively specify an agent instead of using the indexical I some feature such like the proper name dadadarren have to be used. (In everyday language we tend to use indexical terms even when trying to reason objectively. In such instances words such as I should not be regarded as indexicals pointing to a perspective center but a conventional shorthand representing various objective features defining an agent.) From this objective third-person perspective no agent's existence/consciousness is guaranteed. It is logical to ask about any agent's probability of existence. Furthermore, from this perspective all agents/times are logical equals. So a principle of indifference can be applied and they can belong to the same reference class.

Now if we are to ask the probability density function of today being Monday or Tuesday, or the pdf of I being the original or clone, problems arise. At one end, to use the indexicals I and now to specify an agent or date requires we take the participant's first-person perspective. They cannot be used to specify a particular agent or time if we are reasoning objectively as an impartial observer since these indexicals have no objective significance. This is why using these terms in anthropic problems seems ambiguous. On the other hand if we reason from the first-person perspective of a participant, yes the meaning of I or now are clear. Yet a sample space containing all possible agents (the original and the clone) or all times (Monday and Tuesday) cannot be constructed. Because from a participant's first-person perspective all perspective centres are not logical equals. A principle of indifference among the two days was thrown out of the window the minute a particular day is regarded as inherently special such that it can be specified not by its objective difference from other days but by a simple utterance of of the word "today". Therefore even though it is correct to say that I am either the original or the clone it is impossible to put a probability on either alternative. This is also backed by frequentist analysis. Which btw, if a consistent perspective is used the long run frequency of Heads should be 1/2.

When I ask my coworker "what day is it today?" The today is still primitively defined from the first-person perspective by both me and my coworker. I don't think it is a shared concept. It is just that the time taken of our communication is minuscule compare to the duration of interest (day) such that one's perspective center can be used to approximate the other's perspective center without causing problems in communication. If instead you find a message in a bottle on the beach which says "what day is it today?" Then this question becomes impossible to answer. Since you would have no idea what this today refers to.

Since my entire position is that first-person (centered) and third-person (uncentered) reasoning should not mix I cannot agree with your mirror argument. Although I would say due to its simplicity (this is a compliment) thirders would have a hard time countering it. Yet the current reality of the Sleeping Beauty discussion is less of finding mistakes in other’s argument but more of whose position have less undesirable consequences. So I won’t be surprised if the mirror argument fail to convince many thirders. In your paper you seems to agree with David Lewis that if the coin toss has already happened and beauty is told it is Monday then the probability of Heads should be rightfully 2/3. Only when the coin toss is yet to happen then the probability shall be 1/2. That the time of coin toss has a material influence on the probability. If this is the correct understanding then I feel the argument is quite problematic. I don’t think there is any logical significance to the physical coin toss. You argued the toss is a chancy event whose timing could affect probability. Yet it can also be deemed as a deterministic event: as long as one has the detailed information of the various variables, such as magnitude and direction of force and air resistance and impact surface shape etc, the result can be readily predicted. The randomness could be interpreted as entirely due to the lack of information. Whether it is a truly random event or a pseudo one shouldn’t affect the probability calculation. Yet this version of double-halving argument depends on that.

Comment by dadadarren on Perspective Reasoning and the Sleeping Beauty Problem · 2019-05-03T20:22:51.916Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Thank you for the reply. Let's take a step back. Thirders argue there is new information when waking up in the sleeping beauty problem. That information is "I am awake today". Similarly for the cloning problem thirders argue the new information is "I exist". Both of which are interpreted as evidence favouring more observers even though not explaining who is this specific I or what is this today's date. It is treated as if they are primitively understood concepts do not need any explanation. By this standard I do not need to explain who is this specific me in the question of "what's the probability of me being a clone?". If you think the question is invalid/ambiguous because by using me I did not specify a particular clone then by the same logic thirders' argument for new information also fails. When waking up in cloning experiment instead of saying a specific I exist thirders are only saying an unspecific copy exists, (i.e. there is at least one copy exists). That is not new information.

The reason why thirder's argument seems convincing is because if reasoned from an observer's first person perspective the indexical concepts such as I, now or here are indeed primitively understood. E.g I do not need to know how I look like to tell this is me. I do not need to know the exact date and hour to tell when is this now (and subsequently today). They do not need any further explanation because they are primitively identified base on their immediacy to the subjective experience. In another word the meaning of these indexicals depends on the thinker's perspective center. If we reason purely objectively (from a third-person perspective) then these indexicals are meaningless.

So in a sense you are correct. The questions are invalid because a particular copy is not specified by using the indexical me. Because in this third-person question it is asking about someone only identifiable from the first-person perspective. To make the question valid, instead of using the indexical me an individual must be specified objectively. e.g. a randomly selected person etc.

Comment by dadadarren on [Answer] Why wasn't science invented in China? · 2019-04-25T13:50:07.530Z · score: 22 (8 votes) · LW · GW

I am by no means expert in this. My theory is effective writing in general is a way to signal one's intelligence in most medieval societies. This is especially so if one can write and read in a form of ancient text. But in Western Europe this was achieved by directly using a old language - Latin. Proficiency in a different language by itself is enough to be an indicator of intelligence. However the Chinese to an extent have been using the same language (or at least writing) for the entire history. An example would be for a typical grade 8 Chinese language textbook would include many old passages some of which was written 18 centuries ago. Being able to write plainly in an everyday language is not something hard. So the Chinese scholars have a greater urge to show their status by using poetic and archaic expressions. Very often at the expense of clarity.

Comment by dadadarren on [Answer] Why wasn't science invented in China? · 2019-04-25T03:20:31.358Z · score: 18 (8 votes) · LW · GW

Ahh, the famous Lun Yu. It is full of such expressions that direct translation gives you a headache. To me the most famous example would be "民可使由之不可使知之". Due to the lack of punctuation it can be translated in two different ways:

1: 民可使由之,不可使知之:common people shall be commanded, (but) not enlightened.

2: 民可,使由之。不可,使知之。:(if) common people are well educated let them act on their own. If not, enlighten them. Pretty drastically different political ideal here.

Comment by dadadarren on [Answer] Why wasn't science invented in China? · 2019-04-24T15:59:09.941Z · score: 38 (16 votes) · LW · GW

As a Chinese I want to contribute some thought into this topic.

One thing I want to mention is the difference in language. Classical Chinese is a language extremely difficult to master. It literally take decades of effort to be able to write a decent piece. It is hard not because of complicated grammar or complex sentence structure. But because it focus on poetic expressions and scholarly idioms. This language is very enjoyable to read and relatable when used in expressing emotions and ideas. However it is quite cumbersome in expressing precise logic and definitions. Yet at least before the new cultural movement in 1916 it is generally regarded that anything worth put into writing should be done in Classical Chinese. This severely limits the participation of the general populace. Even if someone is trained enough to put down scientific related topics in Classical Chinese it is unlikely to be regarded as a masterful piece and gather much audience. Just like if a poorly written piece is posted in lesswrong we are more likely to skip it regardless of the content it is expressing.

Comment by dadadarren on Where to Draw the Boundaries? · 2019-04-14T02:49:15.230Z · score: 8 (5 votes) · LW · GW

Interesting article. I dare not say I understand it fully. But to argue for some categories as more or less wrong than others is it fair to say you are arguing against the ugly duckling theorem?

Comment by dadadarren on Would solving logical counterfactuals solve anthropics? · 2019-04-07T15:02:02.197Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Not sure if I'm following. I don't see in anyway the original is privileged over its copies. In each repetition after waking up I could be the newly created clone just like in the first experiment. The only privileged concepts are due to my first-person perspective such as here, now, this, or the "me" based on my subjective experience.

Comment by dadadarren on Would solving logical counterfactuals solve anthropics? · 2019-04-06T22:56:27.800Z · score: 2 (3 votes) · LW · GW

In this case beauty still shouldn't use the reference class logic to assign a probability of 0.5. I argue for sleeping beauty problem the probability of "today" being Monday/Tuesday is an incoherent concept so it do not exist. To ask this question we must specify a day from the view of an outsider. E.g. "what's the probability the hotter day is Monday?" or " what is the probability the randomly selected day among the two is Monday?".

Imagine you participate in a cloning experiment. At night when you are sleeping a highly accurate clone of you with indistinguishable memory is created in an identical room. When waking up there is no way to tell if you are old or new. It might be tempted to ask "what's the probability of "me" being the clone?" I would guess your answer is 0.5 as well. But you can repeat the same experiment as many times as you want by falling asleep let another clone of you be created and wake up again. Each time waking up you can easily tell "this is me", but the is no reason to expect in all these repetitions the "me" would be the new clone about half the times. In fact there is no reason the relative frequency of me being the clone would converge to any value as the number of repetition increases. However if instead of this first person concept of "me" we use an outsider's specification then the question is easily answerable. E.g. what is the probability the randomly chosen version among the two is the clone? The answer is obviously 0.5. If we repeat the experiments and each time let an outsider randomly choose a version then the relative frequency would obviously approach 0.5 as well.

On a side note this also explains why double-halving is not unBayesian.

Comment by dadadarren on Would solving logical counterfactuals solve anthropics? · 2019-04-06T17:34:36.340Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

From an agent's first-person perspective there is no reference class for himself, i.e. he is the only one in its reference class. A reference class containing multiple agents only exists if we employ an outsider view.

When beauty wakes up in the experiment she can tell it is "today" and she's experiencing "this awakening". That is not because she knows any objective differences between "today" and "the other day" or between "this awakening" and "the other awakening". It is because from her perspective "today" and "this awakening" is most immediate to her subjective experience which makes them inherently unique and identifiable. She doesn't need to consider the other day(s) to specify today. "Today" is in a class of its own to begin with. But if we reason as an objective outsider and not use any perspective center in our logic then none of the two days are inherently unique. To specify one among the two would require a selection process. For example a day can be specified by say "the earlier day of the two", "the hotter day of the two" or the old fashioned "the randomly selected among of the two". (an awakening can similarly be specified among all awakenings the same way) It is this selection process from the outsider view that defines the reference class.

Paradoxes happens when we mix reasonings from the first-person perspective and the outsider's perspective in the same logic framework. "Today" becomes both uniquely identifiable while at the same time also belongs to a reference class of multiple days. The same can be said about "this awakening". This difference leads to the debate between SIA and SSA.

The importance of perspectives also means when using betting argument we need to repeat the experiment from the perspective of the agent as well. This also means from an agent's first-person perspective, if his objective is simply to maximize his own utility no other agent's decision need to be considered.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-21T14:18:44.826Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Beauty can make a rational decision if she changes the objective. Instead of the first-person apparent "I" if she try to maximize the utility of a person distinguishable by a third-person then a rational decision can be made. The problem is that in almost all anthropic school of thought the first-person center is used without discrimination. E.g. in sleeping beauty problem the new evidence is I'm awake "today". In Doomsday argument it considers "my" birth rank. In SIA's rebuttal to Doomsday Argument the evidence supporting more observers is that "I" exist. In such logics it doesn't matter when you read the argument the "I" in your mind is a different physical person from the "I" in my mind when I read the same argument. Since the "I" or "Now" is defined by first-person center in their logic it should be used the same way in the decision making as well. The fact a rational decision cannot be made while using the self-apparent "I" only shows there is a problem with the objective. That using the self-apparent concept of "I" or "Now" indiscriminately in anthropic reasoning is wrong.

Actually in this regard my idea is quite similar to your FNC. Of course there are obvious differences. But I think a discussion of that deserves another thread.

I got a feeling that our discussion here is coming to an end. While we didn't convince each other, as expected for any anthropic related discussion, I still feel I have gained something out of it. It forced me to try to think and express more clearly and better structure my argument. I also want to think I have a better understanding of potential counter arguments. For that I want to express my gratitude

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-20T14:31:02.670Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I think while comparing cloning and sleeping beauty problem you are not holding them to the same standard. You said we have good reason to think that "good-enough" memory erasure is possible. By good-enough I think you meant the end result might not be 100% same from a previous mental state but the difference is too small for human cognitives to notice. So I think when talking about cloning the same leniency should be given and we shouldn't insist on a exact quantum copy either. You also suggested if our mental state is determined by our brain structure at a molecular level then it can be easily revered. But then suggests cloning would be impossible if our mind is determined by the brain at a quantum level. If our mind is determined at a quantum level simply reverting the molecular structure would not be enough to recreate a previous mental state either. I feel you are giving the sleeping beauty problem a easy pass here.

Why would the use of first-person me render all use of probability invalid? Regarding the risk of a medical procedure we are talking about an event with different possible outcomes that we cannot reliably predict for certain. Unlike the color of the eyes example you presented earlier this uncertainty can be well understood from the first-person perspective. For example when talking about the probability of winning the lottery you can interpret it from the third-person perspective and say if everyone in the world enters then only one person would win. But it is also possible to interpret it from the first-person perspective and say if I buy 7 billion tickets I would have only 1 winning ticket (or if I enter the same lottery 7 billion times I would only win once). They both work. Imagine while repeating the cloning experiment, after each wake up you toss a fair coin before going back to sleep again for the next repetition of cloning. As the number of repetitions increases the relative frequency of Heads of the coin tosses experienced by "me" would approach 1/2. However there is no reason the relative frequency of "me" being the original would converge to any value as the number of repetitions increase.

The reason there is no way to decide on whether or not to eat the cookie is because the only objective is to maximize the pleasure of the self-explanatory "me" and the reward is linked to "me" being the original. Not only my theory cannot handle the situation. I am arguing the situation is setup in a way no theory could handle it. People claiming beauty can make a rational decision is either changing the objective (e.g. be altruistic towards other copies instead of just the simple self) or did not use the first-person "me" (e.g. trying to maximize the pleasure of the person defined by some feature or selection process instead of this self-explanatory me).

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-18T14:48:47.960Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

You mentioned if our consciousness is quantum state dependent then creating a clone with indistinguishable memory would be impossible. (Because to duplicate someone's memory would require complete information about his current quantum state, if I understand correctly) But at the same time you said sleeping beauty experiment is still possible since memory erasing only requires acting on the quantum state of the person without measuring it in its entirety. But wouldn't the action's end goal to revert the current state to a previous (Sunday nights) one? It would ultimately require beauty's quantum state to be measured at Sunday night. Unless there is some mechanics to exactly reverse the effect of time on something. But that to me appears even more unrealistic. I do agree that the practical difficulty between the two experiment is different. Cloning with memory does require more advanced technology to carry out. However I think that does not change how we analysis the experiments or affect probability calculations. Furthermore, I do not think this difference in technical difficulty means we are too primitive to ponder about the cloning example while sleeping beauty problem is fair game.

The reason I bring out the cloning example is because it makes my argument a lot easier to express than using the sleeping beauty problem. You think the two problem are significantly different because one may be impossible in theory the other problem is definitely feasible. So I felt obligated to show the two problems are similar especially concerning theoretical feasibilities. If you don't feel the theoretical feasibility is crucial to the discussion I'm ok to drop it from here on. One thing I want to point out is that all argument made by using the cloning experiment can be made by using the sleeping beauty problem. It is just that the expression would be very longwinded and messy.

You mentioning that no matter how we put it one of the copies is the original while the other is the clone. Again I agree with that. I am not arguing "I am the original" is a meaningless statement. I am arguing "the probability of me being the original" is invalid. And it is not because being the original or the clone makes no difference to the participant. But because in this question the first-person self explanatory concept of "me" should not be used. From the participant's first-person perspective imagine repeating this experiment. You fall asleep and undergone the cloning and wake up again. After this awakening you can guess again whether you are the original for this new experiment. This process can be repeated as many times as you want. Now we have a series of experiment that you have first-person subjective experience. However there is no reason the relative frequency of you being the original in this series of experiments would converge to any particular value.

Of course one could argue the probability must be half because half of the resulting copies are original and the other half is the clone. However this reasoning is actually thinking from the perspective of an outsider. It treats the resulting clones as entities from the same reference class. So it is in conflict with using the first-person "me" in question. This reasoning is applicable if the entity in question is singled out among the copies from a third-person perspective, e.g. "the probability of a randomly selected copy being original." Whereas the process described in the previous paragraph is strictly from the participants first-person perspective and inline with the use of first-person "me".

Now we can modify the experiment slightly such that the cloning only happens if a coin toss land on Tails. This way it exactly mirrors the sleeping beauty problem. After wake up we can give each of them a cookie that is delicious to the original but painful to the clone. Because from first-person perspective repeating the experiment would not converge to a relative frequency there is no way to come up with an strategy for the participant to decide whether or not to eat them that will benefit "me" in the long run. In another word if beauty's only concern is the subjective pleasure and pain of the apparent first-person "me", then probability calculation could not help her to make a choice. Beauty have no rational way of deciding to eat the cookie or not.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-14T04:06:59.753Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Thank you for the speedy reply professor. I was worried that with my slow response you might have lost interest in the discussion.

Forgive me for not discussing the issues in the order you presented. But I feel the most important argument I want to challenge is that sleeping beauty problem is physically possible but the cloning experiments are strictly fantastical.

In the cloning experiment the goal is not to make a physically exact copy of someone but to make the copy accurate enough that a human could not differentiate. Which is no different from the sleeping beauty problem. Considering the limitations of human cognitive ability and memory this doesn't remotely require a exact quantum state copy. Unless you take the position that the human memory is so sophisticated it is quantum state dependent. But then it means to revert beauty's memory to a earlier state would require her brain to change back to a previous quantum state. Complete information about that quantum state cannot be obtained unless she is destroyed at the time. I.E. Sleeping beauty would be against no-cloning theorem thus non-feasible as well. Apart from memory there is also the problem of physical differences. It is understood during the first day beauty would inevitably undergone some physical changes. E.g. her hair may grow, her skin is aging a tiny bit, etc. This is not considered a problem for the experiment because it is understood human cannot pick on such minuscule details. So even with these physical changes beauty would still think this is her first awakening after waking up the second time. The same principle applies to the cloning example. As long as the copy is physically close enough for human's cognitive ability to not notice any differences the clone would believe he is the original. In summary if sleeping beauty problem is physically possible the cloning example must be as well. In this problem after waking up in the experiment the "probability of me being the original" makes no sense. Even if you consider repeating the experiment many times there is no answer to it. Again it is referring to the primitively understood first-person "me" not someone identified form a third-person perspective such as "the probability of a randomly selected copy being the original."

As for the question of my soul getting incarnated into somebody. This is not my idea. Various anthropic school of thoughts lead to such an expression. For example in Doomsday Argument's prior probability calculation SSA argues I am equally likely to be born as any human ever exists. SIA adds on top of it and suggests I am more likely to be born into this world if more human ever exists. They both closely resemble the idea of soul embodiment into a pool of candidate. I mentioned this expression because it neatly describes what "the probability of me being a man" refers to in the anthropic context. And let's not loose the big picture here that I am arguing such probabilities do not make sense. So I complete agree with you that using soul embodiment as an experiment to assign probability is highly questionable. In fact I am arguing such notions are outright wrong.

Regarding the case of eye color quite clearly we are not discussing anything resembling the above idea. By surveying other people in the tribe I would know what percentage of the tribesman have blue eyes. If we say that percentage is the probability of someone having blue eyes then there is an underlying assumption this someone is an ordinary member of such tribe. He is not special. This is against the first-person perspective where I am inherently different from anybody else. Meaning this person is identified among the tribesman from a third-person perspective. Therefore that percentage is not the probability the first-person "I" have blue eyes. But rather the probability of an randomly selected tribesman have blue eyes. A optimal level of avoiding sun exposure can be derived from that survey number. However it cannot be said that strategy is optimal for myself. All we know is that if every tribesman follows this strategy then it would be optimal for the tribe as a whole.

I think by using a betting argument there is an underlying assumption that someone trying to maximize her own earning would follow a strategy determined by the correct probability. This I agree. However that is when the decision maker and the reward receiver is the same person. It is to say if beauty is contemplating the probability of "today" being Monday, then the reward for a correct guess should be given to today's beauty. That's what I meant by Monday Beauty's correct decision should reward Monday Beauty alone. In the setup you presented that is not the case. In your setup the objective is to maximize the accumulated earnings. For this objective the concept of a self-explanatory "today" is never used. So the calculation is not reflecting the probability of "today being Monday". But rather reflecting the probability that "the day beauty remembers the previous experiment is Monday". Essentially it has the same problem as the eye color example. The first-person center concept of "today" is switched to a third-person identity. If we go back to the cloning experiment, you are arguing after waking up "the probability of a randomly selected copy being original" is valid and meaningful. I agree with this. I am arguing using first-person center "the probability 'me' being the original" do not exist.

For the cookie experiment yes the painful reaction and delicious bliss are of course meaningful. But it only means "today is Monday" and "today is Tuesday" are both meaningful to her. This I never argued against. However if a probability of "today is Monday" exists then there should be an optimal strategy for "beauty in the moment" to maximize her pleasure. Notice strategies exists to maximize the pleasure throughout the two day experiment. Strategies also exists to optimize the pleasure of beauty exists at the end of experiment. But there is no strategy to maximize the pleasure of this self apparent "beauty in the moment". We can even repeat the experiment for this "today's beauty". Let her sleep now and enter another round of sleeping beauty experiment. Instead of the two potential awakenings 24 hour apart, this time they are 12 hours apart. So this new experiment fit into 1 day, beauty would not experience the memory wipe from the original experiment. (Here I'm assuming the actual awakening and interviewing takes no time, for the ease of expression). Again in the first awakening she would be given allergic cookies and the second awakening good cookies. When she wakes up she would be facing the same choice again. We can repeat the experiment further with later iterations' awakenings closer and closer. But there is no strategy to maximize a "beauty in the moments" overall pleasure. (Here it shows why I want to use the cloning example, because to repeat the sleeping beauty experiment from beauty's first-person perspective is very messy. And question such as if the pain is completely forgotten does it still matter comes into question.)

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-13T04:09:22.647Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I do find some of the ideas related to anthropic reasoning hard to express. Let me try another expression and see if it is better. "The probability of me being a man" in the anthropic sense means the probability of me being born into this world as a human male. Or it can been seen as the probability of my soul getting embodied as a human male. This is what I meant by "experiencing the world from the perspective of a man". I'm think even though "I'm a man" is a valid statement "the probability of me being a man" does not exist. It might be tempting to say the probability is simply 1/2. But that implies I can only be a man or a women. The probability of me being anything else such as a chimpanzee or an alien is zero. There is no basis for that. Further problems involves the possibility of me not even born into this world at all. Trying to assign a value to this probability is impossible. Because to construct a sample space a reference class containing "me" is needed. However from the first-person perspective this "me" is defined by the perspective center. It is inherently unique. i. e. there is nothing else in its reference class. So a first-person identity cannot be used in such questions. Someone has to be identified from a third-person perspective instead. Because from a third-person perceptive no one is inherently special, so to specify someone would involve a process to single it out. Information about this process would determined the reference class. This is why both SSA and SIA argues the first-person "me" is conceptually equivalent to someone randomly selected from a certain group. Because that way it gives a reference class subsequently allows them to assign a value to such probabilities. However this equivalency means mixed reasoning from the two perspectives. Using the first-person "me" interchangeably with the proposed third-person identity leads to other anthropic paradoxes.

I do agree that sleeping beauty experiment is physically possible. For the experiment to take place the memory wipe doesn't even need to be perfect. As long as it is accurate enough to fool the human mind it will work. Since human mind can only contain finite amount of information nothing in theory denies its feasibility. I also appreciate you present your argument by experiments and numbers. I find discussing clearly defined examples much easier. Allow me to explain our differences.

First of all I agree with the calculations (with the exceptions of frequentist repetitions which I discusses in Section 4). Secondly I also agree maximizing someone's own earning would force the decisions to reflect the probability. Our differences is regarding how should the reward be handled. The whole reason sleeping beauty problem is related to anthropic reasoning is because it involves an observer duplication. That is with the memory wipe Monday Beauty and Tuesday Beauty are two separate entities (at least from their own perspectives). So they should have distinct rewards. Monday beauty's correct decision should benefit Monday Beauty alone and Tuesday Beauty's wrong decision should punish Tuesday Beauty only. In the example you presented that is not the case. The potential reward that is always given to whoever exists at the end of the experiment. In this kind of setup even when beauty experiences the status reset her rewards never do. It is like her money doesn't participates in the duplicating experiment as she does. I disagree with this discrepancy. In this question beauty is no longer trying to maximize the reward to the obvious first-person "me" but to maximize the cumulated reward at the end of the experiment. This shift in objective means instead of strategizing directly from the first-person perspective beauty should strategize from the perspective of a non participant, i.e. a third person. So instead of using first-person center to define a self-explanatory "today", the specific day in question is defined in third person. For example, it is calculating the probability that the day beauty remembers the experiment is a Monday.

Constructing a sleeping beauty experiment with appropriate rewards and repetitions is quite troublesome. (for example questions such as "if you do not have a chance to spend the money is it still a reward" comes into play). I want to present my argument in a different but also physically feasible experiment. Suppose when you go to sleep tonight a clone of you would be created and put into an identical room. The clone is highly accurate it retains the memory good enough so he fully believes he is the one fall asleep yesterday. After waking up in the experiment you ask yourself "what is the probability that I am the original?". My position is there is no such probability. Notice the "I" here is the self-explanatory "I" from first-person perspective. If a third-person specification is used instead, e.g. "the probability of a randomly chosen copy being the original", then there is no mix of perspectives and it is obviously valid. Now suppose if guessed correctly a reward of $1 would be given to you. The experiment is repeated many times. I.e. When fall asleep again on the second day another clone would be created. Same happens the third day, etc. During this process your money is cloned along with you. Everyday you get a chance to guess if you are the original regarding the previous night. Here to earn the maximum reward for yourself the only consideration is to guess correctly. I argue there is no strategy for that objective. Again notice I'm not trying to come up with a strategy that would maximize the total or average money owned by all copies. The objective is much more direct: to maximize the money owned by me, myself.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-12T00:37:02.634Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Guessing the number of months by my birthday is essentially treating me as an sample. It is a valid method because if we take the birthdays from a large number of people then the estimation would converge on the true value. However in this logic framework no individual is inherently unique. Everyone belongs to the same reference class. So here we shouldn't use the concept of first-person me, or actual me, which automatically stands out from all others. Instead each individual, including myself, shall be treated equally and be specified from a third-person perspective by features. And as I have argued previously Doomsday Argument do not work if the individual is specified by features. It requires the use of first-person me and treat it as an ordinary number of a false reference class.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-11T04:54:27.232Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Thank you for the counter argument professor Neal. Allow me to explain.

First of all I want to point out I am not arguing statements such as "today is Monday" is invalid. It is just saying on the day most immediate to my perception (today) the calendar is showing Monday. It is like when I say "I am a man." Nothing wrong with it.

What I am arguing is in the Sleeping Beauty Problem "the probability of today is Monday (or Tuesday)" is invalid. In this problem the question is asking "out of the two potential awakenings what's the probability that this is the first/second one?". In such problems the two awakenings are treated as they belongs to the same reference class but at the same time one of the awakenings (this one, the one today) is also inherently unique such that no information is needed to single it out from the two. This is self-contradictory. Yes it is true from the perspective of an outsider the two awakenings are just like one another and can belong to the same reference class. And from the perspective of a first person "today" or "this" or "me" is self explanatory so it can specify a particular entity. But these reasonings should not mix. i.e. we cannot single out an entity from a reference class by using first-person perspective. Imagine receiving an unsolicited message and you ask among all people in the world who is texting you. The answer you receive: "I'm texting you." While the sender is telling the truth and the message is clear to him. To you, another person who's trying to single out a particular person among a group, it means absolutely nothing. Anthropic questions in the form of "among all entities in the reference class which one is me" and related probabilites all have the same problem. So questions such as "the probability that I am a man" is also invalid. (note in the anthropic sense it the question is not asking about any physical process that's random/unknown and determines the gender of my physical body, but the conceptual "I" ,as first-person center dictates, observe the world from the perspective of any human that is male. )

I also want to clarify that I am not arguing "The probability of today being Monday"is invalid simply because of its wording. For example, imagine you are put to sleep on Sunday and the experimenters toss a coin. If it lands head they will inject you with a drug that would make you sleep though Monday and wake up Tuesday morning. Otherwise you would wake up on Monday as usual. In this problem when you wake up "the probability of today being Monday/Tuesday" is perfectly valid. The two possibilities reflects the outcomes of a unknown coin toss. Which can be well understood from a first-person perspective. Compare it to "today being Monday/Tuesday" in the sleeping beauty problem, where a third-person perspective is needed to comprehend the possibilities as elements in the same reference class. The latter requires a mix of reasoning from different perspectives.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-11T02:46:35.805Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

So by "actual me" we are talking about me as from first-person perspective. Then I stand by my previous comment. There is no reason to think the time of my birth is random. Apart from the small randomness in the actual time of labour. I do not see why our discussion should exclude year and only consider month and date. Especially considering the Doomsday argument is talking about the entire history of humans. Even if only the month and dates are considered I fail to see why my birthday can be any value between 1Jan to 31 Dec. My birthday is mid August. There is no way for me to be born on 1 Jan unless we are talking about someone else entirely.

Unless of course if you are treating the starting point of our calendar year as random. Which has its merit since that point is rather arbitrary and bears no logical significance. In that sense yes technically the calendar date of my birth is random. However this only means how we denote my time of birth is random. Not that my actual birth time itself is random.

I am confused by your last paragraph. That my birth year cannot be before 1800. So instead of treating all human beings as in the same reference class like ordinary Doomsday Argument suggests, are you suggesting that only people who have ever considered ideas like Doomsday Argument are in the reference class? That is quite an extraordinary statement. I know such ideas exist but never seen any serious proponent. In comparison I think what I'm proposing is much more straightforward: If I employ first-person perspective and use introspection to identify me, or the "actual me" which is the only person there is to identify, then in this logic framework I am inherently unique. The only person in my reference class is me alone.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-10T17:45:49.055Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I'm not sure what "actual me" stands for in this context. If we take a third-person view and randomly specify one individual among all humans then that person's birthday is random. If we take a first-person perspective and think about the birthday of "me, as the perspective center defines" then there is no reason to treat it as random. Of course there is some small randomness in the actual time of labour. But there is no reason to think I could have been born in the 2nd century and live as someone else in history and the fact I'm living in the current era is a random outcome.

Name is a different story. I can treat my name as an random variable if the naming process can be seen as an random event. This random nature of naming can be fully understood from both the first-person and the third-person perspective. For comparison consider this: during the two days in the sleeping beauty problem one day is randomly chosen and the room is painted red. On the other day the room is painted blue. When I wake up in the experiment "the probability that today is Monday" is invalid. However "the probability that today is the room is painted red" is a perfectly valid question. Both question uses first-person center to define "today". But the former have to switch to third-person to put the two awakenings into the same reference class. While the latter is only regarding the outcome of an random process which is comprehensible from a first-person perspective. The former is analogous to my birthday. The later is analogous to my name.

Lastly, no my theory is almost in every way against FNC. They give different answer to sleeping beauty problem. In fact I'm arguing SSA, SIA and FNC are all false because they mixed reasonings from two perspectives.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-10T15:29:18.175Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

If mediocre principle holds then how can we specify one particular individual among all humans simply by uttering the word "I"? While specifying others requires using their unique features to differentiate him/her from the other humans. If "I" is understood to be this special person then isn't it self-contradictory to say "I" am also mediocre?

From first-person perspective concept of "I" is self-explanatory. Using the word is enough to specify me since to me I am inherently special from anything else. If we take an outsider's view and employ a third-person perspective then all human beings are in the same reference class and the mediocre principle applies. But then an individual has to be specified by its features to differentiate it from the rest. Pick one, not both.

Comment by dadadarren on Sleeping Beauty Problem, Anthropic Principle and Perspective Reasoning · 2019-03-10T02:46:00.434Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Base on my argument Sleeping Beauty Problem's answer is double halving. So Doomsday Argument and Presumptuous Philosopher are invalid.

More specifically there is no such thing as "the probability distribution of my birth rank among all humans". To treat all humans in the same reference class requires an outsider's third-person perspective. But from this perceptive there is no self explanatory "I". If reasoned from a first-person perspective then "I" is self explanatory as to myself I am inherently unique. But then nobody else is in the same reference class as I do. So proposed probability distribution mixes reasoning from different perspectives therefore invalid.

To make the statement perspectively consistent the individual in question must be specified not by a perspective center (such as "I" or "now") but by some objective feature to differentiate it from all humans. E.g. it is valid to ask "the probability distribution of the tallest person's birth rank among all humans". In this case it is theoretically correct to perform a Bayesian update once the birth rank is known. However this information won't be available until all human are born. So no supernatural predicting power as suggested by the Doomsday Argument is present.

Comment by dadadarren on Perspective Reasoning and the Sleeping Beauty Problem · 2019-02-08T16:18:55.391Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Sorry for the slow reply as well. For some reason replies from this thread is not showing up in my notifications.

If I say "I'm a man" then it is definitely true and meaningful as the body most immediate to my perception is of a human male. To my wife the same statement is obviously false since she is a woman. It is rather trivial if the subject "I" is defined by a first-person perspective's center then the statement may not be valid once switched to someone else's perspective. Of course in real life if I say "I'm a man" my wife would (hopefully) agree. She maybe interpreting the sentence as "My husband is a man". However "my husband" is still defined by her perspective and the sentence might be invalid to others (e.g. I do not have a husband). Or we can employ a third-person's perspective and reason as an impartial outsider. The statement may become "Dadadarren is a man." Here "The person named Dadadarren" is not defined by any perspective center. Notice the name must be used to specify me in third person because for a impartial outsider I am just an ordinary person like everybody else. There is no self apparent "I" anymore. So some feature must be used to specify me among all persons. My argument is that a logic framework must be fully contained within one perspective. E.g. if we use my perspective center to define "I" then we cannot switch to an outsider's third-person perspective just as we cannot switch to my wife's perspective. Consequently if my first-person center is used then we are no longer treating every person as ordinary, or belongs to the same reference class, since I'm inherently different from everybody else in this reasoning

First-person perspective center can be used to define not only "I" but also other concepts such as "this", "here", "now" and subsequently "today".

With the above in mind let's get back to "Today is Tuesday." As my previous reply had said, my argument is Not that "Today's Tuesday" is invalid. It is a perfectly meaningful and valid statement. It can be fully understood from the first person perspective just like the statement "I'm a man." It could simply means on the day that is most immediate to my perception, aka "today", the calendar says Tuesday. We can also take an outsider's perspective and change "today" to a day defined by some feature/event. E.g. if the experimenter randomly assigns the color of the wallpaper to be red or blue during the two days in the experiment then "The red day is Tuesday" may also be a valid statement just like "The person named Dadadarren is a man." I'm arguing that "the probability of today being Monday/Tuesday" is invalid in the setup of the Sleeping Beauty Problem. It's asking out of the two possible awakenings which is THIS one? "This awakening" or "today's awakening" is defined by first-person perspective center. But the questions also treats the two awakenings as elements in the same reference class as a third-person would. The question itself involves a perspective switch. It is essentially asking in the eyes of an outside observer which one is my first-person perspective center. Where from a third-person perspective an awakening must be specified by some feature (e.g. the red awakening) since there is no self-apparent "today" or "this awakening".

It may help to clarify my argument a bit to think about this example. Imagine you are cloned during your sleep last night. The clone is highly accurate and retains your memory well enough such that the clone could not tell he is the new copy. After waking up I argue the question of "The probability of me being the clone/original" is invalid. If the two copies are randomly put into either a red or a blue room. It would be valid to ask "The probability of the copy in the red room being the clone/original." Since this question is entirely from a third-person perspective (it doesn't treat one copy as inherently unique "I" as a result has to specify a copy by its feature).

I also want to clarify that I am not arguing "The probability of today being Tuesday"is invalid simply because of its wording. For example, imagine you are put to sleep on Sunday and the experimenters toss a coin. If it lands head they will inject you with a drug that would make you sleep though Monday and wake up Tuesday morning. Otherwise you would wake up on Monday as usual. In this problem when you wake up "the probability of today being Monday/Tuesday" is perfectly valid. The two possibilities reflects the two outcomes of a coin toss. Which can be well understood from a first-person perspective. Compare it to me being clone/original, or "today being Monday/Tuesday" in the sleeping beauty problem, where a third-person perspective is needed to comprehend the possibilities as elements in the same reference class.

I'm not arguing for a communal consciousness among sleeping beauties. In fact it can be said I argue the exact opposite. So it worries me how I gave you that impression. To me consciousness among the awakenings or among different clones are definitely distinct. Or in your words every beauty is a complete person. That's the reason why there is a self apparent "I" from first-person perspective even without knowing any objective difference between me and others. Whereas from a third-person perspective nobody's consciousness is inherently unique. So it is better to just ignore consciousness altogether as it is unobservable and unmeasurable to anyone except the first-person anyway.

Comment by dadadarren on Perspective Reasoning and the Sleeping Beauty Problem · 2019-01-02T16:15:05.547Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Hello Jeff. Good seeing you again. Happy new year.

A typical thirder argument follows the Self-Indication Assumption. That this awakening should be regarded as being randomly selected from one of the three possible awakenings. One awakening for Monday-Heads, one for Monday-Tails and another for Tuesday-Tails. The way I understand what your experiment does is, very cleverly, using actually existing participants to represent these possibilities. I.e. today, out of the three awaking participants two of witch would be awake on both days and one would be awake on one day only. So my argument against you is the same as my argument against SIA (or SSA as a matter of fact): in the same logical framework it is wrong to use terms such as [today] or [myself] as self-explanatory concepts while also treat them as in the same reference class of all days and all people. Because [now] or [I] is only meaningful if reasoning from a first-person perspective for they are inherently unique to oneself. If they are treated as unique then it is logically inconsistent to treat them as ordinary time or people. Even though they might be ordinary by objective measures, i.e. in the same reference class as other time and people from a third-person perspective/uncentered reasoning. More specifically applying to your argument, I disagree with assertion C. Just because there are three people awake today does not mean I should regard myself as randomly selected among those three or as if today is randomly selected among Monday or Tuesday.

In this question Monday and Tuesday are not indexical. They are defined by a calendar which could be interpreted as defined by the relative positions of planetary bodies. In this sense the dates are defined by objective events. They can be treated as ordinary compare to one another from a third-person perspective. What is indexical is rather the concept of [today]. Which require a perspective center (first-person) to define. My argument is that first-person and third-person reasoning (or centered and uncentered reasoning) should not be mixed together in the same logic.

Comment by dadadarren on Anthropic paradoxes transposed into Anthropic Decision Theory · 2018-12-19T20:34:14.799Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Hi, I've read your paper on anthropic decision theory. Personally I think that it givens the most complete explaination to bets and decisions related to paradoxes such as sleeping beauty problem. I cited it in my paper and recommended it whenever a discussion about bets in sleeping beauty problem comes up. That being said I feel tackling the anthropic paradoxes as purely decision making problems is very counter-intuitive.

Take the Doomsday argument for example. The explanation you provided here illustrates why someone would bet heavily in favour of doom soon given the reward setup, even when he do not assign a higher probability to it. That his objective is to max average utility. However that seems to be different from what the original doomsday argument is about. In its original form it demonstrates a Bayesian update on my birth rank would shift the probability towards doom soon. My preference towards average or total utility plays no part in its logic. So there is a distinction between actually believing in doom soon and strategically betting on doom soon base on some utility objective. Base on this I think we cannot bypass the probabilities and only discuss decision making in anthropic related paradoxes.

Comment by dadadarren on Agreement on anthropics · 2018-12-19T18:17:45.669Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The information between the two in the meeting are not exactly the same. From the A person's perspective this is a meeting between a specific A, I, meeting an unspecific B. From the B person's perspective this is a meeting between a specific B, again I, meeting an unspecific A. This importance of specification can be checked by changing the particular individual in the meeting to a different one and see if that affects the reasoning. For example from that A's perspective if this particular A, I, did not meet a B then his reasoning would be entirely different. It doesn't matter if another A have met with a B. Yet if he did not meet this particular B, but some other B instead, his reasoning would still be the same. This difference of specification is entirely due to their different perspectives. It is incommunicable.

Consider this experiment. An alien has abducted you and one of your friends. You are put to sleep. The alien then tosses a fair coin. If it lands on heads it won’t do anything to you. If it lands on tails it will clone you and put the clone into another identical room. The clone process is highly accurate so that the memory is retained. As a result the clone, as well as the original, can not tell if he is old or new. Meanwhile your friend never goes though any cloning process. After waking you up the alien let your friend choose one of the two rooms to enter. Suppose your friend has chosen your room. As a result you guys meet each other inside. How should you reason about the probability of the coin toss? How should your friend reason it?

For my friend the question is non-anthropic thus very simple. If the coin landed heads then 1 out of the 2 rooms would be empty. If the coin landed tails then both rooms would be occupied. Because the room that she randomly chose is occupied she now has new evidence favouring tails. As a result the probability of heads can be calculate by a simply bayesian update to be 1/3.

For halfers the question is not too complicated either. After waking up I have no new evidence about the fair coin toss. So I ought to believe the probability of heads is 1/2. Because my friend is randomly choosing between two rooms, regardless of the coin toss result the probability of my room being chosen is always half. Therefore seeing my friend gives me no new information about the coin toss either. This means I should keep believing that the probability of heads to be 1/2.

Here the disagreement is apparent. Even though the two of us appear to have the same information about the coin toss we assign different probability to the same proposition. To make the matter more interesting nothing I could say would change her mind and vice versa. We can communicate however we like but nobody is going to revise their answer. This may seem strange but it is completely justified. The cause of this disagreement is our different interpretations of who is exactly in this meeting. Remember according to my friends’ reasoning the evidence that causes the probability update is “the chosen room is occupied.” The occupant, in case there are duplicates, could not be specified from her perspective. In other words, as long as there is someone in the room she will reason as such. This is expected since the cloning procedure is highly accurate so there is no objective feature relevant to the coin toss to differentiate each duplicate. However from my first-person perspective I can inherently specify the one whom she is in meeting with. It is me, myself. But this specification is only valid from first-perspective. First-person identity is based on the immediacy to perception, which is primitive. It is incommunicable. I can keep telling her “this is me” and it would not mean anything to her. As a result the two of us would keep our own answers and remain in disagreement

This disagreement is also valid with a frequentist interpretation, which in my opinion is also easier to understand. The experiment can be repeated many times and the relative frequency can be used to show the correct probability. From my perspective repeating the experiment simply involves me going back to sleep, and wake up again after a coin toss and the potential cloning process. Of course after waking up I may not be the same physical human being just as the case of the first experiment. But this does not matter because in first-person perspective I am defined primitively base on subjective identity instead of objective features or qualities. So I would always regard the one falling asleep on the previous night as part of my subjective persistent self since it was the center of my perspective To make the procedure easier suppose I can check the previous coin toss result before going back to sleep again. So each iteration can be summarize as to go to sleep, wake up, and check the coin. Imagine repeating this iteration 1000 times by my count. I would have experienced about 500 heads and tails each. Furthermore if my friend is involved then I would see her about 500 times with about equal number of occurrences after heads or tails. However for these 1000 coin tosses my friend would see an occupied room about 750 times. The extra 250 times would be due to seeing the other duplicate instead of me after tails. It is easy to see our relative frequency of heads with a meeting are indeed different, half for me, a third for her. Of course my friend should be involved in far more repetitions than I do since every duplication of me are indifferent from her perspective so she shall be involved with their repetitions as well. However her relative frequency would remain unchanged by the higher number of iterations.

The disagreement arises because for my friend meeting someone in the room is technically not the same event for me meeting her. This is quite clearly so once the experiment is repeated a large number of times as discussed above. Her seeing someone in the room contains more experiments than me meeting her (750 vs 500). So we are actually assigning probability to different events. In my opinion this means it does not technically violate the theorem. Even though it may seems so superficially.

Comment by dadadarren on Perspective Reasoning and the Sleeping Beauty Problem · 2018-11-26T12:31:37.578Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I appreciate the insight. Something I want to clarify. Point 1,2,3 are not new assumptions but rather derived from the notion that reasonings from different perspectives should not mix. The complete deduction is explained in the pdf. It is quite lengthy so I will try to summarize it at the risk of oversimplifying.

Point 1 for example, when woke up in the experiment, from beauty's first-person perspective the information available is "I am awake today". Here "today" is a valid specification of the time since it is from first-person perspective. However from first-person perspective finding oneself awake is a guarantee. So there is no new info. Beauty can also reason from third-person perspective (e.g. by imagine how would an outside observer assign probability with the available info). Here beauty being awake is not a guarantee but "today" is no longer a valid specification of time. So the only info available is "beauty is awake on an unspecific day" i.e. "there is at least one awakening". There's no new info either. That's why "No matter which perspective one choose to reason from there is no new information when beauty wakes up." Only if we mix the two perspectives together: treating beauty awake as a surprise AND treat "today" as a specific day, then new information can be argued.

For point 2. My argument is not that today being Monday is an invalid observation. I'm arguing if you treat one of the days as inherently special then you should no longer treat the twos potential days as equals. Even though "today" is inherently special from first-person perspective and the two days are ordinary like one another from third-person perspective. To comprehend "the probability of today being Monday" requires one to do both. It uses "today" as one specified day, and it treats Monday and Tuesday as two parallel outcomes in the sample space. This is discussed in section 5 in detail. I also explained in length the difference between such probabilities and probabilities of random experiments such as your example of coin toss. One thing to point out: there is no random experiment deciding if "today" is Monday or Tuesday (or if the duplicated instances are created by memory retained cloning, there is nothing determining if "I" am the original or the clone). So the uncertainty cannot be solely explained from first-person perspective. I really wish if you are interested then give it a look. I look forward to you counter argument.

Point 3 is just a natural following of point 1 and 2. Since there's no such thing as "the probability of today being Monday/Tuesday". Then after being told it's Monday keeping the probability of heads unchanged at 1/2 does not violate extant bayesian updating rules.

Also my frequentist argument for 1/2 (point 4) is not contained in point 1,2 and 3. To my knowledge it is entirely new. The key is that, considering the importance of a consistent perspective, the repetitions should not be chronologically linear. It should be a nested structure. That is: i.e. using memory wipes, the first level separate the duration of the experiment into two halves, the next level separate each resulting segment into two halves again, so on and so forth. It would be in a form similar to a supertask. Even if the experiment is repeated near infinite number of times it would still have to happen within two days. From beauty's first-person perspective as the number of repetitions increases, note all these repetitions do not pass though any memory wipe, the relative frequency would approach 1/2. (this is discussed in detail in section 3 with betting arguments follows)

As for your betting argument. Forgive my bluntness, it is a common argument for the thirders' side. Betting argument have the problem of too many underlying assumptions involved. E.g. beauty's motive, accounting rule, how many bets offered per toss etc. This causes halfers and thirders have little common ground in discussion so they are rarely effective at persuading the opposition. As expected there are many things I do not agree with the argument you presented. However I only wish to point out one thing: only considering the outsider's view is not enough. An outsider could be in direct communication with beauty and they should still assign different probability to heads. Even with bets involved. This is what I meant by point 6. It is discussed in detail in section 4.

In hindsight I should probably make clear the point forms are not my assumptions but notable conclusions of my argument. They were intended to spark some interest for the pdf. Sorry for any confusion.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-15T08:32:31.867Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I see what you mean. I agree that we know more than just "the older child of the family is a boy". The "more" would be the process of how I come to know it. To me what's special about the island problem is that when trying to express what I know into a simply statement such as "the older child is a boy" any information about the process is lost. Therefore it left us with an ambiguity about the process thats up to interpretation. This is exactly what happens in the Boy or Girl paradox as well. If there is any lesson then it should be conditioning on a statement such as "someone with all those detailed perception and memory exists" is a rather delicate matter. Is this someone specified first and then all the details about her explored? Or is all these details spelled out first and someone with these details was found to be exist? SSA and SIA would give different answers from a third-person perspective. But from first-person perspective the process is clear. It is the former. That someone is specified based on immediacy to perception, i.e. that someone is this one. And then all the details about me are found out though my experience. Therefore the perspective consistency argument would not change its answer basing on any details observed after waking up.

As for the disagreement, more preciously the "agree to disagree", between friends while in communication. I'm aware it is a rather peculiar case. SIA and FNC would not result in that which can certainly be used as a argument favouring them. But in my opinion it can be quite simply explained by perspective differences. Of course basing on my experience with paradoxes relating to anthropic reasoning, nothing is simple. So I understand if others find it hard to accept.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-15T02:17:05.554Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

At this point I feel any further attempt to explain my position would be at the risk of repeating my previous arguments. The frustration is real because I think my idea is actually very simple. I'm having a bit of struggle to express it. From your reply I feel like we are not exactly engaging each other's argument on the same page. There must be something fundamental that the two of us are not having the same definition yet we don't realize. So I will get back to what I meant by first-person and third-person perspective as well as their differences. Maybe that way my reason of why some of the questions being invalid would be a little bit obvious to understand.

First-person perspective to me is the realization that my reasoning is based on my consciousness and perception. One of its perk is self identification based on subjective closeness to perception, which do not need any information. E.g. Twins do not need to know the objective differences between the two to tell themselves apart. For anybody else differences must be used to specify one among the pair (like older vs the younger). A question is perspectively consistent if it can be fully interpreted by one of the perspectives. For everyday probability questions, either perspective would do the job. For example, if you (I assume Jessica) and a guy called Darren are in a experiment where a fair coin is tosses. If heads then only one of the two would be waken up during the experiment whereas tails means both would be awaken. It can be asked from your first-person perspective what is the probability of me waking up in the experiment? Here "me" can be interpreted as the special person most immediate to perception. From third-person perspective, or the perspective of an outsider if you prefer, the two person are in equal positions. It can specify one by their differences (for example their names) and ask what is the probability of Jessica waking up in the experiment? Both questions are fully contained within their own perspectives. Both of which are valid.

But for a question such as "am I the clone or the original?" that's not the case. It requires first-person perspective to specify an individual by immediacy to perception while also requires third-person perspective to put the two clones in equal positions and differentiate them base on their originality. That's why it requires us to switch perspectives to attempt to understand it thus invalid.

As for the red/green question. If it is known that the original would be painted red and the clone painted green then asking what color would mine be obviously is asking if I'm the original or clone. Of course the wall in front of me is defined by proximity to perception, but the supposed uncertainty of its color is only because I don't know who I am from a third-person perspective (original/clone). So we need both perspectives to interpret the question. Compare that to blue/not blue. The wall is still define by proximity to perception and the uncertainty is due to the coin toss. I am perfectly capable of understanding what a coin toss is without having to identity me by some objective differences among a certain reference class. So that question is understandable solely from first-person perspective thus perspectively consistent.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-13T01:11:06.986Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I think I can put more structure into my argument comparing the island problem to technicolor beauty.

The Island Problem

While the statement "the older child is a boy" is factually true it can be learnt by two different processes.

Process 1:

First a boy is specified among all boy(s). One can ask: "is this boy the younger or the older child?". Then it found out that he is actually the older.

Process 2:

First the older child is specified among all children. One can ask: "is the older child a boy or a girl?". Then it found out that the older child is actually a boy.

As you have pointed out in the first reply the correct process is Process 1. However in the island problem the calculation was done according to Process 2. That is why its answer is wrong.

The Technicolor Problem

While the statement "I'm awake on a blue day" is factually true it can also be learnt by two different processes.

Process 1:

First an awakening is specified among all awakening(s). One can ask: "is this awakening a blue or a red awakening?" As beauty opens her eyes it is found out that it's the blue one.

Process 2:

First the blue day is specified among all days. One can ask "is there an awakening on the blue day?". Then it is found out that there is indeed an awakening on the blue day.

Technicolor beauty used Process 2 in its calculation without any justification. To me Process 1 is describing what actually took place. Before opening my eyes, I can ask "is this awakening red or blue?" and expect to find the answer after opening my eyes. I cannot ask "is there an awakening on the blue day?" and expect to find an answer. What if the paper turns out to be red? Shall I retrospectively change the question to ask about the red day instead?

To me the justification would be treating today as a randomly chosen day among the two days. Then Process 2 would be the correct description. However that is exactly what SIA assumes in the first place. SIA would lead to thirder's answer regardless if there are papers involved. People thinking the coin fell with equal chance would disagree and say Process 1 is the correct one to use. Using which their probability, even after considering the papers, would still remain at half. So the added detail of different colors would be inconsequential to the problem after all.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-13T00:34:20.438Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Because to make sense of this question I do not have to think from both perspectives. In the question "I" is whoever that's most immediate to perception. So it is fully understandable within first-person perspective. Yes the room is painted by another individual but I do not have to use a theory of mind to reason from his perspective to appreciate the uncertainty.

Compare to asking the probability of me being the clone vs the original. From first-person perspective I specify myself only by immediacy to perception. Using differences to differentiate the clones (like clone or original) is third-person thinking. Therefore to understand the question I do have to think from both perspectives. This means it is a perspectively inconsistent question.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-12T06:55:31.616Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Ok, let's ignore about how are the rooms defined. In the question I am also defined both in first-person as well as in third-person. And the difference is easier to show this way.

The difference is this: for the original problem in your previous comment the uncertainty about red or green is due to the method of assigning the colors are unknown to me. But for the problem I modified the "uncertainty" is due to that I can be either be the original or the clone. The first uncertainty is explainable within the first-person perspective. I don't know the method. Plain and simple. The "I" in "I don't know" obviously means the first-person self. While the second kind of "uncertainty" needs both perspectives to interpret. Form first-person there is no uncertainty about who I am: this is me. Distinguishing the two clones basing on their difference, like original or clone, is an outsider's logic. But if I reason from an outsider's perspective, and ask if a specific person is the original or clone then the problem is which one is this "specific person". Obviously that person is the first-person self. Effectively we need to switch perspectives to make sense of the supposed uncertainty. Hence the perspective inconsistency and the reason why I say it is invalid.

In my blog under the doomsday argument section I said asking the probability of my room number (indexed) is not a valid question. The reason is the same as above: to understand the question one needs to switch perspectives. If we keep a constant perceptive the doomsday argument fails. For example from third-person perceptive seeing my room number simply means an ordinary clone with that number exists (instead of a specific clone has that number). And that is no evidence to favour the lower population.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-11T01:47:44.268Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I think we agreed that FNC reasons from a third-person perspective, which i would say SIA attempted to do so as well. From this perspective all clones are in indifferent positions. Of course from a clone's first-person perspective the process of knowing the color was simply opening my eyes and saw a piece of blue paper. But from a third-person perspective, where no clone is inherently special, it remains a question of how come the details in discussion is from one particular clone's observation rather than from any other (potential) clone's. Here a process is missing explaining how is that clone chosen.

As you have pointed out in the island problem this process is crucial in the calculation. The fact of "older child is boy" can be the answer to the question of "Is this boy the younger or the older child" or "Is the older child a boy or a girl". Different questions imply different processes of how the fact was learnt and the calculation would be different. The island problem assumed latter question thus used the wrong process and got the absurd answer. Similarly for the technicolor beauty problem that fact that "awake on blue day" can either be the answer to "what color was assigned to this day?" or "is there an awakening on the blue day?". In the technicolor beauty argument the question was chosen to be the latter. There is no justification for this. With this question implies an imaginary process from the third-person perspective: from all days the blue day is specified, then it is checked to see if there is an awakening in it. This is the process SIA assumes in the first-place. Of course its conclusion would confirm thirder's answer. So the technicolor beauty is just showing SIA would lead to a thirder conclusion, nothing more. In another word, only thirders should conclude the probability of heads to be 1/3 after considering the color of the paper. The argument attempts to show even if someone initially assigns equal probability to heads and tails he should update his answer to 1/3 after seeing the paper. It is incorrect. For example a supporter of SSA would say beauty after waking up must be in one of the three positions: 1H,1T, 2T (here the number of 1 or 2 means first or second day and H or T means heads or tails.), the respective probability according to SSA is 1/2, 1/4, 1/4. Regardless of which situation she's in the likelihood of seeing blue would always be 1/2. So he would still conclude the probability of heads as 1/2. That is because according to SSA the process of learning about the blue paper (from third-person perspective) is different. Here an awakening is first chosen among all awakening(s) and the color of that day just turns out to be blue by chance. Applying technicolor beauty's argument in this case and say he should update to 1/3 would be making the exact mistake the island problem did. In effect after considering the paper color thirders would still be thirders and halfers should remain halfers. Meaning the color is inconsequential to the problem.

I agree using all information available, though not necessary in most cases, would give the correct answer. But here the process of which clone's detailed observation is chosen to be used in third-person argument, which is the key information to calculation, is assumed. Then it is no longer safe to say FNC must be correct. In my opinion the supposed missing process is trying to link first-person and third-person perspectives. The link would cause perspective inconsistency thus there should be no such process to begin with. The perspectives should just be kept separate.

As for the so called "Ad hoc" information it's my mistake to just use made up terms and not defining them. When we deal with everyday problems there are always some detailed information with no effect one the answer that we automatically ignore them in the calculation. These are details that are not related to the subject matter at hand, eg being the older kid has no effect on the sex of the child; and played no part in the process of how we get to know relevant evidences, e.g. being the older kid does not change the chance of him coming to the door. These are what I refer to as Ad-hoc informations because they cannot be pre-specified in an observation. As in the island problem the kid at the door just happens to be the older one. If I was predetermined to meet the older child then I have to use this info and specify him as such in the calculation and the answer should then be rightly half. Other example of Ad-hoc information could include how does the boy look, what is he wearing, which day of the week was he born in or any other detailed information you can get about him. I think it is best practice if we just ignore these. As using these info to specify the boy in front of you would lead to mistakes in calculation. But as you have shown in the first reply they can be used if we pay attention to the process of how are these information learnt (or what questions does these details answer). So I am mistaken to say these info cannot be used. Just that correctly using these information would not make any changes to the answer.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-10T14:35:46.022Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

As for the calendar I understand your view. Treating a material object as a perspective is not something I like either, I think it's just one way to express the argument. Alternatively it can also be seen as something which its evolvement follows that the perspective of an outsider. For beauty to base her decision on the condition of that object is analogous to switching to an outsider's perspective. Like in sleeping beauty problem there are numerous arguments using monetary awards or bets. Depending on if the bookkeeping is done by an outsider or by beauty herself the conclusion would be completely different. But again my suggestion is that we do not dwell to much on this. Because whether or not the awakenings happens on specific dates, whether or not calendars are significant in the experiment setup, sleeping beauty is still the same problem. The paradox is only caused by the different number of awakenings.

My position to the problem is that the probabilities are for the blue 1/2, and others 1/4 each. As stated in my argument I shall believe the coin fall with an equal chance. So in case of heads my room would be blue the probability is 1/2. If it is tails then the room assigning experiment is exactly like the room painting problem from my previous reply. With no other information I would assume the probability of me being assigned to either room are equal. Hence 1/4 each. So far it is pretty similar to SSA's answer. However I want to point out if the question is modified that in case of tails the original would be put into the green room and the clone goes into the red room then the question becomes invalid (the red or green part, the blue part is still half.) Because in this case my room is defined in first-person as well as in third-person (original or clone). A telltale sign is that the imaginary experiment would involve soul embodiment. For such perspectively inconsistent questions there is no possible answer. But SSA and SIA would still produce an answer with no problem.

If I ask why am I a human being rather than a cow?(here "I" is a first-person definition. So I'm asking why am I experiencing the world from the perspective of a certain primate rather than a bovine.) To me it is pretty obvious logic reasoning wouldn't able to answer that. Only some sort of metaphysical conjecture or even religious creed could attempt to explain it. But with SSA there is an answer. It would be because there are more humans than cows so it's more likely that way. If we throw SIA into the mix then it can also be said because I exist it means there are a lot of humans+cows +all other kinds of minds in the universe and possibly multiverses . Of course now the reference class problem rises and the whole thing becomes messy. While in perspectively consistent reasonings I shall simply accept there is no answer and the reference class is never a problem to begin with.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-10T05:37:28.535Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Professor Neal, first of all I want to thank you for your input in this discussion. I'm an U of T graduate from 2010, so getting a reply from you means a lot to me.

Of course I have read your paper on the FNC approach. As you said it treats all interference from a third-person perspective. I think we have a disagreement about why for everyday problem third-person and first-person perspectives do not cause a difference in answer. According to FNC approach it is because that we have enormous amount of details information available that there is another person with the same perception would be virtually impossible. So the answer from both perspectives should be extremely close or for all practical purposes: equal. I think the reason is because for everyday probability problems third-person identity is obvious and they are not related with questions of self-existence. The main differences between the two perspectives is that first-person identity is inherently obvious but third-person identity is not. Also from first-person perspective self-existence is a guaranteed observation while from third-person perspective no one's existence is a guarantee. So for everyday problems none of these two points matters. So the reasoning from either perspectives would be the same. And we can arbitrarily switch perspectives without worrying about a change in the answer.

I completely agree with your analysis on the island problem. The example is trying to repeat the argument of Technicolor Beauty by Titelbaum yet arriving at an obviously incorrect answer. In fact when I was writing the example I was thinking about the Boy or Girl Paradox. But it makes perfect sense that it reminds others about the Monty Hall problem. Since from both problems the key to the answer is not about what information do we have but rather about how we got the information. As you have pointed out in the island problem the process of knowing the information "the older kid is a boy" was twisted and we get a wrong answer. In the Monty Hall problem the key is not the empty door shown but that the host knows which doors are empty and is selecting among those rather than just randomly selecting a door to show us. Yet in the technicolor argument the information available is conceptualized as an static description that "I am awake on a blue day." without discussing how is that obtained. And that how is exactly where the paradox is at. If I treat me as a randomly selected individual from all actually exist individuals then seeing the color blue doesn't really matter in calculation and we get halfer's position. If I treat me as a randomly selected individual from all potential individuals then seeing blue matters and we get thirder's position. It is only due to our habit of interpreting the language that the argument concludes thirders are correct. After all, if the color does not matter why purposely say I am awake on a blue day.

In my opinion FNC is definitely superior to SIA because it does not out right uses first-person identity in an otherwise third-person argument. However it still need an assumption about how all the details of perceptions are obtained from a third-person perspective. Because the same details and information functions differently in calculation depending on the process.

In my opinion we should always keep the perspectives separate. Then there is no assumption involved. The details I see in first-person that are not relevant to the coin toss would not need to be kept in mind in our calculation.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-10T03:48:00.332Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW
Huh? Beauty might even be able to go into the other room and check the calendar. Everyone else in the world could be dead and she could still go check the calendar. I'm really confused about how talking about this calendar requires a different person's perspective; there are few things more immediate to Beauty's first-person experience than a calendar she can just go look at.

Here I don't mean that beauty has to check the calendar through another person. Think this way. If beauty has a calendar of her own which also goes though the "memory wipe" as she does then for sure it would say it's Monday. Beauty knows this as well. For the calendar to be indeterminate to beauty it has to be outside of the experiment unaffected by the memory tempering. If we can say the calendar is a valid perspective then to beauty it is an third-person perspective just as the experimenter's or an outside observers'. That's what I meant by checking the calendar to determined the date beauty is switching to a third-person perspective.

I personally do not like the version of the problem where the awakenings happen on two specific dates. For sure it makes some arguments easier to express but I feel it also give a false sense where only the outsider's perspective is valid because only they know the date. I think calendar in the context of this question is just a consensus of a referencing point to account the passing of time, nothing special to it. So beauty could rightfully have her own calendar different from everybody else. However I think these arguments are hard to convey and not really the point of contention anyway. That's why in my blog I did not specify the dates. I think we can all agree for the experiment the specific dates or the timing of the awakening doesn't really matter. Only the number of awakenings matters to the answer. So the real question is whether this awakening is the first or the second, (or alternatively if this is the awakening that would always happen or the one that only happens if tails). The concept of first vs second is only meaningful from the third-person perceptive of an outsider not affected by the memory wipe. But using "this awakening" or "today" to specify a time is purely based on immediacy to perception, i.e. first-person. Hence the perspective inconsistency, in another word, the question is formed by using part of the logic from one person and combine it with part of the logic from another.

If I may I want to use a cloning example instead of memory wiping to discuss the difference between these perspectively inconsistent problems and normal non-anthropic problems. Here I'm going to cut the corner and just use one of my example from the footnote. Consider a case where memory retained cloning has created two indistinguishable individuals and you are one of them. Each person is put into an identical room. Someone would randomly choose one out of the two rooms and paint it red and paint the other room blue. It is perfectly valid to ask "what is the probability that I would open my eyes and see a red room (instead of a blue one)?". I think even though this thought experiment involves anthropic reasoning it is analogous to the marble in box problem you presented. Here the clones are only specified in first-person. Whatever happens to others is not interested to the problem. It keeps a constant perspective and it's a valid question. The experiment refers to the random choosing of the rooms. To answer the question the experiment can be repeated to count the relative frequency. And the two outcomes of "red room" vs "blue room" to me are indifferent. A perspectively inconsistent question would be "what is the probability of me being the clone in the red room (instead of being the clone in the blue room)?" I know this expression is a bit weird. Here the individuals are defined in first-person as in "me", but also in third-person as the two clones in different rooms. To make sense of the question I have to combine the perspective of me with the perspective of some observer. That's whats make the question fallacious. There really is no experiment to the question. Except maybe I can make up a fictitious one where my wandering soul finds one of the clone to get embodied. Then the sample space would be for one person (me) to become two possible persons (the red clone or the blue clone). Even if we use this made up experiment there is no way of repeating it to get a frequentist interpretation. Also because part of the question is from first-person perspective it means not all clones are treated equally (since it treats the first-person as an inherently special individual). It would be self contradicting to treat each clone indifferently in its answer. For example, a common argument would be if all clones guessed "red" then half would be correct so my probability of being the red clone is 1/2. This argument only works if the "I" in question is specified in third-person. If I was defined in first-person then I'm already inherently unique and has no one else in my reference class. Basing my answer on averaging me with others makes no sense at all. What I want to stress is that even though the two question looks similar the latter is actually invalid and has no answer. But because the questions are similar we usually just treat the latter as an alternative expression of the former without realizing that. However for questions like "what is the probability of me being the original (instead of being the clone)?" or in the sleeping beauty problem "what is the probability of this awakening being the first (instead of being the second)?" There is no readily available former question. SIA and SSA are just attempts trying to come up with one. In my opinion these are ultimately pointless.

PS: Sorry for the slow reply. Had to take a 14 hour flight with my one year old. Reading your questions made me realise how poorly I expressed myself in the first reply. Really hoping you are still interested in this discussion. I find it really challenging and at the same time forcing me to try to articulate my argument.

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-07T02:48:49.219Z · score: 2 (2 votes) · LW · GW

As explained earlier in the blog, from my first-person perspective whoever wakes up on the other day is a different person. So from my perspective the amount of time passed is not the same as everyone else's. That's why for me this is indeed the first day. To ask about the calendar in the other room is to switch to a third-person's (who have not experienced a memory wipe) perspective thus the perspective inconsistency. The event of "the calendar in the room next to mine says it is Monday" and "the calendar in the room next to mine says it is Tuesday" refers to two different persons and cannot be both in my sample space. Regarding its difference from an ordinary physical uncertainty I have discussed it in the chapter regarding the doomsday argument. The exact same reason applies here. To summarized it the probability cannot be interpreted in frequentist's sense because there is no experiment to repeat. Principle of indifference cannot be used either because defining "today" basing on immediacy to perception already violates it. Where as for a physical uncertainty both interpretation works.

If I may make a plea. I find discussing duplication by memory wipes very difficult because it is hard to put into words. IF you agree that duplication by cloning is logically the same problem can we proceed with that route?

Comment by dadadarren on The Sleeping Beauty Problem and The Doomsday Argument Can Be Explained by Perspective Inconsistency · 2018-08-07T01:05:34.414Z · score: 1 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I think you are correct that all perspectives are ultimately first-person. That's why I had to say to reason in third-person is to use a theory of mind to deduct how another person would reason. As a result I guess I'm using the term first-person and third-person in sense of everyday language rather than strict philosophical terminology. I appreciate this insight. Please forgive me in the following paragraphs as I will keep using the terms this way. Not because I don't agree with you. Just that it makes writing easier.

My main argument is that from first-person perspectives there are unique perk/limitation not applicable to any body else. Such as one do not need any information to specify oneself, and one would always find oneself exists. If I bypass these perks and limitations then my reasoning would be meaningful to others in general. For example twins do not need to know their difference to tell themselves apart. But for everybody else differentiating them require knowing their difference. For the twin it is natural to ask how would others identify me without having to specify which exact person's perspective among the "others" must he reason from to answer the question. Of course there is nothing wrong in specifying a third person either. In the sleeping beauty problem, we can take the experimenter's perspective, an observer's perspective, or even an imaginary person's perspective, just that their reasoning would be the same. I am not trying to define third-person perspective as the unique perspective of an outside-the-universe observer. As you pointed out that would make uniquely identifying any individual near (if not completely) impossible. Even worse it would make identifying the reference class impossible as well. I feel this identification would ultimately fall back to immediacy to perception. As you suggested in the names case: spatiotemporally close. Which again showing that you are correct in saying all perspective are first-person.

In the case of perspective of a non-mind such as a camera. To be completely honest I feel I do not know enough to contribute an opinion. Coming from a civil engineering background philosophy is not my forte. It is already quite difficult for me to put these not so easily describable ideas down in a second language. Can we reason from the perspective of a camera? I want to say yes? Because we can imagine it has a mind and mind is a non-physical concept so there is no logical contradiction. But again my opinion probably don't worth two cents. Just want to say that this part I don't think can change the answer to doomsday argument or the sleeping beauty problem.