Worst-case thinking in AI alignment

A few more reasons...

First: why do software engineers use worst-case reasoning?

• A joking answer would be "the users are adversaries". For most software this isn't literally true; the users don't want to break the software. But users are optimizing for things, and optimization in general tends to find corner cases. (In linear programming, for instance, almost all objectives will be maximized at a literal corner of the set allowed by the constraints.) This is sort of like "being optimized against", but it emphasizes that the optimizer need not be "adversarial" in the intuitive sense of the word in order to have that effect.
• Users do a lot of different things, and "corner cases" tend to come up a lot more often than a naive analysis might think. If a user is weird in one way, they're more likely to be weird in another way too. This is sort of like "the space contains a high proportion of bad things", but with more emphasis on the points in the space being weighted in ways which weight Weirdness more than a naive analysis would suggest.
• Software engineers often want to provide simple, predictable APIs. Error cases (especially unexpected error cases) make APIs more complex.
• In software, we tend to have a whole tech stack. Even if each component of the stack fails only rarely, overall failure can still be extremely common if there's enough pieces any one of which can break the whole thing. (I worked at a mortgage startup where this was a big problem - we used a dozen external APIs which were each fine 95+% of the time, but that still meant our app was down very frequently overall.) So, we need each individual component to be very highly reliable.

And one more, generated by thinking about some of my own use-cases:

• Unknown unknowns. Worst-case reasoning forces people to consider all the possible failure modes, and rule out any unknown unknowns.

These all carry over to alignment pretty straightforwardly.

Just want to draw out and highlight something mentioned in passing in the "You want to solve a problem in as much generality as possible..." section. Not only would it be great if you could solve a problem in the worst case, the worst case assumption is also often radically easier to think about than trying to think about realistic cases. In some sense the worst case assumption is the second-simplest assumption you could possibly make about the empirical situation (the simplest being the best case assumption -- "this problem never comes up"). My understanding is that proving theorems about average case phenomena is a huge pain and often comes much after proofs about the worst case bounds.

Thanks! I appreciated these distinctions. The worst-case argument for modularity came up in a past argument I had with Eliezer, where I argued that this was a reason for randomization (even though Bayesian decision theory implies you should never randomize). See section 2 here: The Power of Noise [LW · GW].

Re: 50% vs. 10% vs. 90%. I liked this illustration, although I don't think your argument actually implies 50% specifically. For instance if it turns out that everyone else is working on the 50% worlds and no one is working on the 90% worlds, you should probably work on the 90% worlds. In addition:

 *  It seems pretty plausible that the problem is overall more tractable in 10% worlds than 50% worlds, so given equal neglectedness you would prefer the 10% world.

 * Many ideas will generalize across worlds, and recruitment / skill-building / organization-building also generalizes across worlds. This is an argument towards working on problems that seem tractable and relevant to any world, as long as they are neglected enough that you are building out distinct ideas and organizational capacity (vs. just picking from the same tree as ML generally). I don't think that this argument dominates considerations, but it likely explains some of our differences in approach.

In the terms laid out in your post, I think my biggest functional disagreement (in terms of how it affects what problems we work on) is that I expect most worst-case assumptions make the problem entirely impossible, and I am more optimistic that many empirically-grounded assumptions will generalize quite far, all the way to AGI. To be clear, I am not against all worst-case assumptions (for instance my entire PhD thesis is about this) but I do think they are usually a source of significant added difficulty and one has to be fairly careful where they are making them.

For instance, as regards Redwood's project, I expect making language models fully adversarially robust is impossible with currently accessible techniques, and that even a fairly restricted adversary will be impossible to defend against while maintaining good test accuracy. On the other hand I am still pretty excited about Redwood's project because I think you will learn interesting things by trying. (I spent some time trying to solve the unrestricted adversarial example competition, totally failed, but still felt it was a good use of time for similar reasons, and the difficulties for language models seem interestingly distinct in a way that should generate additional insight.) I'm actually not sure if this differs that much from your beliefs, though.

This is a relatively banal meta-commentary on reasons people sometimes give for doing worst-case analysis, and the differences between those reasons. The post reads like a list of things with no clear through-line. There is a gesture at an important idea from a Yudkowsky post (the logistic success curve idea) but the post does not helpfully expound that idea. There is a kind of trailing-off towards the end of the post as things like "planning fallacy" seem to have been added to the list with little time taken to place them in the context of the other things on the list. In the "differences between these arguments" section, the post doesn't clearly elucidate deep differences between the arguments, it just lists verbal responses that you might make if you are challenged on plausibility grounds in each case.

Overall, I felt that this post under-delivered on an important topic.

Somewhere between worst-case and average-case performance is quantile-case performance, known in SRE circles as percentile latency and widely measured empirically in practice (but rarely estimated in theory). Formally, optimizing $p$-quantile-case performance looks like ${max}_{\theta }sup\left\{k\right|E_x\left[\left[f\right(\theta ,x)>k]\right]>p\}$ (compare to my expressions below for other cases [AF(p) · GW(p)]). My impression is that quantile-case is heavily underexplored in theoretical CS and also underused in ML, with the exceptions of PAC learning and VC theory.

When you’re considering between a project that gives us a boost in worlds where P(doom) was 50% and projects that help out in worlds where P(doom) was 1% or 99%, you should probably pick the first project, because the derivative of P(doom) with respect to alignment progress is maximized at 50%.

Many prominent alignment researchers estimate P(doom) as substantially less than 50%. Those people often focus on scenarios which are surprisingly bad from their perspective basically for this reason.

And conversely, people who think P(doom) > 50% should aim their efforts at worlds that are better than they expected.

This section seems reversed to me, unless I'm misunderstanding it. If "things as I expect" are P(doom) 99%, and "I'm pleasantly wrong about the usefulness of natural abstractions" is P(doom) 50%, the first paragraph suggests I should do the "better than expected" / "surprisingly good" world, because the marginal impact of effort is higher in that world. 

[Another way to think about it is surprising in the direction you already expect is extremizing, but logistic success has its highest derivative in the middle, i.e. is a moderating force.]

This piece took an important topic that I hadn't realized I was confused/muddled about, convinced me I was confused/muddled about it, while simultaneously providing a good framework for thinking about it. I feel like I have a clearer sense of how Worst Case Thinking applies in alignment.

I also appreciated a lot of the comments here that explore the topic in more detail.

I like this post a lot! Three other reasons came to mind, which might be technically encompassed by some of the current ones but seemed to mostly fall outside the post's framing of them at least.

Some (non-agentic) repeated selections won't terminate until they find a bad thing
In a world with many AI deployments, an overwhelming majority of deployed agents might be unable to mount a takeover, but the generating process for new deployed agents might not halt until a rare candidate that can mount a takeover is found. More specifically, consider a world where AI progress slows (either due to governance interventions or a new AI winter), but people continue conducting training runs at a fairly constant level of sophistication. Suppose that for these state-of-the-art training runs that (i) there is only a negligible chance of finding a non-gradient-hacked AI that can mount a takeover or enable a pivotal act, but (ii) there is a tiny but nonnegligible chance of finding a gradient hacker that can mount a takeover.^[1] Then eventually we will stumble across an unlikely training run that produces a gradient hacker.

This problem mostly seems like a special case of You're being optimised against, though here you are not optimised against by an agent, but rather by the nature of the problem. Alternatively, this example could be lumped into The space you’re selecting over happens to mostly contain bad things if we either (i) reframe the space under consideration from "deployed AIs" to "AIs capable of mounting a takeover" (h/t Thomas Kehrenberg), or (ii) reframe The space you’re selecting over happens to mostly contain bad things to The space you’re selecting over happens to mostly contain bad things, relative to the number of selections made.  But I think the fact that a selection may not terminate until a bad thing has been found is an important thing to pay attention to when it comes up, and weakly think it'd be useful to have a separate conceptual handle for it.

Aiming your efforts at worst-case scenarios
As long as some failure states are worse than others, optimising for the satisfaction of a binary success criterion won't generally be sufficient to maximise your marginal impact. Instead, you should target worlds based in part on how bad failure within them would be, along with the change in success probability for a marginal contribution. For example, maybe many low P(doom) worlds are such because intent-aligning AI turns out to be pretty straightforward in them. But easy intent-alignment may imply higher misuse risk, such that if misuse risk is more concerning than accident risk then contributing towards solving alignment problems in ways robust to misuse may remain very high impact in easy-intent-alignment worlds.^[2]

One alternative way to state this consideration is that in most domains, there are actually multiple overlapping success criteria. Sometimes the more easily satisfied ones will be much higher-priority to target—even if your marginal contributions result in smaller changes to the odds of satisfying them—because they are more important.

This consideration is the main reason I prioritise worst-case AI outcomes (i.e. s-risks) over ordinary x-risk from AI.

Some bad things might be really bad
In a similar vein, for The space you’re selecting over happens to mostly contain bad things, it's not the raw probability of selecting a bad thing that matters, but the product of that with the expected harm of a bad thing. Since some bad things are Really Very Terrible, sometimes it will make sense to use worst-case assumptions even when bad things are quite rare, as long as the risk of finding one isn't Pascalian. I think the EU of an insecure selection is at particular risk of being awful whenever the left tail of the utility distribution of things you're selecting for is much thicker than the right.

1. ^{^}

   This is plausible to me because gradient-hacking could yield a "sharp left turn", taking us very OOD for the sort of models runs had previously been producing. Some other sharp left turn candidates should work just as well in this example.

2. ^{^}

   This is an interesting example, because in low P(doom) worlds of this sort marginal efforts to advance intent-alignment seem more likely to be harmful. If that were the case, alignment researchers would want to prioritise developing techniques that differentially help align AI to widely endorsed values rather than to the intent of an arbitrary deployer. Efforts to more directly intervene to prevent misuse would also look pretty valuable.
   
   But because of effects like these, it's not obvious that you would want to prioritise low P(doom) worlds even if you were convinced that failure within them was worse than in high P(doom) worlds, since advancing-intent-alignment interventions might be helpful in most other worlds where it might be harder for malevolent users [EA · GW] to make use of them. (And it's definitely not apparent to me in reality that failure in low P(doom) worlds is worse than in high P(doom) worlds for this reason; I just thought this would make for a good example!)

For example, I don’t think that “a terrorist infiltrates the team of labellers who are being used to train the AGI and poisons the data” is a very likely AI doom scenario. But I think there are probably 100 scenarios as plausible as that one, each of which sounds kind of bad.

There are even much more likely scenarios which have the same basic mechanism and effect, such as "a disgruntled employee poisons the data", "nation state operation", "criminal group", "software bug", "one intern making an error", or even "internet trolls for the lulz". All of these have actually happened to corrupt data for important software projects in subtle and destructive ways.

Defending the security mindset here! Without having even read the rest of the text yet...

It's not (necessarily) about worst-case thinking. It's more about making sure that you assign realistic probabilities to cases, taking into account the knowledge that intelligent agent may turn up and intentionally mess with things to make otherwise low probabilities higher.

One application of that is that you have to be exhaustive in enumerating all the possible cases, and can't neglect any just because they seem weird or haven't happened in the past. That does indeed often turn into identifying inobvious cases that may indeed be worst or approximately worst. But you are not required to assume the worst case in security, only to compensate for distortions of your determination of how likely that case actually is.

On edit: The next phase, of course, is to compensate for your likely failure to have identified all the cases to begin with...