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Spreading cash over multiple banks within the deposit insurance limits is an interesting business concept. In Germany (with a deposit insurance limit of 100,000 Euros per customer and bank) a large robo advisor, LIQID, had such a service (I think since 2020 or so), called LIQID Cash.
However, currently they don't provide this service anymore (but they are saying there service will be back "soon"), so there seem to be some nontrivial problems with doing something like that, even for an established player with more than a billion Euros under management.
In the U.S, male adolescents die by suicide at a rate five times greater than that of female adolescents, although suicide attempts by females are three times as frequent as those by males. A possible reason for this is the method of attempted suicide for males is typically that of firearm use, with a 78–90% chance of fatality.
The quoted possible reason of more attempted firearm use by male adolescents committing suicide can only be a partial explanation.
Looking at the German figures (where firearms are not widely available) from 2021, absolute numbers of suicides:
under 15: m 12, w 15
15-19: m 118, w 44
20-24: m 223, w 83
25-29: m 268, w 58
and from then on about a 3:1 ratio more or less across the age groups.
One could use a shared bank account to which both partners contribute the same percentage of their income.
Another thing that could be interesting with spies is what they can do before a US/NATO-Russian war. If the Russian had one or more top level spies in the US security establishment or in NATO (as they, or their East German satellite, had during the cold war), then it could increase or decrease the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons.
If Russia got signals from inside US/NATO that the West was really willing to retaliate militarily in the case of a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine, then this information could decrease Russia's willingness to escalate. If, however, Russia got signals from inside US/NATO that the West was not willing to use military force as an answer to a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine, then this information could increase Russia's will to escalate.
From the current numbers (-3 and -4) your post does not seem to be heavily downvoted. I believe there may be some users here who see any arguments for a smaller threat as dangerous. As long as there are not many upvotes, even a very small number of users with this attitude could lead to those numbers. We have seen a similar dynamic with the public health authorities during the Covid crisis (prioritizing message control over epistemic rationality).
And as a good rationalist he explicitly asked:
I'd love to hear your thoughts both on this risk modeling framework and on the factor probabilities (30%, 80%, 70%) listed in the figure!
My estimate is quite high (80%) that NATO's response will be forceful enough to include a non-nuclear military strike against Russia, because key NATO leaders have already made strongly worded statements to this effect.
Here, my estimate is much lower (about 25%). Talk is cheap, so strongly worded statements in itself are only weak evidence for future intentions if carrying out those threats poses threats on this level (and I do think it to be likely that the relevant players in NATO are aware of the level of risk).
...or it might escalate with a Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine followed by NATO counterattacks against Russia...
That is possible. But I think it is important not to treat this as one scenario in your list of possible escalations but as two:
- Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine
- Russian nuclear strike against Ukraine followed by NATO counterattacks against Russia
I believe that P(scenario 1) >> P(scenario 2). NATO knows about the nuclear capabilities of Russia. Therefore attacks of NATO on Russia seem to me extremely unlikely, given the history of the Cold War.
Unless, of course, NATO (or the US unilaterally) extends its deterrence on the Ukraine (e.g., by taking Ukraine into NATO; however there won't be the necessary unanimity within NATO for that). Because attacking Russia as a result of a Russian nuclear strike on a third country (Ukraine) without explicitly threating to do so in advance would be approaching the level of craziness of the movie "Dr. Strangelove" (Russia's secret doomsday machine).
For that reason I don't spend much time thinking about preparation for a nuclear war (I am living in Germany). But what I do think to be important is to prepare for acts of state terrorism, e.g.:
a) This time it was an attack on the Russian pipelines (whoever may be responsible for that). The next time there could be attacks on Western gas pipelines or LNG-terminals.
b) Hacker attacks could bring down crucial elements of Western societies (e.g., electricity grid, banking system).
I think given this increased risk it makes sense to prepare for situations where the normal systems in a country are not working for a couple of weeks (having enough food, water, banknotes, etc.).
Given that 335 users with 300+ karma were active on the site on Petrov Day, and the site didn't go down until we got beneath that, you could argue this is most successful Petrov Day yet on LessWrong (in past years, at most 250 people were given codes, and it's not clear they all visited LessWrong even). Plus, as above, this year the 300+ users didn't press the button despite the offer of anonymity.
I think that reasoning apllies only for the subset of users in the Americas. For users in Europe the time point when 300+ was enough to launch was deep in the night, and for parts of Asia very early in the morning. Someone from that group would have had to set the alarm to get up from bed to nuke the site which required considerable more energy than not withstanding the temptation and pressing the launch button while visiting Less Wrong during the day.
Still, I think it was a successful Petrov Day.
1. Make sure to have a good sleeping bag that is suitable for colder temperatures.
2. Prepare for power outages. I believe in most countries there are official agencies providing advice for such a situation (e.g., in the case of Germany: Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe)
3. Maybe get a dehumidifier (for situations with reduced heating but still with electricity) in order to prevent mould with reduced temperature.
News corporations provably have an imperative to reduce panic during a recession, although I don't know the specifics of where the momentum for this comes from.
Do they, provably? Or, to put it differently: Is having an imperative to reduce panic the only plausible explanation for headlines like this?
My primary model of news organizations' goals is that they are trying to maximize attention, ideally (but not always) without being factually wrong. I think the WSJ headline is compatible with those goals.
For me the reporting about daily fluctuations in the financial press is mostly a source for amusement, not to be taking seriously (on 99% of the days, of course).
The most helpful thing my physiotherapist did when he treated me for chronic back trouble: making the observation that there was a considerable amount of avoidance behavior on my part. Stopping that and becoming more active has greatly reduced my back problems.
CFAR's focus on AI research (as opposed to raising the rationality water line in general) leads me to two questions:
- Given the long feedback loops involved with AI alignment: Wouldn't it be better to concentrate at first on other target populations (not AI research) to validate rationality techniques (even if, in the end, the aim is to deploy those techniques/attitudes in the context of alignement)?
- Even if it were possible to increase the rationality in parts of the AI research area, in democracies wouldn't it still be very important to target other parts of society as well with interventions to increase collective rationality? Because, I think, in the end there has to be some sort of regulation even after AI alignment were theoretically solved to solve it in practice.
Based on that: Shouldn't it be an important goal to test and popularize rationality techniques outside of subcultures in AI research if one wants to solve the alignment problem in practice? (Whether that is a job for CFAR or someone else is a different question, of course).
When it comes to men who have sex with men (MSM) and Monkeypox in Europe and North America I think a crucial bit of information would be this:
Is the proportion of infected MSM with AIDS (compared to all infected MSM) about the same as in the MSM population or is it much higher?
If the proportion were about the same then the high number of MSM with Monkeypox would make this more or less an STD (not completely an STD, as AIDS isn't completely an STD as well). The health impact of that should be limited. And that would lead me to strongly believe that there is (almost) no airborne transmission because that would not target primarily MSM.
If, however, there were primarily MSM with AIDS that suffer from Monkeypox in our countries, then the reason for that could be their immunocompromised status. That would lead me to suspect that there was a considerable asymptomatic spread of Monkeypox. And that could be quite dangerous for other immunocompromised populations.
I try to budget some time/energy for new ideas, new projects, etc. So that I can satisfy my unsatiable hunger for "new" without feeling guilty about it, but at the same time can make progress on some longer term project with the majority of my time/energy.
What's scares me a little is this: If (or maybe better "When") this containment policy has to be abandoned, how will the Chinese government deflect blame? How will it try to distract the public? That could prove to be quite dangerous.
Regarding "Reminder that we should be very grateful here in America that we have the right of free speech, for Europeans enjoy no such right." and Germany:
The basis for the claim made by the German embassy is the following section of the German criminal code (§ 140 StGB - translation by me):
"If one of the unlawful acts specified in section 138 (1) numbers 2 to 4 and 5 last alternative or in section 126 (1) or an unlawful act pursuant to section 176 (1) or to sections 176c and 176d
- is rewarded after it has been committed or attempted in a punishable manner, or
- is approved in a manner likely to disturb the public peace, publicly, in a meeting or by disseminating a content (Section 11 (3)),
that is punishable by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine."
The acts in section 138 are, e.g., murder, high treason, and relevant here, conducting a war of aggression.
In Germany, the government does not have the right to decide what you can say. But it is true that there are some very specific things that are by law forbidden to say in public (mostly as a result of the crimes committed by Nazi Germany).
If Putin used nukes, I would think he would do it with two objectives:
1. Force Ukraine to surrender (or give in to peace conditions in favour of Russia).
2. Stop or reduce foreign weapons supply for Ukraine.
For that, the most likely targets for Russian (tactical) nukes would be traffic hubs near the Polish-Ukrainian border (but of course far enough on the Ukrainian side of the border so that it can't be seen as an attack on a NATO country).
I don't think it it likely that this would escelate into a US-Russia nuclear exchange (but of course the probability is a bit higher than zero).
About the 70:1 odds at the start of the calculation: Shouldn't we include our knowledge from other potential conflicts as well to get to our prior? I.e. India - Pakistan, US - China, Russia/SU - China?
Sadly I don't know how to do that computation myself, so please tell us if you can explain it step by step.
Here is an IMF working paper explaining the process (there is not one single formula for that, so we don't know exactly how Bloomberg has calculated it). Market-Based Estimation of Default Probabilities and its Application to Financial Market Surveillance
Basically, you need at least two pieces of information:
- The price spread of the CDS
- The expected recovery rate (RR) - how much money will the creditors get back (which in most cases is more than zero).
However, in the case of Russia it seems to be a bit complicated:
Dislocation in Russian debt prices suggests CDS won't work
(The article is a few days old; I don't know if the current prices still show this problem).
- - - -
I would be very surprised if there will not be some players in the financial markets killed by a Russian default. There are always people who are "picking up nickels in front of a steam roller". But I have no prediction whether there will be one or more systemically relevant institutions being hit by this.
That is a very important point. We don't know how stable or instable the (first) Cold War would have been with social media. How would have been the West's reaction to Budapest 1956 or Prague 1968 with Twitter and Facebook?
Second, this is the start of a new cold war.
The current cold war didn't start with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Maybe with the invasion of Georgia or of the Crimean peninsula or with the constant threats against the Baltic states.
But now the West has clearly realized it, and my point is that this has some potential to reduce the threat.
He threatened us when he invaded Ukraine, and threatened us again when there was the proposal of establishing a no-fly zone in Ukraine ("the consequences would be catastrophic for the entire world").
During the Cold War nobody would have come up with a proposal like a no-fly zone during a regional war of one of both sides. The US didn't even dream of proposing a no-fly zone over Afghanistan when the Russians invaded. The Soviet Union didn't think of a no-fly zone over North Vietnam, either, I believe. Because both sides understood perfectly well the implications of such an act. It wasn't necessary to make an explicit threat.
And I don't think the Ukraine really thought it could get a no-fly zone. I see this more as a negotiation tool in the sense of requesting something huge that the other side is probably not willing to give in order to then get something smaller, which is a very effective tactic.
I don't have memory of any other leader of a big nuclear power threatening the world with nuclear war if we meddle with their business, i.e. willing the risk world anihilation to accomplish his objectives.
Nixon comes to mind, Operation Giant Lance. It is hard to tell to what extent Putin is irrational and to what extent Putin projects irrationality as a tool, as in Nixon's Madman Theory of foreign diplomacy.
And furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between different levels of change in the risk for nuclear war:
a) How likely was a nuclear war before Russia's invasion? How likely is it now? That is what I have tried to adress.
b) As how likely was a nuclear war perceived before the invasion and as how likely is it perceived now?
It is quite possible that the risk for a nuclear war has been stable or even decreased, and that, at the same time, the widespread perception of a hightened risk is correct in the sense that on average the current risk assessment is more realistic than the risk assessment was before the war.
What is, based on your understanding, the Russian perspective on what "Nazi" stands for?
I think that is an important distinction you are making. Russia's (and Putin's) motivations for aggression seem to be primarily defensive, made from a position of weakness, of vulnerability (which can make them extremely dangerous). That wasn't the case with the SU.
Yes, two NATO members were involved on different sides in a civil war in a third (independent & non-NATO) country. I think that lies outside the scope of NATO's Article 5.
If Russia were part of NATO, then something like that could have happened, too, e.g.:
Romanian and Russian troops fighting each other in a civil war in the Republic of Moldova.
I believe their last war ended 1922. But there were times when a next war between them seemed quiet likely and NATO spend a lot of energy discouraging both sides from open hostilities, if I remember correctly.
Yes, according to the NATO treaty there is only support for a victim of an attack. Here is the relevant Article 5 of the NATO treaty:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” (NATO)
[emphasis by me]
I am not so sure whether it makes sense to put Russia and the SU in the same category when it comes to being missionary. The ideology of the SU was basically universal - an ideal end state would have been the conversion of every country in the world to communism. For Russia I don't see that. Getting the former parts of the Russian empire back, yes, maybe being the leading slavonic country (especially an important motivation until 1917). But would Russia care how, e.g., Spain was governed? I don't think so (SU or USA would care).
I was thinking about short term consequences. What do you think could be longer term consequences against which one should prepare now?
As long as it does not get really cold, according to the article.
It may be that I have overestimated the risk of a very cold late winter (implicitly I used 40% to get from 25% gas embargo risk to 10% risk for shortages).
Yes, there is that risk. In 2021 about 10% electricity with natural gas, and in addition hard coal (where the main source is Russia, too) 9%. This year probably more, because two additional nuclear power plants have been closed at the end of 2021.
But these numbers underestimate the problem: Natural gas is used to even out fluctuations in the production of electricity with wind or solar (33% of electricity in 2021, 23% wind, 10% solar). Therefore a lack of gas could seriously destabilise electricity production.
Because of that risk I would predict that the use of gas for electricity will have priority compared to private heating, decreasing the risk of electric grid breakdown but increasing the risk of supply shortages for private households (and industrial production, which uses even more natural gas than is used for heating).
Here, a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution shares his thoughts about possible parallels with Afghanistan, but more with the Russian occupation of Afghanistan: Could Ukraine be Putin’s Afghanistan?
He doen't really answer this, but gives a couple of questions on which an answer could hinge:
- Which state or states will be the frontline sponsor? [Pakistan in the case of Afghanistan]
- Are they ready to take the heat from Russia?
- How much support will the United States and NATO provide?
- Will the insurgency spark a broader conflict, and can it be contained?
- Are Ukrainians prepared to pay the price?
Thermal nuclear weapons are still Big Five exclusive. (I think India claim to have it, but the test yield is not conclusive)
North Korea's test on 3 September 2017 could have been thermonuclear, too (BBC). Of course, even if true, that does not mean that they have successfully weaponized it yet. But North Korea being able to do that would lead me to updating the probability of other countries being able to develop thermonuclear weapons.
I think one has to look at what one can "afford" on different time scales. The answer can be quite different in the short run than with more time.
Of course, technically you are right. Germany could afford harsh sanctions against Russia even in the short term, in the sense that it will not be the end of Germany. However, living in Germany, I like to have electricity. And in winter I do like to have heating, too (the building I am living in is heated with natural gas - gas has a market share for heating of 48% in Germany, and district heating 14%, from which 42% are produced by gas, too). It is not only about "higher gas prices" - without Russian gas (and Russian coal) it is questionable if there will be enough energy available for electricity production and heating.
So, the main problem from my perspective isn't the short term reluctance to risk Germany's energy supply. The problem is that Germany has allowed itself to be dependent on such a highly unreliable energy source as Russia. And that one hasn't invested in at least the option to use alternative sources, e.g., building a LNG terminal to be able to import gas from other sources (US, Qatar) - I believe mostly due to ideological reasons (gas is "bad" because it is a fossile fuel). And less than two months ago three additional nuclear power plants were shut down on schedule while the conflict between Russia and Ukraine was heating up.
When it comes to defense spending I believe there are different reasons for Germany's unwillingness to do more: One factor is a highly naive reliance on an idealistic theory of foreign relations (that morality and international law trump national interests). Another factor is that it has worked in the past - during the cold war there was constant complaining by the US that the European countries should do more to defend themselves. Then there is the feeling that the threat to Germany is much less than during the cold war, Putin's Russia is not seen as having aspirations to conquer Germany or all of Europe - quite different from the universalistic ideology of communism or from Hitler's territorial aims (and I believe that assessment is actually somewhat correct - for Russia a neutral Germany would be more beneficial than a Germany under Russian rule - as with Sweden's neutrality for Germany during WWII ). And, as a result of two lost world wars, Germany has become deeply pacifistic. All those reasons have led to a motivated blindness towards Putin's aims and actions. I am quite curious whether this will change now (but I somehow doubt it).
That has been a key problem of NATO's defense posture for many decades: How believable is it that the US will risk complete self destruction to protect the freedom of European countries? And iirc that was one reason during the cold war to switch from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" as a deterrence doctrine.
As it was then, even now, I think, it is not about assuring the adversary that the US will be involved - there can't be certainty about that. It is more about changing the probabilities for a US involvement. That is the main reason behind the troop movements to NATO's eastern border, e.g. US F-35 fighter jets and an infantry batallion. An operation killing American soldiers in combat is massively more risky (and therefore, hopefully, much less likely) than an operation without this risk.
Telling the US "Get out of the Baltic states (even though you have guaranteed their safety), or else" is quite different from "Don't get into Ukraine, or else". Furthermore, there are troops in the Baltic states of other NATO countries with nuclear weapons, France and the UK.
Not unexpectedly, Europe is divided on the sanctions against Russia. Germany, Italy, Cyprus, and maybe the Netherlands seem to have blocked Russia's exclusion from the international finance system SWIFT (Guardian).
One reason behind Germany's position is the fear that without SWIFT it can't pay for the Russian gas it depends on (FAZ - in German) for heating and for electricity.
Apparently, in one important sense this isn't true: they physically possessed the weapons, but not the capacity to do anything with them.
That's an important point.
However, I believe that a highly industrialized nation with modern nuclear weapons (but without the launch codes) would have had the capacity to do something with them. Using the weapons grade material (not only the fissible material, also the electronics etc) and using the weapons as prototypes for designing warheads should have had the potential to greatly accelerate a nuclear weapons program.
So, in a way this case is quite similar to Gaddafi's - not giving up a functional nuclear arsenal (only South Africa has done that up to now, and I don't think there will be a second case any time soon) but giving up the potential for a nuclear weapons program.
Nevertheless, I am quite confident that Putin could come up with historical arguments for invading the Baltic states, too. E.g., that the Baltic states were part of Russia for more than a century and had gotten their independence primarily from the German occupation forces at the end of WW I.
...that the setting up of the Union Republics of the USSR in 1922 (which included the three Baltic states) involved transferring the territory and "the population of what was historically Russia" to the new states.
The setting up of the SU in 1922 did not include the Baltic states - these were independent states from 1918 until 1940 (and I don't think that in Monday's speech Putin contradicted that).
Parties to the Treaty on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922 were only:
- Russian SFSR
- Ukrainian SSR
- Byelorussian SSR
- Transcaucasian SFSR
...with the Baltic states being analogous to Czechoslovakia (which was allies with France, but which was more or less abandoned to Hitler)
I think a key difference is the presence of NATO troops in the Baltic states (NATO Enhanced Forward Presence, Baltic Air Policing). Militarily, those are only a tripwire, but killing US pilots in an attack on the Baltic states seems to me a very dangerous move.
If France and England had had garrisons in Czechoslovakia, then 1938 could have played out quite differently.
I don't expect another military attack against a neigbouring country of Russia soon - it takes some time to consolidate power after an invasion (if that really is Russia's objective).
What I do think likely is international treaties between Russia and some non-NATO former Sowjet republics giving Russia additional rights, maybe military bases, etc. Because Russia's "bargaining position" towards its neigbours should have increased considerably.
I think it could have indirect effects on you and people you know personally because of sanctions against Russia and Russia's countermoves against those sanctions. That are the key informations to watch the next days and weeks.
The three perspectives map to some extent on to the political discussion in Germany. Currently there is a debate whether there should be a general vaccination mandate (there is already a mandate for health care workers). The parlament will not decide along party lines (which is quite atypical for the German political system), currently there are three possible bills:
a) A general vaccination mandate (18+ years), the reasoning behind that look somewhat like "Zero COVID" (but maybe it's a combination of "Zero COVID" and "Flatten the Curve").
b) A vaccination mandate for older citizens (50+ years) because those groups are primarily at risk and a high number of infections there puts too much stress on the healthcare systems (leading to capacity restraints for other urgent treatments, e.g. cancer surgery), "Flatten the Curve".
c) The rejection of a general vaccination mandate because everybody has the possibility of protecting themselves by vaccination, "Focused Protection".
One possible component e.g. drug overdose deaths, with an increase of 31% from 2019 to 2020 (it will be interesting to see, how the numbers for 2021 are). CDC
Great list, thanks.
I think for 7. there is a possible alternative:
Writing something like "In the case that you would be willing to answer my questions I have included them below this mail" and putting them in at the end of the mail (below the closing of the e-mail).
This could have advantages for both sides:
- The recipient can, if they choose, have a short look at the questions and decide based on that whether they want to answer. They don't run the risk of saying "yes" and then being confronted with a time investment they didn't want to make once they read the questions in a second mail.
- Maybe the questions are interesting for the recipient (increasing the likelihood of them answering).
- If the questions are easy to answer and the mail reaches the recipient at a time when he is able and willing to answer them it is not necessary for them to answer the mail and then wait for the questions.
In general, I agree with your view that one should try not to get Covid (Unless the individual costs for trying not to get it are very high, which would depend on the individual life circumstances. Since here in Germany many things are closed down anyway, for me the costs are smaller than the benefit of playing ist safe). Having said that, short remarks about two of your points:
G. Here it is interesting to look at different countries. For me the default in the tool was UK and Germany, and the differences in excess mortality for the age group 15-64 were huge. I am not sure whether that can only be explained by different Covid rates in different countries.
Q. On a short time-scale one important factor could be how long ago you were boostered (assuming you have got 3 vaccinations). With a booster very recently (maybe a couple of weeks) it could be better to be infected now than in 3 months. (I still think it would be even better not be infected now or in 3 months, but depending on the individual costs of not getting infected the timing of the booster could be a relevant factor for some people).
Based on a study by the University Mainz (Germany) it seems to me that long Covid is real, but not necessarily if you look at the specific symptoms thought to be associated with long covid.
They compared three groups:
Group 1 Covid patients ("wissentlich infizierte")
Group 2 persons with Covid antibodies not knowing that they had Covid ("unwissentlich infizierte")
Group 3 persons without Covid antibodies ("ohne Infektion")
a) Looking at a list of possible long Covid symptoms 59.5% of group 1 were asymptomatic, 60.4% of group 2 and 54.3% of group 3. Serious long Covid symptoms 7.3% in group 1, 9.3% in group 2 and 11.3% in group 3. [slides 18 and 21]. Taking this at face value would indicate a small protective effect for getting Covid symptoms against long Covid (not the official conclusions of that study, of course, and mine neither, but it would have been such an amusing headline).
b) Looking at the subjective health state, however, yielded more plausible results:
29.8% of group 1 (knowingly infected) reported worse health compared to before the pandemic, whereas 22.4% of group 2 (unknowingly infected) and 22.0% of group 3 (not infected) [see slide 13]. Maybe the difference between group 1 and groups 2+3 could be seen as a rough estimate for long Covid (my conclusion, not necessarily the study's), that would put the risk for long Covid at about 7.5%. Of course, there are factors that could lead to this estimate being too low (having had Covid reducing the anxiety related health problems compared to the other groups; then the organ based health problems for group 1 could be more frequent than 7.5% to get to the same overall results) or too high (persons who know they had Covid think they should say that their health is worse, e.g. because of the discussion about long Covid.).
As for the second risk (that your public claims become part of your identity), even pseudonymous blogging could be a problem if you have a certain number of followers. To guard against this to some degree, the advice might be:
"You should try blogging under different pseudonyms" (maybe on different platforms when it is, understandably, discouraged to do so on one platform.)
Am curious, are you suggesting any actionable trading strategy?
No, primarily I wanted to point out certain risk factors. The last sentence of my post was meant primarily as an illustration of the sentence before that.
d) sounds like you might be suggesting long vol, are you suggesting that?
Based on the risk factors stated above (but also based on the fact that overvaluations can be quite long lasting) I think most likely is one of two scenarios: A continued increase in the stock market based on the feeling of "there is no alternative" or a marked reduction of equity prices, so basically a bimodal distribution of expected returns.
Whether this is already priced in in the current option market I don't know. (And since I don't do short term trading I don't really care that much.) Without a specific prediction for the distribution of the expected returns (which I am unable to give above the more qualitative statement in the previous paragraph) I think it isn't possible to answer that.
Thank you very much, now I have realized the problem.
For some reason I had activated the option "Restore the previous WYSIWYG editor". After unselecting that I can paste pictures into the editor (but I don't have to because the current editors automatically used the best size for the pictures).